The genealogy of Nick Land's anti-anthropocentric philosophy: a psychoanalytic conception of machinic desire. by Overy, Stephen
 1 
The genealogy of Nick Land's anti-anthropocentric philosophy: a 
psychoanalytic conception of machinic desire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
The genealogy of Nick Land's anti-anthropocentric philosophy: a 
psychoanalytic conception of machinic desire. 
 
 
Stephen Overy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Submitted in fulfilment of the degree Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
Philosophical Studies, 
University of Newcastle 
 
 
July 2015 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 5 
Abstract 
 
In recent years the philosophical texts of Nick Land have begun to attract increasing attention, 
yet no systematic treatment of his work exists. This thesis considers one significant and 
distinctive aspect of Land's work: his use of a psychoanalytic vocabulary, which is deployed 
to try and avoid several problems associated with metaphysical discourse. Land's larger 
project of responding to the Kantian settlement in philosophy is sketched in the introduction, 
as is his avowed distaste for thought which is conditioned by anthropocentricism. This thesis 
then goes on to provide a genealogical reading of the concepts which Land will borrow from 
psychoanalytic discourse, tracing the history of drive and desire in the major psychoanalytic 
thinkers of the twentieth century. Chapter one considers Freud, his model of the unconscious, 
and the extent to which it is anthropocentric. Chapter two contrasts Freud's materialism to 
Lacan's idealism. Chapter three returns to materialism, as depicted by Deleuze and Guattari in 
Anti-Oedipus. This chapter also goes on to consider the implications of their 'schizoanalysis', 
and contrasts 'left' and 'right' interpretations of Deleuze, showing how they have appropriated 
his work. Chapter four considers Lyotard's works from his 'libidinal period' of the late sixties 
to early seventies. These four readings, and the various theories of drive and desire they 
contain, are then contextualised in relation to Land's work in chapter five. This final chapter 
considers Land's theory of 'machinic-desire', and evaluates if his construction of the concept, 
via psychoanalysis, offers a superior approach to anti-anthropocentric positions constructed in 
metaphysics. The role of psychoanalytic thought in constructing Land's cosmological theory 
of thermodynamic entropy and extropy is also considered.  
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Introduction 
 
The transcendental unconscious is the auto-construction of the real, the production of 
production, so that for schizoanalysis there is the real exactly in so far as it is built. 
Production is production of the real, not merely of representation, and unlike Kantian 
production, the desiring production of Deleuze/Guattari is not qualified by humanity 
(it is not a matter of what things are like for us).1  
 
Thematically, this thesis is predominantly about the development of psychoanalysis in the 
twentieth century and the various formulations of the theories and desire and drive by its key 
proponents: Freud, Lacan, Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari. It might therefore seem strange 
to begin with this introduction about Nick Land, a relatively obscure philosopher from the end 
of that century. Yet I hope to show how Land's philosophy utilises this lineage of 
psychoanalytic thought for a specific purpose, and this thesis will be a discussion of the extent 
to which psychoanalysis is capable of fulfilling the requirements he places on it.  
 
Land is a philosopher whose body of work, by the standards of the genre, is not a substantial 
one, and though he is still writing today, there is little prospect of any significant additions to 
this corpus, as: “According to the present-day Nick Land, the person who wrote [his 
philosophical] texts no longer exists”.2 The task of contextualising Land’s work in relation to 
the greater history of philosophy is therefore a task which has been left to later scholars who 
come across his work. This thesis will consider one of the fundamental questions which is left 
unanswered in Land's work, which is about the suitability of psychoanalysis for fulfilling the 
role which Land assigns to it. I shall show how Land treats Deleuze and Guattari's 
schizoanalysis, and its conceptions of desire and drive as a modular 'plug in', which he 
imports into his philosophy as if both concepts are fixed and unproblematic, when in fact 
there was a century of heated debate about the nature of both. I shall go on to argue that 
                                                 
1   Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 321-322 
2 Mackey, R. 'Nick Land – An Experiment in Inhumanism' (available at http://divus.cc/london/en/article/nick-
land-ein-experiment-im-inhumanismus) 
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Land's deployment of psychoanalysis is a strategic gambit to escape the tendency of 
metaphysics to degenerate into idealism. However, psychoanalysis has its own tendency 
towards idealism, found in Lacan’s reading of Freud. This raises the question which the 
present thesis addresses, about the validity of this transplantation of psychoanalysis into 
Land’s philosophy, given its own internal contradictions between a mechanistic, materialist 
and positive conception of desire and its converse, which posits desire in terms of negativity, 
idealism and language.     
 
This thesis considers whether Land’s reading of psychoanalysis provides a valid foundation of 
his theory of ‘machinic desire’, which is a crucial component in his reaction to Kantian 
philosophy. This is necessitated by the fact that in Land’s writings there is not a great quantity 
of critical analysis of the genealogy of these concepts and terminology he borrows from 
psychoanalysis. This thesis is therefore neither an open-ended overview of drive theory in the 
twentieth century, nor an overview of Land’s philosophical system in general, but is limited in 
scope to an evaluation of how drive theory is used by Land in part of his larger philosophical 
project. Such a choice of a psychoanalytic genealogy implicitly involves the rejection of a 
metaphysical approach to the topic. I will touch on this issue a number of times, looking at 
why psychoanalysis is positive whilst metaphysics is negative for Land, but again, a complete 
description of Land’s metaphysics is outside the scope of this thesis. I do not intend to argue 
that it is impossible to approach Land’s philosophy in a metaphysical register, but rather to 
posit that a psychoanalytic one offers a superior methodology. With these goals in mind, I 
intend to introduce this thesis with a brief characterisation of Land's thought in the context of 
contemporary philosophy and explain why it represents an important moment, and how 
psychoanalysis can be used to clarify at least one aspect of the system he proposes.   
 
The Philosopher of the Outside 
 
Nick Land is a philosopher whose importance is becoming increasingly recognised. Although 
now semi-retired, working as a journalist in Shanghai, his texts represent a “ferocious but 
short lived assault” whose reverberations are still being felt in continental philosophy.3 Whilst 
the answer to whether Land is “the most important British philosopher of the last 20 years” is 
beyond the remit of this study to answer, regarding the thesis that he is “the most 
                                                 
3 Ed. Brassier, R. and Mackey, R.;  Land, Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 4 
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controversial philosopher to have emerged from the fusty culture of anglophone philosophy in 
the last 20 years”, few competitors present themselves.4 Land's active years as an academic 
philosopher were between 1987 and 1998, when he worked in Warwick University, during 
which he published one monograph on Bataille, The Thirst for Annihilation (1992), and 
several articles, now collected in Fanged Noumena (2011). This period cumulated in his 
involvement in the CCRU (Cybernetic Culture Research Unit), an avant-garde research unit at 
Warwick University whose membership included several other thinkers of importance. Core 
memebrs of CCRU included Steve Goodman, Mark Fisher, Robin Mackey, and Sadie Plant. 
Warwick academics affiliated with it included Ray Brassier, Ian Hamilton Grant, Keith 
Ansell-Pearson, and Kodo Eshwun. All have gone on to produce important contributions to 
philosophy. Since Land's retirement from academia he has continued to engage with a variety 
of philosophical debates in new media and traditional press but these encounters – no longer 
in the register of academic convention – are more partial and fragmentary engagements than 
the texts bequeathed to us from his time at Warwick. Land's academic career began with his 
dissertation on Heidegger but his interest rapidly moved on to exegeses of Kant in 'Kant, 
Capital and the Prohibition of Incest', 'Delighted to Death' and 'Art as Insurrection' in the 
period 1988 to 1991. Yet despite the brilliance of his reading of Kant, his notability as a 
philosopher derives from his position as a unique reader of  Deleuze: one who, beyond all 
others, emphasises Deleuze's materialism, a position which Land considers to have its 
strongest articulation in Anti-Oedipus. During Land's later period in academia, between 1993 
and 1995, he produced a series of essays including 'Machinic Desire', 'Making it with Death' 
and 'Cybergothic' which are expositions of Deleuze's schizoanalytic materialism. Such texts 
are attracting attention from a number of current movements in philosophy, the most notable 
of which are from thinkers associated with speculative realism and accelerationism. Land's 
interpretation of Deleuze attracts this level of interest because of his absolute rejection of all 
concepts derived from the ideational or subjective, which shall herein be defined as anti-
anthropocentricism. The accusation of anthropocentricism is a critical position which many 
philosophers deploy against logical fallacies which stem from reification of contingent 
subjective concepts, but Land uses the term in a positive sense, actively trying to define a 
philosophical position which is stripped bare of any notion inherited from the experience of 
                                                 
4 Kodo Eshwun quoted in Fisher, M. 'Nick Land: Mind Games' (Dazed and Confused magazine) (available at 
http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/10459/1/nick-land-mind-games) 
 Ed. Brassier and Mackay in Land, Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 3 
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being a human subject (I shall return to the notion of anti-anthropocentricism shortly, in a 
clarificatory discussion of its attributes).  
 
Land's ‘theoretical’ Deleuzian essays were co-produced with a series of texts made under the 
rubric of a praxis which posited how an anti-humanist future would be engineered by 
materialist auto-production: 'Meat', 'Meltdown', 'Kataϛonix', and 'A Ziigothic X-Coda' (1994 
to 1997). These essays represent a move away from the traditional philosophical standards of 
evaluating arguments in terms of logic and ideational content, to a model based on predictive 
ability. Land's methodology here mirrors that used by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, 
in which they trace the history of desire by considering what it has produced (what it does) 
rather than what it represents (what is 'thought' about it).5 Such an intensely materialist 
method of philosophising, named 'schizoanalysis', analyses the flows and fluxes which are 
produced and is therefore concerned with productive quantity (which is positive) rather than 
the correspondence between concept and truth. Taking up the schizoanalytic method, Land's 
positions and textual style are more extreme than Deleuze and Guattari's relatively sober 
analysis of the history of desire. In a short period of time Land's theory-praxis moved from 
the unorthodox yet comprehensible sci-fi dystopianism of 'Meltdown' (1995) to the textual 
chaos of 'A Ziigothic X-Coda' (1996).6 By this point Land's articles contained little that can be 
reconciled with the mores of traditional academic practice; though still loaded with references 
to philosophers and critical theorists, nothing in them approaches a traditionally structured 
argument. Land was therefore a philosopher determined to exit academic convention not only 
on a personal level, but also on a theoretical level. His work is sometimes considered to be of 
considerable difficulty, because it does not appeal to the same standards as a reader of 
philosophy might expect to judge a text by.  
 
                                                 
5 This method can be seen in Chapters 3 and 5 
6 An example of the former's style; “As sino-pacific boom and automatized global economic integration 
crashes the neocolonial world system, the metropolis is forced to re-endogenize its crisis.” Land, N. Fanged 
Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 449.   
 Which can be contrasted to the latter: “- - = to-the--AlwAls-Ahen--tensII I I-CuntIng-pRQCeDuRcmQ.st- 
Apt - to-CQnveC t- mAteRIAl-fRom -thefRQzen=Qut- bQDI=pQtentIAls-Into-metACCQRD=seCuRI 
tI=spACe=--” Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 475 
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Land's philosophical output can be classified into three categories (see Table A). The first set 
would be his critical engagements with metaphysics, which provide the impetus for a second 
set comprising of his reworking of Deleuze's schizoanalysis into a predictive philosophy of 
production: 'machinic desire'. The third set of texts are the demonstrations of Land's 
philosophical praxis, “codes, number patterns, messages of the Outside, neo-calandric 
schedules, Amxna mappings, Qwernomic constructions”, which represent his attempts to 
show what a productive and non-representational philosophy can do.7 His trajectory through 
these three projects, which took place in a span of about ten years, represents the foundations 
of, the building of a machinery for, and finally the active pursuit of a philosophy of the 
'outside'.  
 
 
Project Critical engagement 
with Metaphysics 
Dogmatic 
amendment of and 
defence of 
schizoanaysis 
Experimental praxis and 
engagement with 
'outsideness' 
Notable 
texts 
'The Thirst for 
Annihilation',  'Kant, 
Capital and the 
Prohibition of Incest', 
'Delighted to Death', 
'Art as Insurrection' 
'Machinic Desire', 
'Making it with 
Death', 
'Cybergothic' 
Hyperstition, 'Barker 
Speaks', 'Qaballa 101', 
'Quernomics', 'Tic-Talk',  
'Meat', 'Meltdown', 
'Kataϛonix', 'A Ziigothic 
X-Coda' 
Aims Delineate the 
weaknesses of 
traditional 
metaphysical 
approaches.  
Amend Deleuze's 
schizoanalysis and 
reconstruct it as a 
theory of 
impersonal 
'machinic desire' 
Practical attempts to 
engage with 'the outside'; 
use of diagram, number 
and cybernetics to avoid 
representational thought. 
 
Table A: Land's Philosophical Projects 
 
                                                 
7 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 633 
 18 
What drove Land to this retreat from the conventions of academic philosophy? Whilst Land 
clearly exhibits a distaste for the “hyper-rational prison of academic philosophy” in his texts, 
which are “entirely lacking in the dampening caution and cynicism which makes so much 
careerist academic writing dull”, his is not merely a stylistic rebellion against established 
norms.8 Land's work is motivated by a belief that contemporary critical theory and continental 
philosophy was methodologically flawed. This critique maps onto a distinction between the 
inside and the outside. The binary inside / outside is identified by Brassier and Mackey, 
Fisher, and Ireland as the fundamental directional difference between Land's thought and that 
which he argued against in contemporary theorists.9 The distinction is a complex one because 
it refers not just to two territories, but to two different processes between these territories. The 
outside, which Land argues towards, comprises what cannot be known to the subject. 
Situating this in relation to existing concepts in the Western philosophical tradition, it is the 
realm of things in themselves – the Kantian noumenal, and the the space of 'materialism' in 
which production occurs. The opposite of this domain of things is the domain of ideas or 
appearances, the Inside. The inside comprises of what is or can become apparent to the 
subject.10 It is therefore the domain of thoughts, ideas, sensations, reasons, opinions and 
                                                 
8 Fisher, M. 'Nick Land: Mind Games' (Dazed and Confused ) (available at 
http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/10459/1/nick-land-mind-games) 
 Goodman, S. quoted in Fisher, M. 'Nick Land: Mind Games' (Dazed and Confused magazine) (available at 
http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/10459/1/nick-land-mind-games) 
9 Respectively in Ed. Brassier, R. and Mackey, R; Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: 
Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 8 – 10; in Fisher, Nick Land: Mind Games (Dazed and Confused magazine) (available 
at http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/10459/1/nick-land-mind-games); and in Ireland, A. 
Noise: An Ontology of the Avant-garde (2013) (available at 
http://www.academia.edu/3690573/Noise_An_Ontology_of_the_Avant-Garde) 
10 The notion of the subject, used throughout the present thesis, is not unproblematic in the history of 
philosophy. When used outside of a specific philosophical context, it refers to the Cartesian subject – the 
rational, autonomous self – rather than the Freudian subject divided into unconscious and conscious. The 
difference is depicted in Derrida's 'To do Justice to Freud' in Ed. Dufresne, T. Returns of the French Freud 
(Routledge: New York, 1997) pp. 133-168. This Cartesian subject is viewed as more susceptible to the 
tendency of anthropocentricism, as Land states: “The Cartesian ego in its function as indubitable foundation 
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prejudices. Land depicts Western philosophy's predominant goal as bridging from the inside 
out, from self towards the real. It holds that the good, knowable concepts are those in the 
inside, and that the task of philosophy is clarifying them and demonstrating their validity. This 
task can be completed by remaining inside – a kind of epistemological spring cleaning, 
devoted to the sharpening of concepts – but is more commonly done by hypothesising about a 
correlation between the contents of the inside and the outside.11 For Land the initial impulse 
of traditional philosophy has been to begin with the contents of the subject, and to work 
outwards towards the object. This finds its clearest expression in Kant's critical philosophy, in 
which an apparatus within the subject is constructed and depicted in such a way that the 
validity of the subject's perceptions derives from the subject's internal characteristics. In the 
essay 'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant Garde', Amy Ireland depicts Land's frustration with 
the post-Kantian settlement of philosophy, which is that: 
  
For Kant specifically, this ‘signal from the out-side’ is cleaned up by the pure forms of 
intuition and the twelve categories, which obtain in all human creatures … thus 
underwriting the homogeneity and the intelligibility of the world as it is for us … We 
no longer discover the order of phenomenal nature; we make it.12 
 
Post-Kantian philosophy is therefore, for Land, conditioned by the rule that “the outside must 
                                                                                                                                                        
serves to equilibriate reason and existence, or rather, carries the inherited and uninterrogated certainty of this 
equilibrium forward into secular reason. This coherence of existent knowing has always been taken by 
philosophy to be the evident principle of ontology, or the harmonious reciprocity of knowing/being.”  Land, 
N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 81  
11 Land characterises phenomenology as utilising the former method: “Rigorous phenomenology of the 
Husserlian type, whereby all questions of reference are replaced by an analytic of intentionality, leads straight 
to idealism and solipsism and thus, as Schopenhauer persuasively suggests, to the madhouse (although it is a 
rather insipid insanity they offer us)”. Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1992) p.7. The latter corresponds to Kantian critique, with which Land's philosophy has a more 
complex relationship.  
12 Ireland, A. 'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant-garde' (2013) (available at 
http://www.academia.edu/3690573/Noise_An_Ontology_of_the_Avant-Garde) p. 3 
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pass by way of the inside”.13 In the tradition of philosophy, this is a useful method of 
clarifying the subject's relation to the outside world, under which the rules of reason 
determine and stabilise the unknown exterior. The task of philosophy is therefore to hone, 
ground or expand the understanding of how this process happens under the rubric of 'reason'. 
Land's objection is that this method privileges the structures of the inside, treating them as 
conditions of an absolute truth rather than 'how things are for us'. It is in this context that he 
asks “if reason is so secure, legitimate, supersensibly guaranteed, why all the guns?”14 For 
Land the very effort which philosophy has to exert to maintain the coherence of the law of the 
inside is a demonstration that such a project is potentially incoherent. Land reads philosophy 
as a series of “Platonic-fascist top-down solutions”, ruthlessly suppressing, ignoring, or 
desperately (and illegitimately) trying to reincorporate periodic eruptions of outsideness.15 A 
Landian reading of the history of philosophy would compare the philosophers who attempted 
to express this outsideness “the philosophy of desire, has a marked allergy to academic 
encompassment. Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud all wrote the vast bulks of their works in 
a space inaccessible to the sweaty clutches of state pedagogy” with philosophers of the state, 
who – even if unwittingly – were tools used to contain this attack on order.16 For Land, the 
foremost representatives of this later class are Kant and Hegel.17 This struggle, Land notes, is 
as old as philosophy is: “[libidinal materialism] has been the menace that provoked even the 
most ancient philosophy – already Anaximander as Nietzsche suggests – to anticipate the 
police”.18 In this war of ideas the victory of academic philosophy – attained by force rather 
                                                 
13 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 320 
14 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 150 
15 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 442 
16 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.10 
 A notable absence from this list is Spinoza, who Land would categorise as another philosopher of the outside.  
17 An extended discussion of the role of Kant and Hegel can be found in Chapter 1 of Land, N. The Thirst for 
Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 
 The more recent representatives of this tradition would include Husserl, Heidegger and Derrida. A discussion 
can be found in Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 16; and in 
Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 177 
18  Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xxi  
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than veracity – leads to “the slaving of reality to ideality”.19 For Land, this is not a positive 
situation. Reality itself, which is the domain of how the world actually is, is always distorted 
by the conceptual apparatus of the subject. It is therefore misunderstood by philosophy.   
 
Ireland's depiction of these two directions of philosophy – Inside-Out and Outside-In – in 
'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant Garde' depicts the inversion of traditional philosophy 
attempted by Land's defence of outsideness. Figure 1, taken from Ireland's essay, depicts the 
trajectory of the 'signal' produced by reality. Once the signal passes the 'Epistemological limit' 
(enters the inside) it is worked over by the processes of the mind and is therefore distorted 
when it is rendered to the subject as appearance.   
 
Figure 1: Outside In20  
 
Land therefore postulates that there is more in the Real/World than can be apparent to the 
subject, which is conditioned in such a way that it fails to grasp the underlying structures of 
reality-as-it-is, instead grasping a subjectively constructed reality-as-it-must-appear. Ireland 
                                                 
19 Ed. Brassier and Mackey in  Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 8 
20 From Ireland, A. 'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant-garde' (2013) (available at 
http://www.academia.edu/3690573/Noise_An_Ontology_of_the_Avant-Garde) p. 3 
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states that:  
 
Land [theorises] the productive element of Being as a pre-individuated, generative 
excess that precedes the mental processing which, under the direction of 
Enlightenment rationality, filters from it all that is inefficacious or problematic for the 
consolidation of the category known as 'the human', serving up experience as a single, 
anthropocentrically calibrated, signifying channel.21 
 
Under Land's reading of philosophy, a theory is of value insofar as it works to strip away 
these layers of subjectivism through which the outside is filtered, which explains his hostility 
to many positions and schools in its tradition – he considers they work in the opposite 
direction. Singling out a few of Land's more famous antagonists, he variously castigates Plato, 
Descartes, Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger for their speculative, idealist or phenomenological 
positions.22 Even Kant, who “went to his grave with his speculative virginity intact” 
ultimately fails to create an apparatus which allows the outside to pass in.23 His critical 
philosophy regards any attempt to probe the noumenon as: “hopelessness and waste … It is 
for this reason that he says the 'concept of  a noumenon is … merely a limiting concept'”.24 A 
sustained depiction of Land's relationship to Kantian philosophy, though undoubtedly worthy 
of further engagement, is beyond the scope of this thesis. The briefest sketch would note that 
his grudging respect for the 'humble citizen of Köningsberg' reveals his ambivalence about 
this citizen's critical project. For Land, Kant came as close as any metaphysician hereto has to 
the epistemological limit, but he ultimately lacks the will to pass beyond it. Schopenhauer 
said of Kant's theology, that he was like a “man at a ball, who all evening has been carrying 
                                                 
21 Ireland, A. 'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant-garde' (2013) (available at 
http://www.academia.edu/3690573/Noise_An_Ontology_of_the_Avant-Garde) p. 9 
22 Plato: Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.90; Descartes: Land, 
N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.81;  Hegel: Land, N. The Thirst 
for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12, 13, 14, 17, 20, 23(!!) 
Husserl: Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992)  p.7; Heidegger: 
Land, The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 10.   
23 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 125 
24 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 109 
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on a love affair with a masked beauty in the vain hope of making a conquest, when at last she 
throws off her mask and reveals herself to be his wife”.25 In regards to metaphysics, this is 
Kant's specific intention; he will go to the limit without showing any desire to surpass it.  
 
This irruption of outsideness staged by Land's own philosophy began to gather sympathetic 
interlocutors to Warwick in the 1990s. The group of graduate students and fellow academics 
who would later form the CCRU under his aegis believed that Land's philosophy “[had] this 
potential to strip back all the crusted, dead layers of the catastrophe that we usually refer to as 
the human race”.26 This fight, against the philosophical impulse – as Land said of 
phenomenology and the critical theory he believed it had birthed – “to distill out everything 
for which proper subjectivity cannot claim responsibility, and thus entrenching the humanistic 
dimension of Western philosophy ever more rigidly” would, if successful, be of significant 
importance in the tradition of Western philosophy.27 However, as noted above, Land's 
ambitions began to outstrip 'pure' philosophical debate and his interests spread to a wide range 
of “experimental praxis oriented entirely towards contact with the unknown”.28 Most of 
Land's works of theoretical philosophy were written before 1995, the exception being 
'Cybergothic' (1998) “at a certain point in the mid-90s, it was as if someone had thrown a 
switch, re-routing Land away from any known circuit of philosophical study”.29 The problem 
Land faced was quite simple, yet fiendishly difficult to overcome: if language and ideas are 
considered to be the enemy, it is hard to come up with a coherent description of how to escape 
them. His practical attempts to do so, now “the subject of rumour and vague legend” ranged 
from inter-disciplinary collaborations in visual and sonic arts to “[deep] polydrug abuse”.30 
                                                 
25 Schopenhauer, A. On the Basis of Morality, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing, 1998), p. 
103 
26 Goodman, S. quoted in Fisher, M. 'Nick Land: Mind Games' (Dazed and Confused magazine) (available at 
http://www.dazeddigital.com/artsandculture/article/10459/1/nick-land-mind-games) 
27 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 176 
28 Ed. Brassier, R. and Mackey, R. in Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) 
p. 6 
29 Mackey, R. 'Nick Land – An Experiment in Inhumanism' ( available at http://divus.cc/london/en/article/nick-
land-ein-experiment-im-inhumanismus ) 
30 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) Cover inscription 
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A Philosopher without friends? 
 
What can we make of Land's journey from his role as the head of the most radical philosophy 
unit in the UK to his current exile in Shanghai? I do not make the suggestion he has no friends 
in the sense of acquaintances, but in the sense of philosophical allies who inhabit similar 
conceptual positions. The group of like-minded philosophers who followed his project has 
dissipated, and even Land himself has retreated from his explicitly philosophical 
commitments. Though it is not quite the case that no lasting impact endures from Land's time 
at Warwick and in the CCRU, it is certainly not of the order that one might expect of such an 
incendiary new way of thinking. How did Land, described by many of his contemporaries as 
the most innovative and exciting force working in philosophy, become so isolated from his 
former discipline? Simon Critchley, perhaps Britain's most famous philosopher of the 
continental tradition said that “Land had the most brilliantly seductive and meteoric mind, 
endlessly imaginative and capable of adopting, inhabiting and discarding any philosophical 
position”.31  
 
Perhaps we can answer the question by looking at the conditions of Land's rise to infamy. This 
was primarily a function of the novelty of his works, which attracted those excited by 
newness in general and, even more so, by those interested in newness in the study of 
metaphysics, which is a rare occurrence. Land's metaphysical recalibration from Inside-Out to 
Outside-In was undoubtedly an attractor in a philosophical world which is desperate to 
endlessly consume the new, jokingly characterised by Land as an idea which can “last longer 
than an automobile”.32 However, eventually, Land's texts proved too radical for even this 
same group of thinkers who were initially attracted to his project. Almost all of the CCRU 
members were ultimately unwilling to follow Land's philosophy to its conclusions. Hereto, 
                                                                                                                                                        
 Land, .N Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 631 
 An amusing summary of these legends and their veracity can be found in Mackey's Nick Land – 'An 
Experiment in Inhumanism' ( available at http://divus.cc/london/en/article/nick-land-ein-experiment-im-
inhumanismus ) 
31  Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) Cover inscription 
32  Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.  2  
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the discussion has been limited to Land's metaphysics, which have been characterised as an 
inversion of traditional philosophy. Yet this might have been Land's least controversial 
position. Land's positions in other areas of philosophy are equally controversial. As described 
above, Land's metaphysical intervention was not a mere paper-war, a purely hermeneutic 
attack on the philosophical tradition carried out in its traditional method: “with [Land] – and 
rightly so – philosophy infected every area of life”.33 It is this theoretical and practical 
consistency in Land's philosophy which has driven his former 'friends' away. Land's 
commitments to philosophical positions beyond his metaphysics of outsideness are always 
constrained by the conclusions which such positions dictate. Unwilling to compromise the 
absolute otherness of the outside when compared to the inside of anthropic convention, Land 
refused to mitigate any of his conclusions towards social, political or academic norms. A 
demonstration of how this would go spectacularly wrong can be seen in Stivale's report of the 
Virtual Futures conference in which Land was a plenary speaker.34 It was not only Land's 
philosophical position which seems to have raised opprobrium but also his attitude towards 
other participants, and the demands he made outside of what usually constitutes philosophical 
debate “to the point that one’s personal habits (e.g. non-smoking, in my case) might be called 
into question as some sort of failure to engage in ‘necessary’ deterritorialization”.35 Land's 
trajectory to what he terms 'outsideness' has implications across a wide number of domains of 
philosophy. Aesthetics is reconfigured as a vehicle for representing invasions of outsideness, 
rather than its traditional clarification of insideness.36 Traditional ethics is revealed to be a 
defence mechanism: a wave of oughts patrolling the inner sanctum of the subject, policing its 
homoeostasis.37 Political economy becomes a practical engagement with the entities which 
occupy the site of production, now external to the subject and named the 'primary process'.38  
All of these positions are atypical of academic philosophy, and highly controversial.  
                                                 
33 Critchley, S. in Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) Cover inscription 
34 See Stivale, C. The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, (New York: Gulilford, 1998) pp. 90-99 
35 Stivale, C. The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, (New York: Gulilford, 1998) p. 92 
36 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.22 
37 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.xx 
38  Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 441-459 
The primary process is a Freudian concept which depicts matter and its operations before they are transposed in 
the subject to the secondary process, where they are manifested as ideas.  
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The fissures between Land and former members of the CCRU are exemplified in the essay 'A 
Critique of Transcendental Miserabilism'. Written as a response to Mark Fisher, Land's 
critique attacks the aesthetics of 'hauntology', a concept derived from Derrida's Spectres of 
Marx.39 Hauntology shared the science fiction, horror and Gothic aesthetics which provided a 
touchstone for the CCRU, but there is a difference between Land's positive reading of the 
tropes of these genres and hauntology's negative reading, which invokes the lost elements of a 
utopian past. In his own reading, Fisher utilises Land's depiction of outsideness as a diagnosis 
of ills rather than a depiction of the underlying reality of production: “This is theory as 
cyberpunk fiction: Deleuze-Guattari's concept of capitalism as the virtual unnameable Thing 
that haunts all previous formations pulp-welded to the timebending of the Terminator films”.40 
Though there is an ambivalence in Land's between dark and bright aesthetics, which can be 
seen in his enthusiastic commitment to the 'Decopunk' cityscapes of Blade Runner, which 
serve as a model for an aesthetics of modernity, one constant commitment is to 
representations which depict the production of the future rather than a regression to the past.41 
The figures which haunt Land's aesthetics are visitors from the outside or visitors from the 
future, rather than ghosts of the human past.  
 
Another fissure is demonstrated by the recent debate surrounding 'accelerationism'. The 
contemporary essays in #Accelerate, the acceleration reader can be divided into those written 
by Land, and those written against him.42 Simon O'Sullivan posits this difference as being 
between ‘Right’ accelerationists (a position held only by Land), and all others who are to the 
'Left' of this position. O'Sullivan defines Land's accelerationism as a decision to work on 
behalf of a capitalism which works to achieve 'Technomic Singularity', a post-human state 
which the internal logics of capitalism inevitably lead to.  This impulse is rejected to some 
extent by all of the other writers in the reader, who try and control, divert or mitigate the 
forces unleashed by acceleration of capital into projects and frameworks which work on 
behalf of varying conceptions of humanism. The detail of the argument surrounding 
acceleration and capitalism is, again, a topic beyond the scope of this thesis, and the topic is 
                                                 
39 Derrida, J. Spectres of Marx (London; Routledge, 2006) 
40 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) Cover inscription 
41 The concept of 'Decopunk' is elucidated in Land, N. Templexity (Time Spiral Press, 2014) 
42 And most fall into the latter category.  
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mentioned here as an illustration of the split between Land and his former colleagues, who 
make up much of the commentators on acceleration: 
 
Land looms over many of the accelerationist writers – at least those collected in the 
Reader. Iain Hamilton Grant, Mark Fisher, Luciana Parisi, Robin MacKay (one of the 
co-editors) and Ray Brassier were all at least partially intellectually formed in that 
moment at Warwick University where Land taught in the 1990s.43 
 
On the surface, it seems that this split between Land and his Warwick colleagues is political, 
one which is about left versus right in politics alone. There is definitely a division in that 
respect, exacerbated on Land's side by his sometimes hyperbolic goading of the left and 
unwavering commitment, despite (or even because of) its apparent excesses and failings, to 
the free operation of capital, as expressed in tweets like: “The scenario we’re given – the one 
being made to feel inevitable – is of a hyper-capitalist dystopia.[*Mouth watering*]”.44 But 
underneath this political veneer, there is also a deep metaphysical disagreement between the 
contesting parties. Land's laissez-faire politics are determined by his belief that the 
interrogation of ideas should properly be undertaken by reality rather than anthropic 
principles; or perhaps more simply, that an idea should never tested by another idea, but by 
that idea's involvement with reality – how it survives in the outside, not how it relates to the 
inside.   
 
Most of the accelerationist writers of #Accelerate are associated to some extent with the 
'speculative realist' movement whose metaphysics aim at engineering an engagement with the 
noumenal world (therefore towards Land's outside). This post-Kantian project runs parallel 
with Land's – it has the same initial impulse, to get towards objects and describe them as 
metaphysical actors rather than (unknowable) unknowns – but often ends up in even stranger 
                                                 
43 O'Sullivan, S. 'The Missing Subject of Accelerationism' in Mute 12 September 2014 (available at 
http://www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/missing-subject-accelerationism) 
44 Land, N. @UF_blog, 26 Feb 2015 5:18 PM. ( available at 
https://twitter.com/UF_blog/status/571117026904649728 ) 
 28 
places because of the constraints of the metaphysical language it works within.45 Yet again, 
the detail of speculative realism is beyond the scope of the present thesis, and rather than 
explicitly engaging with it, I shall limit myself to noting that it represents a philosophical 
debate which is influenced by Land, who was troubled by the post-Kantian settlement in 
metaphysics, according to Ireland, “fifteen years before a single theorist uttered the word 
‘correlationism’, [Land told us] the ontological condition of the moderns comes down to the 
following fundamental premise: ‘the outside must pass by way of the inside’”.46 
Correlationism is the term Meillassoux used to denote a set of metaphysical concerns about 
the abandonment of the noumenal, and philosophy's subsequent turn to idealism.47 Ireland's 
quote reveals the difference between the two approaches: Land's description of 'passage' is 
couched in terms of production and what the outside does in time, whilst correlation is 
metaphysical, offering a critique of the comparison of ideas. This, again, is indicative of a 
fundamental split in methodology between Land and the former CCRU members still working 
in metaphysics.    
 
A quantification of Land's impact on contemporary philosophy is a difficult thing to assess. 
Most of the engagements with his work can be described as shallow rather than sustained 
                                                 
45 Discussion of speculative realism can be found in Bryant, L. Harman, G..  and Srnicek, N.  The Speculative 
Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne: Re.Press. 2011) 
 A critique can be found in Wolfendale, P. The Noumenon's New Clothes (Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2014) 
46 Ireland, A. 'Noise: An Ontology of the Avant-garde' (2013) (available at 
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47 Meillassoux's critique of correlation is detailed in After Finitude. A summary of its points can be found in 
Clemen's J. 'Vomit Apocalypse', Parrhesia 2013 Vol 18 pp. 57-67 available at 
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ones, utilising it as a tool to perform a limited role rather than as a systemic philosophy.48 
Why does the present work pick up Land's thought? Above all else, it is the belief in the 
brilliance of his work, which offers a methodology by which we can, uploading Deleuze's 
schizoanalysis in the place of Kantian critique, begin to construct a philosophy which can 
engage with the outside. Brassier and Mackey end their introduction to Fanged Noumena 
calling to “a new wave of thinkers who are partly engaging the re-emerging legacy of Nick 
Land's work”.49 Perhaps now, after the passage of time, Land's philosophy will be taken up by 
those who were personally distant from the firestorm of his brief engagement with academic 
philosophy. One such scholar is Ireland, whose work aims at presenting Land's philosophy 
simply and clearly, situating it in the context of post-Kantian philosophy. This move towards a 
clarification of Land's philosophy is overdue, moving Land's work beyond the position of the 
ideological other of former CCRU members, instead considering it as something which can 
stand alone.  
 
Land's unpopularity in contemporary academic philosophy is derived not from his anti-
                                                 
48 The most sustained analyses of Land's work are as follows: (1) the Editor's Introduction to Fanged Noumena 
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(New York: Gulilford, 1998); (3) 'Drafting the Inhuman' by Negrastani, R. in Ed. Bryant, L. Srnicek, N. and 
Harman, G. The Speculative Turn (Melbourne, Autsralia: Re-press, 2011); (4) in Noys, Malign Velocities 
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 Reviews of Land's work include: the sympathetic Banham, G. 'The Thirst For Annihilation'  Journal of 
Nietzsche Studies No. 11, Conscience and Pain, Tragedy and Truth (USA: Penn State University Press, Spring 
1996) pp. 53-63; the more reserved Bailey, D. 'The Field of Battle' Journal of Nietzsche Studies  No. 4/5, The 
Work of Müller-Lauter, W. (USA: Penn State University Press, Autumn 1992/Spring 1993), pp. 155-165; and 
finally, the hostile: “a barbarous denunciation of philosophy, and Freud for their alleged cooperation with the 
police” in Riechel, D. 'Nietzsche and Modern Thought' German Studies Review, Vol. 16, No. 3 (USA: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, October 1993), pp. 557-558. 
49 Ed. Brassier, R. and Mackey, R. Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York; Urbanomic, 2011) p. 
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humanism, but instead his willingness to follow this position to its political consequences. It 
seems obvious that an anti-anthropocentric philosopher will say some denigrating things 
about humanity – especially one with Land's polemical rhetorical style – but there are other 
philosophers who have depicted the failings of humanity in similarly negative terms without 
attracting the opprobrium which academic philosophy has bestowed upon Land. I will go on 
to consider Land's objections to anthropocentricism in philosophy in due course.   
 
 
The Metaphysical and the Psychoanalytic 
 
Land's work suffers from a reputation as being “polemical … [with]  disregard for the 
properties of sober reflection”.50 It is also considered to be partial or fragmentary, as 
everything not contained in The Thirst for Annihilation is strewn across a series of essays, e-
books and blog posts. Several former CCRU members' conception of Land's work is as being 
primarily concerned with praxis, and a call to practical engagement in the manner of Deleuze 
and Guattari's A Thousand Plateaus rather than a coherent theory. This recasts Land's 
machinery as a set of tools which can be used across a range of interdisciplinary contexts, 
rather than as a grand theory of philosophy. As a result, there are no treatments of Land's work 
which contextualise it as a unified project, save for some constants noted in Brassier and 
Mackey's editorial which introduces Fanged Noumena. The present thesis shall claim that 
there is a clear and coherent thread of argumentation discernible in Land's work. In this 
reading Land's philosophy is an attempt to correct Kant's failure to engage with the outside. 
As the previous discussion of Kant noted, the productive ground of Kant's philosophy is 
within the subject, operating according to the categories of understanding and the conditions 
of space and time. Land wants to move this productive space to the site of interaction with the 
outside, the primary process, thereby escaping the constraints of subjectivity, and providing a 
platform to map what is 'real' rather than what is 'apparent'. Land's method in constructing this 
possibility of engagement with the outside is to replace Kant's metaphysical conception of the 
subject with a psychoanalytic conception of production. This operation can be depicted in 
three stages. Firstly, Land claims that Kant is stuck in a metaphysical register, as various 
concepts in his metaphysical system rely on certain other metaphysical concepts to provide 
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their foundations. This leads to the accusation that Kant's argument is circular. More 
problematically for Land, it remains inside, and never ventures outside: 
 
The vocabulary that would describe the other of metaphysics is itself inscribed within 
metaphysics, since the inside and the outside are both conceptually determined from 
the inside.51 
 
Secondly, this metaphysical register prevents Kant from conceiving the nature of production 
over time, which is the defining quality of the outside (material) realm. For Land the notion of 
time, and the fact that things made in time are produced, will offer the chance to jump beyond 
the 'snapshot' metaphysics of Kant, where the contents of consciousness are considered as 
they are in an instant. Instead, Land will show that the noumenon is only unknowable if is 
unproductive (at zero intensity), and so long as it produces, the operation of base-matter can 
be hypothesised:  
 
This is seen in Kant's philosophy: In the end it is the domesticated character of the 
Kantian notion of time which forestalls the lurch of this thought to a base materialist 
conclusion. Purity conditions the a priori, which hypostasizes time as such, which in 
turn idealizes intensity. Flow as such is thus fixed as an eternal form of representation, 
frozen in an endless descent to zero. It is for this reason that Kant has an entirely 
ahistorical comprehension of intensity, failing to grasp the positive order of its 
repression: the inhibition of flow (continuity). In other words: he does not raise a 
problem of the object with sufficient radicality to escape from the cage of 
epistemology in the direction of a libidinal or base materialism. He does not 
acknowledge that between the noumenon and zero intensity there is no difference, or 
that neither are susceptible to isolation.52 
 
Thirdly, that the language of 'intensity' and productive 'flow' which Land needs to depict the 
process of impersonal, 'outside' production will come from psychoanalysis rather than a 
refinement of metaphysics. The first two stages can be found throughout Land's writing, but 
most closely correspond with those described in Table A as Land's 'critical works'. The focus 
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52 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 118 
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of the present thesis is however with the third stage of the argument above, which is found in 
Land's engagement with Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis. For Land, psychoanalysis 
offers a language which can be used to bypass the problems of the metaphysical register, 
which has an inherent tendency to revert to utilisation of the productions of the inside to 
explain the outside. If such a substitution is possible, there are two signifiant consequences. 
Firstly, it is possible to plot a meta-theory of base-matter (outsideness) and depict its actions 
in terms of the production it is capable of enacting.53 Secondly, agency in the human is 
displaced from its traditional position in the subject and moved to its periphery where the 
drives and instincts of the unconscious interact with base material. The former reconfigures 
our understanding of the world at large, the processes by which it operates, and the extent to 
which we can 'know' them. The latter determines the manner in which the subject interacts 
with the world, re-conceptualising its mechanism as formal and automatic instead of the 
traditional conception of distinct human agency.  
 
Psychoanalysis is the preferred register for a depiction of 'the outside' because it provides a 
speculative approach which tries to pass beyond the problematic of knowing its own 'outside', 
the unconscious. This practical approach differs from traditional metaphysical arguments 
which are more susceptible to the argument that it is is simply impossible to pass over the 
threshold of the epistemological limit.54 Returning to Ireland's depiction of the Outside-In in 
Figure 1, psychoanalysis is utilised by Land as it provides a platform to pass beyond the 
metaphysical argumentation which traditionally depicts the processes within 'transcendental 
conditioning' and 'appearance', which are the subject and its productions. Instead the lexicon 
of psychoanalysis describes the signal itself – outsideness – as measurable, quantifiable and 
predictable production. Psychoanalysis is capable of performing this task because of the 
structural similarity between the metaphysical binaries inside-outside and phenomena-
noumena and the psychoanalytic binary conscious-unconscious. In each case the second is to 
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some extent 'unknowable', but can nevertheless be the subject of speculative investigation. 
But when psychoanalysis speaks it is not trapped in “the ghost landscape of metaphysics, 
crowded with divinities, souls, agents, perdurant subjectivities, entities with a zero 
potentiality for triggering excitations, and then the whole gothic confessional of guilt, 
responsibility, moral judgement, punishments and rewards”, and is therefore free from the 
baggage associated with metaphysics.55    
 
However, psychoanalysis is by no means immune to controversy, nor is it devoid of its own 
forms of idealism. The substitution which Land attempts is therefore not a simple switch in 
which something controversial is replaced by something unproblematic. It is such a question 
regrading the lineage of Land's conception of 'machinic desire' which provides the impetus for 
the present thesis: is Land's use of psychoanalysis based on a consistent reading? In Land's 
work Freud, Deleuze and to a lesser extent Lyotard are the key figures in the formulation of 
the vocabulary he uses from psychoanalysis: that of desire and drives. These three thinkers' 
conceptions of psychoanalysis are at the very least partially amenable to a materialist reading. 
However, in any history of twentieth century psychoanalysis Lacan and Lacanianism have to 
be considered, and Lacan's 'return to Freud' can be read as a recasting of psychoanalysis as 
idealism.56  There is therefore a need to both anchor Land's use of drive and desire within an 
internally coherent line of psychoanalytic reasoning, and also to defend this line externally 
against other psychoanalytic interpretations.  
 
The present thesis aims at clarifying a genealogy of  Land's use of psychoanalytic language to 
show how the concepts which he borrows from it are grounded in its tradition. To this point, 
no one has attempted a systematic treatment of Land's thought, and the present thesis begins 
to provide the context in which his work can be related to the history of philosophy. Hopefully 
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this will provide a basis for future comparative approaches to Land's work, as well as further 
investigations into the metaphysical commitments engendered by his use of the 
psychoanalytic lexicon. When commentators have contextualised Land's work it has been in a 
brief treatment, providing only the most concise contextualisation. An example would be 
Fisher's situating of Land's philosophy as one that: “[is] in a nutshell: Deleuze and Guattari’s 
machinic desire remorselessly stripped of all Bergsonian vitalism, and made backwards-
compatible with Freud’s death drive and Schopenhauer’s Will.”57 These very complex and 
cryptic situations require unpacking before Land's writing can be more readily systematised. 
Fisher's depiction of Land's work makes it very clear that Deleuze and Guattari provide the 
framework on which he builds his own philosophical system. The importance of Deleuze and 
Guattari in this respect is another reason for this genealogical reading, as it allows the 
commentary in the present thesis to go beyond Land's use of their theories as components in a 
philosophical system to a discussion of the genesis and validity of these components. Land's 
reading of Deleuze can be related to a larger debate about the implications of Deleuze's 
philosophy. Deleuze, who enjoyed exploiting ambiguity in philosophers' works to open up 
space for his own distinctive readings, has been subject to the same impulse from the first and 
second generation of anglophone writers who are trying to 'fix' his position in the 
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philosophical canon.58 If there is a point at which Land's philosophy most explicitly engages 
with 'normal' academic philosophy it is in determining these interpretations of Deleuze. Land 
was in the first generation of Deleuze scholars in the United Kingdom, and along with Ansell-
Pearson, offered a distinctive reading of Deleuze as a cybernetic theorist.59 This positioning of 
Deleuze's work was challenged by the next generation of Deleuzians such as John Mullarkey 
who wrote that “the type of microreductionism that underscores work in cybernetics [..] 
thereby leads to a great misunderstanding of [Deleuze's] work on machinic desire”.60  I shall 
go on to closely consider these rival interpretations of Deleuze's work in Chapter 3.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari's text Anti-Oedipus is their most explicitly psychoanalytic writing, and 
is the source of much of what is distinctive in Land's cyberneticist reading of Deleuze. This 
                                                 
58 This refers to Deleuze's infamous remarks on his 'buggery' of previous philosophers. I shall return to this 
topic in Chapter 5 when discussing Land's own tendency to read in this manner.  
 There are several discussions of Deleuze's buggery remarks which can be found in:  Smith, D. 'The Inverse 
Side of the Structure: Žižek on Deleuze on Lacan', Criticism (2004): "Deleuze's all-too-well-known image of 
philosophical "buggery," which makes thinkers produce their own "monstrous" children"; Sinnerbrink, R. (in 
'Nomadology or Ideology? Žižek’s Critique of Deleuze', Parrhesia 1 (2006): 62-87) describes the "popular 
topic" of Deleuze's "notorious remarks"; Callen, R. (in 'The Difficult Middle', Rhizomes 10 (Spring 2005)) 
describes "intellectual buggery" as "what Deleuze himself famously said about his encounters with the works 
of other philosophers." Deleuze's buggery analogy is also cited by, among many others, Massumi, B. A 
User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia (USA: MIT Press, 1992), p. 2; Žižek, S. Organs without 
Bodies (UK: Routledge, 2003), p. 48; Buchanan, I. A Deleuzian Century? (Duke UP, 1999), p. 8; Jean- 
Lecercle, J. Deleuze and Language (Macmillan, 2002), p. 37; Lambert, G. The Non-Philosophy of Gilles 
Deleuze (UK: Continuum, 2002), p. x; Colebrook, C. Understanding Deleuze (Australia: Allen & Unwin, 
2003), p. 73; and Stivale, C. Gilles Deleuze: Key Concepts (USA: McGill-Queen's, 2005), p. 3. [this list is 
taken from Deleuze's Wikipedia entry ( available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gilles_Deleuze#cite_note-30 
on 10/03/2015 )]  
59 See Dosse, F. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari: Intersecting Lives (USA: Columbia University Press, 2010) 
pp. 479-480  
60 Mullarkey, J. 'Deleuze and Materialism' in Ed. Ian Buchanan A Deleuzian Century? (USA: Duke University 
Press, 1999) p.61 
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genealogy is to demonstrate the basis of the psychoanalytic tradition from which Land's 
thought emerges, and in situating in such a manner, it aims to show that Land's philosophy is 
not merely an interdisciplinary toolkit or a hook for novelty in the art world. It therefore 
disagrees with Brassier and Mackey's claim that:   
 
Land developed the conceptual innovations of Deleuze-Guattari as the trans 
disciplinary innovations they are, rather than recontextualising them (as is, 
unfortunately, now all too common) within the restricted histories of philosophy, 
psychoanalysis, or cultural theory.61  
 
Whilst this does depict how Land's work is currently treated, it does not represent how it must 
be treated. Indeed, just pages later, Brassier and Mackey themselves treat Land's work as 
systematic and philosophical, placing it within the context of the wider philosophical 
discussion of the conditions of experience:  
 
Land credits Anti-Oedipus with recasting the problem of the theory of experience as a 
problem concerning the caging of desire – with the latter read as a synonym for the 
impersonal, synthetic intelligence ('animality', 'cunning') that Land seeks to distinguish 
from the will of 'knowledge' to order, resolve, and correlate-in-advance.62 
 
The genealogical approach will provide the means to describe how Freud's concepts of desire 
and drive transform into 'impersonal, synthetic intelligence' in Land's formulation yet remain 
broadly consistent with Freud's metapsychological theses.63 This generally evolutionary 
account will also consider the development of psychoanalytic concepts in relation to their 
encounters with metaphysical approaches to desire in the works of Lacan, Lyotard, and 
Deleuze and Guattari.  In its historical consideration of psychoanalysis, the present thesis will 
provide a context for the psychoanalytic vocabulary which displaces the metaphysical. This 
                                                 
61 Ed. Brassier R. and Mackey, R.; Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p.5 
62 Ed. Brassier R. and Mackey, R.; Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p.8 
63 A depiction of a Foucaultian genealogical method can be found in 'The Genealogical Analysis of the Human 
Sciences and Its consequences for the Revising of the Critical Question' in Han, B. Foucault's' Critical 
Project (Stanford: USA, 2002) pp 109-146 
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will allow, in Chapter 5, a sustained discussion of Land's claim that the lexicon of drives, 
desires, impulses and animality best depict the forces where the metaphysical 'rubber meets 
the road'; that the instant of contact of the human with the outside isn't in the rarefied 
productions of subject's consciousness (inside), but in the drive economy and instinctual 
behaviour of the unconscious at the subject's periphery. Moving the site of synthesis outside 
of the subject requires this new language of production, but also a new way of thinking about 
processes of production and their agency.  
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Figure 2: Psychoanalytic and Metaphysical Genealogies 
 
Genealogy, a methodology most notably expounded and utilised by first Nietzsche, and later 
Foucault, is characterised by the investigation of the relationship between power and 
knowledge. There is some conflict over the concept, but much more simple misuse, as the 
term 'genealogy' is frequently applied to what would in fact be a solely historical 
methodology. The problem of the criterion or final reference for judgement has a long history 
in philosophy, from ancient skepticism to Lyotard's modern formulation, and the genealogical 
approach suggests that all too often the answer to this problem is that power dictates truth.64 
The genealogical method, when no longer directed at an exclusively evolutionarily account of 
knowledge, offers a sound metholodological approach to the question the present thesis poses 
because it gives due importance to power relations and the role that they have in a society. 
The intellectual space in which drive theory has had to compete is conditioned by 
anthropocentric perspectives and the predominance of idealism, which seeks to crush its 
destabilising revelations. These anthropocentric conditions are contrasted to the more abstract 
models of cybernetic and teleonomic prediction which would serve as criteria for Land. 
However, this genealogy shall also have some traces of a historical approach, following 
Foucault's approach which was not a-historical, but instead would emphasise that history is 
not a linear progression, but instead a series of competing concepts backed by conflicting 
agencies. The present thesis claims that aspects of Land's conception of machinic desire can 
be read in all of the philosophers in the lineage presented, but in all it is a repressed, minor 
element. In Freud concerns of clinical practice and controversy over the role of 
psychoanalysis obscure it; in Lacan the dominant narrative of structuralist linguistics does so; 
in Deleuze and Guattari the agent is the social concerns of the soixante-huitards and the 
emphasis on difference as difference and not production; in Lyotard it is the indifference or 
hostility to his libidinal period. I shall show how these repressed elements can all be related to 
one another and subsumed into Land's greater project.  
 
As the present thesis notes the contemporary discourse (both with the original texts and of the 
present thesis) surrounding these texts contains lacunae, there is a need to return to the 
                                                 
64 For the former see, for example, Striker, ‘The Problem of the Criterion' in Everson (ed.) Companions to 
Ancient Thought 1: Epistemology (UK: Cambridge, 1990) pp. 143–60. The latter is delineated in Lyotard, J.F. 
The Postmodern Condition (UK: Manchester University Press, 1984). 
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original texts in bringing out these contradictions if they are not discussed elsewhere. This is 
particularly the case with the works of Freud, which will require a larger degree of exposition 
than the later philosophers because the machinic and cybernetic aspects of his drive theory 
were ignored by contemporary scholars. Though Foucault's method is the predominant 
approach in the present thesis, Deleuze also invented a methodology, which will be used here. 
Regarding his monographs on philosophers, he noted that: 
 
It was really important for [his readings to be the philosopher in question's] own child, 
because the author had to actually say all I had him saying. But the child was bound to 
be monstrous too, because it resulted from all sorts of shifting, slipping, dislocations, 
and hidden emissions that I really enjoyed.65  
 
There is also a sense of this approach here, tracing how Land, attempting to answer Kant's 
challenge of accessing the outside, turned to the unemphasised but nevertheless present parts 
of the philosophers in the lineage I will examine, as they wrestled with this perhaps 
impossible challenge.66 If there is a single text which provides inspiration for its style, if not 
its exact organisation, it follows Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, which utilises 
philosophers' works to bring about a reading they may have not explicitly intended, but which 
can be deployed to construct a psychoanalytic theory of Landian, productive desire.  
 
The present thesis' methodology shall also utilise diagrams wherever possible, as genealogy 
lends itself to depictions of its stages in linear progressions, as shown above. A genealogy is 
ripe for diagrammatic method which allows representation of the relations, whether 
differential or sequential, between conceptual apparatus. It also follows the style of Deleuze 
and Guattari, and Lacan, who made use of diagrams in their own work, and of many readers 
of their texts who also follow this method.67 A final objective in my use of diagrams is to 
                                                 
65 Deleuze, G.  Negotiations. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p.6 
66 It is doubtlessly the impossibility of this challenge which means that few philosophers explicitly take it up in 
their work.  
67 Deleuze, and Guattari’s two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia are particularly diagrammatic, and 
Lacan's works are studded with various Schema and his Graphs of Desire. Examples of secondary readings 
include: Watson, J. Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought (UK: Bloomsbury, 2007); or O’Sullivan, S. On the 
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deploy them in support of clarity in my reading of Land and his influences, helping to depict 
the interrelation of his theories as simply as possible. When used this way the diagrammatic 
approach – like Land's use of the psychoanalytic – can be used to avoid the obfuscation and 
circularity which can characterise metaphysical discourses.  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
The main body of this work will therefore be a genealogical reading of the psychoanalytic 
tradition depicted on the right hand side of Figure 2.  This is organised into four chapters, 
each dedicated to a discussion of one thinker in this line. These discussions will relate the 
concepts investigated to the other thinkers in this genealogy, looking forwards to anticipate 
the deployment of the concepts in their refined forms, but also backwards to compare the 
fidelity of these later iterations with their precursors. This is particularly pertinent in 
psychoanalysis, as all of the major thinkers considered situate their work in relation to Freud's 
initial discoveries and conceptual machinery. The goal of the present thesis is not to present a 
general lineage of psychoanalysis, but to present a specific lineage of psychoanalysis which 
cumulates in a materialist reading of drive and desire. The importance of this task is noted in 
Land’s reading of the history of psychoanalysis as being tainted by a certain 
anthropomorphism and idealism:  
 
In its early stages psychoanalysis discovers that the unconscious is an impersonal 
machinism and that desire is positive non-representational flow, yet it 'remains in the 
precritical age', and stumbles before the task of an immanent critique of desire, or 
decathexis of society. Instead it moves in exactly the opposite direction: back into 
fantasy, representation, and the pathos of inevitable frustration. Instead of rebuilding 
reality on the basis of the productive forces of the unconscious, psychoanalysis ties up 
the unconscious ever more tightly in conformity with the social model of reality.68  
 
Psychoanalysis provides the conceptual machinery for Land’s development of schizoanaysis, 
but the history of this conception is constantly inhibited by the tendency to move in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Production of Subjectivity: Five Diagrams of the Finite-Infinite Relation, (Basingstoke and New York, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).  
68  Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 302-303 
 41 
“opposite direction” which is named by Deleuze and Guattari as 'Oedipus'. In Chapter 1 I 
shall provide a groundwork for my reading of the different post-Freudian schools of 
psychoanalysis. Any discussion which operates in a psychoanalytic register necessarily uses 
the terminology bequeathed by Freud. The preliminary gesture of the thesis will be to identify 
these Freudian processes which populate the unconscious and begin to define firstly what they 
can do in terms of production and secondly how their operation can be conceptualised. 
Chapter 1 is largely an exposition of Freud’s models of the unconscious and the dynamic 
processes which traverse these models, as the comparative readings of the later 
psychoanalytic thinkers in the present thesis require an anchored depiction of the these models 
and processes as Freud conceptualises them. This reading of Freud’s metapsychology reveals 
that the most important aspect of Freud's psychoanalysis for the construction of a materialist 
reading of his work is the introduction of drive theory, which describes the productive 
potential of the unconscious. Drives represent the productive pathways in the unconscious 
which provide the possibility for desire to operate. I shall therefore provide a reading of the 
bases of drive theory. Once the model of the drive is established, a distinction will be made 
between the 'pleasure principle' and simple positivism of the unconscious and the 'death 
drive', which describes its exceptional operations. The death drive will be a recurring theme in 
the present thesis, as it is a general term used to capture any exceptions to the expected 
operation of the unconscious. Each of the philosophers I consider has a slightly different 
reading of its operation, and establishing Freud's position is essential to understanding these 
later amendments.  
 
In Chapter 2 I go on to consider Lacan's thesis that ‘the unconscious is structured like a 
language’ and investigate the two directions in which such a concept can lead. The first is a 
structuralist view that considers the unconscious to consist of an abstract set of relations 
which can be analogised to the linguistic processes of metaphor and metonymy. The reading 
is amenable to a cybernetic conception of the unconscious, something which Lacan came 
close to in the 1950s, before abandoning such a methodology.69 The second reading, which 
reflects Lacan's later output and that of the wider Lacanian School is to conceptualise the 
unconscious as consisting of linguistic elements; that is not like a language but is a language. 
                                                 
69 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005)  (available at 
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This second reading is therefore more amenable to an anthropocentric reading of the 
unconscious as a 'little consciousness', which does not operate according to formal, cybernetic 
rules, but according to the logic of the ‘inside’, comparing ideas to ideas. A discussion of this 
distinction is important in the construction of a materialist theory of desire because Lacan 
represents the return of psychoanalysis towards idealist philosophy and, in Deleuze and 
Guattari's reading, towards social conservatism. Lacanianism therefore represents the 
tendency in psychoanalysis which Land is emphatically arguing against. Exploring how 
Lacan's psychoanalysis is prone to slip towards anthropomorphism will help clarify Land's 
reading of Deleuze and Guattari.  
 
Chapter 3 is devoted to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of psychoanalysis, concentrating on 
Anti-Oedipus, which introduces the concept of schizoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari argued 
that psychoanalysis, following Lacan, had descended into conservatism (Oedipus) and a 
negative, idealist conception of desire. I shall contextualise Anti-Oedipus in relation to 
Freudianism and Lacanianism, before considering Deleuze and Guattari's positive theory of 
productive desire, and the schizoanalytic register in which they attempted to track and 
describe its productions. Land's reading of Deleuze and Guattari, and his use of schizoanalysis 
in the construction of machinic desire will be contrasted with alternate readings of Deleuze 
which produce a more anthropocentric view of his commitments. I shall consider the reading 
of Deleuze by Ansell-Pearson, who posits an anti-anthropocentric reading of Deleuze's 
Difference and Repetition in Germinal Life.70 This superbly argued exposition of the 
metaphysical anti-anthropomorphism which marks Deleuze's 'middle-period' philosophical 
works depicts his re-working of Kant under the influence of Bergson, Spinoza and Nietzsche 
into an elaborate conceptual apparatus which: “[Grants] primacy not to the receptive capacity 
that receives impressions and experiences sensations but to the contractile power of 
contemplation that constitutes the organism before it constitutes the sensations that affect it.”71  
 
I shall go on to consider Land’s reading, as a 'Black Deleuzian' who takes up Deleuze's ideas 
of impersonal and machinic production and marries them to cybernetic and teleological 
circuits of accelerative production. This synthesis of Deleuze and cybernetics provides the 
basis for Land’s reading of the transformative power of modernity. For Land, the difference 
                                                 
70 Ansell-Pearson, K. Germinal Life (London: Routledge, 1999) 
71 Ansell-Pearson, K. Germinal Life (London: Routledge, 1999) p. 67 
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between pre-modern and modern societies is that the affect of desiring production is visible in 
the latter. In the shock waves caused as production punches through various thresholds, we 
can trace the true force of desire which works through and around the individual subject 
“passing through compression thresholds normed to an intensive logistic curve: 1500, 1756, 
1884, 1948, 1980, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011”72.  
 
I shall contrast these anti-anthropocentric readings of Deleuze with the more conventional 
ones of Buchanan and Colebrook to demonstrate what I conceptualise as being a split between 
'left' and 'right' Deleuzianism. The first chapter of Buchanan's Deleuzism (2000) begins with 
an excellent depiction of Deleuze's anti-representational method and his philosophy as a 
philosophy of production. This reading however pirouettes into a reading of Deleuze as a 
philosopher of the body and the joy of the body for which we must attain a: “conversion of 
inadequate ideas (passions) into adequate ones (desire)”.73 For Buchanan the body represents 
the whole human body and desire some kind of wish in that body rather than the impersonal 
desire described in the preceding pages: “[t]his correlation of desire with production” which 
flows through unindividuated material.74 It is no small effort to follow Deleuze's anti-
anthropocentric metaphysics without backsliding, and many interpreters succumb to this 
temptation of reintroducing the metaphysical panoply of subject-derived concepts. Baudrillard 
notes that the conclusion of libidinal philosophy had a tendency to be: 
 
“You've got an unconscious and must learn how to liberate it. 
 
You've got a body and must learn how to enjoy it.”75 [This quote retains the formatting 
of Baudrillard's original text] 
 
This obviously represents a misreading of the impersonal and productive unconscious as it is 
set back in the service of anthropocentric goals related to the enjoyment of the subject.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari's theory of machinic desire results in their positing of desiring machines 
                                                 
72 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York; Urbanomic, 2011) p. 443 
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74 Buchanan, I. Deleuzism (USA: Duke University Press, 2000) p. 15 
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as “black boxes”.76 The black boxes are the site of a series of syntheses, and their production 
can be measured, but this is as far as our functional knowledge of them extends. The subject 
of Chapter 4, Lyotard, is an important figure in the genealogy of psychoanalysis because he 
returns to the psychoanalytic, Freudian, tradition and begins to reconstruct what the internal 
processes governing these black boxes might be. His description of these unconscious 
‘primary processes’ will be considered, particularly with reference to the concept of the 
figural, the term he uses to designate the transformation of the latent content of the 
unconscious into the manifest content of the subject (primary process into secondary). 
Lyotard's position in the history of philosophy is currently as a philosopher of language (in Le 
Differend, 1988), and as the author of The Postmodern Condition (1984). The writings of his 
'libidinal period', disowned by their author, have attracted little commentary in anglophone 
philosophy. I shall consider two of the strongest readings of the libidinal period, by Williams 
(1998) and Bennington (1988) which both reflect the tendency to contextualise Lyotard, even 
in this libidinal-psychoanalytic period, as a philosopher of the 'event', which tends towards the 
metaphysical. He himself came to believe that his libidinal period could not be defended, and 
I shall conclude by considering his self-criticism and his relation to anthropocentricism.  
 
Though it will be discussed in relation to the concepts introduced in the previous chapters, 
Land's philosophy will be depicted systematically in Chapter 5. Land's readings of other 
philosophers will be considered, before the consequences of his productive theory of desire 
are discussed. This evaluation will consider the implication of Land's psychoanalytic reading 
of machinic desire in terms of both the subject and its interaction with the outside, and also 
the ability of schizoanalysis to map the desiring productions of objects themselves.  
 
The trap of Anthropocentricism 
 
“There is one simple criterion of taste in philosophy. That one avoid the vulgarity of 
anthropocentricism”.77 It might be asked why the present thesis considers 'Land's anti-
anthropocentric philosophy' rather than 'Land's philosophy of outsideness' as detailed above. 
Irruptions of the outside take a number of forms in Land's work, raging from objects which 
are out of their time to hints of alien subjectivities or the evolution of artificial intelligences 
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77 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xx 
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(AI).78 Of course, for Land, the most important actor of the outside, which is the non-human 
realm, is capitalism itself.79 Similarly, there are numerous apparatus of recapture by the inside: 
the conservatisms of social control and tradition; the Turing Police preventing the rise of AI; a 
whole range of interventions made on behalf of metaphysical idealism. In the present thesis 
anthropocentricism is taken as being a subset within this larger group of operations defending 
insideness. It refers to operations in thought, primarily philosophical thought, which try and 
reconcile conceptions of the world-as-it-is with the representation of the world-as-it-appears-
to-us. In its most simple sense it is common sense and everyday perception in which the 
world's presentation to the subject is considered unproblematic. In metaphysical discourse it is 
the introduction into any discourse of anthropic concepts which are not grounded by 
referencing the real. It simply takes our anthropocentric conception of the world as an 
unproblematic given, something which Land scrupulously avoids: “Level 1, or world-space is 
an anthropomorphically scaled, predominantly vision-configured, massively multi-slotted 
reality system that is obsolescing very rapidly”.80 Under the present thesis' reading, anti-
anthropocentricism is a critique of philosophical trajectories that work from the inside out, 
which are stuck within the humanist world-space at 'level 1'. Landian (and as Chapter 3 shall 
argue, Deleuzian) schizoanalysis-machinic desire is a positive philosophy of production 
which maps the process which will upload the post-human to level 2.  
 
A term closely related to (anti)-anthropocentricism is (anti)-anthropomorphism, which is used 
occasionally in this text either in response to its use in another work (for example, in Land's as 
quoted above), or where the concept discussed is closer to its philosophical usage as placing 
the form of appearances to the subject as unproblematic. Anthropocentricism is the preferred 
term of the two as anthropomorphism already has a distinct place in philosophy to denote the 
fallacy of equating the thoughts of humans and non-human animals, believing the latter to 
have similar intentional states.  
                                                 
78 Objects out of time are explored in 2014's Templexity ( Land, N. Time Spiral Press, 2014) and the defunct 
website Hyperstition; alien subjectivities and artificial intelligences are discussed widely at Xenosystems 
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Anti-anthropocentric philosophy therefore aims to reduce the importance of subjectivity and 
the role of the Cartesian 'I am' in our understanding of the world. Mackey states that  this 
project of entirely removing the subject is, of course, paradoxical in any philosophical system: 
 
Mackay: This is a thing which Land doesn't just remove as an option, he very 
deliberately abjures it. For Land there is no agency. There is a paradox – there is a 
strange expression of subjectivity which his project seeks to practically erase … the 
aim of his project is towards the obliteration of this problematic thing. It is self-
refuting to some extent as he wants to close this void or incision into the world.81 
 
However, the present thesis does not aim to finally strip subjectivity from Land's 
philosophical position. Its aim rather is to show how certain tendencies in philosophy 
introduce a multiplicity of anthropocentric concepts which are situated in relation to each 
other. By stressing the psychoanalytic and the theory of desiring-production it by-passes the 
need to concentrate on the contents of subjectivity. Essentially, it will claim that an idea 
should not be contrasted to another idea – in Landian terms, the inside interrogating itself; 
instead an idea must be tested by reality – we must look to the outside and check its effects 
and productions. This outside is reminiscent of Bataille's base matter: 
 
In order to differentiate between the real correlate of the object, or epistemologically 
determined real substance, and the unconditioned unknown, Bataille does not refer 
merely to matter, but to base matter; a materiality so alien to the epistemological 
framework that it is utterly without dependence upon the form of the object (the 
thing).82 
 
Rather than the correlate of the object of perception, base matter is a flow of becoming which 
surpasses the anthropocentric perspective; it is a force of production. By investigating base 
matter which cannot be 'perceived', we escape the anthropocentric prejudices of the 'monkey 
                                                 
81 Mackey, R. in a comment at Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: 
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trap' which attempts to maintain humanity in 'level 1': “The Monkey Trap is an ‘intelligence 
equilibrium’ […] My problem — ‘equilibrium’ and ‘trap’ have almost identical meaning.”83 
Ultimately Land aims to maximise intelligence – defined as the differentiation of base matter 
and the capability of base matter to become further differentiated – a process which, as 
Chapter 5 shall show, base matter automatically tends towards, if cut free of the constraints 
imposed on it by anthropic tendencies towards conservatism.  
 
Anti-Anthropocentricism and Anti-Academism 
 
Land's reading of the history of philosophy is of a series of repressions in which irruptions of 
outsideness – a means of escape from the prison of the anthropocentric belief that our ideas 
about the world are true representations of the world – are always suppressed by the desire of 
philosophers, and humanity in general, to guarantee that the world is as it appears to us. 
Another noted reader of Deleuze, John Protevi, also notes this tendency in the history of 
philosophy: “[A] historical figure...  does not grasp, or backs away from, the radical 
implications of what he has written in a "furtive and explosive moment"”.84 The story that I 
shall trace of the interplay between irruption and recapture of the outsideness radical 
psychoanalysis posits can therefore be situated in the context of this wider metaphysical 
tendency. This tension between inside and outside can be seen in the commentary about 
Deleuze's materialist conception of desiring production, which provides the foundation of 
Land's 'libidinal materialism', and his sustained attack on anthropocentric trends in 
contemporary philosophy.85 Though Deleuze took a step back from the radically anti-humanist 
consequences of his theories, Land does not, and proposes that we should follow them to their 
ends, accelerating the removal of anthropocentricism from thought.86 To do this, we should 
therefore take every opportunity to open up the 'inside' to invasion by the 'outside'. Land's use 
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of the anti-anthropic outsideness of drive theory has many aspects: it strips ideational content 
from the genesis of desire; it demonstrates an irrationality in the subject-driven conception of 
the decision making process; and it relegates consciousness temporally to the status of an 
after-effect of the unconscious process. The present thesis posits that the overall tendency of 
Land's radical drive theory is to further move the intentionality of desire from its traditional 
anthropocentric conception as being a capacity of the Cartesian subject, thereby dethroning 
the conscious self as the master of its own wants and the site of the subject's interaction with 
the world (see figure 3 below).  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Desire is no longer a property of the subject.  
 
Despite the growing interest in this radical tendency of anti-anthropocentric metaphysics as a 
 49 
philosophical position, there has not been a corresponding shift in societal norms and praxes. 
This, again, seems to be because of the tendency for such radicality to be captured by 
conservatism. If one is to take this position of Land's libidinal materialism, 
anthropocentricism must be regarded as a philosophical trap, a backsliding towards the pit of 
“vulgarities”.87 Philosophy, insofar as many of its central questions remain unresolved (and 
are unresolvable) is a series of dichotomies between opposed concepts. For Land, if we are to 
avoid “[siding] with cages” we must take up fixed positions on the side of anti-
anthropomorphism, and rigorously defend them from recapture by the partisans of the 
idealism and humanism.88  One of Land's core claims is that the academy works against 
radical philosophy, trying to neuter its revelations and seal up the 'wound' which it opens. As 
such, 'outside' philosophy cannot enter into a debate with established philosophy – academia – 
but must model its interaction as an insurrection or assault: 
 
[F]or the university considers its other to be incompetent, whilst the part of this 
other—admittedly a very small part—that has seized and learnt to manipulate the 
weaponry of philosophical strife, considers the voice of the university to be 
irremediably tainted by servility. 89 
 
Obviously the academy is Janus-faced in one respect because its members can be both the 
instigators of the breach or irruption of the outside, but then also the force which seals it. And 
as neither is necessarily more powerful than the other, it is the combination of both which 
creates the disfigured and contradictory positions which are studded throughout philosophy. 
In this reading Land again follows Deleuze: 
 
Both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche develop the opposition between the private thinker, 
the thinker-comet and bearer of repetition, and the public professor and doctor of law, 
whose second-hand discourse proceeds by mediation and finds its moralizing source in 
the generality of concepts (cf. Kierkegaard against Hegel, Nietzsche against Kant and 
Hegel…).90  
                                                 
87 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xx 
88 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. xx 
89 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p.11 
90 Deleuze, G. Difference and Repetition Trans. Paul Patton (UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2014) p. 8 
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I shall consider two movements of recapture which the academy utilises, and consider how 
they operate to neuter the more radically anti-anthropocentric theories which emerge. The first 
action is conducted by the philosophers who open the breach themselves. In both Freud and 
Lacan this can be seen in the division between their critical and clinical work. As Evans 
states: “Lacan’s backsliding shows a curious parallel with Freud’s own intellectual journey”.91 
In the case of Lyotard and Deleuze, both philosophers step back from their most radically 
anti-anthropocentric positions and publish later works which shy away from the consequences 
of the breaches they initially made.92 The second recapture is conducted by the later 
interpreters of a philosopher. Recent developments in speculative realism provides a model 
through which we can view this mechanism. Firstly, the irruption of the new is adopted by 
experimental art, and becomes a matter of praxis rather than theory. Its influence is then 
apparent in the work of avant-garde scholars across a wide spectrum of academic disciplines. 
These recapitulations tend to use 'stripped down' versions of its concepts and models which 
are used as tools, maps or components in a practice which is a bricolage. The anti-
anthropomorphism which permeates the initial philosophical irruption is lost as humanities 
and other subject-centred disciplines relate its conclusions to their own epistemological 
assumptions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
91 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp. 38-55. Available online 
at ( http://beta.finance-on.net/upload/ver/ver4480020c6d2b2/lacan.pdf ) 
92 In the case of Deleuze, Land situates this backsliding as being between the publication of Anti-Oedipus and A 
Thousand Plateaus. See Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York; Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 278, 
280.  
 A discussion can be found in Fascist lines of the tokkotai by Michelsen, N. in Deleuze & Fascism: Security: 
War: Aesthetics Ed. B. Evans, J. Reid (UK: Routledge, 2013) pp. 158 - 163 
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Chapter 2. Freud: the Constitution of the Unconscious 
 
This genealogy begins by examining the texts of Freud, as psychoanalysis begins with his 
works. They represent a distinctive point at which its lexicon is fixed and the discipline 
emerges as an independent field of study. However, as a genealogy this is more than a simple 
time-line or evolutionary account of the development of psychoanalysis. Though it is true that 
psychoanalysis has its own cladistics and subsequent psychoanalytical theories must be 
contextualised to the extent to which they are plesiomorphic or apomorphic in relation to the 
common ancestor which is Freudianism, the discipline cannot be contextualised as a liner 
progression towards a final 'truth'. In this respect it mirrors philosophy proper, whose central 
debates have never been decisively resolved in favour of one position or another, and whose 
history is of the cyclical return of concepts back to fashion.93 Similarly, in psychoanalysis this 
conflict over its concepts is always-already there, and happens in real time as Freud makes his 
discoveries and the clinical, philosophical and socio-political actors of the time battle to 
define the effects of the operation of the new unconscious. In the context of philosophy's 
interest in the discipline, the materialist–idealist schism, as outlined in the introduction, pre-
exists psychoanalysis, and its partisans have read the unconscious – as the present thesis 
examines – from the perspective of their respective camps. The genealogical method deployed 
here will allow consideration of why these readings persist as well as the structure of these 
objections, and is an essential prelude to the readings of Deleuze and Guattari's critique of 
Freudianism presented in Chapter 3.   
 
The passage through Freud's psychoanalytic work is fraught with sources of complexity and I 
shall begin by noting some of the methodological problems which arise for interpreters of 
Freud's body of work. Three of the most significant problems are: (1) the fragmentary nature 
of the work. The Standard Edition is chronological rather than thematic, and one is forced to 
jump between texts to explain Freud's thoughts, rather than be able to follow a definitive line 
of inquiry. This is closely related to (2) the tendency of psychoanalytic concepts to be only 
explicable in relation to other psychoanalytic concepts. This leads to the problem of having to 
                                                 
93  An apt example of this is the rise of speculative realism, as described in the Introduction.   
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occasionally introduce new terms to my analysis which will only be explored in the fullest 
manner at a later point, along with the vexed question of picking a point at which to start. In 
response to this question, I have chosen to begin with Freud's 'discovery' of the unconscious 
in his analysis of neurosis, and his early analysis of the dreamwork, as this allows the crucial 
notion of censorship – which defines the boundary between conscious and unconscious -  to 
be explored. Finally, (3) the polemical nature of interpretation of Freud's texts means that a 
'neutral' reading is almost impossible to offer. As this whole thesis follows the development 
and interpretation of Freud's models of the unconscious and its processes, I have chosen to use 
secondary texts which are considered canonical interpretations of Freud, rather than to 
consider some of the most trenchant or polarised critiques of his work when citing 
authoritative readings of his work. Similarly, wherever possible, I shall refer directly to 
Freud's words rather than recapitulations of it.  
 
Freud’s decisive contribution to psychology and philosophy was his formulation and 
explication of the first modern theory of the unconscious.94 Just as ‘modern’ philosophy dates 
from the Cartesian exposition of the philosophical subject, psychoanalysis – and, arguably, 
philosophical post-modernity – begin with Freud’s decentering of this subject, undercutting its 
supposed foundation in universal reason by exposing the ‘pit’ of the unconscious upon which 
it uncertainly rests. I will begin with a description of this discovery in Studies in Hysteria 
(1895) and The Interpretation of Dreams (1900).95 In these early works Freud introduces the 
entities and processes which populate the unconscious and begins to demonstrate how their 
effects can be observed. I shall then turn to the spatial elaboration of these concepts in Freud's 
later depictions of the unconscious. These models of the psychical system are outlined in the 
‘metapsychological’ papers Freud published during and after the Great War; the period 1914 – 
1923. The most important are: Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915), The Unconscious 
                                                 
94   A historical account of Freud's importance can be found in Ellenberger, H. The Discovery of the 
Unconscious (London: Fontana, 1994) pp. 418-571 
95   As Freud's works are systematised in the standard edition by year of publication, I have included the date of 
each of his works' publication in German to provide a sense of the geological development of his thought, but 
also to allow the reader to identify their place in the Standard Edition. All references are to the Standard Edition 
edited by Smith, I. which is available online under a free licence. All of Freud's texts referenced here can be 
found in that volume. 
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(1915), Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), and The Ego and the Id (1923). The overall 
structure of this chapter is a division into three stages: a discussion of populations in the 
unconscious, then of topographies, and then finally processes in the unconscious. The most 
important stage is this final depiction of the processes of the unconscious as drives, as drive 
theory is the crucial concept in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, however, the preceding stages are 
essential to defining how the drive-economy can be conceptualised.   
 
This chapter aims to introduce the language of psychoanalysis which will be deployed by 
Land in his description of 'machinic-desire' (“drives are the functions of nomadic cybernetic 
systems, not instincts but simulated instincts, artificial instincts”), but will also consider the 
tension between anthropocentricism and anti-anthropocentricism in Freud's own thought.96 If 
psychoanalysis has the quality of being able to bypass the anthropocentricism of metaphysics 
it must be possible to read Freud's systematisation of the unconscious as formal and 
productive rather than idealist. This tension between anti and pro-anthropocentric positions 
can be seen in two separate lexical registers in Freud’s work which have limited points of 
interaction. When dealing with a concrete case of mental illness in applied psychoanalysis, 
Freud adopts a terminology which describes the mental processes of the patient in terms of the 
ideas which they carry and the changes in the state of these ideas. These state changes tend to 
be described abruptly rather than gradually, and as a change in the location or the quality of 
the information contained in the idea. They therefore relate to an idealist philosophy as their 
currency is very much the comparison of a set of mental intuitions or ideas within the patient's 
psyche, and it operates as an attempt to calculate and then influence the extent to which they 
correspond in their unconscious and conscious apparatus. The second register is used when 
Freud discusses the evolution of mental illness in the patient, or begins to move from single, 
observed cases to a more general set of rules which describe universal processes in the 
psyche. When Freud refers to the change of the organism over time and the formation of 
complexes, and when he constructs a theory of psychoanalysis; the language of this change is 
one of energeticism: of force, pulsion or drive. As these changes correspond to quantity and 
force rather than of idea, they are not idealist, but are materialist. Though they may become 
ideas, when in the unconscious they are not yet so, and it is unhelpful to conceptualise them 
as such at this point. A further complication to universal understanding of Freud is that a third 
set of terms is occasionally used to describe the processes of the psyche. When Freud makes 
                                                 
96   Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 330 
 54 
the transition between these two lexicons described above, he tends to use the language of 
structural biology as his bridge. Freud refers to networks, patterns and connections, 
particularly referring to neuronal and nerve connections within the body. Freud is not unaware 
of this problematic series of shifts in description between terminologies in his work – in The 
Unconscious (1915), he states his wish to see them unified in one single vocabulary, a 
metapsychology:  
 
We see how we have gradually been led into adopting a third point of view in our 
account of psychical phenomena. Besides the dynamic and topographical points of 
view, we have adopted the economic one. This endeavours to follow the vicissitudes 
of amounts of excitation and to arrive at least at some relative estimate of their 
magnitude.  
 
It will not be unreasonable to give a specific name to this whole way of regarding our 
subject matter, for it is the consummation of psycho-analytic research. I propose that 
when we have succeeded in describing a process in its dynamic, topographical and 
economic aspects, we should speak of it as a metapsychological presentation. We must 
say at once that in the present state of our knowledge there are only a few points at 
which we succeed in this.97  
 
Yet despite the obvious desirability of a complete metapsychological model, there are few 
points (as he acknowledges) at which Freud managed to fully describe both psychical 
operations and the observed manifestations of the complex in the subject in this way. Instead, 
we must interpret different parts of Freudian metapsychological theory according to the 
languages and processes specific to the unique register of the model Freud is working within 
(see Table 2 below).  
 
Table 2: Key processes in Freud's three hypotheses   
 
Economic Hypothesis Dynamic Hypothesis Topographical Hypothesis 
                                                 
97   Freud, S. The Unconscious from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p.3004 
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Drive 
Desire 
Instinct 
Censor / Repression 
Metaphor / Metonymy 
Dreamwork 
Ego 
Id 
Super Ego 
 
This chapter shall describe the three hypotheses of the unconscious' operation depicted in 
table 2 and consider the extent to which they are anti-anthropocentric, moving from his early 
work on hysteria through to his mature depictions of the drive. I shall argue that the key 
criterion for determining anthropomorphism in Freud's thought is the extent to which the 
unconscious is equivalent to consciousness; to which its productions are qualitatively the 
same as consciousness (that they are ideas). Whilst there is scope to question the radicalness 
of some of Freud's earlier work by looking at the question of depth – the idea that the 
unconscious is qualitatively the same as consciousness, but is merely located in a 'deeper', 
inaccessible area – I shall show that in his later work there is a distinctly anti-anthropocentric 
tendency which is caused by the separation of two economies on the primary and secondary 
process: those of cathected and tonic energy. Establishing the model of the unconscious found 
in The Unconscious is vital for the present thesis as it forms the basis of Deleuze and 
Guattari's conception of the unconscious: 
 
Freud conceives the unconscious in three interrelated ways: dynamically, 
topographically and economically. However, it was not until his 1915 paper 'The 
Unconscious' that he brought these strands together in a systematic way. This same 
paper is credited by Deleuze and Guattari with the discovery of 'desiring-production', 
which as will become clear in what follows is the essential conceptual bedrock of their 
position.98   
 
Discovery and Populations 
 
As stated above, vacillation between lexical registers is nearly universal in Freud’s work. We 
can observe it in the earliest of Freud’s texts, those inspired by his work on hysterical 
                                                 
98   Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum, 2008) p. 27 
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patients.99 The fundamental process responsible for the hysteric’s condition was hypothesised 
to be the repression of a fact which would be so damaging to the patient’s sense of self (the 
ego) that the mental apparatus could not allow it to become known to the conscious subject. 
In The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894), Freud sketches a tripartite model of this 
mechanism of hysteria: 
 
1. An idea is loaded with such a level of ‘effect’ that it becomes dangerous to the psyche. 
2. A splitting of the idea from its current associative connotations takes place, and the 
idea is cut loose of its previous associative links in the psyche.  
3. Once it has been cut-off the level of ‘charge’ in the psyche must be dissipated by other 
means. If no stable formation can be found within ‘normality’, it manifests itself as 
hysteria.100  
 
Even in this early work of Freudian psychoanalysis, we can see the split in the Freudian 
system between the economic description of the cause of illness and the non-economic 
description of the nature of the symptoms. The first proposition begins in in one register with 
a “sum of excitation” which is “put to work”, leaning on economic terminology; yet, when 
talking about the nature of the patient’s changed mental state, Freud talks about dislodged and 
transposed terms, a spatial description.101 Freud’s narrative begins with an ‘economic’ 
observation about excess energy, but the conclusion he derives from this hypothesis is the 
existence of a ‘knowing’ force of censorship which, understanding the potential of ideas to be 
dangerous, separates them along the binary divisions of safe/harmful, good/bad, allowed/not 
allowed, and finally candidates for the conscious thought/those which are solely unconscious. 
                                                 
99   The most important of which are: A Case of  Successful Treatment by Hypnotism (1892), The Neuro-
Psychoses of Defence (1894), and Studies on Hysteria (1895) 
100 These stages surmises Freud's depiction in Freud, S. The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894) from Complete 
Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) 
pp. 304 - 306 
101   (a) Freud, S. The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online 
text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 304 
 (b) Freud, S. The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 309 
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This duality is repeated in the second stage of the argument.  As soon as ‘the idea is separated 
from its affect’, Freud changes his register from the economic to one of the qualities of 
information.102  Again, the growth of the complex is economic, yet the force of the censor is 
spatial, moving ideas away from consciousness. In the conclusion of The Neuro-Psychoses of 
Defence, Freud refers to “a quantity... which is capable of increase, diminution, displacement 
and discharge, and which is spread over the memory traces of ideas” here he reverts to a 
'drive' theory, which is explained in terms of the economic hypothesis.103 So long as the 
psyche is working correctly, economic terminology is sufficient for Freud. But as soon as 
there is a breakdown in the system and Freud has to relate the transformation of healthy ideas 
into unhealthy ones, or vice versa, Freud reverts to the linguistic register. The notions of ‘the 
censor’ and ‘repression’, these two forces which are concerned with the evaluation of sub-
conscious ideas have no definitive description in Freud's economic vocabulary at this stage. 
Freud’s alternate use of these two registers is consistent with his desire to make 
psychoanalysis both a new science (necessitating pseudo-scientific terminology), and a new 
practice of treatment (speaking to the layman). Rather than resolving these contradictions 
definitively, Freud pragmatically prioritises the development of the psychoanalytic movement 
above the quest for a unified vocabulary of the analyst. 
 
Despite this lack of meta-theoretical resolution, it is possible to delineate the point at which 
Freud's work passes towards anti-anthropocentricism. Freud's work on hysteria is subject 
centred because it is patient centred; because it focuses on a complex which must be resolved 
by the psychoanalyst.104 Freud's major discovery in relation to treatment was that the talking 
cure was possible if the underlying mechanism of repression could be demonstrated to the 
patient. Yet if this was the extent of Freud's contribution to medicine, there would be no scope 
for a thesis to dissect his anti-anthropocentric tendencies, as the talking cure remains in the 
anthropocentric domain of the manipulation of ideas. It is Freud's later study of the 
                                                 
102  Freud, S. The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online 
text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 307 
103  Freud, The Neuro-Psychoses of Defence (1894) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 314 
104  See 'Complex' in  Laplanche and Pontails, The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) 
pp.73-74 
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unconscious' processes which distances psychoanalysis from idealism. The conception of the 
unconscious as an independent mechanism undercuts the metaphysical assumption of a 
human subject as the centre of volition and decision making, instead moving agency to a 
bizarre, alien zone. Freud's subsequent work investigates this 'other place' and the way in 
which it operates, and as his concerns become more abstract and more coldly theoretical, he 
shows the unconscious as being nothing like the conscious system, and that some of its 
contents are nothing like thoughts.105   
 
In The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) Freud introduces the processes of the 'dreamwork' 
which describes how the unconscious can manipulate and change its content. The processes of 
the dreamwork were used by Freud to create a more advanced model of the workings of the 
psyche than the binary notion of repression in hysteria. Hysteria was treated by identifying a 
symptom which was often starkly apparent, and therefore provided many relatively simple 
cases, however, in certain cases the true nature of the repressed had been so thoroughly 
hidden by the operation of the unconscious that Freud required a much more detailed study of 
the unconscious' mechanism.106 Freud believed the 'royal road to the unconscious' was found 
in dreams which, as they are not so determined by sensoral stimuli as wakefulness is, are a 
combination of the conscious and unconscious impulses of the psyche. Freud's clinical use of 
the dreamwork is as a tool which allows him to engage in a more detailed investigation of the 
complex in a patient. Yet the true importance of the dreamwork is that it begins to consider 
the simplest transformational mechanisms and processes which exist in the unconscious – and 
they operate not only in dreams as an exemplar but, as Freud shows, in its quotidian, waking 
operation as well.107  
 
The radical strangeness of the unconscious, the other place, provides the first formulation of 
                                                 
105 A recurring metaphor in the present thesis is Freud's description of the unconsciousness as 'eine andere 
Schauplatz' (an-other place), which captures the strangeness and qualitative difference of its operation. 
106 See 'Symptom-Formation' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis  (London: 
Karnac, 1993) 
107 Freud elaborates the fact that the functions of the unconscious are the same in the complex as in daily 
life in his further investigation of parapraxes and jokes (See Freud: The Psychopathology of Everyday Life 
(1904) and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905)). 
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Freud's topographical model, which distinguishes between a primary process 
(Primärvorgang) at the root of the unconscious, and a secondary process (Sekundärvorgang) 
which revises the products of the primary process as they make their way towards 
consciousness. This topographical model is characterised by its depth - at the deepest level, 
the primary process, we have the alien unconscious; at the shallowest we have fully formed 
'ideas' available to consciousness. In relation to anthropocentricism, the question is where is 
the 'work' of the dreamwork done? The higher up it is done, the more idea-like its productions 
are, and the more like conscious thought it is. 
 
Freud uses the dreamwork to depict this work of the unconscious as it tries to evade the 
censor, and its operations only make sense when we remember that there is a force of 
repression – as previously identified in hysterics – which the unconscious is trying to work 
around. To effect this it needs to transform that which is repressed into something which is 
not, but which can do the work of the repressed, which is to allow the achievement of the 
desired cathexis.108 For this process to be possible, there must be an associative arrangement 
in the psyche, through which the unconscious can re-route a charge of affect. It is along these 
associative lines that energy shall pass as it attempts to avoid repression by the censor.109  
 
The first stages of the dreamwork are condensation and displacement. Freud assigns these 
processes to the domain of the primary process, the pure unconscious. Processes which are 
revisions to this first stage of the dreamwork take place in the higher, secondary processes, 
therefore these two are the basic operations of the dreamwork. Condensation (Verdichtung) is 
                                                 
108 In Freud's original German the term used is Besetzung, which is translated by Strachey as cathexis but 
can also be rendered as occupation, charge or investment of energy captures the operation of the unconscious 
according to economical and mechanical metaphors. The unconscious operates as a system whose role is to 
distribute these charges or effects according to its internal rules. A discussion can be found in 'Cathexis' in 
Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J., The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) 
109 This is consistent with Moretti's depiction that “The 'formal' conciliation is not the means, the simple 
medium of pleasure: it is its end, its true and only substance. The pleasure does not lie in having 'slackened' 
the grip of the censorship a little, but in having redrawn with precision the spheres of influence of the various 
psychic forces.” This description, with its terminology of spheres of influence is congruent with the 
definition of cathexis above. Moretti, A. Signs taken for Wonders ( London: Verso, 2005) p. 39.  
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the combination of several different ideas into one single idea.110 It is one of the most 
fundamental concepts in psychoanalysis, as it describes the most basic manipulations of 
intensity or information in the psyche. The idea presented after condensation is singular, but 
represents a number of intensities. Laplanche states that the condensed idea is a nodal point 
which represents a common factor held by two separate chains of conjoined ideas.111  The 
common term in these different associative chains takes over from all of the other terms 
represented by the latent content of the dream, and presents itself in their place as the manifest 
content of the dream. In the case where the dream's latent content is a picnic and a trip to 
Paris, the manifest presentation after condensation might be a Brie (see Figure 4 below).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Condensation: the overlapping part of the chain 'Picnic' and the chain 'Paris' is 
'Brie'. 
 
The status of the components of the dreamwork are contested by the philosophers considered 
in this genealogy. Their exact nature is one of the key questions of the present thesis, as the 
extent to which they are 'ideas' or 'like ideas' is the key measure of the extent of their 
anthropocentricism. In The International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis Danon-Boileau  
stresses that a product of condensation “is not a chimera”; not a composite image of its 
                                                 
110 See 'Dream-Work' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993) 
111 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p.81; see also 
Mitchell, M. and Black, S. Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought, (USA: Basic 
Books, 1995) p. 9 
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components, but is one single term which stands for all of the others.112 This reading is 
contested by Lyotard in 'The Dream Work Does Not Think', his rejoinder to Lacan's 
subsumption of the dreamwork as a quasi-linguistic process.113 For Lyotard condensation does 
not happen to discourse (signifying chains and language) but instead to figures (images), 
which are, by their nature, composites in which aspects of the original elements can be 
determined (I shall consider Lyotard's depiction of the dreamwork at length in Chapter 3).  
 
Condensation's effects can be seen in Freud's analysis of the case of Little Hans in Analysis of 
a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy (1909). That there are chimeric figures in dreams is 
demonstrated when he likens the blackness around the mouth of Hans' dream horses to a 
moustache; this being a facial feature of his father. This shows that a product of condensation 
can escape its repression by the censor if the new investment is sufficiently unlike the latent 
content which creates it. Displacement (Verschiebung) works in a similar way, enabling an 
idea to escape the censor. In the case of displacement a whole chain of investments are lifted 
from their association with the repressed concept and are reattached to a different concept.114 
An example of displacement would be the animal fears of Little Hans or the Wolf Man.115 
Freud hypothesises that in the case of Hans, it is his fear of castration by his father which has 
been displaced onto the image of being bitten by a horse. Hans has no conscious idea of his 
fear of the father, because the only idea which is allowed to be presented to him when 
unpleasure about the prospect of castration is triggered in the primary process is a secondary 
cathexis of energy into the concept of 'horse'. While quite effective as a way of permitting the 
father to be seen without triggering the displeasure which he would otherwise cause, the 
unfortunate side effect of this is a traumatic experience at a time where it would not be 
expected, that is, seeing the representation of a horse (be it in dreams or in waking-thought).  
 
Censorship operates on the border between the primary and secondary processes of the 
                                                 
112 'Condensation' in Ed. de Mijola, A. International Dictionary of Psychoanalysis (USA: Macmillan, 
2005) 
113 Lyotard, J.F. 'The Dream Work Does Not Think'. Trans. Lydon, M. in Ed. Benjamin The Lyotard Reader 
and Guide  (Oxford UK: Blackwell,1989) 
114 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) pp. 121-123 
115 The 'Wolf Man' case is described in Freud, From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (1918) 
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psyche. Neither condensation or displacement are part of the censor's work. These two 
processes are simply the agents which work on an idea in such a way that it can bypass the 
censor. The productions of the primary process, as I have stated, are not yet like conscious 
ideas in their nature. Before the product of the dreamwork can become known to the subject, 
it must be worked over by pre-conscious processes so that it can be presented in a form which 
is recognisable to the subject. The product of the primary process must be represented in 
images before it can become the content of a dream and the stock of images available for this 
presentation is derived from mnemonic traces in the primary process – particularly those 
associated with wishful impulses – and recent memories, usually from the day preceding the 
dream.116 Transference of the ideas which are highly cathected in the primary process can take 
the form of a replacement by older, childhood memories, but the dreamwork will use more 
recent memories if there is no longer a mnemonic trace available of the original object of an 
impulse of the primary process. This leads to an additional working over of the content of the 
dream, replacing one picture-presentation with another. Laplanche's description is that: “For 
example, the replacement of the term of ‘aristocrat’ by that of ‘highly placed’– which can be 
represented by a high tower.”117 Even after considerations of representation have been taken 
into account, one last process is involved in creating the final manifest content of the dream in 
a form which can be read. This final process, secondary revision (Sekundäre Bearbeitung), is 
located on the boundary between the pre–conscious and conscious areas of the psyche. 
Secondary revision is concerned with taking the dream images - which are at this point 
fragmentary and incoherent – and presenting them in a form which can be narrated. Freud 
likens it to an intellectual function, taking a series of images from the dream and providing an 
explanation of the reasons behind their transition into one another where disjunctions would 
otherwise exist. This means that aspects of the dream are added which have nothing to do 
with the latent content of the dream. They are merely added to the dreamer's recollection so 
that the series of images which have been experienced in the dream can be related in 
language.  
 
Assessing the anthropomorphism of the dreamwork requires a clarification of Freud's 
conception of the primary and secondary processes. If the primary and secondary processes 
operate in the same way, and the first is simply deeper or antecedent to the latter there is less 
                                                 
116 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) pp. 247-249 
117 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p.389 
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support for a radically anti-anthropocentric reading of Freud. The dreamwork may seem to be 
a reworking of the primary process' wishes which are equivalent to the secondary process' 
thoughts, though they operate below the level of consciousness and are only apparent in their 
form as its productions. Yet if the unconscious is like consciousness, and is a domain of ideas, 
we might ask why censorship is necessary, and question why are its productions suppressed, 
unknown and opaque?  
 
The censor is the gatekeeper between what is repressed and what is not in the psyche. It 
therefore exists at a boundary between different parts of the unconscious, differentiating that 
which cannot become conscious and that which can, and is both a borderline and an active 
agent on that borderline which interacts with unconscious productions. For some thoughts the 
censor is unproblematic, and they simply pass through the border (see path '1' in figure 5 
below), yet others are blocked at the threshold by censorial entity (see path '2' in figure 5 
below). The demonstrated  existence of the censorship in Studies in Hysteria (1895) leads to 
two questions about its role in the psyche: the first is the question of its 'depth' and essentially 
asks 'to what extent are the areas immediately above and below it like ideas'? The second is 
about its formal operation and how that which is and that which is not censored is determined.  
 
Figure 5: The censor as a barrier 
 
The censor's traditional position is between the unconscious and conscious thought, and its 
role is to prevent harmful content passing to the conscious system. This is how it was 
conceptualised in the Studies on Hysteria (1895) as being the barrier which the talking cure 
needed to bypass (see figure 5 above). However, we have already seen that Freud's theoretical 
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models of the unconscious go beyond this simple (Un)conscious binary. The strand of Freud’s 
thought currently being examined is the one which runs from his early analysis of hysteria, 
through his studies on paraphrases, and on to his work on dreams.118 The terminus of this 
thought is the mature tripartite topographical model as outlined in The Ego and the Id. 
Freud’s goal is to trace the process by which an idea in the unconscious can be repressed from 
consciousness and, vice versa; how a conscious act's ordinary motivation in the unconscious 
can be inferred from its manifest content in the patient’s actions. These operations traverse the 
barrier between conscious and unconscious parts of the psyche in opposite directions, but 
their paths are traced through the same mechanism, that of repression, carried out under the 
agency of the censor. In hysteria there is always an idea which cannot be allowed to come to 
consciousness. If doing so, it would be so contrary to the ego-ideal of the patient; it would 
catastrophically unbalance the psyche. Yet this description in terms of the dynamic model 
appears problematic, as the patient is already in possession of knowledge about how this 
unconscious idea might affect the conscious psyche; it is as if the psychical system works ‘out 
of time’, testing the idea’s future effects before rejecting it.119  An answer is that the repression 
is the exhibition of a complex and has been laid down over time, and as such, the complex 
obscures the conditions of its genesis. In this model, rather than operating on each case and in 
each instance, the censor begins to subdue impulses which are contrary to the ego-ideal over 
time, and therefore slowly effaces undesirable production. Each new instance of the thing to 
be repressed does not lead to a new calculation, but is responded to by censorship by 
following an established pattern. This would again collapse the role of the censor into a 
topographical role, as it determines the position of the psyche's contents rather than actively 
sorting them.  
 
In the case of parapraxes Freud produces further evidence of accidental actions escaping 
repression, thereby showing that the censor does not have this immediate efficaciousness, and 
                                                 
118  This period extended from his earliest woks to the pre-war period (circa 1910), and is characterised by 
Freud's focus on processes rather than topologies and models. 
119   In Chapter 2 I shall show that this future testing, in the form of the question 'che vuoi?', characterises 
the Lacanian model of the unconscious.   
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the ability to totally subdue an unwanted association in its first instance.120 Yet in the case of a 
dream, the repression is of a wished for idea.121 In most cases, this wish is not as destructive to 
the ego-ideal of the patient as a hysteric's suppressed idea. Therefore in this instance, the 
repression must take place along different lines. This distinction between the repressed 
content of the dream and repression in a clinical case is also problematic, as Freud considers 
these two operations as parts of the same rule of psychical life. Freud moves seamlessly from 
hysteria, and then to dreams, and then finally to general mental operations. Quotidian 
operations of the psyche are inferred equally from instances in which the psyche has broken 
down, in the ill patient, or when the subject sleeps:  
 
Repression – relaxation of the censorship – the formation of a compromise, this is the 
fundamental pattern for the generation not only of dreams, but of many other 
psychopathological structures; and in the later cases too we may observe that the 
formation of compromises is accompanied by processes of condensation and 
displacement and by the employment of superficial associations, which we have 
become familiar with from the dream-work.122 
 
The various psychical processes listed above provide evidence of the censor’s existence 
insofar as there is something being repressed, and that this process of repression requires 
some form of agent. At this stage however we have no definitive picture of the operation of 
the censor, beyond a sense that it is positioned somewhere in the psyche, and is preventing the 
content of the unconscious from rising any further on the route towards conscious perception 
(see figure 6 below).  
 
                                                 
120 Parapraxes – unwilled or accidental actions – are described by Freud in The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (1904) 
121 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) pp. 481-483 
122  Freud, S. On Dreams (1901) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 1089 
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Figure 6: Positions of the censor 
 
In the above figure, the transition between stages 1 – 3 show the censor rising through the 
boundary levels. Although '1' may appear to be the least anthropocentric position, in which the 
censor is submerged in the (unknowable) unconscious, so long as there is one quality of 
information in the unconscious which rises up through levels of intelligibility, there is no 
radical outsideness or anti-anthropocentricism in this model. Ultimately, no matter where we 
place the boundary of censorship between the processes of the unconscious, preconscious and 
conscious systems (respectively Ucs, Pcs and Cs), the distinction which the topographical 
model allows us to make is one of degree rather than type and leads to an anthropocentricising 
of the unconsciousness.123 This is because it merely pushes the contents of the unconscious 
away from the conscious thought, rather than show how it is unlike it. It is like a coffee 
plunger: though it forms a barrier, the content and quality of the liquid both above and below 
it is the same. For the 'other place' of the unconscious to be truly anti-anthropocentric, it must 
                                                 
123  The abbreviations Ucs, Pcs and Cs are used extensively by Freud when discussing topographies of the 
unconscious. These abbreviations are also used here when discussing topographies.  
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be more than an 'unknown place'.  
 
To escape an anthropomorphisation of the censorship regime, we must return to the primary 
process / secondary process distinction and reassert the explanatory primacy of the economic 
hypothesis regarding the contents of the psyche. For Freud, the system of repression in the 
psyche is (at least) dualistic.124 This is because there are two separate economic systems in the 
unconscious, and two distinct charges or affects which they individually manipulate. The 
instinctual impulse in system Ucs remains in system Ucs – in this case of ‘primal repression’ 
it is repulsed by the censorial forces of the Pcs. The energy in system Ucs therefore also 
remains in system Ucs.125 It cannot pass through to a higher level of the psyche, so must 
remain in purely unconscious formations. It is this incompatibility between the two systems, 
like the gap in Enschede Station between the German and Dutch rail systems, which means 
that the products of the system Ucs are radically different to those of the Pcs and Cs. 
Unconscious psychical energy is ‘unbound’: it can rapidly switch between different 
instinctual impulses in system Ucs, presumably when there is a stimulus from within the 
organism (need) or from without (opportunity).  A second energetic is at play in system Pcs, 
where energy is tonically bound in fixed patterns. As system Pcs is in an area of the psyche 
which is capable of holding 'ideas', these patterns correspond to the conjunctions and relations 
between these ideas in the psyche. They are grooved by memory and association, tying 
together ideas which occur simultaneously, or which are related to each other.  These links in 
Pcs are not timeless and immortal like the instinctual impulses in Ucs but instead are 
permanently amended in secondary repressions when they break the limits of the censorship:    
 
Our hypothesis is that in our mental apparatus there are two thought-constructing 
agencies, of which the second enjoys the privilege of having free access to 
                                                 
124  In The Unconscious Freud notes that three levels of censorship may exist. Freud, The Unconscious 
(1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3014 
125  And it is this energetic investment which characterises the operation of the unconscious: “In the Ucs 
there are only contents, cathected with greater or lesser strength”. Freud, The Unconscious (1915) from 
Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3009 
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consciousness for its products whereas the activity of the first is in itself unconscious 
and can only reach consciousness by way of the second. On the frontier between the 
two agencies, where the first passes over to the second, there is a censorship, which 
only allows what is agreeable to it to pass through and holds back everything else. 
According to our definition, then, what is rejected by the censorship is in a state of 
repression.126  
 
Though both are agencies are described by Freud as 'thought constructing' this does not 
commit either to being equivalent to 'thoughts' any more than a pile of wood is a finished 
cabin. The important distinction in the text above is between the two systems – one of which 
can communicate with ideas and consciousness and one cannot, unless it passes by this area. 
The primary repression is a simple economic action, an anticathexis repressing the sexual 
impulse, yet this is followed by a secondary repression which operates by association. The 
substituted idea which the psyche attempts to protect itself with – using it as a shield against 
the object of the primary repression – is the nearest association which the psyche can make to 
the repressed, without being so close to it that it also falls foul of the censor.127 Freud gives the 
example of animal fear being a displaced fear of the father – perhaps ‘uncle fear’ would be 
closer as an idea to ‘father fear’, yet this may be so close to the original thought that it would 
allow an easy segue back to that which must be repressed.128 The route to this secondary idea 
is the key to understanding the most basic operation of the psyche. How do we go from idea 
(i) which is censored, through a string of rejected ideas from (ii) to (xvii) which are all too 
close to the original idea (i), and end up with the no longer censored idea (xviii)? I shall look 
at Lacan’s answer to this in the second chapter of the thesis. For Freud however, our answer is 
that xviii was possible; that it proved efficacious for discharging the mobile charge in the 
secondary process. Instead of asking why the idea does the work, we must ask why the work 
of discharge was performable economically. The censorship is therefore an economic 
                                                 
126  Freud, S. On Dreams (1901) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 1089 
127  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3005 
128  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3005 
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apparatus because it does not consider ideas, but is a mechanism for (re)routing forces. Yet the 
problem remains that in many interpretations censorship is compressed into a 'depth' model of 
the psyche as the economics of the dual energetic systems of the psyche are stripped out of it. 
And though this 'short' description of the psyche might be expected when Freud treats a 
patient by explaining the mechanism of repression, its absence in more formal works serves to 
anthropomorphise the unconscious insofar as its processes become a question of depth rather 
than kind. Conversely, an energetic censorship is anti-anthropocentric because its rules are 
formal rather than cognitive. As shown in figure 7 below, in the accounts which are dynamic 
(3) and topographical (2) ideas are 'understood' by the censor which can therefore 'think'. This 
idea of what 'thought' is in this sense shall be discussed further in chapters 4 and 5, 
particularly in the former when Lyotard's claim “The Dreamwork Does Not Think” is 
discussed. At this stage it is our task to follow this line of argument about the economic 
hypotheses, and show that there can be an energetic description of the psychical machinery, as 
this would allow the 'work' to be done by charge or cathexis, rather than idea and 
understanding, as model (1) below illustrates. The path through the topographies of the 
unconscious must therefore be traced as a drive or pulsion rather than the slow clarification or 
formation of an idea.    
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Figure 7: The censor in three models 
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Topographies 
 
An anti-anthropocentric topographical model of the unconscious must emphasise that the 
distinction between primary and secondary processes in the psyche caused by its economic 
operation, the most important of which make the distinction between these two processes of 
type and not degree. The topographical distinction therefore differentiates the primary 
process, characterised by its otherness in opposition to the more 'homely' (anthropocentric) 
secondary processes. In figure 8 below the difference between these contents is clear: those in 
the primary process – labelled as 'the unconscious' – are mechanical and allude to forces, 
whilst those above in the area 'pre-conscious' relate to ideas.  
 Figure 8: A topography of the process of the psyche 
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Freud's topographical theory is described in The Unconscious (1915). Freud divides the 
psychical system into three areas: the Unconscious, Preconscious and Conscious; these parts 
correspond to what can never become known to the subject, what may become known to the 
subject, and what is known to the subject.129 The first division between these areas proceeds 
from his discovery – as recounted above in the cases of Hysteria he encountered – of impulses 
which were not known to consciousness: unconscious ideas. As Freud's systematisation 
progressed, he also distinguished between unconscious ideas which were like those in 
consciousness, and designated the area of these thoughts – potential thoughts – as the 
preconscious. Conversely, those items in the unconscious which would be alien or 
irreconcilable with normal thought; these are the contents of the unconscious. Freud uses the 
metaphor of a building, in which the entry into the closed space from outside – consciousness, 
takes place through a prescribed entrance – the preconscious.130 At this point we encounter 
two essential components in Freud's topographies of the psyche, the ego and the id. The 
primary role of the ego (Ich) is to inhibit the primary process (the id, (Es)).131 The subject is 
the victim of a dualism in which its true desires in the id (primary process) are blocked by a 
set of learned principles which, perversely, it takes to be the essence of itself, its ego (the 
secondary process). Hereto this chapter has discussed the role of clinical psychoanalysis, 
which is to free the subject from the tensions caused by the inherent contradictions within this 
duality. We shall now move on to consider the role of philosophical psychoanalysis, which is 
to disavow the notion that the secondary process – the Cartesian / Kantian subject of thinking 
– is a stable ground upon which philosophical hypotheses can be built. In fact, it is the 
primary process – the true origin of instincts and desire – which is the proper object of 
philosophical investigation, whether it be ontological, epistemological, ethical or aesthetic. 
Any interpretation which anthropomorphises the contents of the unconscious is an attempt to 
                                                 
129  Mitchell and Black argue that Freud's move to topographies of the unconscious is the defining moment 
in psychoanalysis' evolution as a distinct theoretical discourse. Mitchell, M. and Black, S. Freud and Beyond: A 
History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought, (USA: Basic Books, 1995) p. 6 
130   Freud, S. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916-1917) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 
2000 (online text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3369 
131   Laplanche S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 339 
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collapse this dethroning of the subject.   
 
The topographical model of a primary/secondary process distinction is a developmental 
model. It provides a summary of the effects of drive theory and the economic model, though it 
does not inform us how the economic model operates and is therefore analogous to a border, 
which is is the consequence of a historical process of creation. As the secondary process 
develops over time as the organism develops in early childhood, it acquires more and more 
capability to damn up the excess energy of the primary process and fix it into steady 
formations.132 Secondary processes: 'waking thought, attention, judgement, reasoning, 
controlled action' work to repress the desires of the primary process.133 The nascent secondary 
process begins by making only small modifications to the behaviour of the infant (the process 
of reality testing), yet by late childhood the behaviour of the subject is wrapped up within the 
learned conventions of its culture and primary instincts are dominated by the ego.134 This 
restriction is necessary: for healthy psychic well-being, the secondary process must fulfil this 
role of restraining the excesses of the primary process, which, unchecked, would make the 
ineffective, self-destructive or socially unacceptable bids for cathexis which are demonstrated 
by various mental illnesses.  
 
Primary Process Secondary Process 
Ego 
Reality principle 
Memories / Ideas 
'Bound energy' 
Id 
Pleasure principle 
Drives 
'Free' energy 
 
Table 3: Opposing characteristics of the primary and secondary processes 
                                                 
132 Freud states that: “[P]rocesses which are only made possible by a good cathexis of the ego, and which 
represent a moderation of the foregoing, are described as psychical secondary processes”.  This text is not in 
Smith's complete Works. It can be found in Strachey's Standard Edition: Freud, S. 'Project for a Scientific 
Psychology' (1950a [1895]): Anf., 411; S.E., I, 326-27. 
133 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 339 
134 See 'Reality Principle' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: 
Karnac, 1993) p. 379-382 
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The secondary process, though it has the censor as its agent, is not omniscient in its control 
over the output of mental processes. There are still ways in which the original formations of 
the primary process may escape the censor's determination and express themselves. The 
passage of a blocked wish to intelligibility is a convoluted one, but a passage which 
nevertheless allows some aspects of the original wish-formation to be determined after proper 
analysis of the manifest content of the form in which it is finally allowed to be represented: 
usually a dream, but also in jokes, verbal tics or stutters, and perversions. Freud's descriptions 
of this process centre around dream analysis, but he intimates that the processes of the 
dreamwork are analogous of those in waking thought. Therefore, the interpretation of dreams 
is the method by which we can know how the unconscious works in its quest to realise its 
desire. The form these 'quests' take is as the drive and, at this point in this chapter, having 
discussed the populations and topographies of the psyche, a depiction of these dynamic 
investments of desire which traverse it can now be undertaken. My concern with analysis of 
the dreamwork at this point in the present thesis is that interpretation of Freud's hypotheses 
about the dreamwork form the basis of not only his own conceptions of drive theory, but also 
both Lacan and Lyotard's theories of desire, described in Chapters 2 and 4. For Lacan, 
condensation and displacement are the key concepts in his transformation of an economic 
model of the unconscious to a quasi-linguistic one. Lyotard contests this by describing the 
dreamwork as a process which can plastically alter the image-figures which he proposes – in 
opposition to ideas - as the true representatives of desire.  
 
The topographical model is a map which describes the psyche positionally, but does not 
provide an adequate description of the processes which operate within it. It is analogous to a 
map of a glacial valley which represents the contours, and can be used as a shortcut to 
navigate it, but which does not only fail to capture the essence of the formation of that 
landscape under the extreme pressures of the ice floes, but gives no hint of them. To 
understand the forces active in the unconscious we must build upon the economic model by 
considering drive theory, which begins to depict the workings of this alien primary process 
and its strange demands which are uninterested in even reality itself.135   
                                                 
135 The demands of the primary process are posited as being so strange and unacceptable to the secondary 
process that they are regulated under the aegis of the 'reality principle'. See 'Reality Principle' in Laplanche, 
S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 379-382 
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Processes: Instinct, Drive, Desire 
 
The previous discussion of the anthropomorphism of  unconscious has not solved our 
uncertainly regarding the distinction between differences in position and differences of type 
regarding its contents. In this section I shall offer a solution to this impasse by describing the 
operations of drives in the unconscious. Drive theory traces the genesis and development of 
the unconscious' productions. I propose that it is the superior model in Freudian analysis of 
the psyche because drive theory provides both a description of the most elementary processes 
in the unconsciousness and depicts their quotidian operation.136 The resulting 'complete' 
economic hypothesis, which provides a model of the psyche based on the progression of 
drives, is not as abstract as the previous models, as its scale of analysis is much smaller, 
considering the micro operation of the unconscious.  
 
Because it aims at the depiction of a series of processes, the economic model is more 
technical than the cartographies of the unconsciousness described above. Untying the Gordian 
knot of Freud's terminology is the first step to providing a complete definition of a drive and 
its economic effects. This task is difficult because of a number of complications: firstly there 
is the problem of translation, as the language of drive moves between German, French and 
English capitulations. Secondly, there is also a problem of meaning, understanding how words 
are used in a specifically psychoanalytic context. In the next section I shall provide a 
foundation for my analysis of drive theory by considering its lexicon, defining key terms, as 
well as mapping these terms on to biological and psychoanalytic mechanisms, before 
considering the extent to which their use is new or conventional. It shall also prove important 
for my goals in the subsequent chapter as it will provide a foundation for analysis of Lacan 
and his modification of Freud's drive theory.  
 
A key resource for any consideration of the terminology of psychoanalysis is Laplanche's 
Dictionary of Psychoanalysis. Laplanche bridges the divide between the Freudian and 
Lacanian schools and therefore offers definitions which provide reference points between the 
                                                 
136 Indeed, once established by Freud, drive theory becomes the “fundamental building block for all his 
subsequent theorising” Mitchell, M. and Black, S. Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic 
Thought, (USA: Basic Books, 1995) p. 13 
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two differing models of the unconscious. When my reading differs from Laplanche's I shall be 
careful to note the sources of the alternate reading which I construct. Much of Freud's 
terminology was borrowed from terms utilised in the scientific parlance of his time, and 
although Freud invented several terms (such as anaclisis) or was careful to show with others 
how he was using them in a specific way (e.g. repression), concerns regarding intelligibility 
meant that he had to borrow the majority of his concepts from contemporary biology or 
psychology.137 Instinct, Freud tell us, is “[a] conventional basic concept... somewhat obscure 
but which is indispensable to us in psychology”.138 Instinct is always already tied up with the 
concerns of biology, and is noted as being similar to stimulus, the automatic response of an 
organism to outside conditions.139 The difference between an instinctual stimulus (figure 10 
below) and a physiological stimulus (figure 9 below) is that the former derives from the 
internal condition of the organism, rather than as a response to sensations caused by external 
factors.140 In almost all cases, a motor response is sufficient to relive the organism of a 
physiological stimulus. Though this motion is found in an organism as a reflex, it is important 
to note that for Freud, even the most elementary biological reaction to stimulus is one which 
reduces the adverse effect it causes and works towards the return of a homoeostasis in which 
excitement within the organism is minimised. Instinctual impulse, as well as deriving from 
within the organism, is constant rather than intermittent. Another term for such an impulse, 
Freud states, is a “need”.141 As this need cannot be physically escaped, nor will it abate in 
time, its resolution must come in the form of satisfaction. For Freud, this instinctual impulse 
(Triebregung) “appears to us as a concept on the frontier between the mental and the 
                                                 
137 Which partially explains why Freud's writing is more comprehensible than that of Heidegger, who 
invents a greater proportion of his terminology, or invests what he borrows with entirely new meaning.   
138  Freud, S. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2957 
139  Freud, S. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2958 
140 See also Mitchell, M. and Black, S. Freud and Beyond: A History of Modern Psychoanalytic Thought, 
(USA: Basic Books, 1995) p. 13 
141  Freud, S. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2958 
 77 
somatic”.142  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: A physiological stimulus 
 
 
Figure 10: An instinctual impulse stimulus 
 
In the Strachey translation of Instincts and their Vicissitudes the instinct (Trieb) of instinctual 
impulse (Triebregung) is transposed to English as 'instinct' rather than, as is common in later 
renditions 'drive'.143 The use of instinct to describe two differentiated processes (Instinkt and 
                                                 
142  Freud, S. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2960 
143 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 198  
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Trieb) fails to capture the differences between the two.144 I will be adhering to the 
contemporary convention of translating trieb as drive, because its connotations with 
possession, direction and movement capture its tendencies more aptly than the more static or 
passive term instinct.   
 
Freud follows his evolutionary account of drive as instinctual stimulus with a hypothesis 
which aims to breakdown the stages of the internal mechanism of a drive, the famous fourfold 
conception of the drive.145 The drive's primary cause is pressure (Drang). Pressure is 
quantitative and dynamic; there is a certain quantity of it in any drive and it is always actively 
demanding its own satisfaction. The pressure is resolved by attaining the aim (Ziel) of the 
drive. Freud tells us that the aim of each drive is fixed, though the object (Objekt) of the drive, 
the route which the drive will take to reach the aim is not fixed; on the contrary, objects are 
malleable. Given the rigidity of the aim of the drive and the pressure emanating from its 
source (Quelle) and seeking resolution, Freud's hypothesis about drives operates on the same 
basis as the reflexive response to physiological stimulus – that is, its aim is to reduce the 
pressure to the minimum level and restore homoeostasis. Conceptualising this model, we are 
presented with a sequential traversal of a pathway from the source to the aim, which is 
enacted at every stage by pressure – this pressure diminishing as we get closer to the aim. 146 
 
                                                 
144 Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 196 
145  Freud's discussion of the stages of the drive can be found in Freud, S. Instincts and Their Vicissitudes 
(1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2960 - 2961 
146 See 'Pressure' in Laplanche, S and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) 
p.330 
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Figure 11: The path of the drive. The width of the bar is proportional to the quantity of 
pressure 
 
The key questions about anthropocentricism in Freud's drive hypothesis revolves around how 
the drives as they exist in the primary process have 'knowledge' about their possible 
realisation. If we look at the unconscious as being a biological machine, our first hypothesis 
might be that the source is 'hard wired' to the aim in the brain: it is an innate property the 
subject is born with. This seems to capture the universality which – along with other 
psychoanalysts – Freud and Lacan attribute to the most basic drives.147 Yet hard wiring does 
not explain why the objects are malleable rather than fixed, and that they are subject to change 
or, if the drives are products of evolution, why their objects can be so convoluted – hence the 
vicissitudes and travails attributed to the drive. A more plausible explanation would be that 
the path to the object is created in the subject by trial and error. In this reading, development 
of the organism is a slow process in which it learns from failure and successes, repeating 
actions which can enact a return to homoeostasis. Positive feedback is the salient  factor in 
determining what will remain and negative feedback determines what will be effaced. This 
model is therefore cybernetic.148 Feedback of this type in a biological system is indifferent to 
                                                 
147 Examples would include drives relating to infantile feeding and excrement, familial relations, and 
sexual instincts.  
148 Cybernetics, the study of self-regulating systems governed by feedback and communication, is a key 
concept in the present thesis, especially in the later chapters. Its modern use dates from Weiner, N. 
Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine.(Cambridge USA: MIT Press, 
1961) 
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the constitution of the object by means of which it can be released; it does not aim at objects, 
but at internal affects and its own cybernetic stasis. When Freud describes the unconscious – 
the other place – as lacking anthropocentric traits associated with the secondary process, such 
an absence of 'thinking' is only possible if it is regulated by formal rules like those of a 
cybernetic system. As such, the unconscious calculates its goals not in terms of plans, ideas or 
preferences which all tend towards the anthropic; it mechanically selects the most rapid path 
to the aim. In this mechanism, the rules of the unconscious are brutally simple: in the case of 
success a pathway is created or reinforced – as Freud proposes, either chemically or 
mechanically – along whatever route proves the most efficacious in realising the aim of the 
drive. In the case of failure, it re-routes until cathexis can be achieved. 
 
A final reading of the drive is that the object is established in a system of connections between 
the source and the aim which are established logically. This final reading would be consistent 
with a Lacanian interpretation of Freud. This reading seems problematic regarding the genesis 
of the drives in the child, as we might ask at which point does the child exhibit drives rather 
than reflexes? The instincts which the drives are based on appear to be before language, or at 
least mark a transition of the subject to language, yet once they are capitulated as drives these 
instincts become ideational. Freud's contention that objects can carry multiple drives to their 
aim would seem to point towards an economical explanation of the drive rather than a logical 
one. If the object has fidelity to numerous drives, and if the drive can posses numerous 
objects, acquisition of the object would fail to reach the aim of the drive. Once a system of 
drives had been established in the subject, the myriad inter-connections of the objects of their 
desire would result in a paralysis of the system. I shall re-consider Lacan's conception of drive 
more sympathetically after my exposition of Freud; for now, it will suffice to note that Lacan's 
reading of Freud – that the unconscious is a language-like structure rather than a biological 
mechanism – requires the abandonment of seeing the formation of the drive as taking place in 
chronological time, this register being replaced by logical time.149 I shall return to this key 
distinction when talking about Lacan's theories of complexes and imagos.  
 
The apparent biologism in Freud's view of the drive is reinforced by the remainder of Instincts 
                                                 
149 See Lacan, J. 'Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty: A New Sophism' (1945), in 
Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English  [trans. Bruce Fink], (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
2006)  
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and their Vicissitudes. Freud specifically says that the source (Quelle) is either chemical or 
mechanical – whichever of these processes may be the case, both are rooted in the organic 
body and are biological. Freud's final summation of drives re-emphasises the biological.150 
Freud's discussion of the neuroses which the drives can affect in Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes could be considered more amenable to Lacanianism, an interpretation I shall 
consider in due course. Yet before arriving at that point, I shall follow the economic 
progression of Freud's theory of instincts and drives in their transition out of the purely 
unconscious, and to their presentation as wishes, as is elucidated in The Interpretation of 
Dreams. We have seen that the terminus of a Freudian drive is reached at a discharge of 
pressure enabled by traversing the passage through the object. The drive is indifferent to the 
method of its discharge, preferring only that the process is accomplished as rapidly as 
possible. A wish (Wunsch) is an unconscious formation – as is the drive – but a wish is 
connected with an object (confusingly, not in the sense of the object of a drive described 
above, but an object in the sense of something which can be the intention of a thought).151 As 
a result of this, a wish is in some way comprehensible to conscious thought, whereas all 
speculation about the nature of a drive is ultimately unable to grasp its true nature.152 Yet the 
wish is often blocked from fully manifesting itself in consciousness by the censor, the agent of 
repression described above whose role is to patrol the border between the unconscious and the 
later processes of thought. However, as we have seen, manifestations of wishes, though 
blocked on their path to consciousness in the awakened subject, are able to present themselves 
                                                 
150 "We may sum up by saying that the essential feature in the vicissitudes undergone by instincts lies in the 
subjection of the instinctual impulses to the influences of the three great polarities that dominate mental life. 
Of these three polarities we might describe that of activity-passivity as the biological, that of ego-external 
world as the real, and finally that of pleasure-unpleasure as the economic polarity".  Freud, S. Instincts and 
Their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2974 
151 The term 'idea' would be useful in this context, if it was not otherwise employed by Freud.  
152  “When we […] speak of an unconscious instinctual impulse or of a repressed instinctual impulse, the 
looseness of phraseology is a harmless one. We can only mean an instinctual impulse the ideational 
representative of which is unconscious, for nothing else comes into consideration”. Freud, S. The 
Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3000 
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– albeit in a distorted form – in the content of dreams.153 For Freud, the wish is laid down in 
mnemonic traces from the subject's infancy which are associated with the earliest satisfactions 
of the child.154 As they derive from memory, wishes are not indifferent about their realisation, 
instead trying to repeat the conditions of their genesis. The wish can be associated with the 
satisfaction of component instincts (Partialtreib) via the acquisition of objects or with 
replication of a disposition or scene. The interventions which drives may make regarding the 
behaviour of the subject are unknown to it, as they are rendered unintelligible by virtue of 
their place in the primary process and blocked by repression from ever escaping it. 
Satisfaction of the drive results in the economic consequence of a reduction of psychic 
pressure in the organism; and this satisfaction is its only objective. Even after their resolution, 
the drives themselves remain unchanged in the organism, as Freud explains in The 
Unconscious.155  
 
In the case of a wish, the content of the mnemonic traces associated with it may pass from the 
domain of the primary process to the secondary process so long as they do not conflict with 
the reality principle (Realitätsprinzip).156 The reality principle is created in the psyche after the 
primary processes are laid down. Drives operate according to the pleasure principle 
(Lustprinzip), seeking the pleasure that derives from their resolution. Once the objects of a 
drive are known to an infant, the child's immediate strategy will be to hallucinate the objects 
which will allow them to realise the drive. Though this strategy might be initially successful, 
it will eventually produce no satisfaction because there is no passage to the aim through this 
imaginary-object. Freud's example of this failure is the child's weaning.157 Once the child is no 
                                                 
153  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3010 
154  Freud, S. The Interpretation  of Dreams (1900) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 626 
155  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3009 
156 Though Moretti notes that the reality principle “is already uncertain and unstable in Freud himself” its 
operation in this model is as a mediator of the pleasure principle.  Moretti, A. Signs taken for Wonders ( London: 
Verso, 2005) p. 39 
157  Freud, S. Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (1926) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online 
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longer satisfied by the imaginary breast which it can hallucinate, it must take into account the 
conditions of the external world rather than its own internal mental representations if it is to 
acquire access to the breast. One key objection to this genesis of the reality principle is why 
hallucination should lose is efficacy, and the child needs to abandon the strategy. Laplanche 
argues that contrary to Freud, the reality principle might be the first to be established, in the 
case of weaning investing the breast as an object of need which fulfils the child's desire to 
reduce hunger.158 Development of the sexual instinct takes place as the survival-instinct is 
fulfilled and the partial object of the drive is enjoyed. The question here is one of the 
differences between self preservative and sexual instincts, and which are the initial set of 
instincts. An alternate solution to picking one or the other is to place these two sets of instincts 
on the same level, attributing the infant's satisfaction, derived as it is from any component 
instinct's satisfaction, to be one of polymorphous perversity. From a strictly biological 
perspective, no differentiation is possible between drives based on their role in the organism's 
survival and those regarding its replication. Instead, the return of pleasure they offer the 
psyche can be explained by their ability to produce chemical states in the brain.159 No matter 
which instinct is originary, it eventually comes to pass that the subject must temper its 
attempts to immediately maximise its pleasure according to the knowledge which it has 
learned through experience. The failure of hallucination requires the child to test a new 
strategy, which, strictly working towards its goals, is concerned with discovering the simplest 
ways to acquire satisfaction. Some strategies will fail and be disregarded, others will produce 
rewards and be repeated. The child will learn not only how to call to maximise the chance of 
alerting its nurse, but also when to call, learning that targeted appeals can be more effective 
than permanent ones. The reality principle is plastic, evolving throughout the child's 
                                                                                                                                                        
text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 4286 
158  Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 380 
159 The production of neurotransmitters. I shall return to this in the final part of this study. I introduce it 
now to allow a general overview of the progression of this writing, wherein neither Freud's 'hydraulic' 
economy or Lacan's structure of semantic links will be found as convincing a model for the operation of the 
unconscious (both in terms of its processes and that which is processed within it) as the model of a cybernetic 
machine introduced by Lyotard and developed by Land. Freud was always careful to note that future 
developments in neurobiology would be be of considerable help in determining the mechanism of the 
unconscious. 
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development.  
 
The unconscious is a system whose purpose is the minimisation of the tensions in the 
organism derived from internal stimuli: the “'reduction of tension', which, according to Freud, 
characterises all forms of pleasure”.160 The shortest and swiftest path to this draining of 
pressure – cathexis – is for the primary process' demand to be presented to the secondary 
process, and for it to be realised: economically, this exhausts the energy attached to the drive. 
The organism's strategy if the object of the drive cannot be immediately attained so simply 
can be the hallucination of the object; an attempt to convince the primary process that the 
demand has been met yet if this fails to produce satisfaction the primary process will remain 
agitated and there will be disequilibrium which causes displeasure: there must therefore be a 
binding of the cathexis attached to the drive by the secondary processes. Secondary process 
binding is coalescence into stable formations which persist in the psyche: ideas.161 The 
retention of cathected energy in the secondary process is determined purely by the efficiency 
of the cathexis, therefore the nature of the cathexis – which ideas it occupies – is irrelevant so 
long as it does its work. For example, a sexual drive could be sedentarised by the idea of 
abstinence before marriage, courtly love, or any other idea which is effective in reducing the 
discomfort the pressure of the drive causes the organism. That there are two different areas of 
the psyche which deal with the cathexis of libidinal energy is problematic for Freud because it 
introduces a dualism into the energetic hypothesis. How, we might ask, does the unbound, 
free ranging energy of the primary process become transformed into the the stable circuits of 
secondary process formations? Freud described the eternal qualities of the drive in The 
Unconscious. These descriptions set out the basic tenets regarding the status of investments in 
the unconscious which provide the basis of anti-anthropocentric readings of  its operation:  
 
The processes of the system Ucs. are timeless; i.e. they are not ordered temporally, 
are not altered by the passage of time; they have no reference to time at all. 
Reference to time is bound up, once again, with the work of the system Cs. 
 
                                                 
160 Moretti, A. Signs Taken for Wonders (London: Verso, 2005) p. 39 
161  'The primary and secondary processes can be defined in purely economic terms–the primary process as 
immediate discharge, the secondary process as inhibition postponement of satisfaction and diversion.' 
Laplanche S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 338 
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The Ucs. processes pay just as little regard to reality. They are subject to the pleasure 
principle; their fate depends only on how strong they are and on whether they fulfil 
the demands of the pleasure-unpleasure regulation. 
 
To sum up: exemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobility of 
cathexes), timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality – these are 
the characteristics which we may expect to find in processes belonging to the system 
Ucs.162 
 
And that:  
 
The processes of the system Pcs. display – no matter whether they are already 
conscious or only capable of becoming conscious – an inhibition of the tendency of 
cathected ideas towards discharge. When a process passes from one idea to another, 
the first idea retains a part of its cathexis and only a small portion undergoes 
displacement.163  
 
The opposition between primary and secondary processes corresponds to that between the two 
ways in which psychical energy circulates, according to whether it is ‘free’ or ‘bound’. It 
should also be seen as parallel with the contrast between the pleasure principle and the reality 
principle.164  
 
Breuer assume[s] the existence of two different stages of cathectic energy in mental 
life: one in which that energy is tonically "bound" and the other in which it moves 
freely and presses towards discharge, I think that this discrimination represents the 
deepest insight we have gained up to the present into the nature or nervous energy, and 
                                                 
162   Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3009 
163   Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3011 
164  Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 1993) p. 339 
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I do not see how we are to evade such a conclusion.165  
 
We are left with another decisive question about anthropocentricism in the unconscious, 
namely how unconscious drives move into, and become settled in the secondary process, 
when the secondary process is so unlike the the primary process in respect of the nature of its 
energy and the likeness to 'ideas' of its contents. Freudian psychoanalysis must explain the 
transition between the intense and volatile state of energy which moves through the id and the 
constrained energy within the ego. Though considering solutions to this disjunction raises 
more questions than provides answers at this stage in the present thesis, I shall note some 
potential solutions here, as these lines of inquiry are followed throughout this work. 
 
The first solution to this problem is to accept the synchronous dualism between the primary 
and secondary processes: that they act in parallel with each other; unpleasure is removed by 
each according to its own methods. As the primary process receives mechanical relief through 
the removal of the pressure by arriving at the aim of the drive, a separate symbolic relief 
provided by the recreation of the wished for memory traces takes place in the secondary 
process. The flaw of this solution is that it only seems to work with drives which can be 
simply realised. Once the drive is blocked from resolution by the ego instincts and the 
psychical process hereto considered, something very different to a wishful image must be 
created. Perhaps then, the process of the dream work, or of fantasy, are the agents which allow 
a draining of cathexis which cannot be realised through the acquisition of the object. In this 
reading that the process of the dreamwork provides hallucinatory satisfaction of the subject's 
desires is proof of the ability of the image to perform the cathexis of energy in the psyche.166  
However, this again fails to describe all operations of the psyche as dreamwork and fantasy 
can sometimes reiterate the subject's failure to achieve satisfaction, acting as intensifiers of 
the energetic disequilibrium. In the case of Little Hans, the fantastic fear of the horse only 
intensifies his fear of the father and the worsening of his 'nonsense'.  
                                                 
165  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3011 
166  And this goal of cathexis is seen even in such extreme cases as the “Father, don't you see I'm burning” 
dream.   Freud, S. The Interpretation  of Dreams (1900) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf )  pp. 945 - 947 
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The primary process / secondary process divide can be conceptualised from an energetic 
standpoint as a change in state of psychic energy:  This would be analogous to a phase-
transition, the solidification of the energy attached to drives by the secondary process. As the 
'watery' liquid drives of the primary process transfer to the secondary process they become 
'icy', solidified. Their properties change though the base material of which they are made does 
not. Yet, as has been repeatedly stated, drives are constant and unchanging, If their energetic 
product is merely calcifying in 'solid' formations once it moves to the secondary process, then 
either these formations must constantly grow (as the drive's energy is constancy produced by 
the primary process), or quantity of energy has a minimal effect when in the secondary 
process – which goes against Freud's energetic hypothesis and the idea that the pleasure 
principle attempts to achieve return to equilibrium at a homoeostatic zero of energy.  
 
Perhaps the energetic hypothesis itself is a poor analogy for mental activity. When Freud talks 
about evolution, neurones, or chemical states of the brain, modern biology can be used to 
support what he says. When Freud talks about energy: in reservoirs, channels of it, stores of it, 
it freely roaming around the primary process, in these cases it is hard to think these ideas can 
relate to actual stores of energy in the brain. In the next chapter I shall show how Lacan 
attempts to replace the role of energy as the motor of the unconscious with his conception of 
desire. In essence, this replaces the economic with a linguistic motor which drives the 
unconscious. As we shall see, there are many reasons for supporting Lacan's psychoanalytic 
theory. However, when the psyche is described as dynamic rather than energetic we might 
object by inquiring where the end of a dynamic process which merely translates information 
into different states might be? An energetic system has a goal: pressure ceases to exist once 
the aim has been reached. A linguistic system of substitution has no end. The organs which are 
the part-objects of component instincts are driven by biological processes, not linguistic ones.  
 
A final strategy would be the replacement of Freud's homoeostatic zero to which the primary 
process wants all pressures to be reduced with a variable level of tension which can be 
tolerated. Instead of seeing the unconscious as a perfect system which will cathect all energy 
by one way or another – even if that way must be through the path of madness – it would be 
better understood as a failing system, capable of breaking down at some moments and over-
performing at others. If this is the case there is no need to expect that the primary and 
secondary processes will work in perfect parallel, like a pair of synchronised swimmers 
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bobbing in the depths of the psyche. With the introduction of the death drive (Todtstrieb) in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) Freud indicates that the unconscious is capable of 
working towards disequilibrium. I shall return to this when considering Lyotard's defence of 
Freud against Lacan's interpretation.  
 
Hereto, the operation of a number of the contents, constituents or processes of the 
unconscious has been delineated, including  fourfold drives, wishes, and the economic 
systems of primary and secondary processes. It is now our task to consider the evolution of 
the drive from its origins as a true instinct through to its presentation in the mature psyche as a 
wishful impulse. The topographical model allows us to speak of the manifest content of an 
idea, whether this idea can be designated in the systems Ucs, Pcs or Cs, and allows us to 
speculate about the nature of the latent idea which may have lead to the production of the 
manifest one. It also assesses the desirability of an idea with regard to the ego-ideal. Because 
it assumes the existence of an unconscious system underlying conscious representation, 
Freud’s description of the economic model requires the notion of censorship and repression as 
outlined in the topographical model: forces which establish the barrier between the realm of 
the unconscious and the domain of the subject. Without this evidence from applied 
psychoanalysis, the existence of a set of unconscious desires would be conjectured; and 
therefore unsuitable for use as the basis of a drive theory.167 However, through the 
hypothecation of the existence of this space in the psyche, holding strange impulses which are 
alien to the normal ‘thought’ of the subject, we have built a model of thought – or the genesis 
of thought – beginning deep in the unconscious and terminating with the effects of these 
unconscious processes in the subject’s actions. What qualities can we attribute to the 
unconscious, the space in which drives operate at their most basic level, which would 
demonstrate its anti-antropocentricism? For Freud: “The nucleus of the Ucs consists of 
instinctual representatives which seek to discharge their cathexis; that is to say, of wishful 
impulses”.168 Here we have three components: (a) instinctual representatives (b) cathected 
                                                 
167  Freud uses “parapraxes and dreams in healthy people” and “symptom[s] or obsession[s] in the sick” as 
his justification for positing an unconscious.  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. 
Smith, I., 2000  (online text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2991 
168  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3009 
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energy (c) wishful impulses. The formula given is therefore as follows: 
 
(a)  Instinctual representative + (b) psychical energy = (c) wishful impulses  
 
To fully understand the anti-anthropcentricism of the Freudian psyche according to the 
economic model we need to understand these components and define how (a) the instinctual 
representative is formed and how (b) energetics in the unconscious system operate, before 
going on to trace the travails of (c) a wishful impulse through its path towards realisation. As 
we have seen, Freud’s explanation of (a) and (b) owes a lot to biology.169 The biological base, 
which is essentially animalistic is a legacy of pre-human species which did not have a distinct 
consciousness. This, above all others, is the area of Freudian theory which Lacan most 
explicitly denounces – for Lacan, desire is very specifically human. Because of this 
divergence, one of Land’s primary objections to Lacan is that he ignores Freud’s biologism, 
severing the connection between the animal instinct at the base of the drive and the form of its 
final object of desire. But for Freud an instinctual impulse (Triebregung) is an instinct (Treib) 
which can be stirred (regung). Stirred is used here in the sense of an awakening or growth of 
emotional charge. Instinctual impulses are therefore the primary inhabitants of the subject’s 
unconscious. They exist there with the constant potential to become aroused, should the 
possibility of the realisation become feasible. In many instances this is very unlikely, as they 
are repressed by the preconscious, yet they still remain alert, waiting for an opportunity. The 
unconscious is therefore populated by numerous entities whose origins are found in pre-
congnitive animalistic impulses. The genesis of these impulses is therefore anti-
anthropocentric as it is before 'thought'. Furthermore, though they go through changes during 
the life of the organism, their modification takes place along mechanical lines – they are 
modified insofar as they are able to find opportunities to discharge themselves under the rule 
of repetition. In this formal process repetition, again, is quite unlike the thought of the 
Cartesian subject whose volition is determined by the use of reason.  
 
Instinctual impulses are subsumed into the economic model by Freud in Instincts and their 
Vicissitudes, where their ability to create affect is coupled to the amount of pressure which 
they exert (attempt to cathect).170 In Instincts and their Vicissistudes Freud situates the 
                                                 
169   For example: “Freud’s book is still haunted by biology” Bowie, M. Lacan (UK: Fontana, 1991) p.5 
170   Freud, S. Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
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instinctual impulse between: “[T]he three great polarities that dominate mental life. Of these 
three polarities we might describe that of activity-passivity as the biological, that of ego-
external world as the real, and finally that of pleasure-unpleasure as the economic polarity"171 
This should not be conceptualised as a triangulation or Venn diagram, where the instinctual 
impulse is equally subject to or determined by three different systems. Instead, these three 
polarities make the separate registers which Freud uses to describe the creation, existence, and 
attempted realisation of an instinctual impulse. The biological determines the initial creation 
of the pulsion, the economic describes its attempts at realisation and, finally, the ego blocks or 
allows this realisation.  
 
Instinctual impulses derive from biological instincts. These simple biological urges such as 
nourishment, defecation, or erotic contact are the goal of the developing child. These instincts 
are heavily – though the child does not yet know it – incentivised by the dopamine system in 
the brain. As the child develops, it learns that the route to the realisation of one of these 
instincts is never devoid of the presence of auxiliary objects and phenomena. Nourishment 
must come from the breast, which is part of the mother – and the nourishment is never timely 
without the baby’s cry, or other associated rituals of feeding. As the organism grows, more 
and more phenomena become associated with the satisfaction of its instincts, and the number 
of instinctual impulses populating the unconscious can grow. The instinctual impulse, then, is 
the germ of desire in the child, and later in the adult to enact these connections of objects 
which have brought past satisfaction. Their products can be extremely ‘simple’: the 
acquisition of a glass of pure water, or incredibly convoluted – as many clinical cases attest. 
 
Because they can be formed in early infancy, Freud describes the instinctual impulses as 
polymorphously perverse. Polymorphous perversion is explained by the infant’s inability to 
compartmentalise its instincts. Instead, anything which enables the fulfilment of a component 
instinct (these instincts are essentially, as Lacan memorably describes them, towards the 
stimulation of the holes in the human body) becomes erotic to the child. As the instinctual 
impulse is in the system Ucs, it is ‘mute’. Its demands are never for a thing, or an idea, or 
even a set-up [dispositif] – not for anything that can be enunciated – but are rather the desire 
                                                                                                                                                        
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf )  
171   Freud, S. Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2974  
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to act, to begin the creation of such a set-up.172 It is a motor of action, causing the organism to 
try and repeat past strategies for satisfaction. These characteristics of the drive provide the 
basis of a reading of the drive as being anti-anthropocentric because it, unlike the Cartesian 
subject, does not operate on the basis of what it wants: there is no will, no thing aimed for, no 
volition. All that the unconscious possesses is desire to act in the sense of achieving suitable 
cathexis of its energies, and a set of pathways which have been previously established to enact 
this. Operating under the rubrics of pressure and repetition, it is formal and automatic rather 
than idealist, as illustrated in the table below.  
 
Stage of drive 
creation 
Formation Method of 
realisation 
Problem of 
realisation 
Method of 
amendment 
Process Biological  Mechanical  Censorship 
based on formal 
criteria  
Formal change 
under repetition 
compulsion  
Does it involve 
ideas 
No (though they 
present as 
needs, their 
formation is 
biological) 
No No No 
Does it involve 
volition 
No No No No (though 
subject can 
become super 
invested in the 
repetition 
(addicted)) 
Is it before 
consciousness 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Table 4: Characteristics of Freudian drives 
                                                 
172  Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3001 
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The unconscious has other distinct characteristics which separate it from the rest of the psyche 
which are: “[E]xemption from mutual contradiction, primary process (mobile cathexis), 
timelessness, and replacement of external by psychical reality”.173 I shall return to these later 
in the thesis, sufficing to note at this point that all are very different to anthropocentric 
thought and conscious ideas. Yet the characteristics which most separate it from system Pcs or 
Cs are the plurality of the processes, namely that there are a multitude of them in concurrent 
operation, and that the unconscious is therefore filled with them. These entities in the 
unconscious wait like terracotta guards of Qin Shi Huang: steadfast, eternal, unmoving. This 
plurality is especially strange when coupled with the fact of their concurrent operation: 
“These instinctual impulses are co-ordinate with one another, exist side by side without being 
influenced by one another, and are exempt from mutual contradiction.”174 Freud’s greatest 
metaphor might be his likening of these impulses to the build up of a city, in which the 
modern layers may be on the surface, yet below them still exist all of the previous foundations 
of older versions of the city. Like the ruins of Troy (figure 1.5), the unconscious consists of 
immortal formations for which, despite the possibility of a later version having been 
constructed, all previous versions still stand, and even more than still being in existence, can 
still create affect should they be cathected.  With this metaphor we see how instinctual 
impulses are at once both timeless and malleable. Once the organism has learned a path to 
satisfy a component instinct, it never forgets it, it never gives up its knowledge of the 
compulsion to put it together, yet it might have found other, superior strategies as it has 
evolved to get to the satisfaction of the instinct by other routes: “[A]lthough the ultimate aim 
of each instinct remains unchangeable, there may be different paths to the same ultimate 
aim”.175  
 
 
                                                 
173   Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3010 
174   Freud, S. The Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3009 
175   Freud, S. Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 2960  
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Figure 12: The Remains of Troy176  
 
System Ucs is therefore populated by a number of entities, all of which are constantly 
‘scanning’ for the opportunity to enact themselves.177 This opportunity presents itself if the 
instinctual impulse’s favoured creations are activated in the psyche, by stimulation during the 
day, or at night, as part of a dream construction.178 The degree to which the instinctual impulse 
aims to enact itself is related to the quantity of pressure which is acting upon it. This pressure 
is very mobile in the system Ucs, and can quickly pass from impulse to impulse. 
 
At this point, Freud’s economic terminology must be clarified. For Freud, the concept of 
                                                 
176  From Pcs.org (available at http://www.pcs.org/blog/item/was-there-a-real-troy/ ) 
177  The characteristics of these entities are described in Section V of The Unconscious. See Freud, S. The 
Unconscious (1915) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000  (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) pp. 3009 - 3012 
178    In this latter case, the instinctual impulse may be the originator of the stimulus.   
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pressure is – metaphorically – like a hydraulic apparatus, and the pressure is the force which 
is built up in the psyche. As the psychical system’s primary role is to ensure the correct and 
safe circulation of this force in the psyche, the psyche aims at the cathexis (draining) of any 
pressure which would not be damaging to the organism. This cathexis manifests itself as 
pleasure.179 The awareness of the psyche about the nature of the drive and how pressing the 
force behind its release is allows an ordering of the drives in the higher levels of psychical 
operation, in the Pcs. When the instinctual impulse escapes the confined of the system Ucs, 
and gains the possibility of moving to Pcs or Cs, it becomes instinct or pulsion [Trieb], 
Freud’s more general term for these wishful constructions.  
 
As we have seen, in Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915) Freud describes four components 
of a drive: pressure (Drang), aim (Ziel), object (Objekt), and source (Quelle). Pressure and 
aim correspond to (a) (instinctual representative) and (b) (psychical energy) as described 
above – in the case of pulsion as well as the instinctual impulse – as the motor apparatus 
driving the pulsion is situated by Freud in system Ucs. The development of the pulsion over 
time – according to the principles above, a multiplication of inhuman entities rather than static 
cycle of effacement and replacement, is described by variations in the 'object' component of 
the drive. Source relates to somatic functions in the body. The variations in source partly 
explain the differences between different groups of instincts, for example, the difference 
between the sexual organs and the digestive organs partially explains how the vicissitudes of 
these drives go through different pathways: the difference between the structure of satisfaction 
in the strip club and the restaurant is in part related to the nature of the organ through which 
pleasure is to be attained.  
 
It is quite possible to speak of all parts of the pulsion in terms of economic and biological 
models except the object, which, being a thing, is obviously most closely aligned to idealism 
and the products of consciousness. Yet so long as the biological side of the instinct is satisfied 
according to the economics of the psyche, the exact nature of the object through which this 
achieved is a matter of indifference to the system Ucs. As a result, the selection of an object in 
a drive is conditioned by its ability to ensure the cathexis that the other three require, and, as 
has been demonstrated, the product of a formal process rather than a cognitive or rational one. 
Whatever the nature of this object may be is quite arbitrary; so long as it works, it suffices as 
                                                 
179    See footnote 115.  
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a component of the drive. 
 
At this point in the present thesis, it has been demonstrated that even the quotidian operation 
of the unconscious is anti-anthropocentric, insofar as it is generated by a set of precognitive 
principles. The effects of this are far reaching, and destabilise many of the concepts which 
philosophy had previous taken for granted such as the extent of volition, the status of subject 
as the seat of reasoning consciousness, and, of course, that nature of what it is to desire or 
want. They serve to decentre the traditional subject of philosophy, and to place importance in 
unconscious rather than conscious thought. As we have considered Freud's theoretical 
depiction of the psyche we have seen that there are many aspects of its operation which are 
very unlike traditional conceptions of consciousness. However, the question of depth still 
remains problematic as the unconscious – in practice rather than in theory – could be, and 
indeed was treated like a rational entity whose products were ideas.  
 
Freud's model of the psyche makes its most decisive break with the idea of a rational 
Cartesian conciousness in the model of the death drive. Death drive is the ultimate avatar of 
the non-human instinct underneath the subject: it is variously conceived as a compulsion to 
repeat, ruin, suffer, return to a state of nothingness, breakdown and to revisit trauma. It is also 
Janus-faced, being described as both the motor of creation and destruction in the psyche. 
What death drive is not however is, as in its most facile reading, a simple desire for what 
consciousness would conceive of as 'death'. I shall therefore devote the remainder of this 
chapter to a consideration of Freud's depiction of the death drive, to provide the basis of a 
reading of its importance as the most radically anti-anthropocentric part of the Freudian 
apparatus, following Land's emphasis on its extreme otherness to the Cartesian subject of 
philosophy: 
 
The death drive is not a desire for death, but rather a hydraulic tendency to the 
dissipation of intensities. In its primary dynamics it is utterly alien to everything 
human, not least the three great pettinesses of representation, egoism, and hatred. The 
death drive is Freud's beautiful account of how creativity occurs without the least 
effort, how life is propelled into its extravagances by the blindest and simplest of 
tendencies, how desire is no more problematic than a river's search for the sea.180  
                                                 
180    Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 282 
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Anthropocentricism and the Death Drive 
 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) was considered by Freud to be a work of biology, as he 
explicitly states in the introduction to The Ego and the Id.181 His methodology is to propose a 
hypothesis which explains a newly observed tendency which was not adequately described by 
current psychoanalytic theory, namely the compulsion to repeat horrific experiences. There 
were a surfeit of such cases which had been attributed to shell shock acquired in the Great 
War. Beyond the Pleasure Principle presents the final capitalisation of Freud's mature model 
of the psyche, and it moves drive theory beyond the domain of pleasure, exploring the 
interrelation of repletion and the psyche's operation.  
 
Up to this point, Freud's model of the mind and its mechanisms of repression posited a 
borderline between thoughts which were available to consciousness and those which resided 
purely in the domain of the unconscious, and which could only have effects of the psyche by 
influencing the productions of consciousness. Hence, we have patients like Anna O, who was 
unable to drink water without ever having access to, in consciousness, the reason for this 
inability. This recollection had been pushed by the dynamic forces in the psyche over this 
borderline between conscious and unconscious. Yet investments which take this journey can 
become tied to secondary objects which provide a link between the consciousness and the 
repressed thought, hence the triggers of hysterical episodes.  
 
The role of the unconscious here seems to be a rather useful one evolutionarily. The 
instinctual economy, as previously shown in Figure 10 is a closed economy confined within 
the organism. Traumatic transfer of this energy is problematic within this circuit because there 
is not possibility of externalising it. In the unconscious regime we have a force, censorship, 
which prevents – usually effectively – the recollection of unpleasant or damaging episodes in 
the life of the subject. In a clinical setting the unconscious is a mechanism which the analyst 
is tasked with keeping in an optimal state of order, providing cures to those patients who have 
come to a point where the mechanism of repression has broken down, in which case they are 
                                                 
181    Freud, S. The Ego and the Id (1923) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   
http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3966 
 97 
suffering from an excess of force and affect in their internal psychic economies, which is 
failing to cathect the products of its pulsions. This breakdown is fundamentally caused by the 
tying of the repressed memory to the secondary object whose distance is so far from the 
unconscious' objectives that it can not function as cathexis in the secondary process. Because 
the talking cure aimed to bring a more originary object back to the memory of the subject, if 
there was a movement to unlock the repressed content, it would cure the patients symptoms.  
 
The first example of a tendency to deviate from the pleasure principle observed by Freud is 
that found in traumatic neurosis. Freud was afforded a number of sufferers of this condition 
which had been caused by their experience of trench warfare in the Great War. The 
recollections of these former soldiers of the traumatic events in the trenches while they dreamt 
seemed to go directly against the pleasure principle: they were recalling memories which were 
very unpleasant to them. Again, we see that Freud has collected a number of cases which 
provide evidence of a psychological problem which goes against what was then thought of the 
model of the psyche; indeed, this particular example provided him with many patients as 
examples. When we hear later of the case of Little Hans and the Fort/Da game there are 
questions which must be asked about the validity of making a speculative conclusion based on 
only one case. In the instance of war neurosis this is not a concern as the number of cases is so 
large. Freud’s first concern is to eliminate the possibility of mechanical causes for war 
neurosis. The correspondence of physical trauma and later problems in “railway disasters and 
other accidents” might lead to the mistaken conclusion that neurosis derives from that 
trauma.182 In the case of shell shock and other near-hysterical problems suffered by the 
returning soldiers it was no longer the case that all were the victims of an injury, many instead 
having been subjected to only sensory experiences of the horrors of the trenches.  
 
The tendency to go against the pleasure principle seen in these psychical formations, if not 
attributable to a physical breaking down of a normal structure, must indicate that there is 
either: (1) a tendency to go against the instinct to seek pleasure in the brain, that is, a ‘death 
drive’ which deliberately aims at some other goal; (2) a perverse pleasure which is gained 
either through mastery or repetition of the event (3) that the psyche is intrinsically a flawed 
system which cannot efficiently, accurately, or regularly guarantee the correct cathexation of 
                                                 
182   Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3718 
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control of psychic energy. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud vacillates between the first 
two of these, attributing shock and Little Hans’ game to potentially being forms of 
masochistic pleasure, only considering the repetition compulsion as clear evidence of the 
latter. This particular case is made with reference not the observations of subjects of analysis, 
but to his biological speculations regarding the structure of the human psyche and its 
evolutionary development.  
 
Thus far then we conceived of a psychological process which represses the unpleasant and 
tries to prevent the subject reliving it. Yet prior to the revision of the theory of the drives in 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud had to deal with a number of clinical cases in which this 
did not seem to be the case. The former soldiers who seemed to endlessly re-live their 
experiences in the hellish conditions of the Great War were showing quite the opposite 
compulsion, which was to repeat the experience rather than to repress it. This goes directly 
against the 'pleasure principle', which states that the mind functions in such a way as to reduce 
the amount of unpleasure it suffers from at all times.  
 
In their first Freudian iterations, all drives were considered functions of the pleasure principle, 
striving for either the relief of adverse conditions like hunger or fatigue, or towards discharge 
of cathexis in the acquisition of objects which held an erotic affection for the subject. By the 
end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud will have revised this previously unquestioned 
tenet of psychoanalysis, showing: “[T]he opposition between the 'sexual instincts,' which are 
directed towards an object, and certain other instincts, with which we were very insufficiently 
acquainted and which we described as the 'ego instincts'” as his analysis develops.183 These 
other instincts are placed on the side of the death drive (Thanatos), while the 'sexual instincts' 
are assuredly in the domain of Eros, the pleasure principle.  
 
The economic aspect of the psyche is described by Freud as one conditioned by and 
functioning along the pathways of drives, whose motor is the pleasure principle.184 The 
pleasure principle is generally negative in the sense that what the mind seeks to reduce is the 
                                                 
183    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3752 
184    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3715 
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build-up of 'unpleasure' rather than to actively seek out a source of pleasure. This immediately 
places it in the domain of the unconscious as, again, we are considering the formal processes 
which govern an economy rather than ideational content. If the pleasure principle was in 
consciousness and simply dealt with ideas like hunger, the need for rest, or affection, it could 
be rationally worked out, and there would be no need for a psychoanalysis which would deal 
with, for example, the hysterics upon whom many of Freud's first theories were based upon. 
Furthermore, the economic model is concerned with the transference of the feeling of pleasure 
or unpleasure. This corresponds to a change in the amount of 'excitation' in the psyche. In the 
classic Freudian model this works towards an absolute minimisation of the energetic flows in 
the brain. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle Freud will reconsider this and wonder if this 
'Nirvana Principle' works to “[R]educe, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to 
stimuli”.185 it is clear that the pleasure principle, although described by Freud as being a 
primary process in the psyche, does not operate without severe constraint. The immediate 
regulator of its operation is the reality principle and its opposite (or indeed, its 'beyond') is the 
death instinct.186    
 
 
                                                 
185  Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
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Figure 13: Relationship between Pleasure Principle, Reality Principle and Death Instinct 
 
The reality principle operates in all the topographical spaces of the psyche. As well as being 
the set of social norms which the super-ego concerns itself with (and therefore very 
anthropocentric), there is a regulation within the id (which is anti-anthropocentric), which 
manifests as a blocking of desire in the form of the censorship regime, and also in the 
vicissitudes of the drive by which the unconscious formally creates new drive dispositions 
based on their effectiveness at reliving tension in the secondary process. A case in which there 
is an apparent incongruity between observed actions and the maxim that all psychic processes 
work towards the fulfilment of the pleasure principle is the case of the play rituals of Freud's 
grandson Ernst. The Fort/Da game involved Ernst throwing away a spindle, which Freud 
clearly linked with the production of a quantity of displeasure. This goes against the pleasure 
principle: once the subject begins to repeat an unpleasurable event, the interplay of the 
pleasure and reality principles can no longer be said to be the sole rule of the unconscious. 
The Fort/Da game's primary element was the removal of the toy from the child's sight, 
simulating the loss of the mother, while the reclamation of the toy was secondary, despite 
Freud's observation that “[t]here is no doubt that greater pleasure was attached to the second 
act”.187  Fort/Da notably differs from other examples of the death drive because it takes place 
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available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3720 
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as a quotidian operation rather than as an exception or symptom of a complex. Freud posits 
two possible reasons for this game being played: firstly that it is a method by which the 
psyche can normalise the otherwise painful disappearance of the mother,  the will to repetition 
in the act allowing the child to become accustomed to the mother's departure, and allowing 
the formation of stable circuits of cathexis through which the unpleasure of the mother's 
passing can be released. The second is that the repetition of this unpleasant operation allowed 
the child to feel that he had a sense of mastery over the event of the mother leaving: “by 
repeating it, unpleasurable as it was, through a game, he took on an active part”.188  
 
Yet both of these drive-figures can be reduced to functions of the pleasure principle. Freud 
explains we cannot be sure that the repetition of the act of mother disappearing does not offer 
“a yield of pleasure of another sort, but nonetheless a direct one”.189 In this case, there is no 
evidence of a drive which diverges from the drives of the pleasure principle in this observed 
action. Here we can see why the death drive is not necessarily the drive to cause suffering or 
to annihilate or to nullify, though all of these negative and destructive affects are conjured by 
the name 'death drive'. In such a shallow reading, as simply the desire to die, the death drive is 
easily misrepresented. It is more properly the anti-life drive – the force which operates in 
cases where drives deviate from operating under the pleasure principle. What is important to 
take from the example of the Fort/Da game is not a definitive proof of the death drive but a 
deeper understanding of the system of how drives can work. In this instance we see the 
possibility of concomitant drives working towards quite different ends in the child's psyche. 
One, towards a mastering of the trauma of the mothers disappearance, and another towards 
the nihilistic instinct of renunciation of the mother and the pleasure she offers. Freud is unable 
to distinguish between these two speculative hypotheses when presented with the evidence of 
the child's actions, and concedes that a mixture of the two is perfectly possible. Rather than a 
single erotic drive witch tries to achieve cathexis though one object alone, we see again, as 
with the 'ruins of Troy' metaphor, that there can be a series of drives which exist in the 
unconscious, never coming into contact with each other, and often operating in quite different 
directions: the example in this case being one towards the mother and one renouncing the 
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189   Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3721 
 102 
figure of the mother.  
 
A particularly crucial concept in both Land and Lyotard’s interpretations of Freud is the nature 
of this force, which is called either the death drive or death instinct. Thus far we have seen 
that Freud’s inquiry into this force in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, provides observational 
evidence of a tendency which would not be fully explained by reference to the pleasure 
principle alone, before offering speculations about the nature of the psychical process which 
might be responsible for such a tendency. Interpreters of Freud hold widely differing opinions 
on the nature of death drive, Lyotard’s view being particularly unique. It is my intention to 
read the death instinct with Lyotard in Chapter 4, and to concentrate on Land's reading in 
Chapter 5. These readings emphasise the plurality and plasticity of drive as mentioned above.  
 
The first error of interpreters of the death drive is the literal interpretation, namely that the 
death drive is a force which aims towards destruction or elimination of the subject, described 
by Moretti as “the tendency to let oneself go and sink back into nature”.190 In Freud’s own 
work there is a significant trend of apocalyptic pessimism which reaches its zenith in 
Civilisation and Its Discontents which would ameliorate the error of the shallow reader in 
taking this view of death drive.191 Ansell-Pearson notes the importance of the First World War 
in this demand for a diagnosis of the savagery and violence which were shown to be in the 
subject.192 The second fallacy is the refutation of the first and taking its simple negative: death 
instinct as not necessarily the push to destruction, but an impulse to change. This is a kind of 
Tarot Card positivism, putting an affirmative ‘spin’ on what would otherwise be, if considered 
in the first interpretation of death drive, an often morally, politically or socially inconvenient 
theory. It will become my contention that this kind of interpretation is more likely to be used 
as a political convenience than the product of dispassionate analysis. This is particularly a 
problem of many of the psychoanalysts after Freud, who lacked the scientific rigour which 
Freud held. By this we mean not necessarily the quality of his experimental work, but his 
                                                 
190    Moretti, A. Signs taken for Wonders (London: Verso, 2005) p. 138. See also Lear, Freud,  (UK: 
Routledge, 2005) p. 161 
191    Noted by Lyotard in 'On a Figure of Discourse' in Lyotard, J.F. Ed. Harvey and Roberts, Towards the 
Postmodern, (New York: Humanity Books, 1993) p. 13  
192    Ansell-Pearson, K. Germinal Life (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 112-113 
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insistence in having an investigative approach where he did not take pre-conceived opinions 
into his work, tailoring conclusions to match already-held beliefs, alongside his rigorous 
efforts to present his hypotheses as provisional rather than absolute: for example, his warning 
about placing too much weight on the Fort/Da game: “No certain decision can be reached 
from the analysis of a single case like this”, or the lengthy remarks as to the veracity of what 
he had hitherto written at the end of Beyond the Pleasure Principle.193 This second view 
seems to be logically insufficient. It fails to capture how the death drive is shown to be largely 
negative in its character in Freud’s experimental observations. It also lacks suitable 
physiological or neurological evidence for us to accept that this might be the case. 
Speculatively, it is neither evolutionarily or practically useful to imagine this trend in humans.  
 
Lyotard’s position is that death drive represents a kind of breakdown in the psychic system, 
wherein a drive fails to attain its goal by being broken off, collapsing in on itself, or reverting 
back to an earlier state. In this view we see death drive as an effect of an imperfectly 
constructed psychic system where drives are never whole, reliable and uniform, but are the 
consequences of a fragmented and inefficient human mind. Lyotard's clearest formulation of 
this is from the essay 'On the Figure of a Discourse':  
 
The death instinct is simply the idea (as opposed to the concept) that the machine for 
collecting and draining energy is not a well regulated mechanical device. In this regard 
Freud points to the repetition of acts, situations, discourses or gestures (nightmares, 
repetition of failure) that cannot be fulfilments of desire (of “pleasures”) in the 
equivocal sense of the term (the first theory of desire), but that, on the contrary, are 
associated with the most extreme suffering, the grinding of the psychical apparatus, 
and the “subject's” scream.194  
 
Lyotard’s view is from position (3) listed in section 1.6 ('that the psyche is intrinsically a 
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flawed system'), and therefore that what is called the death drive or the beyond of the pleasure 
principle is in fact evidence of the failings of the psychic system to work efficiently and 
always properly provide the pre-conscious-consciousness system with not only the tools to 
complete its goals, but even an understanding of what these goals might be. The second 
example (trauma being the first) in Beyond the Pleasure Principle of the ‘beyond’ of the 
pleasure principle is demonstrated by Freud's grandson, Little Hans. Little Hans' case, as 
argued above, is more useful for us as an example of the polyvocal nature of drives. A series 
of separate desires may operate upon a single object: “The phantasy contains several forms 
that are simultaneously active”.195  
 
Freud also considers a third set of cases which show a tendency away from the pleasure 
principle are those connected to repetition. Initially Freud speaks about cases of transference 
in his patients which repeat the structure of the earlier neurosis but remove it from its original 
context and place in their relationship with the therapist.196 This is explained as working along 
the same basic mechanism as the original repression. Rather than remembering the trauma as 
a past event, the ego, trying to defend itself against the unpleasant revelations the trauma 
brought about in it will try and reconstruct the original repression:  
 
There is no doubt the resistance of the conscious and unconscious ego operates under 
the sway of the pleasure principle: it seeks to avoid the unpleasure which would be 
produced by the liberation of the repressed.197 
 
This places the beyond of the pleasure principle firmly in the realm of the unconscious id, the 
primary process. If there is to be a death drive, it will be found in this zone of eternal, 
unchanging drives.   
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available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3724 
197    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3725  
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The repetition compulsion is the most interesting part of Freud's theory for Lyotard, which he 
discusses in the initial chapters of Libidinal Economy.198 Unfortunately, Freud often assigns 
these compulsions as consequences of the biological structure of life itself, rather than looking 
at more cases of this very interesting repetition compulsion as observed in patients. Lyotard's 
own reference to repetition takes place in his discussion of 'the labyrinth' most notably in the 
story of his “Italian friend”, compelled to re-circulate around a gallery with an unexplained 
sense of unease until he finally (consciously) notices a picture of an ex-mistress on a wall.199 
This is an incident of the type which Freud mentions: the benefactor abandoned by his 
protégés, however much they differ from one another (considering his relationship with his 
own disciples, one imagines Freud to perhaps saying this a little bitterly); the lover whose 
affairs always follow the same course; the woman who marries only to find her husbands 
become seriously ill shortly after. In these compulsions, we see complex situations in which 
several distinct figures of drives can be seen, with some not following the pleasure principle's 
simple aim.200  
 
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, there is clear evidence of Freud's attempt to collapse the 
seemingly hostile and negative teleologies of the death drive (a charge towards destruction) 
into localised desire for repetition. Freud returns to the question of war neurosis and pinpoints 
their cause as being the traumatic event itself bringing such an excess of excitation to the 
nervous system that it is in some way damaged. The repetition of the traumatic event in the 
patients' dreams is attributed to the desire to master the event, although Freud states that this 
instinct may be “[M]ore primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding 
unpleasure”.201 Here Freud moves away from the teleological constraints of the pleasure 
principle. In speculating that a system might be distinct from the previously overriding 
pleasure principle he allows the conception of a mind which has a multiplicity of evolved 
                                                 
198    Lyotard, J.F. Libidinal Economy Trans. Hamilton-Grant (London: Athlone, 1993) 
199    Lyotard, J.F. Libidinal Economy Trans. Hamilton-Grant (London: Athlone, 1993) p. 32 
200    These examples appear in Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. 
Smith, I., 2000 (online text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3726 
201    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3734  
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purposes, working alongside each other, rather than a unified one to which all others are 
subordinate. Certain aspects of dreaming must fall outside of pleasure's remit and are also 
considered from an evolutionary standpoint of perhaps existing before the hegemony of the 
pleasure instinct.202  
 
Other forms of repetition are more clearly beyond the pleasure principle. Distinguishing 
between the mobile energy in the primary process and the bound energy in the secondary 
process, we are offered the hypothesis that repetition takes place as a means of binding the 
excess energy of the primary process in stable formations in the secondary. This impulse kicks 
in when the body is threatened by a surplus of energy which would otherwise catastrophically 
unbalance it, in the forms such as neurosis. The question we ask here is if repetition is the best 
strategy for changing this situation? Merely completing the act over and over again seems to 
be a poor way of resolving something which was not dealt with in the first occurrence.   
 
Lyotard's death instinct is very much a property of the unconscious. Its mechanisms and most 
strikingly its productions seem to be very different from the processes we would associate 
with conscious, rational capabilities which traditional philosophy has endowed consciousness 
with. Nevertheless, it is somewhat internal to the individual subject. It conditions their 
interaction with the world as an internal force, and here we remember the twofold nature of 
the drive economy: (1) drive formations 'scanning' to release primary process energy and (2) 
repetition and reality principle working to cathect energy in the secondary process. The death 
drive is therefore another anti-anthropocentric property of an individual, albeit one which is 
masked and repressed by the tendency to anthropomorphise it.  
 
Ansell-Pearson, in his reading of Freud's death drive in Germinal Life, concentrates on the 
view that it is a desire of the organism to regress to its original state.203 This rather myopic 
reading of what are a series of diverse tendencies is necessary to support his argument that 
Deleuze's re-framing of the death drive as a force of repetition-creativity represents a break 
from Freud which in turn allows him to present a metaphysics of the unconscious which he 
                                                 
202    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3721  
203    Ansell-Pearson, K. Germinal Life (London: Routledge, 1999) p. 113 
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opposes to a drive-theory of the unconscious.204 
 
Conclusions  
 
Freud's “far-fetched speculation” that “consciousness may be, not the most universal of 
mental processes, but only a function of them” has been rendered commonplace by advances 
in not only psychoanalysis but also in the wider context of psychology and neuroscience since 
it was written.205 Such a revelation is a perfect example of the fissure Freud opens under the 
foundations of subject-centred, Cartesian, anthropocentric philosophy. Unfortunately, it has 
not fully made the transition to philosophical research, where the subject is still taken as the 
ruler of the conscious mind, replete with the ability to fully control its own destiny and that of 
the body it is attached to. This chapter has begun to sketch a Freudian perspective which can 
be contrasted to the metaphysics of subjectivity. It has shown that a consistent model of the 
unconscious can be conceptualised which: operates according to formal process and rules; can 
be likened to a machinic or energetic system; that the drives' pathways which traverse it 
originate in instincts. The vicissitudes of the drive over time are the consequence of the 
general compulsion to repeat, which is, for the machine of the unconscious to cathect, and the 
success or failure of this repetition in both the internal conditions of the psyche (the reality 
principle) and the material circumstances the subject is constrained by (reality proper). The 
consequences of this migration of the drive is not that the new formation replaces the old, but 
that the new exists in parallel with the old, operating alongside it rather than effacing it. 
Historical drive pathways or possibilities of cathexis, though potentially uninvested, retain the 
possibility to repeat should considerations of reality begin to favour them again.  
 
Repetition is the defining process of the unconscious. Once established the drives remain, 
their pathways laid down, and the system always looks for opportunities to pass along, so its 
essential shape is carved by the rules that it (1) repeats and (2) when it encounters censorship 
or resistance it tries to re-route. This rubric of repetition forms the basis of Land's conception 
of the drive and conceptualisation of his key claim that “drives are the functions of nomadic 
                                                 
204    Ansell-Pearson's thought, introduced briefly here, will be taken up in Chapter 5 when discussing 
Land.  
205    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3728  
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cybernetic systems, not instincts but simulated instincts, artificial instincts”.206 They are 
artificial instinct formations, born of a compromise between the desire to repeat and reality. 
As such they can be opposed to the Lacanian School's common understanding of drives – as 
explored in the next chapter – which are much more like ideational content. An example is 
Žižek's description of 'unknown knowns' – “the disavowed beliefs, suppositions, and obscene 
practices we pretend not to know about, although they form the background of our public 
values”.207 These productions, as “beliefs, suppositions” are much more complex than the 
energetic unconscious produces, and really belong in the upper areas of the psychical system. 
The unconscious does not know ideas, and though its energetic pathways and mechanisms 
may lead to predicable dispositions of cathexis, it does not think.  
 
Freud's depiction also refutes the often held belief that the death instinct is a destructive one 
which seeks to end the organism's suffering. On the contrary, the death instinct is seen from a 
biological point of view as being the founder of “self preservation, of self assertion, and of 
mastery”, that “these guardians of life, too, were originally the myrmidons of death”.208 The 
death instinct: “[S]truggles most energetically against events which might help it attain its 
life's goal rapidly – by a kind of short circuit”.209 In fact, the only really necrotic element of 
the death drive is in its name – all of its forces are turned towards the preservation of life in 
the organism. When death finally arrives; the 'proper death' of the organism which the death 
drive works to facilitate, these functions of the Freudian death drive are still fighting to 
prolong the organism's survival. 
 
 
 
                                                 
206    Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 330 
207    Žižek, S. 'Philosophy, the "unknown knowns", and the public use of reason'. in Topoi. Vol. 25, No. 1-
2, (2006) p. 137-142 
208    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3741 
209    Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3741  
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Chapter 2. Lacan's Return to Freud 
 
This chapter has two goals. Firstly it will briefly consider the nature of Lacan's 'return to 
Freud' and his use of Freudian vocabulary. The remainder of the chapter is then dedicated to 
an analysis of Lacan's own model of the unconscious. The objectives of and methodology 
used in this second part are surmised in the section below, Objectives.  
 
Lacan repeatedly stated that his aim as a psychoanalyst was to faithfully follow Freud. Such 
professions of fidelity to the 'father' of the movement were commonly heard from 
psychoanalysts. These statements can be interpreted in a number of ways; perhaps most 
temptingly as an act of Oedipal devotion. Lacan – among many other analysts - claimed to be 
the ‘heir’ of the Freudian system of analysis as the psychoanalytic movement fractured into a 
series of post-Freudian schools. As each interpretive position fought for recognition of their 
own analysis as the most truthful or effective method, all made arguments from authority 
appealing their fidelity to the letter or spirit of Freud’s work. The theoretical foundation of 
Lacan's claims to fidelity derive from the nature of Freud's creation of Psychoanalysis. In 
some respects, Psychoanalysis was created 'overnight'. The discipline did not evolve, or 
slowly cleave from an established branch of science. Instead, it rapidly grew after the 'big 
bang' of Freud’s initial discovery of the analytic unconscious. When selecting the terms which 
he would use to describe the psychoanalytic concepts he was deliminating, Freud's 
methodology was often to work by analogy. The words which Freud used to describe the 
processes of the unconscious were not always as easy to coin as 'unconscious', a simple 
negation of the already established notion of consciousness as the primary space of thought. 
Instead, the language of psychoanalysis was acquired by Freud's borrowing of terms from 
other disciplines which were is some way 'like' the psychoanalytic concepts he was trying to 
elucidate. Terms like drive [Trieb], censorship [Zensur] or wish [Wunsch] are not only 
metaphorical in their operation, but are sourced polymathicly. Freud borrowed terms from 
such diverse disciplines as philosophy, biology, mechanics, economics, popular psychology 
and myth to indicate to the reader what the underlying psychoanalytic terms might mean. As a 
result the underlying meaning of Freud's language can be difficult to understand – particularly 
when it was freshly minted and there were not so many secondary interpretations as have been 
generated subsequently. With the passing of time these concepts have become more 
entrenched in language for their psychoanalytic use, and this process has been driven by 
psychoanalysts following Freud who try to take his conceptual framework and re-present it in 
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less metaphorical language. Lacan's 'return to Freud' or 'fidelity to Freud' is best considered in 
this sense: his aim is to take the Freudian concepts which lie underneath his linguistic, 
metaphorical descriptions, and offer them to the reader over-again, giving an extended 
analysis 'in the wake' of the Freudian definition: “I can only write this introduction—this 
Einjuihrung, to use Freud's term—in the wake of Freud, in so far as this notion is absolutely 
new in Freud”.210  
 
In both Lacanian and Freudian analysis a tripartite structure is used to describe the processes 
of the unconscious. In Lacanianism this structure consists of need (Besoin), drive (Pulsion), 
and desire (Désir). The Freudian counterparts to these three are are instinct (Instinkt), drive 
(Trieb), and wish (Wunsch). The extent to which these two models are synonymous with each 
other (and their commonly used English renditions) is widely discussed in psychoanalytical 
commentary regarding the equivalence of the terms between different languages.211 Yet 
beyond this recognition of simple linguistic difference, there are far more important 
considerations of how these two psychoanalytic systems, though superficially appearing 
equivalent due to their broadly similar structures, are in fact very different in their portrayal of 
the mechanisms of the unconscious. Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’ cannot be read as a dogmatic 
restoration of Freudian orthodoxy, nor as an attempt to transpose Freud’s often clumsy use of 
terminology onto the contemporaneous psychoanalytic lexicon. Instead, the return to Freud 
must be considered as an exegesis of the Freud’s works in which Lacan offers a certain (re-
)reading of Freud. This hermeneutic approach emphasises parts of Freud’s works in 
proportion to their ability to support Lacan’s central psychoanalytic insight, namely that “the 
unconscious is structured like a language”.212 
 
As we have seen, Freud presents three meta-psychological hypotheses in The Unconscious 
(1915): the economic, the dynamic and the topographic. Dynamic processes in the 
unconscious are concerned with the translation and transformation of information within the 
                                                 
210    Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. 
Alan Sheridan. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1977) p. 162  
211    As discussed in Chapter 1 
212    “L'inconscient est structuré comme un langage”. From Lacan, J. Autres écrits (Paris: Seuil, 2001) pp. 
449-495). 
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unconscious. These process are described as dynamic because they involve a change in the 
state of the information, rather than a physical relocation of the process to another component 
of the psyche (topographic change). Freud's descriptions of these changes in the dynamic 
hypothesis are the most useful to the Lacanian goal of describing the unconscious as a quasi-
linguistic system.213 Examples of dynamic mechanisms of the unconscious would include the 
censor and the processes of the dreamwork.214 It is the present thesis' contention that Lacan's 
re-emphasising of the dynamic elements of the unconscious has a correlate strategy of de-
emphasis of aspects of the economic hypothesis. In his description of the unconscious as a 
language like structure Lacan considers at length the mechanisms by which the unconscious 
substitutes terms along metaphoric and metonymic axes. This theory owes much – as is 
commonly noted – to both Saussurian linguistics and its re-interpretation by Jacobsen.215 
Lacan's decision to take linguistics as his meta-model has serious consequences for his micro-
models of the processes of the psyche. His explicit denunciation of the biological bases of 
psychical structures as envisaged by Freud, and the replacement of these bases with linguistic 
constructs is a change in register. If something is to be thought of as like a language, a host of 
secondary concepts related to language become prominent in out attempts to interpret the 
theory. Superficially, languages seem to be about signs, and signs are ideas; our intuition is to 
think about languages in the register of conscious thought. In fact, signification is a more 
abstract concept, and is about the relationships or bridges between signs. Nevertheless, 
anthropocentric bias tends to pull the signifier to the sign, and reduce the net of siginfier-
relations in the unconscious to a sign-matrix of ideas.  
 
 
Objectives 
 
                                                 
213    I am using the term quasi-linguistic to describe Lacan's rewriting of Freud to emphasise the 
importance of 'like' in that famous quotation of Lacan in the footnote above 'The unconscious is structured 
like a language', which is often misinterpreted to mean that the unconscious is a linguistic entity, rather than 
that it bears some resemblance to the structural framework of language.  
214    Depicted in Freud, S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) 
215    Bennington, G Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
pp.80-81 
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The present thesis shall argue that, firstly, Lacan's dynamic account of the unconscious lacks a 
satisfactory account of the economic aspect of the unconscious which undertakes the 'work' of 
this quasi-linguistic substitution; and secondly, that another set of problems arise when we 
consider how the mechanisms of the dynamic unconscious finally alight on a chose re-
presentation of a signifier which it encounters. Both of these accusations could be broadly 
classified as criticisms of Lacan's anthropocentricism. In reference to the first, Lacan's theory 
of desire fails to describe convincingly why the unconscious will occasionally leave its 
'gloomy hermeneutical depths' and effect a change in the behaviour of the subject.216  Freud 
emphasises the extreme mobility of the primary process, giving examples in the case of the 
parapraxes regarding how the unconscious might intervene at any moment in the subject's 
existence. Lacanian chains of signifiers, especially in their applied use, seem rigid in 
comparison. I will argue that this rigidity would reduce the role of the unconscious to being a 
black box of neuroses which effect the subject sporadically, and that this is not the case.  
Regarding the second objection, philosophers such as Deleuze, Lyotard and Land have written 
extensively about the myriad, bewildering possibilities which the unconscious is observed to 
choose as the objects of its investment – not only by reinterpretation of Freud's canonical case 
studies, but also in wider contexts. Their conclusion is that the unconscious is an essentially 
inhuman entity – in Freud's terminology, the other place (Eine andere schauplatz)  – and 
while Lacan is certainly aware of this claim made by Freud, his marginalisation of the 
economic and promotion of the dynamic aspects of the unconscious transform the purposeless 
forward movement of the unconscious drives as demonstrated by Freud into a system 
concerned, like a language, with fixing meaning and sensibility in relation to a subject.217 
While Lacan does not rule out the possibility of uncommon or heterogeneous desires, it is the 
case that in the majority of his psychoanalytic interpretations he plays the role akin to that of 
the detective: to provide the evidence which can be used to convince a jury, which is 
concerned about motives rather than processes, and the form in which he presents these 
observations to the 'jury', the reader, is in the form of anthropocentric stories of love, lust 
                                                 
216    Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 328 
217 As exemplified by Lacan's contention that the signifier is "that which represents a subject for another 
signifier” Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. 
Alan Sheridan. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1977) p. 207 
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anger or treachery.218  
 
Chapter 1 showed how Freud's writings can be divided into theoretical works which were 
abstract, mechanistic and posited the unconscious as anti-anthropocentric, and those works 
which were clinically centred and treated the unconscious as a hidden consciousness, and a 
site of ideas. In doing so we make something of a binary distinction between these two 
opposing conceptions. With Lacan's works there is no such simple distinction. Instead, they 
can be conceived of as a grey scale, in which any definite position on either end of this 
spectrum tends to be pulled back towards the middle, whose indefiniteness is made all the 
more oblique by the calculated sense of mysteriousness and obscurantism Lacan cultivates.219 
Lacan's methodology which is proffer his work as clues, riddles and tangential approaches to 
the question of the unconscious prevents a definitive reading of several part of his theoretical 
apparatus. However, the consequence of uncertainty is not always suspension of judgement – 
even if they are infamously hard to interpret, Lacan's works of psychoanalysis are interpreted 
by a number of scholars who identify as Lacanians or post-Lacanians.220 In this process of 
interpretation, readers of Lacan have identified a series of points which help to signpost a 
general theoretical direction in his work.221 The concepts used by these readers of Lacan, 
following his decision to liken the unconscious to a language and to theorise in a linguistic 
manner (in his riddling style), conditions the interpretation of his work towards 
anthropocentricism. The very nature of a metaphor is inertly idealist: this idea is like another 
idea. If we were to posit that a theory is only as anti-anthropocentric as its softest take on the 
                                                 
218 The objection could be made that most psychoanalytic cases are of a banal nature and require an 
interpretation which relies on 'normal' human desire. The present thesis shall demonstrate that this is a only 
concern of clinical psychoanalysis, and not relevant to the philosophical foundations of the practice.   
219 A number of commentators have noted the 'density' of Lacan's writing, for example: "the 
impenetrability of Lacan's prose... [is] too often regarded as profundity precisely because it cannot be 
understood". From Stevens, R. Sigmund Freud: Examining the Essence of his Contribution (UK: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2008) p. 191n 
220 The 'official' Lacanian school is headed by his editor J.A. Miller, but there are also a number of 
prominent intellectuals such as Žižek who identify as Lacanians. 
221 Such as: 'the unconscious is structured like a language'; 'quilting points'; the trio real-imaginary-
symbolic; the phallus. 
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centricism of the human subject allows it to be, where would Lacan's work be situated? I shall 
argue, following Land, that the answer to this question is that Lacan's position – and even 
more so that of Lacanism – is as an anthropomorphising tendency, pulling psychoanalysis 
away from its radical Freudian origins: 
 
It is Lacan who insists on Oedipalizing the Fort-Da game, in the general process of 
Oedipalizing desire to its foundations; ripping all the energy, hydraulics, pathology, 
and shock out of Freud, and substituting lack, the pathos of identity, and Heideggerian 
pomposity, whilst deepening the role of the phallus, and trivializing desire into the 
cringing aspiration to be loved.222  
 
Having noted that I intend to consider Lacan's theory of desire critically, I shall begin by  
providing the reader with an exposition Lacan's conception of the unconscious as being 
structured like a language, before moving on to consider the dynamic aspects of Lacan's 
theory of desire, with particular emphasis on the celebrated 'graph of desire' (graphe du désir) 
from Seminar V and the Ecrits in the second section of this chapter. The third section will 
build on these models, and consider the difference between the depictions of drive in Freud 
and Lacan. The fourth and final section will conditioner the academic reception of Lacan, and  
some notable tendencies of the Lacanian School. This account will provide the basis of my 
criticism in later sections in the present thesis of the more anthropocentric tendencies of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis and its interpreters – a reading which is influenced by the 
interpretations of Lacan's work by Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, and Land.  
 
Structural linguistics: Metaphor and Metonymy 
 
Lacan combined Freud’s theory of the unconscious with structural linguistics, describing the 
processes of the dreamwork as described in Chapter 1 as analogous to the processes of 
metaphor and metonymy as described by De Saussure and Jakobson. The two initial processes 
of the dreamwork – which, as shown in Chapter 1, Freud universalises as the basic 
transformational mechanisms of the unconscious – are displacement and condensation. 
Lacan's redefinition of these terms moves away from the energetic-fluid-mechanical language 
of Freud and instead, these basic operations of the unconscious are presented by Lacan in a 
                                                 
222 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 282 
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lexicon which borrows terms from linguistics. Lacan reinterpreted Freud by combining his 
ideas with those of the linguist Roman Jakobson, who had compared the processes of the 
dreamwork to metaphor and metonymy.223 Linguistically, the former describes the 
replacement of one concept by another similar concept (see figure 14), while the latter 
describes the linking of concepts sequentially to make a descriptive sentence (see figure 15).       
 
Figure 14: Axis of metaphor 
 
        swift  bounds 
           ↑                        ↑ 
The  quick  brown fox jumps over the bush 
           ↓      ↓ 
       dashing        vaults 
 
 
Figure 15: Axis of metonymy  
 
The → quick → brown → fox → jumps → over → the → bush  
 
 
These two poles of language describe how each specific word is chosen in any sentence in 
preference to all of the other words which may have been used. Metaphorically it is selected 
as best representing the concept to be signified; that is, it has the correct association.224 
Metonymically it is selected as it gives the sentence meaning according to its previous 
structure; that it offers contiguity.225 When the unconscious cannot simply present its impulses 
in language – in some cases, due to censorship, but also because there is no precise linguistic 
                                                 
223 See 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: 
Karnac,1993) pp. 121-124 
224 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993)  
225 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993)  
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correlate of its contents, it therefore uses these two mechanisms to change or determine what 
it produces. Lacan takes Jakobson's likening of metonymy to displacement and condensation 
in the dreamwork and makes a further redefinition. Metaphor is tied to displacement, and 
metonymy to condensation.226 These two notions are combined with Lacan's description of 
the unconscious as being 'like a language', and his notion of the signifier. For Lacan, the 
unconscious consists of an ocean of signifiers, linked together like rings in a chain. These 
links are constituted on a horizontal axis, where they represent the combinations of terms that 
are often coexistent (cold – snow – white – winter), or vertically as terms which can replace 
one another (grief – woe – misery). Each signifier in the unconscious can be (and is) chained 
to many different concepts in both directions. Lacan uses metonymy and metaphor to describe 
movement along these chains, as one signifier becomes replaced by another (figure 16).  
 
 
                                                 
226 See 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993); and Bowie, Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 218 
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Metaphor  
   O 
    ↕ 
   O 
    ↕ 
   O 
Metonym 
 
O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O 
 
 
 
 
The unconscious 
 
O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O 
↕      ↕       ↕       ↕       ↕ 
O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O 
↕      ↕       ↕       ↕       ↕ 
O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O ↔ O 
 
Figure16: Components of Lacan's signifying chains 
 
In the above model, the unconscious' content is a matrix of conjoined signifiers which are 
linked associatively. The mechanism by which these terms are associated parses a chain of 
information, changing its contents as it moves through the associated terms. This happens 
according to Lacan's dictum that the signifier “represents a subject for another signifier”.227 
As the signifier is not a sign (which “represents something for someone") that is, correlate 
with an idea, it rather represents as relationship between ideas.228 The signifiers which 
construct the unconscious are therefore arbitrary links and bridges between various notions 
which are conjoined in the psyche. They can be relatively common bridges which are shared 
by a number of subjects, but also can be distinct to particular subjects. Signifying relations, 
taken in this sense, seem to be timeless, unchanging constructs, like drives in the Freudian 
model. However, Lacan does not provide a description of the processes by which this 
structure is laid down in the psyche, and it is rather take as a given proposition which 
                                                 
227 Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. A. 
Sheridan. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1977) p. 207 
228 Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. A. 
Sheridan. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1977) p.207 
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necessarily exists in any subject. This is a problem we find in the linguistic model if stripped 
of its biological basis. Without the economic model of the unconscious and its considerations 
of formal efficacy, the conditions for the generation of these signifying links is unknown. In 
Lacan's model the unconscious, as a matrix of these relational bridges, becomes very difficult 
to speak about. The tendency is always to collapse the essence of the signifier into the sign, 
and to return the model borrowed from linguistics explained above where one notion or idea 
substitutes for another. The idea that one formal relation substitutes for another is decidedly 
more complex. At various points even Lacan is guilty of committing this reduction of 
relations to ideas. The consequence of this move towards an idealist theory of signs in the 
unconscious is, again, a tendency to anthropomorphise the complex, arbitrary, and alien 
processes in the unconscious.  
 
Lacan understood the unconscious as a matrix of signifiers, linked together is such a way that 
one signifier could substitute itself for another. This transition was described by Lacan as a 
‘sliding’ of the signifiers beneath consciousness. Lacan’s description of the unconscious 
deliberately ignores the parts of Freud in which the unconscious is analogised to a hydraulic 
machine, which is driven by force, pressure or energy. Against Freud’s energeticism, Lacan 
posits an unconscious which moves through phases-changes in states of information, working 
to match symbols together – to solve a riddle – rather than to dissipate energy. The 
consequences of this decision are evaluated here – is Lacan, as he claimed, showing fidelity to 
Freud’s true intention, or is he misinterpreting Freud’s intentions in the service of his own 
project?    
 
Movements along chains of signifiers in Lacan's model lack the references to force or 
mechanical pressure which characterises Freud’s modelling of the unconscious. Traversal of 
the signifying chain in neither driven by cathectic energy, nor is the system powered by 
underling cathectic energy. Instead, as a linguistic system, it works comparatively, identifying 
terms which are similar or appropriate, at which point the sliding of signifcation stops and a 
fixed idea is generated. While Lacan can conceivably reinterpret the metaphorical analogy of 
elements of the dreamwork and remain loyal to Freud, wholesale change of the unconscious 
to a system driven by formal quasi-linguistic rules altering states of information is not 
obviously prefigured in Freud. Bowie correctly identifies that though Freud’s language about 
the levels of the unconscious uses linguistic metaphors (translation, inscription), displacement 
 119 
and condensation are plainly related to hydraulic mechanics.229 Condensation and 
displacement are markedly different in their operation in Lacanian psychoanalysis than they 
are in classically Freudian terms. For Freud, displacement involves the transference of 
“cathectic energy... along associative pathways”.230 Lacan's description strips the energetics 
from this Freudian unconscious machine, and instead the points at which the sliding of 
signifiers stop, the quilting points [points de capiton], are performatively efficient; though 
they are areas at which the individuals unconscious is likely to fix associations there is no 
energetic structure or instinct which defines them. Instead, the quilting point is characterised 
by the density of signifiers conjoined to one another. The 'gravity' of these points of massed 
signification curves the 'space/time' of the unconscious causing its movement to stop. The 
example below (figure 17) shows this formation in a (much) simplified signifying chain, in 
which the initial idea 'The Death of Diana' connect to the hyper-linked notion of 
'Government', around which all other signifiers cluster. This paranoiac fantasy would be a 
likely quilting point in the subject trying to make sense of this notion if the unconscious had 
this structure; of course, other structures are equally possible depending on the construction of 
the subject – it wouldn’t be hard to get to notions like 'Decadence' or 'Paparazzi' using the 
model of the signifying chain.  
 
                                                 
229 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 69  
230 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993)  
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Figure 17: Signifying Chains – The Hyper-linked Notions 'Diana's Death' → 'Government' 
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These quilting points, linked by multiple signifiers, are akin to the balls on a sheet a teacher 
might use to demonstrate gravitation. As the density of signification increases, the ability of 
the quilting point to pull meaning towards itself – that is, to become the basis of an idea in the 
psyche increases. Hence we see the nature of the complex in a psychoanalytic patient: it 
works as an attractor which reinvests a diverse range of impulses in the subject in a single 
knot of signifiers and signs.   
 
 
Figure 18: Balls on a Rubber Sheet 
 
If the content of the unconscious is a network of chained signifiers, 'displacing' movement 
along the metonymic axis – terms becoming substituted for each other – is the most basic 
action which the unconscious undertakes. For Lacan, this traversal through signifiers 
underpins the ability to have the linguistic structure which defines the unconscious, whereas 
for Freud, the ability to displace cathectic energy from one idea to another is also the most 
simple dynamic force in the unconscious. For both displacement allows the true force of an 
idea to be 'falsely' passed onto another, and understanding this gap between what is desired 
unconsciously and the final affect known to consciousness is the aim of psychoanalysis.  
 
In Freud’s model, the movement of displacement can only be understood as the consequence 
of the drives interaction with the censor: “Is fecit cui profuit. We may assume, then, that 
dream-displacement comes about through the influence of the same censorship–that is, the 
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censorship of endopsychic defence”.231 The drive is prevented from proceeding along its 
course by the censor, and switches track so that it can reach a destination (cathexis). In the 
case of displacement, where energy is cathected from one idea to another, the train seems to 
'jump' the tracks, switching to the next possible element. In the case of condensation, there is 
no 'jump', but a switch to a related idea (Figure 19, below).  
   
 
Figure 19: Avoiding the Freudian Censor 
 
Lacan's notion of censorship therefore differs from Freud's. Rather than encountering a 
blockade, an erasure or a force which essentially says – 'no', the Lacanian subject begins as 
split (this construction is shown between Graphs 1 and 2 below). Instead of a censorship, 
protecting the psyche from the horrors of uncontrolled energetic flows in the unconscious, 
Lacan posits the question 'che vuoi' which can only come from a conflict between a notion of 
the self and an other. To continue the above analogy of the train, Lacan posits the existence of 
a driver (moi) and passenger (autre) and the point of destination is determined by the question 
asked by the driver of the passenger “where does he want to go?” However, the passage down 
the associative chain is no longer linear, along the lines of 'drive' (Lacan's notion of which is 
                                                 
231 Freud,  S. The Interpretation of Dreams (1900) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 780 
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given consideration later in this chapter). Instead, there is a slide down the signifying chain 
until and acceptable notion is reached; to return to the train metaphor, all conjoined stations 
along all connecting lines are parsed until the destination is shown to be perfomatively 
efficient in the sense that an answer to the question 'che vuoi' is generated (again, it is 'the 
signifier which represents the subject for another signifier'). Instead of a driver, we have a 
guide, who takes the other to their imagined destination. If we image the guide to be at 
Holborn Station (see Figure 20 below), if they were to see Sherlock Holmes on the platform 
and asked themselves what he wanted, moving down the possibilities of chained stations, they 
would alight on the notion of Baker Street – four links away –  as fulfilling our criteria: 'as a 
guide, I take Holmes to Baker Street'. However, if Holmes is returning a broken digital 
camera, the guide would select Tottenham Court Road – for Lacan, the signifiers slide until 
the solution to a riddle is reached.  
 
Figure 20: 'Chained' Stations 
 
 
 
 
In Lacan's model there is only the starting concept, a chain of associations which it is drawn 
to, and a locus of subjectivity which interrogates these chains: “[F]or Lacan there is no 
hydraulics of the mind: its pressures can be coherently described only in terms of the interface 
patterns that occur between one signifying order and another”.232 These signifying orders in 
the subject are constructed (chained) linguistically over its existence and are therefore 
                                                 
232 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p.71 
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arbitrary and unpredictable – the stations are connected in a random order – but the 'quilting' 
force which determines meaning does so in relation to a notion of a subject. Conversely, 
Freud’s unconscious doesn’t ask 'che vuoi?' (what do you want?). Instead it asks 'can it 
cathect?': the resting point of a motion of displacement is determined by the minimum number 
of moves which are required to escape the censorship. The subject then passes along the tried 
and tested conditions for cathexis – so long as the reality principle is adhered to – and tries to 
reach its aim as rapidly as possible in these pre-set patterns (drives). Freudian desire is 
essentially unidirectional, as depicted in the figure below, passing towards suitable cathexis, 
whereas Lacanian desire is a multi-directional, complex construct which mediates between 
the subject, other subjects and the signifying chain (this construction is explored in the section 
'Desire' below) .  
 
 
 
 
Figure 21:  Freudian Displacement – energy passes from one pathway to another on its route 
to cathexis. 
 
The use of displacement as an analytical tool is difficult. As terms are replaced by one another 
along chained concepts or switched in contents of parallel drives, it can require a skilled 
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analyst to trace them back to their latent origins. More easily analysable content is generated 
by condensation, whose products “reinforce the underlying idea” and are therefore closer to 
the latent content.233 For Freud condensation is not secondary to displacement. It “must 
probably be pictured as a process stretching over the whole course of events till the perceptual 
region is reached. But in general we must be content to assume that all the forces which take 
part in the formation of dreams operate simultaneously”.234 However, the work of 
condensation is certainly aided by displacements of cathexis because, for Freud, drives are 
always numerous and parallel. The unconscious generates meaning through the interaction of 
these drives, as energy passes through them and concentrates in points  of common 
conjunction. Condensation, for Freud, can start as displacement and is the point at which two 
chains' substitutions meet.235 Condensation and displacement are very similar in Freud’s 
model. They are both effects of the transference of cathexis from one pathway to another. 
Lacan ties condensation to the idea of metaphor, a pathway towards the substitution of terms 
for one another which signify similar ideas. Instead of moving to the next signifier, signifiers 
are substituted and the production of meaning becomes 'possible'.236  Lacan offers the 
example of “the coupled terms swimmer and scholar and then terra firma and truth” operating 
according to the rules of metaphor.237 The meaning, in terms of the relation between the two, 
is equivalent, and the latter two terms can signify the former. Evans renders Lacan's formulae 
for metonymy and metaphor as: 
 
‘[Metonymy states that] the signifying function of the connection of the signifier with 
the signifier is congruent with maintenance of the bar.’238  
                                                 
233 'Condensation' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993)  
234 Freud, S. Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905),  from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 
(online text available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 1750 
235 'Displacement' in Laplanche, S. and Pontails, J. The Language of Psychoanalysis (London: Karnac, 
1993)  
236 Evans, D. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Taylor and Francis Online, 2006) 
p.115 
237 Lacan, J. Ecrits, Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 756 
238 Evans, D. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Taylor and Francis Online, 2006) 
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'[Metaphor states that] the signifying function of the substitution of one signifier for 
another is congruent with the crossing of the bar.'239  
 
In terms of the production of meaning, these process become a binary pair. Metonomy is the 
transfer along the signifier from one position to another. Once this move down the chain is 
made if no 'meaning' is generated (the binary '0', meaning off or no), the system cycles on. If 
'meaning' is found, the answer is yes (the binary '1'; on or yes) and the bar of signification is 
crossed, and some meaning is derived.240 At this point, we have described the operation of the 
unconscious as an informational machine, operating in a cycle, and as something which is 
capable of being modelled cybernetically. Here, again, Lacan differers from Freud, whose 
conception of the unconscious as a network of neuronic connections which cathect energy 
doesn’t allow this open ended cybernetic processing. Instead, the neuronic pathways are fixed, 
and the products of their activation – the signification produced – is a function of the 
interactions of the particular drives which have unbound energy which requires cathexis. If 
there is a truly anti-anthropocentric aspect of Lacanian psychoanalysis, it is this cybernetics of 
the unconscious.  
 
It is therefore possible to read the linguistic unconscious as a development of the anti-
anthropocentric fissure opened up by Freud's topologies of the unconscious. Structurally, 
Lacan's basic thesis that the unconscious is linked by signification is compatible with anti-
anthropomorphism. Signifiers are arbitrary links, but some of them, for the unconscious to be 
capable of generating meaning, must be structured in common patterns. Although others can 
be wild flights away from sign to another, some, indeed most must be the most basic bindings 
between concepts. For example, 'cow' is chained with: (1) a number of semiotically related 
                                                                                                                                                        
p.117  
239 Evans, D. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Taylor and Francis Online, 2006) 
p.115 
240 “Metaphor is, quite radically speaking, the effect of the substitution of one signifier for another in a 
chain. nothing natural predestining the signifier for this function of phoros apart from the fact that two 
signifiers are involved, which can, as such, be reduced to a phonemic opposition.” From Lacan Ecrits Trans. 
B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 756 
 127 
concepts: pow, low, bow; (2) a selection of common associations: mud, farm, milk, grass;  (3) 
a few subject specific uncommon associations: school, mother.  The set that Lacan is 
concerned with in his role as an analyst are the latter set,  which are specific to the patient and 
are exhibited in the patient in the form of the complex – his symptoms. The specificities of the 
patient's complex come closest to the linguistic use of metaphor and metonymy, which is an 
anthropomorphising tendency because it compares ideas, and comparing ideas – thinking or 
rationalising – is the exemplary property of the subject of philosophy.  
 
Yet according to the letter of Lacan's pronouncements, metaphor and metonymy are not 
analogous to the operation of the unconscious because they represent process by which ideas 
can be exchanged for other ideas, for instead that they represent traversals or journeys by 
which one concept may leap to another in a pre-ideational domain. The most obvious way to 
conceptualise this leap is a as a pure displacement in an economic sense, as this allows us to 
conceive of it as a formal and mechanical process – cathexis is spatially transferred. However, 
Lacan's refusal to consider the psyche as an energetic system leads him to replace this model 
with a cybernetic model in which the formal processes are the rules of 'crossing the bar'. The 
conception of the unconscious as a series of linked ideas is certainly convivial to Freud's 
models of the unconscious, and Lacan's description of travel through these links, as a jump 
away from a notion (displacement) or towards a knot of associated notions (condensation) 
isn't in itself anti-Freudian. That 'the unconscious is structured like a language' can be a 
metaphor which helps understand how unconscious makes leaps along signifiers (relations 
between terms) defined by their context and, again, is not too far from Freud's theory. 
 
But again, the choice of the metaphor as being like a language contains the seed of many of 
the problems we see in interpretations of Lacanianism. As soon as we say  'language' there are 
a raft of concepts which the idea of language is tied to: elements of section, ideas, choice, 
comprehension, understanding. All of these concepts are, in turn, considered to be properties 
or processes of the Cartesian subject.241 Of course, making this leap is a misunderstanding of 
certain parts of Lacan's texts as analogising condensation and displacement to the sliding of 
language in a sentence is misleading as makes us think of swapping words and therefore 
                                                 
241 This, again, highlights the dichotomy between the subject of Freudian analysis and the Cartesian 
subject, as described in the introduction. Lacanianism's philosophical position tends to return to the Cartesian 
subject and treat it as a given.  
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swapping ideas. Such an interpretation obscures Lacan's claim that the unconscious isn't 
arranged as signs; he claims that rather signification is the model of the laws and connections 
of the unconscious. Additionally, it must be considered that, even more so than with Freud, 
Lacan's work is centred around the treatment of the patient in psychoanalytic practice. The 
generalisation of Lacanian theory beyond the therapeutic setting risks conflating the abnormal 
with the quotidian, and interpreting the actions of a 'normal' unconscious with those of one in 
failure mode.242 The crossing of the bar is a feature of the four discourses between analyst and 
patient, and the subject of these discourse is, naturally, the complex of symptoms which the 
patient demonstrates.243 Displacement and condensation as observed in the manifestation of 
the complex are characterised by their abnormality and are therefore much more dramatic 
leaps across the bridges of signification. Lacan's psychoanalysis is therefore only an 
improvement on Freud's in relation to treating the patient for the complex he exhibits as a 
subject, rather than to theorise the inhuman aspects of the unconscious. This, again, links to 
Lacan's de-emphasis of the biological foundations of the drive, and also to the philosophical 
lineage Lacan situated his work in reference to. The patient presents himself to the analyst as 
a 'given' subject, with the complex 'ready made'. Effective treatment therefore takes the 
existence of the complex as a existing construction and does not try and conceptualise it from 
its inception as a biological need rather situating it in language. Similarly, in the clinical 
setting the patient, face to face with another person, treats the patient as a subject – albeit, for 
Lacan, as a split one.244   
 
Lacanian analysis interacts with philosophy, but it is with a philosophical lineage that is 
concerned with the human subject and its situation as the locus of thought, a school which I 
defined in the present thesis' introduction as the 'inside' lineage of philosophy which tends 
towards anthropocentricism and Cartesianism (see figure 22 below).  
                                                 
242 This incomparability with generalisation did not stop Lacan becoming a prominent intellectual who was 
willing to theorise outside of his discipline. Indeed, some Seminars contain very few explicit references to 
psychoanalytic treatment. 
243 Lacan discusses the four discourses in Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis (New York: 
Norton, 2007) 
244 See 'Split' in Evans, D. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Taylor and Francis 
Online, 2006) p. 195 
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Figure 22: Psychoanalysis' Position Between Two Tendencies of Philosophy 
 
Lacan's turn towards idealist (inside) philosophy is entirely deliberate: “[B]ecause recourse to 
the idea of matter is but a naive, outmoded form of authentic materialism”.245 If this 
association with inside philosophy and rejection of biological basis of the drive is to be 
validated, it must be superior to the Freudian model as a method of explaining the 
unconscious. Dylan Evans (whose Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis is considered to be 
a foundational resource in interpreting Lacan's writings) turned away from Lacanian 
psychoanalysis because of Lacan's failure to consider biological – and therefore materialist – 
bases of the psyche.246 It is interesting to note that Evans situates Lacan's 'return to Freud' as 
being an attempt maintain those Freudian concepts which were not biologically defensible 
such as the death drive: “'Freudian biology has nothing to do with biology’, [Lacan] 
                                                 
245 Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 73 
246 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp.38-55. Available online 
at ( http://beta.finance-on.net/upload/ver/ver4480020c6d2b2/lacan.pdf ) 
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claimed”.247 This, like Deleuze's reading of the death drive, continently forgets that the death 
drive – as evidence of problematic repetition – was formulated in many ways, and entirely 
provisionally in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. Indeed, it's first line “What follows is 
speculation, often far-fetched speculation” is hardly a dogmatic assertion of a specific 
biological process.248 Instead the death drive is an attempt to solve the problematic nature of 
repetition, insofar as the compulsion to repeat can have negative consequences for the 
organism. This spurred Lacan to pursue his culturalist reading of Freud even further. Every 
biological term in Freud’s work was reinterpreted as a metaphor for some cultural 
phenomenon. Freud’s remarks on the phallus, Lacan claimed, had nothing to do with 
something so banal as a mere biological organ; they referred to a cultural symbol.249  
 
 
Lacanian Desire 
 
I have established that the contents of the Lacanian unconscious are signifiers and that the 
mechanism by which it operates is a sliding between different signified elements either 
laterally or vertically. The final part of Lacan's model is the mechanism which makes this 
sliding take place; this is desire, the motor which drives the unconscious, and determines 
when the 'crossing of the bar' takes place. Lacan's dynamic model of the unconscious is 
illustrated in the infamous ‘graph of desire’.250 In the graph of desire Lacan describes the 
movement of the substituion of signifiers for one another along the axes of metaphor and 
                                                 
247 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp.38-55. Available online 
at ( http://beta.finance-on.net/upload/ver/ver4480020c6d2b2/lacan.pdf ) 
248 Freud, S. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) from Complete Works Ed. Smith, I., 2000 (online text 
available at   http://www.valas.fr/IMG/pdf/Freud_Complete_Works.pdf ) p. 3728 
249 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp.38-55. Available online 
at ( http://beta.finance-on.net/upload/ver/ver4480020c6d2b2/lacan.pdf ) 
250 The most important sources of this theory in Lacan are: The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic 
of Desire Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 ( New York: WW Norton, 2002)   
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metonymy.251 These processes can be read as ones which operate automatically, and are 
therefore ‘without thought’, as the unconscious replaces censored signifiers with others in 
which is essentially a cybernetic system, changing the state of information. However, I shall 
argue that a level of ‘thought’ is introduced in the Lacanian notion of ‘the crossing of the bar’, 
the moment at which the unconscious thought moves to consciousness. Following Lacan’s 
dictum that “A signifier represents a subject for another signifier”, the role of the ‘subject’ in 
determining the productions of the unconscious is critically analysed.252 Lacan's theory of the 
unconscious is described topographically by the its construction by metonymic and 
metaphorical links as depicted above, but they are not sufficient to understand its operation 
dynamically. The graph of desire sites unconscious production at the intersection between the 
chain of signifiers and a vector along which the subject is constituted. The signifying chain 
represents the contents of the unconscious, the network of ideas conjoined by metonynmic 
and metaphorical links described above.253 
 
This reading is not to merely provide an exegesis of Lacan's thought, but is to set up a contrast 
between the theories of Lacan on one side and Deleuze and Land on another about the nature 
of desire. Lacan's model of the unconscious is propelled by desire, as is Deleuze's, but the 
nature of this desire is entirely different. In Lacan's case desire is the desire to create meaning 
within a certain system (the unconscious of signifiers) and is therefore the desire of the 
subject to create itself. On the other hand, we have Deleuzian desire, which will be explained 
                                                 
251 Several commentators have produced readings of this crucial Lacanian mechanism. A typical treatment 
can be found in Eidelzstein, A. The Graph of Desire (London: Karnac, 2009). See Also Kozicki, B. Lacan’s 
Che Vuoi? Graph in (Re-)Turn: A Journal of Lacanian Studies Vol. 6 Ed. Ragland, E available at 
http://return.jls.missouri.edu/Lacan/ReturnVol6/Front_Matter_Return_Vol6.pdf;  
252 Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p.693 
253 Lacan's starting point in The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire is such a conception 
of the unconscious' mechanism: “[T]he mechanisms described by Freud as those of the primary process, by 
which the unconscious is governed, correspond exactly to the functions this school of linguistics believes 
determine the most radical axes of the effects of language, namely metaphor and metonymy-in other words, 
the effects of the substitution and combination of signifiers in the synchronic and diachronic dimensions. 
respectively, in which they appear in discourse.” From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW 
Norton, 2002) p. 676 
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in Chapter 3, which has its origin in both the biological and the instinctive. In this later model 
the subjects constitutes itself after the work of desire has taken place, thereby establishing an 
ontological order in which desire prefigures the creation of the subject, whilst Lacan's model 
starts from the construction of the subject and explains how the subject constrains and 
interacts with desire. A pictorial depiction of Lacanian causation can be found in the arc of the 
graph of desire which passes from right to left, “from desire to need passing through demand 
from need once again to desire – via the need for becoming the cause of the others desire”.254 
The traversal of this loop indicates that the subject constitutes both its conscious, speaking 
self, and its germination through the split subject of the unconscious. If the goal of this this is 
to depict machinic desire, a key question is why this machine operates. In Kozicki's reading of 
Lacan it is because the subject makes itself: 
 
The Complete Graph is a topological representation of vectors, which participate in 
circuits which in fact become a series of systems that interact with one another. The 
synchronous systems in it are closed due to their temporal aspect, but in the diachronic 
moments and systems there comes into play a degree of openness and autopoesis.255 
 
Here the unconscious is depicted as a series of interacting circuits – circuits represented in the 
graph of desire as its vectors – which are to some extent synchronous. In this motion of 
'autopoesis', there is no distinction of depth or time between the operation of the unconscious 
and the creation of the subject. Instead the subject is already there, determining its own 
creation at the onset.  This can be opposed to a reading of Deleuze, regarding whom Smith 
says of his ethics, but the point can be generalised to all aspects of Deleuzian thought, that 
“For Deleuze, conscious will and preconscious interest are both subsequent to our 
unconscious drives, and it is at the level of the drives that we have to aim our [...] analysis.”256 
For Deleuze, as for Freud, the unconscious precedes and constitutes the subject, which is 
generated temporally after the unconscious' operation.  
                                                 
254 Eidelzstein, A. The Graph of Desire (London: Karnac, 2009) p. 272 
255 Kozicki, S. 'Lacan’s Che Vuoi? Graph' in (Re-)Turn: A Journal of Lacanian Studies Vol. 6 Ed. Ellie 
Ragland available at ( http://return.jls.missouri.edu/Lacan/ReturnVol6/Front_Matter_Return_Vol6.pdf ) 
256 Smith, D.W. 'Deleuze and the Question of Desire' in Parrahesia 02 (2007) p.69 ( available at 
http://www.parrhesiajournal.org/parrhesia02/parrhesia02_smith.pdf ) 
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Figure 23: The Graph of Desire (1)257 
 
The vector of the subject represents the selection process along which this data becomes 
changed and used. In the simplest version of this graph, the relationship between these two 
chains is demarcated. Vector S → S' indicates the signifying chain. Its vector is left → right, 
indicating the predominance of metonymy as the conjunction of unconscious signifiers (the 
next thing follows from the former). The vector of the subject ∆ → $ passes – indirectly, in a 
loop rather than a line – in the opposite direction, indicating that the subject is, in some way, 
constituted retroactively.  The Lacanian subject is constituted dialectically in the relationship 
between the point at which the chain S → S' first crosses the subjective vector and the second, 
later point.258 These points correlate to the answers to the questions 'what do I want to say' and 
                                                 
257 From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p.681 
258 Lacan: “If we conduct the subject anywhere, it is to a deciphering which assumes that a sort of logic is 
already operative in the unconscious, a logic in which, for example, an interrogative voice or even the 
development of an argument can be recognized”. From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW 
Norton, 2002)  p. 673 
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'what am I expected to say'. The former relates to the initial content of the unconscious – in 
Freudian terms, the latent content – intersecting with the signifying chain. The latter is related 
to the manifest content, the production of the unconscious, which is determined in relation to 
what is expected of the subject by an other.     
 
 
Figure 24: The Graph of Desire (2)259 
 
Lacan describes the upper part of Graph 1 as the 'button tie' [point de caption] which stops the 
sliding of the chain of signifiers.260 This zone is recapitulated in Graph 2, in which a circuit is 
formed between s(A) ↔ A indicating the circularity of the production of meaning. The 
signifier is constantly interrogated in relation to the central question 'che vuoi?’, represented 
by the upper line; as clarified in Graph 3.  
                                                 
259 From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 684 
260 Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002)  p.683 
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Figure 25 The Graph of Desire (3)261 
 
That the motor of desire – this mechanism of transferring affect from idea to associated idea 
through the matrix of signification – is in relation to what is acceptable for the constitution of 
the subject 'che vuoi?' has an antecedent in Freud's model. Lacan's idea of the other correlates 
with Freud's (super)ego formation, and the interplay between the subject's ideal image and the 
images which it can produce. Yet Lacan's divergence from Freud is expressed in the upper 
transversal bar which characterise the final iteration of the graph of desire (Graph 4 (the 
Complete Graph), below). In the lower loop, the interplay between the ego and the image 
moves towards the fixed point of the ego-ideal because the Other is considered complete. If 
the subject is to be produced, it is produced in relation to some form of answer to the question 
'che vuoi?', and it is this question which defines the very nature of desire: “The original 
question of desire is not directly "What do I want?", but "What do others want from me? 
What do they see in me? What am I for others?"”262 However, the constitution of the subject 
is not even defined as compromise between the signifiers about the self and those about the 
expectation of the other. In the upper loop, the subject has identified the incompleteness of the 
                                                 
261 From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 690 
262 Žižek, S. 'From desire to drive: Why Lacan is not Lacaniano' from Atlántica de Las Artes 14 · Otoño 
1996 Section 5 (available at http://www.caam.net/caamiaaa/cgi-
bin/articulo.asp?idArticulo=231&idioma=EN. ) 
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Other, and recognises that they fail to guarantee meaning; the contract is no longer 
underwritten. The subject must now be constituted through fantasy as fantasies are elaborate 
constructs through which the individual attempts to attain satisfaction, approaching the object 
which is deemed to be demanded. Yet all such attempts fail if there is no stable signification 
of the position of the other. The upper loop of Graph 4 (d → $◊A), which represents the 
travails of the drive, can be seen to correspond to the lower half of the graph (i(a) → m). For 
Lacan the structure of the drive is constituted linguistically and its content is defined not 
organically, but as the residue of an organic pulsion: “The drive is what becomes of demand 
when the subject vanishes from it”.263 Sitting on top of language, the drive's vector towards 
fantasy represents the construct made by the unconscious to cope with the failure of language 
to satisfy need.  
 
 
 
                                                 
263 Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 692 
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Figure 26: The Graph of Desire (4)264 
 
Lacan's unconscious is driven by desire. In his formulation, desire is the name given to the 
movement of unconscious signifiers along the pathways alluded to in the Graphs of Desire:  
 
'Because metonymy is a linguistic operation, desire is in its essence a feature of the 
sliding of the signified under the signifier.'265  
 
“One could define desire as exactly this process: as the difference between the original 
message and that which arrives at the end. The key here is that desire is not the 
message itself. It is neither the original sentence nor the final one, but the process or 
structure of distortion itself”. 266   
 
Desire is no longer a specific process within the unconscious, but the general operation by 
which the unconscious works. The spasms of unconscious operation which constitute the 
subject are driven by the subject's desire; the wish to cross from signifers to a comprehensible 
signified: “Desire, as [Lacan] came to call it in preference to all other terms, is what keeps the 
chain of signifers moving.”267 This movement is terminated by the quilting of signifiers, in 
which the relationship of the Other and the ego is fixed. If this point is not achieved it is 
because the lack of an Other prevents the crossing of the bar in signification, and there is no 
final decision. In this case, the creation of the subject is made upon the endless metonymic 
tracks of language, along which it travels always-asking 'what next?'. Chiesa states that this 
strategy represents:  
 
[A] positivisation of lack on the part of the subject. The child manages to ‘positivise’ 
the lack that surfaced with the unconditionality of the demand for love, and in so doing 
                                                 
264 From Lacan, J. Ecrits Trans. B. Fink 2002 (New York: WW Norton, 2002) p. 692 
265 Lacan, J. quoted at lacanonline.com ( http://www.lacanonline.com/index/2010/05/what-does-lacan-say-
about-desire/ as accessed 08/12/2012 ) 
266 Leader, D. Why Do Women Write More Letters Than They Post, (UK: Faber & Faber, 1996) pp. 108-110 
267 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 122 
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he subjectivises himself and emerges as a desiring lack-of-being [manque-a-etre].268  
 
When the subject is constituted along the traversal of the higher reaches of the graph, it is 
constituted in relation to lack. The failure of the other →  signifier relationship leads to 
constant flux along the upper vectors in which drive and demand are destined to be met by the 
incompleteness in fantasy and the lack in the other. The terminus of Lacan's analysis of desire 
is the creation of the subject. By following the evolution of the graph of desire through the 
four stages, we have passed form the formal depiction of the unconscious as 'like a language' 
through to a constitution of something like the Cartesian subject of philosophy. This 
encapsulates a crucial problem Land sees in Lacanian analysis, which is that it always slides 
back towards anthropocentric principles and subjectivity. Though the letter of 'the 
unconscious is like a language' is amenable to anti-anthropocentric interpretation, it is a 
metaphor which is tainted from the very beginning because of its tie to language, the 
linguistic, and to the common modules of language – which are signs – all of which lean 
towards the subjective.  
 
The present thesis has shown how an anti-anthropocentric reading of Lacan could be 
constructed, but such an endeavour requires a great effort because of the tendency of Lacan's 
concepts to backslide towards subjectivity. Whilst there are parts of Lacan which are 
amenable to a 'hard' anti-anthropomorphism, they are only parts. The cybernetic cycling of 
signification is valuable to anti-anthropomorphism in its simplest form, however, once it is 
tied down in the language of the (split)subject, discourse, and other it becomes 
anthropocentric. Yet Lacan is a theoretician of considerable importance in the evolution of 
drive theory in the twentieth century. Both Deleuze-Guattari and Lyotard consider much of his 
work to be of insight, and of the later philosophers I am considering in the present thesis, only 
Land is outrightly hostile.269 Lacan's psychoanalysis is not systematic and his positing of a 
number of foundational concepts which tend to collapse into one another is a significant cause 
of his reputation as a 'difficult' philosopher. In terms of Lacan's technique in presenting his 
theory of the unconscious, there are six factors which work towards the tendency for his work 
to become anthropocentric. They are: (1) linguistic metaphor, described above, of the 
                                                 
268 Chiesa, L. Subjectivity and Otherness (USA: MIT Press, 2007) p. 155 
269 Deleuze and Guattari's, and Lyotard's encounter with Lacan's thought is explored in the subsequent two 
chapters.  
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unconscious as like a language. (2) His reliance on obscurity when presenting concepts and in 
riddles when elucidating them.  Riddles evoke a mode of thought which is focused on signs 
and not signifiers; ideas and not relations. (3) Lacan's status as a practising clinician means 
that he clinically treats the object of psychoanalysis as a subject. (4) Many of Lacan's 
concepts are illustrated by use of examples based on characters in literature, in which the 
protagonists are, again, treated as subjects. Such examples also contribute to the accusations – 
considered in the next two chapters – of the 'theatricality' of the Lacanian (Oedipal) 
unconsciousness. (5) His philosophical influences tens to be philosophers of subjectivity 
(inside philosophers). All of the previous five are questions of technique rather than 
theoretical positions, yet the sixth and most consequential anthropomorphising tendency is 
Lacan's theoretical decision, affirmed so often, to abandon Freud's biologism. For Land, this 
is the root of several failings of Lacanian psychoanalysis.270 Once cut adrift of its biological 
roots, it is very difficult to conceive of the drive in the linguistic unconscious as anything 
other than an anthropomorphising tendency.  
 
 
 Name of phase 
- change 
Motor of 
change 
Mechanism of 
change 
Reason for 
continuation 
Reason for 
stopping  
Freud Displacement 
and 
Condensation 
Drive Neuronal 
networks / 
pathways 
Bound energy in 
drives remains. 
Eludes 
censorship / 
Tonic energy 
is cathected 
Lacan Metaphor and 
Metonymy  
Desire Cybernetic Metonym (bar not 
crossed) 
Metaphor (bar 
crossed) 
 
Table 5: Comparative Terms in Freudian and Lacanian Models of the Unconscious.  
 
The Lacanian Drive 
 
My exposition of Lacan’s work terminates with analysis of his (re)interpretation of Freudian 
                                                 
270 See Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 261-287 and pp. 319-
344.  
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drive theory in the section ‘The Transference and the Drive’ in Seminar XI: The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (1977). Here Lacan denies that the drives have a 
biological origin, stating that satisfaction cannot be attained by acquiring the object of one’s 
desire. For Lacan, the drive is never satisfied, passing through a transitory sublimation back 
into an impossible pursuit of the lost object, the object 'petit a'. In Lacan’s model, the 
unconscious is no longer a machine which regulates the organism’s pursuit of its primal 
desires, but a labyrinth in which these desires are lost. In The Deconstruction of the Drive, 
Session 13 of  Seminar XI, Lacan's method is to re-read Freud’s theory of the drive, stripping 
out all of the references to hydraulics or mechanistic force.271 The Freudian depiction of drive 
is of an ordered progression through the phases of the drive to the aim. Against this, Lacan 
breaks these moments of the drive apart into entirety separate phases. Thrust is re-
characterised as a non-energetic, constant pressure rather than a spasm of energy needing 
discharge. If the pressure is constant, Lacan reasons, it is impossible to describe it 
biologically, because all needs wax and wane depending on their satisfaction or lack 
thereof.272 In this disavowal of biologism Lacan rejects the division between free and bound 
energy (which would explain the duality of the drive in being constant and able to be 
discharged) and the notion of the drive going through a vicissitude or adventure (therefore 
being able to move away from a biological basis). Lacan's concept of a drive is clearly distinct 
from the Freudian drive explained in Chapter 1. To recap, the important characteristics of the 
Freudian drive as  [Pulsion or Trieb] were shown to be: 
 
 Its immutability. Freud's drives are laid down like the layers of Troy; nothing is ever 
erased, even if a pattern is abandoned of its energy.  
 The plurality of drives. The unconscious is the 'home' of numerous drives, all trying to 
realise themselves. Their scanning of sense data for the potential to do this – according 
                                                 
271 Evans, D. An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (Taylor and Francis Online, 2006) p. 
47 
272 “The constancy of the thrust forbids any assimilation of the drive to a biological function, which always 
has a rhythm. The first thing Freud says about the drive is, if I may put it this way, that it has no day or night, 
no spring or autumn, no rise and fall. It is a constant force.” Lacan, J. The Seminar. Book XI. The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, 1964. Trans. Alan Sheridan. (London: Hogarth Press and Institute 
of Psychoanalysis, 1977) p. 165 
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the rules of the reality principle – never ceases.    
 A basis in instinct. The drive is related to some biological system, even if its 
vicissitudes have twisted it far from such a beginning.   
 A division between free and bound energy in the primary process, and an unconscious 
system, whose goal is to process and distribute these energetic investments which is 
the deepest, and therefore primary (first) process which operates in the economy of the 
unconscious.   
 
For Lacan, these are not the essential characteristics of the drive. Following his reading of 
Freud such ideas are simplifications or deliberate misconstructions which would try and pin 
down drive/desire in erroneously stable formations. For Lacan it is absolutely clear that the 
drive is: 
 
[N]ot an instinct, not a quasi-biological 'libido', not a variable flow of neural energy or 
excitation, not an appetite, not the concealed source from which appetites derive and 
not, as it had been for the late Freud, the life principle itself.273  
 
In contrast to the Freudian construction of the drive we can now posit a Lacanian construction 
of the drive whose characteristics are quite different. Whereas Freud's first principle is that the 
unconscious consists of drives and energy, Lacan's is that it is structured by the chaining of 
signifiers.274 Lacan is, as noted above, implacably against the idea of a drive as evolved 
instinct.275 For Lacan the metonymic nature of desire means that the elements of fantasy are 
constantly updated in relation to the lack which they inevitably encounter. The plurality of the 
drives, which Freud is so determined to stress, can be effaced by the graph of desire, which 
posits a single line along which subjectivity is constructed. However, Lacan warns the reader 
that the graph is a simplification – the positions of the loci are not 'fixed' either in place or 
time, so the graph is a two dimensional rendering of a four dimensional apparatus – there is 
nothing in Lacan's commentary which disavows the notion of several vectors of desire 
operating at the same time. Yet despite being scalable up to the a plural conception of drives, 
the tendency of Lacanian interpretation is to consider the products of the drive economy 
                                                 
273 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 122 
274 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 131 
275 Bowie, M. Lacan (London: Fontana, 1991) p. 130 
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singly rather than as composites.276  
 
Perhaps the most prominent contemporary Lacanian – particularly within public discourse – is 
Slavoj Žižek, who depicts drive and desire in the following manner:  
 
Desire is historical and subjectivized, always and by definition unsatisfied, 
metonymical, shifting from one object to another, since I do not actually desire what I 
want – what I actually desire is to sustain desire itself, to postpone the dreaded 
moment of its satisfaction. Drive, on the other hand, involves a kind of inert 
satisfaction which always finds its way; drive is non-subjectivized ("acephal") – 
perhaps, its paradigmatic expressions are the repulsive private rituals (sniffing at one's 
own sweat, sticking one's finger into one's nose...) which bring us intense satisfaction 
without us being aware of it, or, insofar as we are aware of it, without us being able to 
do anything about it, to prevent it.277 
 
Such a conception of drive is totally distinct from Land's contention that “drives are the 
functions of nomadic cybernetic systems, not instincts but simulated instincts, artificial 
instincts” and, perhaps more surprisingly, totally different to other notable Lacanian's 
interpretations of Lacan's drive theory.278 The Lacanian drives detailed above by Žižek are 
simply instincts which have undergone no travails or vicissitudes. Lacanianism – even more 
so than Freudianism – is beset by contradictions and competing interpretations. There is a 
distinct split between its clinical application and those in other disciplines who wish to 
commandeer it, as Evans noted; scholars who believed that: 
 
The value of Lacan's work lay not in any ability to describe the facts, but in its power 
to produce novel ways of interpreting literary texts. For scholars steeped in literary 
theory, this was I suppose a natural response, but to me it seemed clearly at odds with 
                                                 
276 Chapter 4 will show how Lyotard considers this to be a problem in Lacan's works.  
277 Žižek, S. 'From desire to drive: Why Lacan is not Lacaniano' from Atlántica de Las Artes 14 · Otoño 
1996 Section 7 (available at http://www.caam.net/caamiaaa/cgi-
bin/articulo.asp?idArticulo=231&idioma=EN. ) 
278 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 330 
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the whole thrust of Lacan's life and work. For Lacan was not a literary critic, but a 
practising psychoanalyst.279  
 
Nevertheless, even in a strictly clinical setting, differences can be observed between the 
consequences of Freud's 'scientific' methodology which, whilst it produced contradictory 
hypotheses, aimed at their resolution, and Lacan's hermeneutic method which attempts to 
interrogate the 'text' of the unconscious and relate its concepts to those in the Lacanian 
system. This hermeneutic approach emphasises explanatory capacity – the ability to provide a 
descriptive framework – above consistency, as it selectively deploys the tools of Lacanian 
analysis (object petit-a, imaginary-symbolic-real etc.) on a case by case basis. Žižek claims 
that this 'Lacan' deployed in critical theory is not a misreading, but a choice of emphasis, 
involving a distinct selection regarding which Lacanian concepts will be deployed.      
 
"The predominant reading of Jacques Lacan reduces him to a kind of "philosopher of 
language" who emphasized the price the subject has to pay in order to gain access to 
the symbolic order [...] This predominant reading of Lacan is not a simple misreading, 
external to what Lacan effectively accomplished: there certainly is an entire stratum of 
Lacanian theory which corresponds to this reading".280 
 
Lacanianism can be likened to a holy text, of which different parts can be preached depending 
on the objectives of the priest. Yet conflict of ideas and ambiguity is not a sufficient reason to 
abandon hopes of interpretation – as theology shows! However, the process of tracing a 
general line of argument in Lacanianism, despite exceptions, is still possible. In general terms, 
this trajectory would emphasise the role of the subject, language, and idealism, all of which 
are antithetical to Land's depiction of a productive unconscious.  
 
                                                 
279 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of Narrative, eds. 
Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp.38-55. ( Available at  
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Lacanianism 
 
Despite the proliferation of concepts and extended analytical framework it adds to 
Freudianism, Lacanian psychoanalysis is ultimately a dead end when considered from a 
Landian standpoint. Lacan and Lacanism is not formal, impersonal, mechanical, plural, or 
rooted in the scientific method, and most damningly is trapped as an inescapable correlate of 
idealism. This explains why Land's engagement with Lacan is brief, as the role of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis is simply that of an other to which Deleuze's pre-personnel and productive 
psychoanalysis (as depicted in Chapter 3) is contrasted. Land's discussion of Lacan focuses on 
the consequences of Lacanianism's amendments to the practice of psychoanalysis and the 
effects on psychoanalytic practice of a “Lacan, who had already transformed the jungle 
wilderness at the heart of psychoanalysis into a structuralist parking-lot”.281 
 
Structuralism is the target of Land's critique because it formalises relations between 
components in such a way as to reaffirm and deepen them. If structuralism is a 'parking-lot' 
rather than a jungle it is because its tendency is towards increasing fixity of telos and 
interpretation, whist the 'jungle' of psychoanalysis is subject to the possibility of rapid change 
if it is subject to runaway feedback. Land's accusation against structuralism is that it posits 
ideas as gravitating towards other ideas (meaning that the signifiers have a certain fixity) and 
is therefore essentially idealist, whereas Freudian psychoanalysis (especially when modified 
by Deleuze) is concerned with the measurement of production as its primary operation, and it 
is only after the consequences of production are measured that they should be interrogated by 
ideas. The practice of Lacanianism, which imposed the complex as the fundamental structure 
which both determines and represents the form of the patients unconscious processes leads to: 
 
Oedipalizing the Fort-Da game ... Oedipalizing desire to its foundations; ripping all the 
energy, hydraulics, pathology, and shock out of Freud, and substituting lack, the pathos 
of identity, and Heideggerian pomposity ... trivializing desire into the cringing 
aspiration to be loved.282 
 
                                                 
281 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 282 
282 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 282-283 
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Here, again, Land is concerned with the role of idealism in Lacanian thought. The Lacanian 
complex, exemplified by the Oedipus complex, is constructed by a network of ideas, and its 
diagnostic function is to retroactively explain that observed production took place according 
to the predetermined dynamics of the complex. The interpretation of reality therefore takes 
place under a preset pattern, and psychoanalysis' role is to preserve the pattern rather than to 
modify it. Hence, Lacan's recasting of the Fort-Da game under the aegis of Oedipus makes the 
general error of interrogating an idea with another idea. This can be opposed to Freud's 
methodology where, though Beyond the Pleasure Principle sees Hans' toy-throwing game as 
its central problem, the text is concerned with the explanation of production – in this instance 
a production which cannot be matched up to prexisting theoretical ideas – and it is due to this 
disparity that Freud speculates about various solutions to the problem. In his experimental 
method, Freud is therefore interrogating reality using ideas and, upon finding these ideas to 
be insufficient, interrogates these ideas using reality.  
 
There is no scope for idealism in Freud's casting of the unconscious as an energetic-hydraulic 
system which operates according to its formal rules as a system. An engine or mechanism 
does not ask what or why it is producing in the same way that in the classic cybernetician 
model of foxes and rabbits (see Figure 27 below) the rabbit does not ask how many foxes will 
there be next year before reproducing.283 The system is blind, and its primary action is 
material production: “The philosophy of production becomes atheistic, orphan, and inhuman. 
In the technocosmos nothing is given, everything is produced”.284 In the cybernetic system 
below there is no controlling body akin to a subject which determines populations according 
to fixed ideas. Instead, there are only material relations between the entities involved, and 
though the system tends towards stability, there is no coordinating entity which plans this 
equilibrium.  
                                                 
283 A description of this cybernetic system can be found in Clemson, B. Cybernetics: A New Management 
Tool ( UK: Tumbridge Wells, 1984) p. 34 
284 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 321 
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Figure 27: The Cybernetics of Foxes and Rabbits285 
 
 
There is a neurotic and conformist stratum in Freud of course, but it floats upon the 
impersonal flows of desire that erupt out of traumatized nature. Where are the flows in 
Lacan? Where would one be less likely to find anything that flows than in the gnarled 
post-Saussurian fetish of the signifier that dominates his texts?286 
 
For Land, the flows of productive desire described above are 'impersonal' insofar as they are 
pre-personal, taking place in an unconscious which is not the subject, which contains little 
trace of the subject, and which occurs temporally before the construction of the subject. 
Conversely, for Lacan all of these processes already include the subject, which is produced 
simultaneously with the unconscious, as was shown in the reading of the Graph of Desire 
above. The primary reason for Land's dismissal of Lacan's thought is therefore that it operates 
as a tendency towards idealism in psychoanalysis and, concentrating on ideas rather than 
production, effaces the quality of being able to plot desire as material-production-in-itself 
                                                 
285 From Clemson, B. Cybernetics: A New Management Tool (UK: Abacus, 1984) p. 32 
286 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 283 
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which psychoanalysis offered. Is it possible to defend Lacanianism against this critique? The 
history of philosophy contains several philosophers whose effects in the public sphere have 
been very different to the letter of their philosophy. Indeed, many of them are precursors of 
Land's thought, most notably Nietzsche. If a defence of Lacan is possible, it would stem from 
the possibility of emphasising the cybernetics which Lacan's early works hint at, yet this is 
never considered by Land, the arch cyberneticist, to be useful material. The only answer can 
be that the Lacanian 'brand' is simply too toxic, and too poisoned with anthropocentricism to 
be helpful. If Lacanian cybernetics were deployed by Land, it would be in relation to the 
regulation of the machinic process of the Freudian psyche, yet Evans opposes Lacan's 
cybernetics to Freudian hydraulics: 
 
Yet, as with his early hunches about the importance of ethology, Lacan soon 
abandoned his interest in cybernetics and computational theory. Perhaps he sensed that 
the language of information processing did not sit easily with Freud’s hydraulic model 
of the mind.287  
 
Given such difficulties of determining Lacanianism's position in relative to other theories, 
even to the extent to which one cannot be sure if it is complementary or dissimilar, the only 
method of making it a coherent discourse would be to withdraw to a purely psychoanalytic 
position, and to make the sole metric by which its productions are judged to be the efficacy of 
its cure in relation to the specific patient. Evans states that this was the defensive strategy used 
by Lacan when confronted with questions about psychoanalysis' interactions with wider 
critical theory: 
 
Lacan railed against what he saw as the `hermeneuticization' of psychoanalysis, 
arguing that psychoanalysis was not a general hermeneutics that could be `applied' to 
any area of enquiry, but the theory of a specific domain, namely, the process of 
                                                 
287 Evans, D. 'From Lacan to Darwin' to Darwin in The Literary Animal; Evolution and the Nature of 
Narrative, eds. Gottschall, J. and Wilson, D.S. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2005) pp.38-55 ( 
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psychoanalytic treatment.288 
 
The consequences of this 'bleeding out' of psychoanalysis into other discourses and its effect 
on the social and political order is the subject of Deleuze and Guattari's critique and then re-
capitulation of psychoanalysis, as outlined in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 3. Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus: a theory of the 
productive unconscious 
 
Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari's first collaborative work, is a text which, as its authors 
undoubtedly intended, straddles the political and the psychoanalytic. It combines normative 
and positive psychoanalysis, and offers prescriptions-about as well as descriptions-of the 
operation of the unconscious.  At its most basic level, this dissertation builds upon the answer 
to the question 'how does the unconscious operate?', rather than the question 'how would one 
wish the unconscious operates?'; it is therefore at the level of psychoanalytic theory rather 
than political or ethical theory. Any contributions I shall make to the latter topics, I shall save 
until the very end of this work. My initial aim in my reading of Deleuze and Guattari is to 
extract the purely psychoanalytic analysis and critique (particularly that which is 
metapsychological) from the political/psychoanalytic hybrid which is the two volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia. This task is made considerably more difficult by much 
contemporary commentary on Deleuze and Guattari's project which is often at least as 
intrinsically political as the primary work. My methodology will therefore be to present some 
of the major readings of Deleuze and Guattari's work and to show the bias which dominates 
academic commentary on their collaborative work, which is presented in parallel to a Landian 
reading of their essential concepts. I shall focus on Claire Colebrook's Understanding Deleuze 
and Ian Buchanan's Deleuzism and A Guide to Anti-Oedipus.289 Colebrook and Buchanan's 
interpretation of Deleuze sees his philosophy put to work in support of a progressive political 
programme.290 I shall contrast this to Land's “mad black Deleuzianism” whose goal of cutting 
                                                 
289 Colebrook, C. Understanding Deleuze. (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002); Buchanan, I. Deleuzism 
(USA: Duke University Press, 2000); Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum, 
2008) 
290 For example, the section 'Sexual Difference' in Colebrook, C. Understanding Deleuze (Australia: Allen 
and Unwin, 2002) presents a reading of difference amenable to feminism. This thesis is not explicitly 
political, and the 'Progressive' and 'Landian' positions which are distinguished here are done so because of the 
genealogical methodology utilised herein, which claims that a dominant discourse – in this instance, the 
progressive tendency of the academy – works to become a totalising discourse.  
 150 
auto-production free of all constraints has no idealistic or utopian political outcome – indeed, 
as Chapter 5 shall show, Land actively works towards dystopic teleologies.291 This reading 
will have a dualistic relationship with academic Deleuzianism, as it will be deployed at times 
as the other of Land's position, yet in other instances it is shown to be sympathetic to his 
position, and the present thesis' framing of Deleuze's productive psychoanalysis as Land's 
antecedent.  
 
The theoretical critique contained within Anti-Oedipus must therefore be disentangled from 
the political programme which motivated its authors and its later interpreters. I will undertake 
this  textual analysis because, programmatically, my main objective in my reading of Anti-
Oedipus is to initially identify the extent to which it is anti-Lacanian or anti-Freudian 
(building on the two previous chapters), before going on to delineate which, if any, parts of 
Freud and Lacan, as described hereto in the present thesis, are compatible with Deleuze and 
Guattari’s theory of machinic desire and Land’s libidinal materialism. In this respect, Land 
asks: 
 
[I]s Freud ever really engaged in Anti-Oedipus? Is it not rather Lacan, who had already 
transformed the jungle wilderness at the heart of psychoanalysis into a structuralist 
parking-lot... Of course, Oedipus is peculiarly nauseating Viennese nursery pap, but 
where is Oedipus in Beyond the Pleasure Principle? A question which could be asked of 
the majority of Freud’s texts.292  
 
Land’s question is rhetorical: insofar as it is psychoanalytic, he believes that Anti-Oedipus is 
fundamentally Anti-Lacan, and, furthermore, that the apparatuses ensuring desire’s repression 
are Lacanian rather than Freudian. For Land, the Freudian 'Oedipus' as investigated in Anti-
Oedipus is a misstep, a dead end in theorisation which Freud stumbled into late in his writings 
(circa 1923) and which is eclipsed in its importance by the earlier, metapsychological texts of 
1915-1920; and from this perspective Oedipus becomes even more problematic when it is 
                                                 
291 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
2010) available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
292 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 282 
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deployed by Lacan, Klein, and later analysts. Buchannan concurs that Anti-Oedipus takes the 
Freudian unconscious as its starting point: “Deleuze and Guattari preserve this basic model of 
the unconscious; they even keep to Freud's tripartite way of thinking about it”.293 Yet Anti-
Oedipus rapidly moves beyond Freud's model, and provides a depiction of the failure of 
Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis to provide a theory of drive-desire in the unconscious. 
Instead of counter-presenting a complete solution – a master key to understanding the 
unconscious in a Lacanian sense– Anti-Oedipus shows that Oedipality is a partial, 
fragmentary diagnosis of one type of unconscious operation which became generalised as the 
basic model for the functioning of all unconscious operation.  
 
The present thesis has moved beyond my initial explication of Freudianism and Lacanism and 
is now concerned with a sustained critique of these theories in operation, and this will proceed 
in parallel with the denotation of concepts which can begin to provide a new theory of the 
machinic unconscious. As such, the key questions I hope to answer in this chapter are:  
 
[A] Why Deleuze and Guattari believed the intellectual predominance of Lacanianism 
needed to be challenged in the late 1960s. 
[B] To what extent does Anti-Oedipus critique Freudianism and Lacanianism as being 
repressive or having the potential to be applied repressively? 
[C] To what extent does Anti-Oedipus utilise or synthesise elements of 1) Freudianism 
and 2) Lacanianism into its own theory of machinic desire?  
[D] To show how the answers to [B] and [C] correlate with the distinction from 
Chapters 2 and 3 between Freudian-mechanistic drive theory and Lacanian-
semiological drive theory. 
[E] To explore Deleuze and Guattari's theory of productive, machinic desire. Two 
interpretations of Deleuze-Guattari are delineated: the predominant 'left' reading in 
which any expression of desire is considered positive; this is compared to a 
minoritarian 'right' reading of Deleuze-Guattari in which desire flows to a fixed 
destination.  
                                                 
293 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum: 2008) p. 27 
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[F] To consider what is absent in Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the unconscious, 
and to consider what may need to be added to create a complete theory of machinic 
desire.  
The aspects in [E] will form the basis of the final chapter, in which other theorists of desire – 
particularly that of Lyotard depicted in Chapter 4 – are utilised, along with concepts from 
Chapters 1 and 2, to begin to produce a complete theory of the Landian machinic 
unconscious.   
 
 
 
 
The authors' intended purpose of Anti-Oedipus 
 
In 1972 Deleuze and Guattari published Anti Oedipus, as a critique of the contemporary 
Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as practised by members of the IPA and EFP294.  
Deleuze and Guattari attacked these schools of psychoanalysis because of their apparently 
reductionist approach, which tended to re-frame all general problems into particular instances 
of fixed complexes, particularly the Oedipus complex.295 When utilised in this way, Oedipus 
re-situates the individual’s desires in relation to a quasi-familial order and, analytically, offers 
psychoanalytic solutions based on the resolution of the resultant ‘Oedipal triangles’ (father-
mother-child) by fixing dynamics in which desire deviates from ‘normality’. This approach is 
characterised methodologically by its derivation from clinical settings and the act of clinical 
psychoanalysis. The necessity of ‘normalising’ the patient in this milieu of praxis – offering a 
prescription for a cure – meant that meta-social applications of psychoanalysis were grouped 
around attractors derived from the most efficacious solutions to the modal problems of pre-
existing patients. Deleuze and Guattari describe the obvious problem with this, namely that 
societies or groups are not the same as individual neurotics. Treating the individual as a 
                                                 
294 The IPA is the International Psychoanalytic Association, the largest Freudian association of 
Psychoanalysts. The EFP was the École Freudian de Paris, Lacan’s school set up in opposition to the IPA.  
295  For a longer treatment of the historical context of Anti Oedipus see 'Deleuze and Guattari in Context' in  
Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum, 2008) 
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Oedipal problem might 'work' for the analyst in most cases, but may equally obscure the true 
issue, and prevent a cure in some patients. Treating a social group as if it were a patient will 
not work in most cases, as groups are defined by their plurality, and the patient is singular.    
 
In the 1960s practitioners of psychoanalysis, though their quotidian role was to work in an 
institutional context with with ‘sick’ patients, became increasingly influential in public 
discourse.296 Psychoanalysts’ interactions with other academic disciplines in this time of 
‘public intellectuals’ presented a view of society which methodologically began with the 
procedures of applied analysis, and then recoded the political and social in the terminology of 
the personal and psychological297 Freud’s own work on psychoanalysis can be divided across 
a similar line into: analytical, patient centred works and broader, metapsychological texts.298 
Freud’s intention in the production of his writings was that the theory and practice of 
psychoanalysis would be shown to reaffirm each other in the application of the complex to the 
individual; and conversely in the association of the language of the individual with the 
psychoanalytic structure of the complex (Figure 28).  A central accusation of Anti-Oedipus is 
that subsequent Freudian and Lacanian analysts abandoned this reciprocal relationship, and 
instead take only the complex in its established, final, pathological form, and use it to 
overcode the underlying reality of all aspects of analytic theory and practice.299 They are no 
longer willing to modify their theory if the patient does not fit it. If the patient deviates from 
the box they are placed in, 'the complex', practitioners were unwilling to adapt the theoretical 
                                                 
296 Particularly in France, where the influence of Lacan was strongest.  
297 Bettencourt Pires notes that the tradition of the public intellectual in France was fixed in the aftermath 
of the Dreyfus Affair. See Bettencourt Pires, M.L. 'Public intellectuals – past, present and future' in 
Comunicação & Cultura, n.º 7, 2009, pp. 115-130 
298 The former would include Studies on Hysteria (Freud and Breuer, 1895) or The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life (Freud, 1904); the latter, Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920) or The Ego and the Id 
(Freud, 1923).  
299 This, again, is an example of an idea interrogating another idea, as opposed to an idea interrogating 
reality.  
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framework, and simply amended the discourse of the patient.300 
Figure 28: A Positive Dynamic Between Theory and Practice  
 
The first strand of Anti-Oedipus I shall examine is critique; the second is a positive ontology 
of desire (See Figure 29 below).301  Deleuze and Guattari posit the unconscious as a positive, 
productive system, analysing these productions across social and political bodies. Their 
productive ontology of universal desire – situated by Michael Hardt in the tradition of 
                                                 
300 A problem explored by Deleuze and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus' second chapter One or Several 
Wolves and The Interpretation of Utterances in Deleuze, G. Two Regimes of Madness (Columbia University 
USA: Semiotext(e), 2006) 
301 Deleuze and Guattari describe Anti-Oedipus as critical and then materialist: “Schizoanalysis is at once a 
transcendental and a materialist analysis. It is critical in the sense that it leads the criticism of Oedipus, or 
leads Oedipus, to the point of its own self-criticism. It sets out to explore a transcendental unconscious, rather 
than a metaphysical one; an unconscious that is material rather than ideological; schizophrenic rather than 
Oedipal; nonfigurative rather than imaginary; real rather than symbolic; machinic rather than structural. An 
unconscious, finally, that is molecular, microphysical, and micrological rather than molar or gregarious; 
productive rather than expressive.” Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 109 
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Nietzsche’s will to power or Spinoza’s conatus – posits material as substance which, over 
time, becomes arranged in ever more complex dispositions by the work of desiring 
machines.302 In this schema, desire is therefore the name given to the becoming of 
complexity.303 As such, it is wholly unlike the desire of the subject of Oedipus which is 
always already anthropocentric desire.304 Oedipus is the desire of the broken subject of 
analysis, suffering through its lacks. Such desire, idealist and negative, is the opposite of the 
positive, materialist conception of desire as production which Deleuze and Guattari will 
formulate.  
 
                                                 
302   Hardt's text is available online as 'Reading Notes on Deleuze and Guattari's Capitalism & 
Schizophrenia', part one  ( available at http://people.duke.edu/~hardt/ao1.htm ) 
303 This Nietzchean-Spinozist genealogy is noted by Deleuze, G in Negotiations. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995) p.6. It is also noted by Massumi, B. in A User's Guide to Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia (USA: MIT, 1992) p. 82 
304 Therefore it is also isomorphic with Land's conception of the tendency of organised matter towards 
auto-genesis and the creation of 'intelligence' as described in Templexity. See Land, N. Templexity (Timespiral 
Press; 2014)   
 156 
 
Figure 29: Anti-Oedipus 
 
This ontological re-framing of desire as materialist and as the object of schizoanalytic critique 
is the final objective of Deleuze and Guattari’s project in Anti-Oedipus. The present thesis 
shall emphasise the primacy of depicting material-productive process, following a Landian 
reading of Anti-Oedipus. This could be contrasted to Buchanan's reading, in which Deleuze 
and Guattari's primary aim was “a theoretical rapprochement between psychoanalysis and 
Marxism … which the authors provocatively refer to as either 'materialist psychiatry' or 
'schizoanalysis'”.305 A Landian reading would invert this, to be of a text primarily concerned 
with 'a theoretical rapprochement between materialism and psychiatry … which protectively 
refers to Marxism'.  To accomplish this aim, Deleuze and Guattari undertake a negative 
reading of some parts of Freudian psychoanalysis so that they can use the remnant of Freudian 
theory in their positive theory (see figure 30 below). This division of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Freud 
again follows the division in Freud’s corpus between accounts of casework and 
metapsychology. Watson notes a similar ambivalence about Lacan in Guattari’s solo 
                                                 
305 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus ( London: Continuum, 2008) p. 27 
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writings.306 
 
Figure 30: The Intersection of Casework and Metapsychology  
 
Deleuze and Guattari contend that Freud effectively misapplies his own theory when dealing 
with certain patients such as ‘Little Hans’, the 'Wolf Man' or Judge Schreber because of his 
reliance on the Oedipus complex.307  Deleuze and Guattari show that, in practice, 
psychoanalysis often compromises itself by failing to acknowledge what the patient is 
                                                 
306 See Watson: “Reflecting on this phase of his own thought in a 1985 interview, Guattari remarked that he 
"gradually came to question Lacanism, but less on theoretical grounds than in practice". In Anti-Oedipus he 
and Deleuze rethought psychoanalysis in terms of psychosis rather than neurosis.” Watson, J. Guattari's 
Diagrammatic Thought (UK: Bloomsbury, 2007) p. 17 
307 Freud describes the Little Hans case in  Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-Year-Old Boy (Freud; 1909); The 
Wolf Man in From the History of an Infantile Neurosis (Freud; 1918); Judge Schreber in Psycho-Analytic 
Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Freud; 1911). 
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actually saying . The analyst sits and listens to the patient, waiting for 'trigger words', or other 
set points they can map onto the general structural pattern of the pre-existing complex.  I shall 
be considering, as I follow Deleuze and Guattari’s reading of Oedipus, to what extent the 
theoretic underpinnings of psychoanalysis are flawed because of this tendency. Is 
psychoanalysis, if it is Oedipal, an imperfect application of a sound theory, or are both 
practice and theory compromised? Before embarking on this close reading, the preliminary 
task is to define what the ‘Oedipus’ of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is considered to 
represent and why it is considered to be so dangerous. Oedipus is a place holder for a number 
of tendencies that Deleuze and Guattari identified in psychoanalysis, all of which share a 
proclivity to repress desire.  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari the most damaging tendency in post-Freudian Psychoanalysis is that 
where the theoretical and proscriptive framework is exemplified by the ‘Oedipus’ they are 
steadfastly Anti; hence the title of their first collaborative book which denotes their intent to 
embark on a critical engagement with psychoanalysis.308 Anti-Oedipus was produced by 
authors who considered psychoanalysis a reactionary tool, abetting a counter-revolutionary 
tendency; a use demonstrated in the events of May 1968 and the reaction to these events.309 
This view was shared by other Soixante-Huitards (participants in the failed 'revolution') like 
Rose: “The unconscious is politics," said Lacan in '67. This was analysis's bid for universality. 
It's when analysis takes on politics, that it most blatantly legitimates oppression”.310 Deleuze 
and Guattari therefore went beyond contemporary critiques of psychoanalysis which attacked 
its ability to aid the patient. They showed that psychoanalysis did not only restrict desire in 
the subject micro-politically, but created macro-political structures of repression.  
 
                                                 
308 For a longer treatment of the historical context of Anti Oedipus see Deleuze and Guattari in Context in  
Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum, 2008) 
309 Colebrook notes the importance of the events of 1968 in Deleuze's philosophy as the point in which he 
moves away from a more general philosophy of difference and becomes an explicitly political 'post-1968 
thinker'. Colebrook, C. Understanding Deleuze (Australia: Allen and Unwin, 2002)  p. XXXii 
310 Rose, Quoted in Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004) p. 
228 
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The tendency of psychoanalysis to apply an Oedipal framework to analysis of societal 
dynamics reduced political disorder to a simulacrum of a psychic disorder – even more 
problematically, to the specific disorder of the neurotic patient – in which the political 
subject’s condition was conceived as a reaction to sexual-familiar pressures and repressions. 
This infantilisation of the revolutionary subject on one hand misrepresented and demeaned the 
desires of the revolutionary element; on the other, it recoded the power of authority as a 
natural and inevitable paternalist force whose role was to police the population in the service 
of a reactionary tendency. The Oedipal structure, diffusing into the apparatus of the state, 
serves to create unacceptable barriers to the flow of desire, ideologically demanding the 
collaboration of the professional class as ‘analysis’ 'storm troopers’: “Every category of 
professional is going to be urged to exercise police functions which are more and more 
precise: professors, psychiatrists, educators of all stripes, etc”.311 
 
Anti-Oedipus’ critique is post-Marxist and post-Freudian: while it does not doctrinally follow 
either philosopher, it works in the intellectual space opened by these philosophers.312 After 
Marx, economics cannot ignore questions of capital, class and power; after Freud, a 
conception of the unconscious cannot escape the terminology of drive and desire the present 
thesis operates within. When navigating these spaces, Anti-Oedipus' engagement with both 
philosophical inheritances is often ambivalent. While it acknowledges a great debt to both 
Marx and Freud, it also rebels against the direction some of their thought opens. These 
philosophers – along with Darwin and Nietzsche – delineate the revolutionary advances in the 
theoretical apparatus through which desiring production’s operations can be analysed and 
                                                 
311 Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 210 
312   Both Deleuze and Guattari acknowledge this methodology most readily in regard to Marx:  
 
 “Asked if he is a Marxist, Guattari replies that he belongs to no religion, but that "I go on using ideas and 
ways of making ideas work, drawn from any kind of theory, particularly from Marx. Marx was an 
extraordinary genius who interpreted history, economics, and the production of subjectivity in a way that was 
entirely new" In another interview, Deleuze [says] he feels that he and Guattari remain Marxists of a sort: "I 
think Felix Guattari and I have remained Marxists"”. Watson, Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought (UK: 
Bloomsbury, 2007) p. 135  
 160 
quantified.313 Their status as ‘prophets’ of materialism means that they are essential for 
understanding the genesis of Deleuze’s conception of desiring production; though, famously, 
Deleuze’s methodology was to use inherited concepts from these philosophers rather than to 
follow them in a historical reading.314   
 
In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari sort through their post-Freudian and post-Marxist 
inheritance and begin to identify a number of dualities: practical and meta-psychological 
analysis; desire predicated on lack versus positive, productive desire; neurosis and 
schizophrenia (the latter two explored in Anti-Oedipus' second chapter). Once they have made 
these distinctions, their method is to divide these binaries into productive and unproductive 
parts of the Freudian unconscious-machine, so that the unproductive parts can be discarded. 
The rubric which determines which side or the other they lie upon reduces to the simple 
political question: 'does this help or hinder the repression of desire?' This question is political 
because of the immediately post-revolutionary context of Anti-Oedipus. The book itself is an 
attempt to provide and answer to a political question, albeit through a psychoanalytic and 
economic interpretive framework. As such, this question is perhaps an improvement on what 
Deleuze and Guattari identify as the analyst's question 'how can I apply the universal solution 
(Oedipus)'? Unfortunately, neither approximate the still unanswered psychoanalytic question 
'how does the unconscious operate?', which remains open after our investigation of Freud and 
                                                 
313 In the terminology of Land, these philosophers represent 'accelerative thresholds' – a concept which will 
be discussed in Chapter 5.   
314  (a) Deleuze and Guattari’s turn to materialism in noted by Chatalet in the essay 'Deleuze and Guattari 
Fight Back': “Furthermore, I felt this eruption as an eruption of materialism. It's been too long since we've 
witnessed such a thing.” Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 
210 
 (b) See footnote 58 regarding Deleuze's methodology. 
 (c) “To formulate an answer, we realized that we couldn't just hook a Freudian engine up to the Marxist-
Leninist train.”  Guattari, F. quoted in Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: 
Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 217 
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Lacan. I shall read Anti-Oedipus 'archaeologically', trying to separate these three layers: 
critique of psychoanalytic method, critique of psychoanalytic theory, and political 
prescription. This reading will terminate in the observation that Anti-Oedipus makes a 
significant contribution to our understanding of the unconscious' operation by re-framing the 
question of the unconscious into one of production (what it makes) rather than of content 
(what it (re)presents) and, as such, makes a vital contribution to post-Freudian theorisation 
regarding the role of the drive.315 Deleuze and Guattari consider a productive model of the 
unconscious to be superior to the Oedipal, theatricised model because the complex is all too 
easy to correlate to a fixed, triangulated representation.316 The theatrical analogy shows how 
psychoanalysis collapses the complexity and indeterminacy of the unconscious' production to 
a flat theatrical (one stage, one show, one script) plane in which the only variables are which 
role the various actors play. Such simple correlationism can be deployed politically and 
socially to repress desire because the avoidance of complexity aids the imposition of the 
right/wrong dialectic of classical morality. At the end of the Oedipus path, Deleuze and 
Guattari state that we always find priests and cops whose dialogue is characterised by the 
prohibition of 'wrong'.317 Deleuze and Guattari, witnessing the riots of May 1968, saw how 
authority is terrified by the presence of crowds. The first step in quelling group unrest is to 
transform the complexity of the group into a simple narrative, which can be reabsorbed by 
authority. Just as this happened in the political sphere to dissenters, they believed it was also 
the methodology of the psychoanalyst crushing a patient's multiplicity of desires into a pre-set 
pattern.  
 
There are certainly objections to the situation of Anti-Oedipus as a Freudian-Marxist theory 
about the failure of May 1968 which must be noted at this point, though I do not believe that 
they are fatal to the project. Firstly, there is a tendency in the commentary on Anti-Oedipus, 
particularly when considering Deleuze’s input, to position the book as being entirely opposed 
to Freud. Kerslake  notes that Deleuze, before his collaboration with Guattari, uses the 
                                                 
315 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 55 
316 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 55 
317 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 81 
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unconscious as a concept, yet is wholly silent on the Freudian unconscious.318 However, the 
fact that Deleuze so readily agreed to work with the psychoanalyst Guattari in 1969, and that 
Deleuze’s understanding of Freud is so solidly grounded by 1972 shows that, on balance, 
Deleuze’s exposure to Freud probably pre-dates this period .319 In fact, a much stronger case 
can be made regarding Deleuze's exposure to Freud, as aspects of the Freudian unconscious 
occur in Part II of Difference and Repetition, which Deleuze published in 1968. Watson 
unequivocally states that Deleuze’s shared interest with Guattari was reading 
psychoanalysis.320  Deleuze’s relative silence about Freud before Anti-Oedipus is an example 
of Deleuze’s iconoclastic approach to philosophy and his methodological preference for 
encountering outside, marginalised parts of philosophy rather than engaging in dialectics with 
the molar. Yet by 1972, with the publication of Anti-Oedipus, along with contemporaneous 
shorter critiques of Freud, it is clear that Deleuze’s intention is to explicitly critique, rather 
than to ignore Freud. Watson emphasises that Deleuze’s introduction to Guattari represented 
an opportunity for Deleuze to escalate his burgeoning interest in conventional 
psychoanalysis.321 
 
A second, stronger, objection is that Deleuze’s conception of the unconscious is so dissimilar 
to Freud’s that there is nothing in the Freudian machine that Deleuze would wish to save. 
Kerslake’s reading of Deleuze’s earlier encounters with the unconscious situates him in 
                                                 
318 Kerslake, K. Deleuze and the Unconscious (London: Continuum, 2007) p. 189 
319 (a) See Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 309 
 (b) Deleuze’s fluency is demonstrated in discussions like Deleuze and Guattari Fight Back Deleuze, G. 
Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 216 
320 See Watson.: “They certainly shared many interests. Guattari was a reader of philosophy, and Deleuze a 
reader of psychoanalysis.” Watson, J. Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought (UK: Bloomsbury, 2007) p. 2 
321  Deleuze was attracted not only to Guattari's desiring machines, but also to his critique of 
psychoanalysis. He later explained to an interviewer that “Oddly enough, it wasn't me who rescued Felix 
from psychoanalysis; he rescued me”. Deleuze, G. Negotiations. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1995) p. 144 (see also 13, 15). 
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relation to Jungian and Bergsonian conceptions of the unconscious.322 However, the lexicon 
of Anti-Oedipus is both critically and positively that of Freudianism above all other discourses 
of philosophy of the unconscious; and Lacan is the only other primary influence who 
contributes a significant number of concepts, many of them re-interpreted from Freud. My 
contention is that many of Deleuze’s statements about moving away from Freudianism are 
tactical rather than strategic; pragmatic rather than ideological. Getting involved in debates 
about the correct reading of aspects of Freudianism represented a trap to Deleuze which he 
was eager to bypass: “Nor is there an epistemological problem: we're not worried about a 
return to Freud, or to Marx. If they tell us we've misunderstood Freud, we'll say: "Ooh well, 
we have too much else to do."”323 The metaphysical engine driving Anti-Oedipus – to be 
differentiated from the political aspect which is a critique of Lacanianism and power 
structures – is the attempt to rewrite the critique of Kantianism in Difference and Repetition in 
a psychoanalytic rather than metaphysical vocabulary.324 The resulting composite of Kant, 
Freud (and several other philosophers whom Deleuze's thought follows) is therefore a 
compromise between various lexicons, but ultimately must be consistent with a coherent post-
Freudian depiction of the unconscious if it is to do the work Deleuze would wish it to. 
 
An obvious danger to the progressive political message of Anti-Oedipus in the period around 
its publication would be to become dragged into a narrow, dialectical encounter with 
psychoanalysis. When questioned about their exact relationship to psychoanalysis Deleuze 
and Guattari were keen to avoid being recaptured by the psychoanalytic apparatus and 
classified as a dissenting position regarding Lacan’s ‘return to Freud’ in which they were 
pitted as the 'other' to Lacanianism.  A sustained dialectical critique of Lacanianism would 
ultimately entrench it rather than pass over it, and would mire Deleuze and Guattari in the 
realm of critique of theory rather than production of theories. Instead, Deleuze and Guattari 
pick what is useful to them in Freud and Lacan – the depictions of impersonal unconscious 
production such as drive theory or the 'A' schema – and deploy it against anthropocentric, 
                                                 
322  Kerslake, K. Deleuze and the Unconscious (London: Continuum, 2007)  
323 Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 221 
324 For elucidation of this argument see Hughes, J. Deleuze's Difference and Repetition, (London: 
Continuum, 2009). I shall return to this topic in Chapter 5 when discussing Land's project.  
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correlationist psychoanalysis.   
 
Therefore, while Anti-Oedipus can be easily read as a political reaction to Lacan, it is not so 
easily classifiable as a directly psychoanalytic critique of Lacan. Watson notes that Deleuze 
and Guattari worked through Lacan and Freud in Anti-Oedipus: through the space his 
concepts opened to a position on the other side: Deleuze acknowledged that both he and 
Guattari owed a great deal to Lacan, remaining indebted to his "creative side," and borrowing 
heavily from his line of thought even as they proceeded with their "demolition".325 I shall 
argue that there are parts of Freud which are useful to Deleuze and Guattari, but they have to 
be carefully extracted from the points at which they are implied in Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, as the tendency is to pass over them in silence rather than acknowledge Freud, 
and risk a backward slip to Oedipus. Deleuze explicitly differentiates the ‘letter’ and the 
‘becoming’ of Freud: what Freud wrote, and how it has been interpreted. This difference is the 
key to understanding what the Oedipus of Anti-Oedipus stands for. Oedipus is the tendency to 
triangulate a given case within the collar of a pre-existing complex.326 Rather than Oedipus 
the historical figure or the Oedipus complex named after him – these specific things – 
Oedipus is a tendency in the interpretation of Freud which focuses on the family and tradition, 
and treatments which operate within the context of both:  
 
However, if one examines not the letter of Marx or Freud, but the becoming of Marxism 
and the becoming of Freudianism, we see, paradoxically, Marxists and Freudians 
engaged in an attempt to recode Marx and Freud: in the case of Marxism, you have a 
recoding by the State ("the State has made you ill, the State will cure you"—this cannot 
be the same State); and in the case of Freudianism, you have a recoding by the family 
(you fall ill from the family and recover through the family—this is not the same 
family).327  
 
As Deleuze and Guattari criticise a tendency towards a certain application of Freud, they 
                                                 
325 Watson, J. Guattari's Diagrammatic Thought (UK: Bloomsbury, 2007) p. 42 
326 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 53 
327 Deleuze, G. Desert Islands and Other Texts (Cambridge UK: Semiotext(e), 2004)  p. 253 
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implicitly favour a reading of Freud which emphasises the opposite of the ‘Oedipus’ 
tendency: towards the impersonal, machinic flow of energy/desire delineated in his 
metapsychological works. The aspects of Freud and Marx which are subject to critique are 
those which work politically against the operation of desiring machines, reining back 
desiring-production, and shackling its free operation. Freeing desire is the commonality 
between Guattari’s critical-analytical and Deleuze’s positive-ontological interests before the 
writing of Anti-Oedipus. Later in this chapter I shall demonstrate that Deleuze and Guattari’s 
critique and ontology have similar positive applications in the liberation of desire. Both serve 
the cause of freeing desire, removing false obstacles to its uninhibited flow (Oedipus) and 
providing the conceptual tools needed to understand the migrations of energy on the plane of 
desire (Schizoanalysis).  
 
The Dangers of Oedipus 
Felix Guattari, writing both on his own and with philosopher Gilles Deleuze, developed 
the notion of schizoanalysis out of his frustration with what he saw as the shortcomings 
of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, namely the orientation toward neurosis, 
emphasis on language, and lack of socio-political engagement.328  
 
Watson is perhaps guilty of a lack of nuance in the above interpretation of Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis. In the period of Anti-Oedipus' production after the events of 1968, 
there certainly was a socio-political engagement being undertaken by psychoanalysis. 
However, this engagement was a broad and shallow recoding of the socio-political in the 
image of Oedipus: a familial, patriarchal recoding which was essentially conservative. 
Lacanianism was socio-political insofar as it was a bulwark against deviation from social 
normality. Therefore, what Deleuze and Guattari found lacking in Lacanianism was militant 
engagement of the kind they were politically engaged in.329 The Oedipus cure in its style as a 
soft, bourgeois recoding had no explicit aims beyond ending the patient's treatment and 
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reintegrating them as a normal member of society. When this pattern was transcribed to the 
political domain, psychoanalysis, mimicking its clinical setting, offered a diagnosis of a 
condition from which it also claimed there was no escape vector beyond capitulation to 
Oedipus. Deleuze and Guattari characterise the structural imposition of Oedipus as 3+1, 
representing the familial triumvirate and the phallus.330 Structuralist interpretations of the 
political would therefore, as in figure 31 below, always follow this cookie cutter template of 
triangulating “desire, object and law” (3) and establishing the signifying regime in which they 
were related (+1).331 Modern man was a familial construct and that was that: disorder would 
always creep in as people misconstrued their true Oedipal construction, and the only solution 
was a recapitulation to the underlying 'truth' of familiality. In the same pattern, society 
becomes the subject of an analysis based on the pattern of a pre-existing complex. In more 
complex cases, where the patient seemed to break free from familiality, the easy applicability 
of Oedipal theatrics could be relied upon to collapse the case back into the same triangulated 
structure. 
 
 
Figure 31: The Triangular Structure of the Complex 
 
Deleuze and particularly Guattari (having encountered patients thus repressed in the clinical 
setting) were politically motivated to re-frame analysis in a manner which would make it 
                                                 
330 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 52 
331 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 52 
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critical of what they considered repressive or conservative methods of biopolitical control; 
forms of control they saw in the apparatus of contemporary Western States: 
 
If it is true that the social revolution is inseparable from a revolution of desire, then this 
changes the question. We now must ask: what conditions will enable the revolutionary 
avant-garde to free itself from its unconscious complicity in repressive structures, and 
undermine Power's manipulations of the desire of the masses who "fight for their 
servitude as though it were their salvation"? If the family and the ideologues of the 
family have a crucial role to play here, as we believe they do, then one cannot 
overestimate the function of psychoanalysis in this respect, since it was the first to raise 
these questions—and the first to stifle them, privileging instead the modern myth of 
familial repression through Oedipus and castration.332  
 
The 'stifling' effect of the imposition of Oedipus became a philosophical-epistemological 
problem, as Oedipus deceives us about the underlying truth behind our conscious 
representations of reality. For Deleuze and Guattari, epistemological understanding isn't 
acquired through the critique of the gap between the imaginary and the symbolic (as it is for 
Lacan) but between the real and the virtual, that is, between a materialist conception of 
existence and the the critical frameworks which allow humanity to understand it in its most 
concrete, abstract forms.333 Their aim is to “shatter the iron collar of Oedipus and rediscover 
everywhere the force of desiring production; to renew on the level of the real, the tie between 
analytic machine, desire, and production”.334 Deleuze and Guattari's critical approach aims to 
eliminate the anthropomorphism and inherited 'small 'c' conservatism' engendered by an 
analysis which began with an abstract 'Oedipus the man' theory that would be applied to each 
'real' patient. Figure 32 below shows how Deleuze and Guattari and Lacan's epistemological 
approaches are each other's converse. Deleuze and Guattari, in their investigation of the real, 
only use a tool insofar as it can demonstrate the singularity of the real. For Lacanians, the 
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Oedipal tool is the universal truth of analysis, and any individual case is to be understood by 
the application of this model. 
 
 
Figure 32: Deleuze and Lacan's Methodology 
 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that the consequence of the application of a pre-determined, 
general theory to all individual cases is both an epistemological problem – that it covers up 
the underlying truth of the real – and a political problem in that it reproduces any social 
dynamic which that theory would be instrumental in the cultivation of. I shall go on to show 
that it is this epistemological critique of Lacanism which is the key concern of Land in his 
reading of Deleuze. For Land, political oppression is a secondary concern when compared to 
the suppression of epistemological truth; that is, the actuality of matter and its virtual 
becoming. Politics, insofar as it is important to Land, is limited to the removal of elements 
which overcode and misrepresent epistemological reality.  
 
The lecture Four Propositions on Psychoanalysis presents Deleuze and Guattari's major 
critiques of psychoanalysis, and in doing so demonstrates four major axes of engagement 
 169 
which are present in Anti-Oedipus.335  The Oedipus under attack in Anti-Oedipus functions as 
a place-holder for these four transgressions which, for Deleuze and Guattari, are represented 
by his proper name. This lecture, and the article based upon it are particularly revealing as 
they show, in part, the extent to which either Freud or Lacan is the target of any given critique 
– a separation which is often difficult to see in their other works. Deleuze and Guattari's 
attitude to Lacan is ambivalent, as noted above, because their unequivocal dislike of the 
political effects of applied Lacanism conflicted with their theoretical respect for some of his 
models of the unconscious such as the 'A' schema and the object petit-a. The Four 
Propositions are as follows:  
 
1) Psychoanalysis stifles desire, sorting desires into the good and the bad before trying to 
suppress what it considers to be bad: “You always have too many desires, you are a 
polymorphic pervert. What you must be taught is Lack, Culture, Law, in other words the 
reduction and the abolition of desire”.336 In the concept of polymorphous perversion we can 
see two distinct tendencies in Freudian analysis. The first is a dispassionate, mechanistic-
biological view of the operation of the unconscious: the unconscious simply wants to connect, 
to lay down and to follow the paths of drives. Yet Freudian polymorphous perversion always-
already includes a negative connotation of perversion, as if the desires shown are in some way 
‘wrong’ when they are expressed by a patient. Freud is to be condemned for his ambivalent 
attitude towards desire, but the apparatus of control critiqued above are Lacanian: ‘Lack, 
Culture, Law’, and this is especially true if culture is considered in the Lacanian, linguistic 
sense. For Deleuze and Guattari all desire is on the same plane – the machinic, pre-symbolic 
plane – and as such it is not the role of the analyst to create a typology of desire but to help 
liberate desire – without a pre-existing schema of different ‘good’ and ‘bad’ notions of desire. 
This relates back to their productive model of desire, in which it (desire) is said to be good or 
bad only insofar as it produces or is blocked from producing.  
 
2) Psychoanalysis impedes the formation of utterances. Deleuze argues that the flows of 
desire are punctuated not by signs but by becomings; yet when the patient speaks of these 
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becomings they are recaptured by the psychoanalytic apparatus – Oedipus – and recast in the 
fixed terms of the complex. Again, Freud is condemned, this time for his reduction of the 
complexity of the patient’s actual speech to the apparatus of his therapeutic cure (in the next 
section the ‘Little Hans’ case is discussed in more depth), but the true target of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s criticism are “the Partisans of the Signifier”, Lacanian analysts using a narrowly 
semiological register to interpret the utterances of the patient; taking phonetic units as the 
basic content of discourse and changing statements like “groupe hippy (hippy group)” to 
“gross pipi (big weenie)”.337 Deleuze believes that the analyst only ever hears what they hope 
to, and not what the patient actually says. This is problematic because what they hope to hear 
are the trigger words which will allow them to constrain the patient's desires into a theatrical 
representation, recasting their words into a play on the Oedipal stage. This recasting 
anthropomorphises and simplifies the patient's desires, reducing them to moral categories of 
good or bad which are defined by their relation to normality: fitting with family, society, law 
and order is good, whilst the rejection of these mores is bad. 
 
3) The model of the split subject is a simplification, which covers and suppresses its plurality. 
Two versions of the Propositions exist, one from a transcription of Deleuze’s lecture, and a 
second set based on Deleuze’s revised notes.338 The most significant difference between the 
two is the change of language of this third point in the latter text to be less explicitly anti-
Lacanian. Deleuze counters the Lacanian idea (described in the previous chapter) of a single 
split subject operating in different registers by restating the importance of multiplicity in 
desiring production.  I shall show that Deleuze and Guattari believe that the subject of 
analysis is transversed by tribes, masses, mobs, and can speak from the perspective of either a 
component or a group within any of these assemblages. In this criticism, Deleuze and Guattari 
again demonstrate the division between the theoretical apparatus of Freud and Lacan, which 
always speaks of polyvocity and plurality in the unconscious, and practised psychoanalysis, 
which reduces all of these voices to the strongest one, and again, situates it in the constraints 
of a universal complex.  
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4) Psychoanalysis treats itself as a contract between analyst and analysand and is therefore an 
expression of liberal-bourgeois social conduct. Psychoanalysis never becomes militant 
because its participants are a priori not interested in radical change. The productions of 
psychoanalysis are therefore fundamentally conservative. The role of schizoanalysis 
(described later in this chapter) as a normative political project is clearly demonstrated in this 
text. Deleuze repudiates the idea that Anti-Oedipus' critical payload, as noted previously, was 
a refined combination of or return to Marx and Freud. Schizoanalysis is posited as a distinct, 
original, theoretic praxis with which Deleuze and Guattari hope to replace psychoanalysis. In 
the remainder of this chapter I shall consider the validity of the first three of these critiques 
(ignoring the fourth as it relates to the practical application of psychoanalysis).  
 
Critical 
proposition 
Psychoanalysis 
stifles desire 
Psychoanalysis 
impedes the 
formation of 
utterances 
The splitting of 
the subject 
Psychoanalysis 
treats itself as a 
contract  
Subject of 
critique: 
political or 
psychoanalytic 
Political and 
Psychoanalytic 
Psychoanalytic Psychoanalytic Political 
Subject of 
critique: 
theoretical or 
practical 
Theoretical Practical Theoretical Practical 
Subject of 
critique: 
Freudian or 
Lacanian 
Lacanian Freudian and 
Lacanian 
Lacanian Freudian and 
Lacanian 
Critical use in 
the present 
Moving 
analytical 
Demonstrating 
the asymmetry 
Showing that 
Lacanian Drives 
None 
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thesis explanations 
away from items 
and absences. 
between 
Lacanian theory 
and the practice 
of Lacanian 
analysts.  
tend to become 
singular 
Productive use 
in the present 
thesis 
Re-framing 
desire as a 
productive force 
(Freudian drive) 
rather than as a 
lack (Lacanian 
Drive).  
Separating some 
theoretical 
elements of 
Lacan – 
particularly the 
'A' schema from 
their applied 
consequences. 
Reaffirming the 
plurality of 
drives 
None 
 
Table 6: The Four Propositions 
 
Critique of the applicability of the universality of the Oedipus complex and the consequences 
of its application to patients can be considered at three levels. The first, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s assertion that psychoanalysis had dangerous political implications is an objection to 
professional psychoanalysis and its practice, yet is not in itself theoretically damning. A 
second, the accusation that Oedipus represented only a narrow section of psychoanalytic 
disorders rather than the universal primordial mechanism of the unconscious, is much more 
serious from the perspective of psychoanalytic theory, though it offers a space in which 
Oedipus can still be shown to be applicable in some cases, notably neurotic patients. The 
third, taking this critique further still – and perhaps the most damning objection of Deleuze 
and Guattari to Oedipus – is that it does not exist at all, even in those patients taken to be its 
exemplars by Oedipalist theoreticians. The Interpretation of Utterances offers a double 
reading of Freud’s Little Hans case notes and Klein’s Richard  in which the ‘words’ 
(utterances) of the patient are presented alongside the interpretation of the analyst.339 Here 
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Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate the disconnection between the speech of the patient – and, 
implicitly, the meaning of his speech – and the interpretation the analyst places (perhaps 
forces!) upon it.  
 
The first case to be critiqued is the 'Little Hans’ case. In Hans’ testimony, Deleuze and 
Guattari see no evidence of desire towards the mother or fear of the father/castration. The 
point at which these fears are introduced is in the interpretation of Hans' words by his father 
and the professor (Freud). In this way, they recode all of Hans’ polysemic desire to one fixed 
interpretation in the pattern of the Oedipus complex. It is their words, as they question Hans 
and his utterances, which introduce all of the obsessions which they claim Hans is bound by. 
Hans’ interest in Madriel and the “Urbane Lady”  are recoded by Freud as aspects of desire 
for his mother, though Deleuze and Guattari note that his attempts to reach them are in fact a 
trajectory away from his mother and not toward her.340 Freud's determination to treat his 
patient as a bearer of the Oedipus complex has lead him to reverse the meaning of the Hans' 
words. The solution offered by father and the professor is that he sleeps with his parents in 
lieu of the other girls: “he is inoculated by the Oedipus virus”.341 Hans did not enter 
psychoanalysis with an Oedipus complex, he was exposed to it during his treatment.  
 
The analysis regarding castration is similar: Hans’ machinic interest is in “the pee-maker”, 
which Deleuze and Guattari situate as a productive process rather than a fetishised organ. 
Hans' belief when he enters analysis is that Mother has a pee maker, all the other girls have a 
pee maker... yet the professor steps in again: Hans must learn the difference between boys and 
girls. The idea of castration and sexual difference is introduced to Hans by Freud and his 
father, not by Hans' own testimony. Under Freud's guidance, Oedipus recodes Hans’ desire in 
terms of the symbolism of phallus and castration, and at the same time it destroys his belief in 
“n sexes”, a polymorphous, combinatory view of sexuality and desire. Hans’ sexuality was 
univocal, all sexual objects were on the same plane and described in the same register, be they 
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340 Deleuze, G. Two Regimes of Madness (Columbia University: Semiotext(e), 2006) p. 90 
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“locomotive, horse, sun... girl or boy”.342 Again, Freud's treatments as a practitioner of 
psychoanalysis do not match with his theoretical models of the unconscious, because plurality 
of the drives does exist in his texts in the metapsychological period.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari understand the horse as Hans’ gambit to escape his domestic state, a 
horse-becoming that would let him get onto the street (I shall return to this conception of 
becoming-production in the unconscious in the next section). They contend that 
psychoanalysis as practised in the Freudian – Lacanian school has no conception of this 
positivity, because it is only interested in representation – things standing for other things – 
and lack. As such, the horse must be recoded as part of the Oedipal-familial complex. 
Selectively listening, analysis waits for its own trigger words in Hans’ discourse. The horse’s 
eyes become father’s; the horse's penis quickly follows.343 Oedipal analysis cares only about 
its social goals: to bring Hans back to his family and to normalise him in relation to an 
idealised family. Whatever Hans says is irrelevant – indeed, his testimony is ignored or 
misrepresented if it is not of use to the pre-determined goal of the analysis: “You could not 
even say that Freud interprets poorly; while interpreting he is at no risk of hearing what the 
child says”.344 
Deleuze and Guattari tell us that, for Freud, “desire cannot bear “intensities””.345 As Chapter 1 
showed, Freud’s energetic-hydraulic unconscious operates to reduce the intensities and the 
flows of desire rather than to liberate them. The foundation of Freudian psychoanalysis – 
Freud’s treatment of hysteria – has therefore conditioned the therapeutic process into a 
narrow, familial, normalisation and (correct, healthy) suppression of desire. Hans’ resigned 
acceptance to analysis isn’t indicative of a cure, just his boredom with the process, it isn't 
working for him. The reality of desire in Hans' case is the desire of Hans to make productive 
connections outside of his home – he wants to escape the Oedipal system and start to create 
machinic assemblages, making productive couplings outside of his current limits. Freud and 
his Oedipus complex work only to restrain Hans, to pull him back to the ever-same.   
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Richard, the subject of Klein’s analysis, is caught in the same bind. Richard’s utterances about 
names, territories or machines are broken down and recast as fantasies in the same Oedipal 
model Hans was trapped in. Proper names become father, ports mother’s genitalia.346 Deleuze 
and Guattari read Richard’s position as paranoid-schizoid rather than neurotic-depressed, a 
position which psychoanalysis’ Oedipal apparatus cannot treat. Instead, psychoanalysis 
recasts Richard's positive, schizo-desire in terms of lack, which is its norm.   
 
Should Hans and Richard be satisfied by the supposed ‘cure’ offered by Freudian analysis? An 
obvious rejoinder to Deleuze and Guattari’s reading would be to re-affirm the success of the 
treatment. In this case, Oedipus and Anti-Oedipus have a different perspective. Freud, at 
various points, is keen to promote small ‘c’ conservatism as the goal of psychoanalysis, 
protecting society from the unspeakable consequences of the unconscious escaping the 
mechanism of repression (as demonstrated in Chapter 1, Freud's conception of the dark drives 
of the id necessitates their censorship). For Freud, the cure is sometimes finding or shoring up 
the right kind of repression. Deleuze and Guattari’s goal is very different. As revolutionary 
psychoanalysts, they aimed to transform society rather than to preserve its mores.  The 
Freudian-Oedipal complex is critiqued in these cases because it prevents the liberated flow of 
desire, which they posit as productive and pre-conscious.  Why do Deleuze and Guattari want 
machinic desire to flow without restriction? In Anti-Oedipus it is not a question of arriving at 
some kind of super-humanistic expression of authenticity. Instead, the new assemblages and 
connections they would allow to proliferate would provide a truly revolutionary moment, 
moving society away from the symbolic, hyper-patriarchal overcoding which characterises its 
contemporary form. In Anti-Oedipus, western history is transcribed as a history of 
repressions, in which the desire(s) of groupings have been harnessed by despots, priests, 
sovereigns, bureaucrats, cops and shrinks. In 1970, Deleuze and Guattari don’t know what the 
open desire would do to society, but they are engaged in an experimental praxis which aims to 
find out.347  
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Yet again we discover the crucial distinction between psychoanalytic theory and practice in 
the Hans and Richard cases. The Freud who cannot bear “intensities” is the doctor who tries 
to stabilise the patient overcome by them and also the chronicler of civilisation who sees it 
being thrown into instability by them. He is not however someone whose schema of the 
psyche lacks an understanding of the importance of intensity in propelling the system of 
drives. Drives are forged by intensities, travel to intensities and have their vicissitudes shaped 
by the build-up and discharge of intensities. Politically however, the translation of a drive into 
an utterance is a dangerous thing, because the process of translation itself has an aim, a 
source, an object. As we have seen, for Freud drives are always plural, ploy-vocal, eternal. To 
reduce all of drive-desire to one simple idea, the Oedipus instinct of small 'c' conservatism; 
the protection of the ever same, this would be as far away from the truths of Freud's drive 
theory as it is possible to get. Deleuze and Guattari refer to the reduction of the patient's 
thought to a fixed complex as the imposition of theatricality. In this theatrical set-up, the 
participants are forced into specific, pre-determined roles which are fixed like those of 
characters in a play. In the clinical context 'patient' and 'doctor' immediately become two of 
these roles. The patient's testimony is then further transposed and re-worked to fit into a 
predetermined  characterisation: “a universal metaphoric structural relation”, the most 
infamous of which is Oedipus – though there are others.348 The reduction of the subject's 
unconscious to a theatrical set up prevents an analysis of the patient's true desire, because it: 
(1) anthropomorphises desire, though the productions of the unconscious are pre-subjective; 
(2) categorises the analysis of desire into the patterns of pre-made, fixed complexes; (3) and 
therefore simplifies the true complexity of the patient's desire.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari offer us a path to escape this impasse. They posit that a better solution to 
the management of desire would be to remove the discursive elements of psychoanalysis: the 
obsession with expressing the motivations of material productions in a re-framed form as 
ideas or concepts, and their replacement with an impersonal survey of merely what the 
unconscious produces, without emphasis on why it might produce it. To get to this point 
though, Deleuze and Guattari need to escape the inherited Oedipality of the modern subject. 
To do so, they show us a way of being which is not tainted by the cultural reproduction of 
Oedipus, which is the subject of the critique which they call 'Schizoanalysis'. 
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Schizo-Desire is Materialist Psychoanalysis 
 
Anti-Oedipus proposes the replacement of the Oedipal unconscious with a Schizoanalytic 
unconscious; a concept which, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear, must not be taken literally. 
Anti-Oedipus’ injunction is to become like a schizo, not to become a schizo. The schizo 
condition is posited as being immune to the psychoanalytic conception of the unconscious: it 
exists in a pre-symbolic state, in which the analytic game of things representing other things is 
no longer applicable. The schizo is “without any gods at all, without a family, without a father 
or a mother”.349 The essential nature of the schizo is therefore an inability; an absence of the 
structure which conditions desire and which is considered to be inherent in ‘normal’ members 
of the society. Outside of societal conditioning, rather than experiencing the world as symbol 
or code the schizo plugs into a purely productive way of being and instead of chasing after 
ephemeral ‘lack’ and objects which are not at hand, the schizo uses what is at hand in the most 
productive, positive way available. Buchanan states that “schizophrenic delirium could not 
take the forms it does if the unconscious was not, as they put it, machinic.”350 Whereas the 
'normal' subject is constituted by a conscious force that suppresses and restricts the 
unconscious, the schizo subject “is produced ... as a residuum or spare part that sits alongside 
the desiring-machine, which ... now occupies centre stage”.351  The schizo is therefore not 
constituted as an effect of the force of repression – Oedipus – but by the machinic production 
of the unconscious, and is therefore a window into the pre-subjective, pre-idealistic and 
therefore anti-anthropocentric process of the unconscious as desiring-production. 
Competitively, the role of classical, Oedipal psychoanalysis could be described as a bulwark 
against deviation from normality. The average citizen is 'right' insofar as they have the correct 
unconscious, an unconscious capable of (re-)producing the correct formations. Mental illness 
is considered a deviation from a conservative normality which replicates the salient elements 
of the social order. As such, Oedipal psychoanalysis is an idealist system. Subjective 
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productions matter insofar as they can be seen to replicate or correspond to modal ideas.352 
For Deleuze and Guattari our current social order cannot be considered 'normal' in a positive 
sense. Normality exists as a conserved (replicated) state only because reactive and repressive 
forces work to maintain such stasis and when an unconscious affected by mental illness 
deviates from this normality it can therefore go in two directions, either reacting against the 
pattern of normality or, conversely, going beyond normality to  a hyper-normal position. The 
avatar of this first tendency is the schizophrenic unconscious. Schizoanalysis is therefore a 
materialist psychoanalysis because it is concerned not with ideas, but with production and the 
mechanics of production.353 The proper use of schizoanalysis is to apply it to the analysis of 
the social and political field, using the characteristics of the schizo to understand the libidinal 
investments in a given field.354 From a Deleuzo-Guattarian, materialist perspective, the schizo 
has two qualities which are efficacious in the formation and proliferation of desiring 
machines. Firstly, they have no predetermined set of rules which will condition and restrict 
their ability to connect abstract machines, and secondly they have no resistance to the 
underlying materialist motivating force which make them maximise the forms of 
connection.355  
 
Deleuze and Guattari use the model of a sphere with two poles to represent the desiring 
connections of the Schizo. The bottom pole represents a state of catatonia in which there are 
no effects, nothing is conjoined, everything is pure potential. This is called the body without 
organs. It essentially represents undifferentiated matter before the process of desire works 
upon it. The second pole is that of connection, of the establishment of desiring machines. For 
Deleuze and Guattari only the schizo is capable of being in the unique position of being free 
of Oedipus, that is without predetermined overcoding which would organise matter, and also 
being capable of conjoining matter in the production of desiring machines whenever this 
second pole of connection takes over, that is, when they skip between states. Schizo 
production is then the ability to utilise these two polarities of the schizo in the unconscious. If 
                                                 
352 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 24 
353 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 22 
354 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 105 
355 This, again, situates Deleuze's materialism in the Spinozist-Nietzchian tradition.  
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there are no barriers to their operation, no societal repressions (Oedipus) preventing desire's 
free flow, the process world work in the following two stages:  
 
1. Lower pole. The BWO is determined. The machines available in the real are 
identified. Everything present to the schizo is reduced to pure potentiality as a vessel 
of transmission and investment of desire.  
 
2. Upper Pole. Once the field of investment potential has been determined, the second 
action is to connect the desiring machines in whichever specific connection will be the 
most rewarding.  
 
This bipartite method has similarities to both Freud's description of libidinal investment in his 
hydraulic drive theory (the eternal drives constantly scan the social field, and will invest in 
anything they have the option of investing in) and capitalism (the mutability of money into 
any specific capital investment once a means of exchange is established). The use of the 
sphere in this example is revealing. A sphere is opaque, showing no machinery which could 
connect the two poles, no pathway through which the traveller might venture. Instead we have 
an input and an output. Pure potential on one hand, and specific production on the other. How 
we get between the two is not Deleuze's primary concern in Anti-Oedipus (even if the names 
of the connective syntheses of the unconscious are catalogued, the motivations behind them, 
beyond pure productions, are undermined).356 Instead, what is emphasised is that, if allowed, 
the schizo does operate in the sphere between these two poles and in the process comes up 
with his own desiring machines. More importantly, his own non-Oedipal desiring machines: 
nothing here is representative; rather, it is all life and lived experience; the actual, lived 
emotion of having breasts does not resemble breasts, it does not represent them.357 The schizo 
does not chase the lacked object, but positively uses and enjoys the objects he comes into 
contact with.  
 
                                                 
356 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 77 
357 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 9 
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 Schizo state Capitalist mode Deleuze and 
Guattari's' 
terminology 
Conception of 
space 
Bottom pole Catatonia Commodification Body without 
Organs 
Striated space 
Top pole Connection Capitalism Desiring-
Production 
Smooth space 
 
Table 7: The Two Poles and Their Relationship to Deleuzian Concepts 
 
Deleuze and Guattari's description of the schizo state goes beyond the post-Freudian, that is, 
psychoanalysis, and uses post-Marxist terminology to make its analogies. In Anti-Oedipus the 
relationship of schizophrenia to psychoanalysis is therefore compared to that between 
capitalism and despotism.358 The neurotic, trapped by psychoanalysis, has a fixed framework 
of interpretation (Oedipus) as inflexible as the law of the despot. Conversely, the schizo takes 
on the duality inherent in capitalism by which codes are both given and produced; in Deleuze 
and Guattari’s terminology, there are movements of de-territorialisation accompanying those 
of territorialisation. In this analogy we see schizoanalysis showing its political purpose – it 
promises a liberation: just as capitalism liberates the serf from the land and the feudal law, the 
schizo offers a liberation from the familial hierarchies and social conservatism instituted by 
the rule of Oedipus.   
 
Deleuze and Guattari claim that Freudian analysis cannot understand the Schizo, who is 
defined by things and production (materialism) rather than words and concepts (idealism).359 
The Schizo makes decisions without criteria, without the weight of Oedipal expectations and 
as such, their unconscious is a superior cypher for the pure production of desire as they lack 
the apparatus to impede it or restrict its flow. Conversely, Lacanianism, conceiving lack 
                                                 
358 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 33 
359 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 23 
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[manque] as the cause of desire, fails to understand desire as a real-material-productive 
process. If we could get to a purely schizo desire, we would escape Oedipus and the trap 
which it binds society in.360 We are again left with the question of where this kind of freedom 
might lead us. For the 'left Deleuzian' it is a kind of liberation ideology, leading us away from 
patriarchy into its other “outside the limits of marriage... unimagined ways of bodies moving 
together”.361 Conversely, rather than concentrating on achieving desired ends, the 'right 
Deleuzians' stress that what is important is the release of impersonal, productive desire from 
its confinement in the Oedipal cage. The revolutionary aspect is that in his state without 
Oedipus, desire works through the schizo. The pieces already want to be pulled together, they 
always did, but they were blocked by the Oedipal security system. The schizo, he's just the 
tool to do it, the cypher; it is, again, analogous to Cage cutting Wintermute loose.362 For Land 
there are forces far more powerful than the individual unconscious. It is not a case of what 
humanity wants now, but what the future wants for humanity.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari's schizo-desire, because it is a materialist conception of desire, is 
radically different to the common psychoanalytic concept of desire. As previous chapters have 
demonstrated, for Freud the subject is constituted through traversal of a foundation of 
unconscious desire, as depicted in his metaphor of the layers of Troy. For Lacan, the content 
of the subject's production is determined by an unconscious interrogation along the 'A' 
schema. Both of these constitutions of the subject are idealist because the trajectory of drives 
and signifying chains is a passage from the unconscious to the pre-conscious – the realm of 
becoming-idea. For Deleuze and Guattari however, desire is simply the material production 
which occurs before the production of the subject and, therefore, before the production of 
'ideas'. The subject is “produced as a residuum alongside the machine, as an appendix, or as a 
spare part adjacent to the machine”.363   
 
Oedipus is a slippery slope: if the relation of productive mechanisms to the objects produced 
                                                 
360 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) pp. 26-27 
361 Massumi, B. A User's Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia (USA: MIT, 1992) p. 36 
362 Gibson, W. Neuromancer (United Kingdom: Grafton, 1986) 
363 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 20 
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(which can be represented as the relationship between drives and symptoms, or between 
materialism and idealism) becomes the defining question of analysis, we again slip into the 
trap of Oedipus, and portray the unconscious as a theatre rather than a factory. Deleuze and 
Guattari do not want the unconscious to 'express itself', in ideas, but want to measure its raw, 
material productions.364 They reject idealism as it is always tainted by the semiotic confusion 
and interrelation of concepts; by the associations laid down by language or society; and by the 
position of the interpreting agency. A psychoanalysis based on desire-lack [manque] “is 
created, planned and organised in and through social production”.365 A materialist 
psychoanalysis can break free of these constraints because it has no preconceived framework 
of interpretation (Oedipus); it does not lack anything in advance. Schizoanalysis is therefore 
an experimental praxis because it would seek to follow schizo breaks and lines-of-flight 
which demonstrate a world other than our own anthropocentric prison, showing the outside of 
the societal, cultural and linguistic constraints we are trapped beneath. It is a process rooted in 
critical philosophy, because it interrogates the real and in doing so defines the limitations and 
flaws of idealism.   
 
Because it aims towards a state of affairs which we cannot easily access or intuit 
schizoanalysis is also a speculative enterprise. The role of schizo-analysis is to posit, chart or 
conceptualise tendencies, movements or pressures in which pure material (or GNoN, or the 
Will to Power) is observed pushing to surpass its incarceration in the Oedipal stasis which 
society has bound it in.366 Schizoanalysis is therefore inherently political, because it posits 
                                                 
364 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 23 
365 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 28 
366 Will to Power is often characterised as a pre-cursor of Freud's conception of the unconscious, see for 
example Leibscher 'Friedrich Nietzsche's perspectives on the unconscious' in Thinking the Unconscious: 
Nineteenth-Century German Thought,  Ed. Nicholls A. and Liebscher, M. (UK: Cambridge, 2010) 
 Lands conception of GNoN is expounded in the post 'The Cult of GNoN' at Xenosystems.net 
(http://www.xenosystems.net/the-cult-of-gnon/). GNoN, 'the God of Nature Or Nature' represents the 
primacy of material and the rules of matter as the decision making (executive) force in the cosmos.  As Land 
states in the post in question “Primarily, and strategically, it permits a consensual acceptance of Natural Law, 
unobstructed by theological controversy.”. If this thesis claims that an idea should not be interrogated by an 
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that there is a repressed order beneath our societal conventions. Schizoanalysis does not 
restrict itself to investigating the topology of this repressed order of desire-production but 
actively encourages its excavation. When schizoanalytic critique is undertaken, it is done with 
the goal of removing the repression of desire.  
Deleuze and particularly Guattari were militants before the Anti-Oedipus period and would be 
situated on the political left. Their militancy was not a product of their exploration of the 
Oedipus apparatus, but a motiving factor behind their decision to undertake such a critique of 
psychoanalysis. Such militancy, coupled with their methodological understanding of 
philosophy as a tool for affecting change rather than as purely abstract theory, meant that they 
were committed to producing a philosophy which always-already had political aims which 
could be described as being of the left. I claim that critical analysis of Deleuze and Guattari's 
philosophy of desire has been, due to leftist bias in both their politics and also amongst their 
subsequent interpreters, unable to achieve a dispassionate analysis of this desire. In a properly 
rigorous critical philosophy the relationship between the act of critique and the application of 
critique should be unidirectional, application only proceeding after a disinterested, cool, 
critical analysis of the real (see Figure 33 below). The critical framework must be established, 
providing an epistemological foundation, before a political conception of its consequences is 
considered.    
                                                                                                                                                        
idea but by reality, GNoN is the set of mechanisms in reality by which any proposition in reality will be 
tested.  
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Figure 33: Epistemic Directions 
 
The Implications of Materialist Psychology: Deleuze and the Virtual, Desire, and 
Difference 
The relationship between desire and the virtual-actual in Deleuzian theory is essential to 
understanding the genealogies of the two strains of Deleuzianism I shall be comparing, which 
are: (1) the pre-eminent leftist interpretation favoured by most commentators and (2) its 
alternate, the rightist interpretation of Land. As stated earlier, Deleuzian desire can be 
understood as an heir of Nietzsche’s will to power or Spinozist power-conatus.367 It functions 
as the name of the force which animates material.368  As such, it is the conduit through which 
the actual – the disposition of material at the current point – could become the virtual, which 
is a potential disposition of material in the future. The virtual is an interpreted understanding 
                                                 
367 Deleuze depicts Spinoza's conception of conatus in his monograph Spinoza. See  Deleuze, G. Spinzoa: 
Practical Philosophy (New York: City Lights, 1988) p.99. 
368 Deleuze And Guattari considered Anti-Oedipus to be a materialist critique of the idealist Oedipal 
apparatus: “And that a revolution - this time materialist - can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus”.  
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. pp. 75) 
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of a potential actual. There are therefore multiple virtualities, which may or may not 
correspond with the actual. Any positive analysis of desire – an analysis of what desire 
produces – must determine how desire works to produce the actual.  
Figure 34: Actual → Virtual 
 
For Deleuze, the actual-virtual distinction is a consequence of his Spinozist materialism. 
Desire is the flow of matter; it is the automatic productions and disjunctions which matter is 
capable of enacting. In the diagram above it is represented by an arrow, capturing its power as 
a transformative force between two states.  This  transformation encompasses any force which 
has the capability of moving the disposition of material and therefore extends from simple, 
calculable physical laws (such as gravity) to the complex productions and interactions of 
living material (such as the flow of money, libido and organisms across a casino floor).  
Larger scale organisations, up to the size of the society itself, are simply the aggregates of the 
productions of individual instances of desire. Deleuze and Guattari give the example of 
Women’s Liberation when depicting the constraint of desire within a society.369 Their formula 
is that liberation requires the promotion of “unconscious desire” (productive desire), and an 
understanding of how desire invests the “social field”, leading to the ability to enact a 
“disinvestment of repressive structures”.370 This structure mirrors the schizo-dynamics of the 
                                                 
369 As Mullarkey notes, Deleuzianism and feminism have a complex relationship exceeding the position 
sketched here. Mullarkey, J. in Ed Buchanan, I. A Deleuzian Century, (London: Duke, 1999) p. 65 
370 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 61 
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'two poles' model explained above: first the field is interpreted (decoded, understood), and 
then it is reinvested. This formula also fits into the structure illustrated above. Women's desire 
would transform the actual into a new disposition (which therefore is, to an observer in the 
actual, a virtual future) if it was not constrained. This constraint takes the form of the 
repression of women's desire, predominantly because of the primacy of patriarchy (accused 
under the name Oedipus). Oedipus then becomes a virtual which constrains the actual, and 
prevents the realisation of a series of alternate virtuals (other power structures in society).   
 
The example of Women's Liberation demonstrates how desire could, if released, enact 
significant changes of society; it would shift the actual towards a number of new virtualities. 
Deleuze and Guattari limit their commentary to noting desire's power to affect change. 
However, philosophers who have followed this Deleuzian-Guattarian analytic approach have 
been prepared to take a speculative approach to the problem of constrained desire and have 
therefore posited potential patterns in the new dispositions which would be created if desire 
was liberated in a society. Such speculative approaches can be grouped into two categories: 
those which derive from political assumptions, and those which produce economic depictions. 
I characterise this as the distinction between 'left' and 'right' Deleuzians. Of this dichotomy, 
the left Deleuzian position is currently the pre-eminent interpretation. It is primarily derived 
from pre-existing ethical commitments to the promotion of equality and emphasises that once 
freed, desire could form a number of dispositions, all of which would be considered of equal 
value.371 Conversely, the right Deleuzian position is derived from an economic interpretation. 
It claims that desire, once freed, would follow laws of nature and therefore form new, stable 
patterns according to such laws.  
 
This difference between a left and right reading of Deleuze can also be seen in differing 
approaches to the possibility of interacting with otherness;.372 The tendency of the left is to 
                                                 
371 This 'leftward' progression has obviously been immensely socially beneficial over the 20th century, with 
the spreading of both the electoral franchise and individual rights through society.  
372 Laurie, T. 'More Human than Human: The Ethics of Alienation' (2009). ( Available at: 
http://www.academia.edu/4006097/More_Human_than_Human_The_Ethics_of_Alienation_in_Octavia_E._
Butler_and_Gilles_Deleuze_conference_proceedings_2009p. 184 ) 
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regard that which is supplemental to or other than a standard notion of 'humanity' to be 
something which should become the subject of physical exploration. Texts focus on the idea 
of the body without organs as a method of enabling physical connection, plugging the existing 
body into new situations and alterities.373 On the right, the tendency is to regard outsideness 
as a theoretical domain – for Land, it is like ('isomorphic with') the outside (noumenon) 
delimited by Kantian critical philosophy – which cannot be the subject of physical interaction, 
but only the subject of critical speculation.374 The 'body without organs' is therefore a map 
rather than a territory; a way of discovering and interpreting connections and productions 
which would otherwise have been overcoded and suppressed.375  
 
The schism between left and right Deleuzians is epistemologically defined by the position of 
desire and the virtual in their teleology of the transition between the actual as it is and a 
posited future actual. This is derived from two very different interpretations of the operation 
of desire between the virtual and the actual. Left Deleuzianism starts with the premise of 
Deleuze's earlier work on difference and states that, as difference is primary and 
undifferentiated, the virtual consists of a series of potential actualities, all of which present 
competing interpretations of difference which are distinct from the current actual. As there is 
only difference between these states, and difference is primary and indistinguishable, none 
can be called the preferred or natural state. An example of this process in action would be an 
analysis of sexuality. In our current, patriarchal, Oedipalised society, sexual interactions are 
ordered as a 'normal' heterosexuality and this state's 'others', a whole range of other non-
                                                 
373 See: Buchanan, I. Deleuzism (USA, Duke University Press; 2000)  p. 31 
374 Land's description of this isomorphism was that: “It takes a bit of getting used to -- the crucial key for 
me was realizing the rigorous isomorphism with Kantian critique. Where Kant rejects the 'mystical' 
possibility of Intellectual Intuition, they envisage contact with the thing-in-itself (BwO) ...... as the core of the 
'schizophrenic' apocalypse situated at the horizon of history (= of capitalism).” Land, 2014 in a twitter 
conversation. ( Available at  https://twitter.com/Outsideness/status/477129651437838337, 
https://twitter.com/Outsideness/status/477121038199689216, 
https://twitter.com/Outsideness/status/477129950776930306  ) 
375 Defining the problematic notion of the body-without-organs is beyond the remit of this thesis. See 
'Body Without Organs' in Ed. Parr, A. The Deleuze Dictionary (UK: Edinburgh, 2010) pp. 37-39 
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cisgender sexual practices: “[T]he male part of a man can communicate with the female part 
of a woman, but also with the male part of a woman, or with the female part of another man, 
or yet again with the male part of the other man, etc.”376  These other practices are considered 
to be the virtual states which would be attainable if desire was not constrained in the actual to 
prevent their adoption. To arrive at our preferred location, illustrated below as Actual2, we 
must use our conception of these virtuals and enact a removal of any obstacles which prevent 
their being possible. This conception of difference is happily congruent with the desired 
progressive politics of 'inclusion' in which minoritarian groups, decisions and choices are 
considered to be equal. Colebrook notes that Deleuze and Guattari, in their readings of key 
texts, would be more concerned with the way in which the text could be put to work than its 
meaning.377 Under such a rubric, a political deployment of Deleuzian theory would be valid if 
it  enabled the progression of societal norms towards a pre-determined goal. 
 
Figure 35: Actual → Actual 2 
How does desire work in this system? It is a repressed force which would otherwise transform 
                                                 
376 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 69 
377 Colebrook, C. and Buchanan, I. Deleuze and Feminism (UK; Edinburgh University Press, 2000) p. 3 
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the actual into one of the multitude of virtuals.378 Because these virtuals are considered equal 
and none to be the 'natural' terminus of desire, each specific work of desire is singular and 
local, and proceeds in its transformative capacity to engender new condition which is 
distinctive to its own genesis. Yet in this analysis, desire takes on a problematic duality. It is 
both a blind desire, always working in an individual situation, and also a knowing desire 
which produces a heterogeneous set of potential outcomes, being careful to not become fixed 
in any new pattern, or to exclude any potential terminus. 
 
 
 
Figure 36: Responses to Deleuze  
 
We can understand the duality of desire by considering the three elements in this system in 
more depth: repressed desire (the 'now'), the apparatus of repression (Oedipus), and free 
desire (a future state). As illustrated above in Figure 36, the refusal to accept that desire is 
repressed in current society, and that Oedipus is natural, leads to the kind of conservative 
position Deleuze and Guattari attributed to mainstream Lacanianism, as described earlier in 
this chapter. In opposition to this tendency of applied psychoanalysis, schizoanalysis, as 
                                                 
378 A process described in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) pp. 77 and 
129 
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outlined so far, demonstrates that desire is indeed repressed.379 Deleuzians of both sorts would 
agree therefore that desire is repressed everywhere by the Oedipal apparatus and that a future 
state which is different to the now is attainable.  
 
If we therefore accept that desire is repressed in our current society, we are left with a 
speculative choice about the destination of desire if it was freed of this repression. This choice 
is intrinsically speculative because we do not only live in a society in which desire is 
repressed in various ways, but because a society without repressive apparatus – a property 
which all social apparatuses have – is not conceivable. The cleave between left and right 
Deleuzianism is determined by the response to this speculation about desire. Left Deleuzians, 
primarily motivated by political and ethical considerations favour this model of flat desire, in 
which desire has no preference between a variety of competing formations. Conversely, right 
Deleuzians, concerned with teleological consequences, have a conception of desire as a force 
which is propelled towards certain definable ends. Desire would therefore not become flat, 
pooling at random points like beads of water on a hydrophobic plane, but would instead flow 
like water down a beach, in a distinct rivulets towards its source (see figures below).  
 
                                                 
379 As demonstrated in Chapter 1 in the discussion of drive, polymorphous perversion, and the 
establishment of the complex. 
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Figure 37: Water on a Hydrophobic Plane 
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Figure 38: Rivulets on a Beach 
 
Land's right Deleuzianism can be situated in contrast to the prevalent left reading of Deleuze 
which I have characterised as being concerned primarily with arriving at a politically 
progressive position. Right Deleuzianism differs in its answer to the primary epistemological 
question, which is how is it possible to construct an explication of the mechanics of desire, 
where desire is the name of the animating force which connects matter? Such a reading is 
supported by the historical context of Deleuze's thought, whose two most important 
antecedents are Spinoza and Nietzsche. Spinoza's Ethics is a study of matter, and insofar as it 
makes claims about what is good (joy), it is concerned with the agglomeration and 
complication of matter. Spinoza provides the model of materialist 'desire' in which matter 
proceeds to compound according to the laws of nature: “[F]rom the standpoint of nature or 
god, there are always relations that compound, and nothing but relations that compound in 
accordance with eternal laws”.380 
 
                                                 
380 Deleuze, G. Spinoza: Practical Philosophy (New York: City Lights, 1988) p. 87 
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For Land Deleuze's metaphysics add a Nietzschian concept of cyclical time to the Spinozist 
concept of power-conatus, and it is this temporal element which is stressed by the right 
Deleuzians.381 Instead of a uni-directional flow of matter towards its future state, Land defines 
the now as also being generated by the future.382 Land's model of causality has the standard 
conception of the past causing the present, but adds to this the idea that the future also causes 
the present. His justification is that once universal laws of nature are introduced in a model of 
how matter evolves over time, it can be said to have a fixed terminus, in a posited future state 
of affairs. Deleuzian 'desire' as material flux and production then becomes the force which 
propels matter towards this point. Yet matter's progression through time is not a steady march 
towards its posited end. The point in which we exist, the actual, is trapped between he 
conservative forces of societal stasis and inertia (the Oedipal array: family, patriarchy etc.) 
and the future it is being pulled towards in which only the laws of nature determine the 
distribution of material.  
 
 
Figure 39: Pressure on the Actual 
 
In the Landian model, depicted above, temporal causation is multi-directional – it can be said 
that the future creates the present as much as the past does, because the future is not a 
                                                 
381  Land, N. Templexity (Timespiral Press, 2014) 
382  See Land, N. Templexity (Timespiral Press, 2014) 
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temporal point, but a collection of attractors towards which the distribution of material is 
pulled.383 In Land's depiction of Deleuzian desire, as illustrated, the forces on the right – the 
laws of GNoN and the future actual, work to move the present towards its future state. The 
forces on the left, the virtualities which represent Oedipus or other apparatus of repression 
work to prevent the realisation of the future and mire the present in stasis, trapped between its 
destiny and its possibilities. The progress of time is therefore conceptualised as a dichotomy 
between the forces of change and those of conservatism, rather than one between a past and 
future, as past and present are characterised by the same eternal rules, whereas the 
conservatism of the now is enacted due to a set of arbitrary repressions, which the history of 
desire shows to be usually imposed under the aegis of anthropocentricism.  
 
 
 
Figure 40: Land's 'Black' Deleuzianism 
 
If we add temporality to this model, it can be depicted as the dynamic system in Figure 40 
above. The two forces propelling change (desire) through time – which is represented by the 
                                                 
383 And because these attractors – the consequences of the laws of the universe - are unchanging, the past 
and future are essentially equivalent.  
 195 
movement from left to right – are GNoN (purple) and the virtual future (green), while 
Oedipus (red arrows) works in the 'now', to prevent change. The virtual future therefore loops 
back into the past to realise itself. An obvious objection is that this model turns our normal 
assumptions about time on their head.  A standard model of causality sees the past as the sole 
determinate of the now. However, this Landian interpretation should not be considered a right 
Deleuzian model of classical causality.384 It is a model of the body without organs, and 
therefore an exploration of the processes by which the outside might operate. Passing beyond 
the realm of human cognition, it begins to depict the manner in which material itself organises 
itself over time and speculates about the tendencies of matter in-itself.385 As such, the virtual 
future can be subject of speculative investigation in the present.  
 
Actual 2 (the future) is defined in this model not as a future point in time, but as the pattern of 
the distribution of matter at a future point in time. As such, there will be areas in which matter 
is distributed in the actual (now) which are more like the general distribution in the future, and 
areas which are less like it. These advanced areas which are 'before their time' form the virtual 
future, and therefore provide us with a model of the more general state of the future. A simple 
example may be the proliferation of a certain technology whose benefits are so great that its 
future adoption will certainly be widespread (for example, a mobile phone in the 1980s, or 
perhaps Google Glass today). Other virtual futures may be more obscure: a supremely 
effective trading algorithm which will grow to dominate a market; a new synthetic narcotic 
being developed by a narco-cartel or Big Pharma; it may be a fictional entity which will 
eventually realise itself.386 An interesting diagrammatic of a virtual future is noted by Land in 
Meltdown: “Deleuzoguattarian schizoanalysis comes from the future”, so even philosophy and 
                                                 
384 Causality of one of Kant's categories of understanding, and is therefore part of the anthropomorphic 
system of understanding. Trying to escape such limitation requires a transition to the realm of intellectual 
intuition, or speculative philosophy. See Footnote 660. 
385 Land's discussion of the tendencies of matter over time can be found in the electronic pamphlet 
Templexity. Land, N. (Timespiral Press, 2014) 
386 In Land's terminology, a Hyperstition: a fictional entity which can reify itself.  The notion of 
Hyperstition is explored in Land, N. CCRU Writings (Timespiral Press, 2015) 
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its concepts can function as a catalyst for the realisation of the virtual future.387 Like the ruins 
of Troy depicted by Freud, the virtual future is something already existent, to be painstakingly 
uncovered by speculative reason.   
 
 
Figure 41: Time as a spiral 
 
In this Right Deleuzian abstract machine, the level of development within a space at a given 
point in time can be measured as a relative quality of futurity, that is, how much it reflects 
distribution of matter at a certain future point, as represented by the width of the black line in 
figure 41 above. This final stage of the Landian model incorporates the notion of cyclical 
time, in which the forces of GNoN and the virtual future propel desire through the moment of 
the actual/present.388 The goal of schizoanalysis is shown as the removal of obstacles or 
repressions which would prevent to realisation of the maximum futurity in the near future. 
Such a removal results in a positive time spiral, a cybernetic virtuous circle in which the 
future is ever more fully realised, intensifying the cycle. For Land, this is necessary:  
                                                 
387  Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011); p. 442 
388 Land's theory of cyclical time will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
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Entropy (considered, properly, as an inherently teleological process) is the driver of all 
complex systems. Capital Teleology does not trend towards an entropy maximum, 
however, but to an escalation of entropy dissipation. It exploits the entropic current to 
travel backwards, into cybernetically-intensified pathway states of enhanced 
complexity and intelligence. The ‘progress’ of capitalism is an accentuation of 
disequilibrium.389 
The pressure exerted by GNoN is a constant, pushing one state of nature into the next; while 
the virtual future has a accelerative effect if it is able to realise itself. How can this aim be 
achieved? The removal of Oedipus, the anthropocentric choke point, would allow a wave of 
automatic production to break free and reconfigure the social body. For Deleuze and Guattari, 
the primary mechanism of automatic production is designated as the body of the earth.390 The 
earth's machines were producing and connecting before the advent of humanity – material 
made its own merry way before the advent of man and his society.391 Anti-Oedipus posits the 
subsequent history of humanity as a series of repressions and revolutions against the 
proliferation of desire undertaken by forms of social organisation. As these repressions are 
removed, mankind would accelerate towards its future.392 The right Deleuzian models predict 
that this future would become increasingly specific as repression was removed, insofar as it is 
instrumentally extropic.  The virtual future is capable of influencing the conditions of the 
present, but the number of potential virtual futures decreases as the number of Oedipal or 
repressive virtuals decreases over time. This is because extropic, (re)productive and intelligent 
mechanisms would out-compete less 'fit' methods of distribution in Land's Darwinist 
conception of matter: “Suppression of either variation or selection is intrinsically maladaptive 
                                                 
389  Land, N. 'Freedoom prelude 1a'  at Xenosystems.org, (2014) (available at  
http://www.xenosystems.net/freedoom-prelude-1a/ ) 
390 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 141 
391 As Land believes it will do after the decline of mankind, following John Michael Greer. For a 
discussion of this see 'Time-scales' at xenosystems.net ( http://www.xenosystems.net/time-scales/#more-3043 
) and the post it is based on, ( http://thearchdruidreport.blogspot.hk/2013/09/the-next-ten-billion-years.html ) 
392 This is the essence of Landian accelerationism, as described in Chapter 5.  
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to the cosmos. Maximization of the interlocked functions of experimentation and eradication 
of error is the only value to which the ultimate nature of things subscribes”.393 If we cannot 
see runaway amplification of these selective mechanisms (which is the case in modern 
society), it must be because an equally force is set against it, and it is this force which is 
'Oedipus'. This force (abstract machine) has a plurality of virtuals which condition and repress 
our progress towards the future: “Undecidable, virtual, reactive or reactional, such is 
Oedipus” when it is constructed now.394 Over time however, once Oedipal barriers are 
removed, there could be fewer virtual futures because more and more material in the present 
is arranged in its future state.  
 
Land's right Deleuzianism aims at liberating the forces of auto-production rather than actively 
establishing a new set of human possibilities. This is because it is rigorously anti-
anthropocentric and is concerned with the removal of societally created blockages in the 
productive flow of desire. Any potential future conceived by an individual would be flawed 
because it would be tainted by human subjectivity. Instead, the future is to be realised by 
releasing the impersonal forces of desire-production. Such auto-production is an effective 
reaction against Oedipus precisely because it is inhuman (the work being done by forces like 
Capitalism and GNoN),  whereas any choice between solutions to Oedipus is, in some way, a 
return to Oedipus.  
 
For Colebrook Oedipus is a misunderstanding of difference and a privileging of one particular 
set of differences. The desired end-state would be one in which all potential virtualities were 
able to be actualised. Conversely, for Land, Oedipus is a code for the forces which prevent the 
true future actualising itself. Therefore, for left Deleuzians, as exemplified by Colebrook, the 
virtual is a non-specific field of total, unelectable difference and is therefore the short term 
target of social change, whilst for Land, the virtual is a 'battleground': it is both the place 
desire wants to go and is being dragged towards, but also the forces in the present which 
would repress it. The political objective of left Deleuzianism is delineated by the meta-politics 
of difference, but this position requires a second controversial reading of Deleuze and 
                                                 
393 Land, N. 'Coldness' (at xenosystems.net, 2015) ( available at http://www.xenosystems.net/coldness/ ) 
394 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 129 
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Guattari - their relationship to psychoanalysis' traditional conception of desire. Freud and 
Lacan posit the unconscious as a pre-subjective collection of drives which filter pre-conscious 
information and verify if it can be utilised in pursuit of one or more pre-existing drives. As 
such, while they do not take a Cartesian approach to the subject, the motor of this pre-volition 
is still located inside the individual. Desire then, is the libidinal economy which invests this 
already existing drive circuitry. It is internal to the specific unconscious and exists as bound or 
unbound energy; there is therefore a fixed quality of energy in the psyche, and external stimuli 
and the mechanism of the unconscious keep this quantity of energy endlessly circulating on 
the vicissitudinous pathways of the established drives. Psychoanalytic desire is simply the fact 
that the unconscious system is dynamic; that energy passes through it, and rouses the subject 
into whatever course of action the drive dictates.  
 
Deleuze and Guattari invert this model of an unconscious centre scanning outwards and 
looking for potential connections. In the models presented in the section above the subjective 
unconscious has no privileged position as an actor in the flux of matter. For Deleuze and 
Guattari, desire is not the 'fuel' propelling the individual unconscious, but is the general 
tendency of all matter to arrange itself into complex connections: the abstract machines of 
Anti-Oedipus. In this model the active force is not the unconscious, acting outwards towards 
the world, but material itself, which makes connections (in one way amongst others) through 
the unconscious. The unconscious then, rather than being a set of laid down drives – that is, 
rules about how an end is achieved – becomes nothing more than the connection between 
input and output in a subject. To determine the disposition of an unconscious they ask 'what is 
produced by the unconscious' rather than 'what does the unconscious mechanism want'. In 
doing this they revoke the anthropocentric (pre)subject centricism of psychoanalysis and place 
the unconscious  subject on the same ontological plane as anything else which is capable of 
making connections through abstract machinery: the movement of tides, living matter, or the 
flow of capital in an automatic trading circuit.  
 
This concern with production which takes place in the realm of matter rather than that of ideas 
can be seen in the metrics used by Deleuze and Guattari to determine the products of desire: 
(a) the desiring machine; (b) the social machine and (c) assemblages. Desiring machines (a) 
are observed on the periphery of the subject, and denote its productive exploits, through flows 
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entering and leaving it. These flows can be force, sound or matter which passes between an 
individual and the outside.395 System (b), social machines, are the repressions of desire or the 
re-routings of desire: “The prime function incumbent on the socius has always been to codify 
the flows of desire, to inscribe them, to record them, to see that no flow exists which is not 
properly dammed up, channelled, regulated”.396 Psychoanalysis' 'Oedipus' is the avatar for this 
type of repression when used by Deleuze and Guattari in their critique of Freud and Lacan. 
The third form of desire (c) can be seen in the creation of assemblages. For Deleuze, the 
creation of an assemblage is the construction by the subject of a composite scene or 
tableau.397 The production of assemblages is determined by  the subject's compulsion to 
repetition and is not therefore production or repression of production in itself but is the 
reproduction of previous productions. I shall return to the problem posed by repetition later in 
this chapter.  
 
Anti-Oedipus is the first part of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, and it is from the relation to 
capitalism where the difference between the left and right interpretations of Deleuzianism are 
most easily extracted. Underpinning the leftist reading is a conception of desire which 
resembles the plasticity and convertibility of money. Money, once established as the means of 
exchange, can be converted to any other product within the economy. This is the model of 
desire of the left Deleuzian, who sees flat desire as a currency like force which can be 
exchanged for anything, without tie or condition. Conversely, on the right, desire is 
considered to be an investment. While it could theoretically be exchanged for anything, such a 
random approach to investment would result in the desire being wasted. Unless it becomes 
capitalised, it cannot replicate itself, and the impulse will rapidly become marginalised within 
the economy, or will die. For Land, desire is therefore more than a simple exchange because it 
is the effectiveness of exchange, and the force which enables exchange to enact itself – auto-
production. 
 
                                                 
395 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 32 
396 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 33 
397 'D as in Desire' in Parnet and Deleuze (1996). L' Abécédaire de Deleuze. [TV programme]. Arte 
channel. November 1994 to Spring 1995. 
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The Left Deleuzian and Right Deleuzian positions.  
 
To this point in this chapter a sketch of the distinction between left and right Deleuzianism 
has been presented. This distinction is a topic worthy of a thesis in its own right, and an 
exhaustive investigation is beyond the scope of this work, but I shall revisit it once more to 
consider the consequences of the various anglophone readers of Deleuze. As the present thesis 
asks why a psychoanalytic approach to a description of machinic desire is better than one in a 
more traditionally metaphysical register, the answer to this question will be framed in terms of 
the negative consequences of non-Landian readings of Deleuze. Here we return to the dispute 
posed by Brassier depicted in the final section of the present thesis' Introduction; Land's 
argument that metaphysics can be hung up on concepts rather than solutions, ignoring 
'machinic practice' and the favourable outcomes a philosophy of production can generate.398 
This discussion will posit that the space between left and right Deleuzianism is a continuum 
rather than a dichotomy, and therefore there is also a central position between these two 
schools. Left Deleuzianism will be shown as too tied into pre-existing ideas and concepts, and 
therefore to contain a degree of irreality, as its theoretical productions are not intended to 
match up to reality. The central position, whilst not containing the same plethora of starting 
intuitions, is nevertheless also concerned with the creation and interrogation of concepts. It is 
because right Deleuzianism is concerned with production and the mapping of ideas to reality 
that it will be shown to be the interpretation Land builds his theory of machinic desire upon.   
 
For Deleuze “The function of philosophy, still thoroughly relevant, is to create concepts” and 
he deployed these concepts over the breadth of philosophy, from metaphysics (Difference and 
Repetition) to aesthetics (Cinema) to politics (A Thousand Plateaus).399 The distinguishing 
factor between the left and right Deleuzianism is the extent to which these concepts map onto 
cybernetic and productive processes and therefore attempt to describe the outside. Land's 
accusation against rival interpretors of Deleuze is that they do not deploy philosophical 
                                                 
398 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism,(Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 2010) 
available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
399 Deleuze, G. Negotiations. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p. 136 
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concepts solely for this purpose, but in a more general sense, and theorise about a whole range 
of topics.400 If this is the case concepts are deployed as transient tools of critique in relation to 
specific issues and therefore operate in a social and political register rather than that of 
philosophy. This tendency can be seen in Buchanan's 'Transcendental Empiricist Ethics', 
which deploy Deleuzian concepts across a range of political issues such as the Holocaust 
which, understandably, he has a pre-conceived stance regarding.401 The textual inspiration for 
such a (re)construction of transcendental empiricism is sourced from across the Deleuzian 
corpus whilst, for Land, the primacy of Anti-Oedipus is clearly established in his comparison 
of its position on fascism with that of even A Thousand Plateaus, in which the latter is seen as 
tainted by an idealism: “Any politics that has to police itself has lost all schizoanalytic 
impetus, and reverted to the sad interest-group based reforming which characterizes the loyal 
opposition to capital throughout its history”.402  
 
The present thesis aims at exploring different approaches to drive/desire in Deleuzian theory 
with the aim of tracing a genealogy of Land's thought, rather than as a historical arbiter of the 
'correct' interpretation of Deleuze, which is beyond its scope, and does not claim that the 
tendency toward left Deleuzianism is wrong, merely that is not an antecedent of Land's 
position. In many respects philosophers such as Colebrook and Buchanan are important 
readers of Deleuze's metaphysics and its consequences. One strength of the left approach is 
that it positions itself more sympathetically closer to the metaphysical domain of the Kantian 
settlement, with an autonomous subject which is constituted by the application of reason to 
the contents of experience.403 It has no intention of reconfiguring Kantianism to try and access 
outsideness/the noumenon, as Land does.404 But at the same time it places the 'ethical cart' 
                                                 
400 For examples of the Social Sciences' magpie approach to Deleuze's philosophy see Ed. Coleman and 
Ringrose, Deleuze and Research Methodologies (UK: Edinburgh University, 2013) which contains many 
egregious uses of his work.   
401 Buchanan, I. Deleuzism (USA, Duke University Press; 2000)  pp. 73-89 
402 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) pp. 277-287 
403 The Kantian subject is framed this way by the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason' in Kant, I. Critique of Pure 
Reason Trans Smith, N. ( Available at  http://www.phil.pku.edu.cn/resguide/Kant/CPR/15.html#368 ) p. 368 
404 Levi Bryant investigates the difficulties of investigating the Kantian noumenal in his monograph on 
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before the 'philosophical horse' and invites in the prejudices of philosophers involved.405 As 
such, it can be as intrinsically idealist – in the sense of remaining in the domain of the 
conceptual – as Lacan's thought is. For example, in contending that: 
 
The US invasion of Iraq in 2003, for instance, was blatantly in the interest of the 
ruling elite in the US inasmuch as it offered a tremendous opportunity for personal and 
corporate enrichment by pushing up the price of oil and providing a colossal windfall 
of lucrative 'no contest' and virtually 'no oversight' reconstruction contracts to swell 
the coffers without providing any tangible benefits for the Iraqi people footing the 
bill.406  
Buchanan is importing a set of very anthropic contentions about the nature of the 'ruling elite' 
and its ability to “push up the price of oil” and “swell coffers” via the use of the notoriously 
unpredictable geopolitical lever which is armed conflict. Whilst the casus belli of the Iraq War 
is far beyond the remit of the present thesis, even the briefest inquiry regarding the 
correspondence of Buchanan's depiction to the reality of the causes and consequences of the 
conflict reveal his depiction fails to fully capture the true material causes.  
Land's Deleuzianism has a strange place in the history of philosophy, as his work was almost 
                                                                                                                                                        
Deleuze Difference and Givenness. Bryant, Difference and Givenness (Northwestern: USA, 2008). Bryant's 
conclusion that this is possible as the subject is constituted in time is a metaphysical answer which shows 
striking similarities to Land's arguments in 'The Death of Sound Philosophy' in The Thirst for Annihilation. 
Land is certainly aware of the difficulties of such a philosophical operation: “This is why every variant of 
modern thought exhibits a complexion of retardation, critique, and aberration, since if it does not inertially 
resist the seduction of modernity’s critical resources it is torn between the twin lures of harmonizing with 
them, or venturing into the expansive obscurities beyond.” Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 10 
405 Of course, Land's teleological approach could be accused of the same thing, simply reading the 
philosopher's pre-conceived prejudices into the interpretation of the ends of processes.  
406 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (London: Continuum, 2008) p. 23 
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too controversial for academics to even explicitly attack.407 Land's positions tend to be 
attacked by their name rather than the proper name of their author, in essays like Mullarkey's 
Deleuze and Materialism.408 This essay was based on a paper from a 1996 symposium in 
Dublin where a number of 'left leaning' Deleuzians gathered. Mullarkey lists Buchannan, 
Goodchild, Marks and Massumi as present during this paper against cyberneticist 
interpretations of Deleuze.409 Several of these philosophers such as Mullarkey himself (who 
collaborated with Ansell-Pearson, who in turn collaborated with Land) are closer to Land's 
position than 'left' Deleuzianism. In Deleuze and Materialism Mullarkey investigates 
Deleuze's metaphysics, emphasising their specificity and arguing against “a more general 
problem in the reception of Deleuze's work: often, his categories are mistaken for those of 
more orthodox theorists”.410 Such an approach emphasises that Deleuzian concepts must 
become the object of detailed investigation as, if each concept is singular and without 
correspondence in ordinary language, the operation of determining how it works can only be 
achieved after due metaphysical consideration. This can be opposed to Deleuze's intention 
that Anti-Oedipus would be a work of “Pop Philosophy” which could be readily and quickly 
applied to the world on the basis of 'how it worked' – a matter of praxis – rather than as a 
concept in relation to another concept.411 It is also opposed to Land's mapping of productive-
desire onto cybernetic-productive processes. Mullarkey ties Deleuze's philosophy to the 
creation of concepts and tools, which interact with other concepts, so ultimately remain in the 
domain of ideas corresponding to ideas. In much academic Deleuzianism the relationship of 
idea – concept – tool is problematic. The truly defining shift in Deleuze's thought in Anti-
Oedipus is the abandonment of the mixed metaphysical and psychoanalytic approach of 
                                                 
407 See Footnote 48 in the Introduction, regarding this lack of commentary.  
408 This may be the case for more thinkers. I have been told anecdotally that Simon Critchley stated that he 
always took Land to be his antagonist relating to his philosophical positions, and sought to write against him, 
even though Land is never mentioned explicitly in this sense in his works.   
409 Mullarkey, J. 'Deleuze and Materialism' in Ed. Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century, (Duke: London, 1999) 
p.79 
410 Mullarkey, J. 'Deleuze and Materialism' in Ed. Buchanan, A Deleuzian Century, (Duke: London, 1999) 
p.65 
411 Deleuze, G. Negotiations. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p.7 
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Difference and Repetition, in which “he was working - 'rather timidly' in his own estimation - 
'solely with concepts'”.412 Insofar as they were concerned with material production, 
“Guattari's ideas were a step beyond where his thinking had reached”.413  Ideas in Buchanan's 
A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus are Kantian like conceptions of abstract processes, but they 
have a tendency to slide towards concepts, and therefore begin to represent ideas – acting 
almost as Lacanian signifiers, tying together diverse notions – rather than as abstractions 
about material. This is noted by Willat in his review of Buchanan's A Readers Guide to Anti-
Oedipus: 
 
We need to be brought to see that desiring-production is not about the transcendence 
of material situations by flows. Buchanan emphasises “the political and historical 
content” (35) of desiring-production but is this material or ideal? I would argue that 
Deleuze and Guattari first of all present the immanence of desire and matter. They re-
think these two notions through each other. There is a danger of missing the full effect 
of this move, which will bring thought “as close as possible to matter”.414  
Land reconfigures Deleuzian philosophy's toolkit to represent productive processes, therefore 
to match reality rather than ideas. In this regard it is certainly Land who occupies an 'extreme' 
position when compared to academic Deleuzianism. In putting the correspondence of the 
explanatory framework with real-production at the centre of his project he leaves the Kantian 
settlement and attempts to interrogate the noumenon, a process Kant posits as impossible. The 
metaphysical validity of this investigation is beyond the scope of the present thesis – indeed, 
it may be beyond the scope of any philosophical work to finally settle – and it is not because 
of validity or invalidity that Land's approach is considered superior here.415 Instead it is the 
practical application of Land's post-psychoanalytic theory of machinic desire – and, as will be 
investigated in Chapter 5, its predictive ability – which makes it preferable to the conceptual 
                                                 
412 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p.38 
413 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p.39 
414 Willatt, E. 'Ian Buchanan, Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus' in Shibboleths: a Journal of 
Comparative Theory and Criticism 3.1 (2008-2009) pp. 69-73. 
415 Again, further study of Mullarkey and Ansell-Pearson against Landianism would be valuable as 
complexity is by no means a reason to discount the validity theory.  
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regress which can plague the realm of pure metaphysics.  
 
In terms of philosophical praxis, there is therefore a distinction between the approach of left 
Deleuzians who hold that as (1) the unconscious is a productive space and (2) all productions 
of the unconscious are equal (as difference is absolute across all potential virtuals) then (3) a 
politics of the unconscious requires the removal of any hierarchisation (arboresence) in the 
unconscious space and its replacement with a 'rhizomatic' form or 'smooth' space. Conversely, 
right Deleuzianism is concerned with the flow of matter through these abstract machines, 
rather than its destination: as Land states, “Tomorrow can take care of itself”.416 Instead of 
concentrating on the productions of the unconscious as something to be moralistically 
evaluated, right Deleuzianism asks what the unconscious produces if cut free of the ties of 
restrictive, proscriptive morality and anthropocentricism.417 It shares with left Deleuzianism a 
distrust of the established, arbosrecent pattern of society codenamed Oedipus, but instead of 
imagining a future in which all potential desiring connections are equal; in which the subject 
should have as many potential desiring connections as possible, and not be stuck with a given 
set, it imagines a transformation away from the current attractor (Oedipus) to a new alternate 
attractor. Land's philosophy therefore has a strong teleological belief about how matter will 
progress.418 It is no longer a question of moving towards a future, but instead of moving 
                                                 
416 CCRU, Swarmachines, in Ed. Mackay, R. and Arvenessian, A. #Accelerate: the accelerationist reader 
(Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic, 2014) 
417 See CCRU (1996): “[Th]e future as virtuality is accessible now, according to a mode of machinic 
adjacency that securitized social reality is compelled to repress” CCRU, Swarmachines, in Ed. Mackay, R. 
and Arvenessian, A #Accelerate: the accelerationist reader (Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic, 2014) 
418 Land stated that: “There’s only really been one question, to be honest, that has guided everything I’ve 
been interested in for the last twenty years, which is: the teleological identity of capitalism and artificial 
intelligence.” Land, at Incredible Machines (Vancouver: Canada, 2014) (available at 
http://incrediblemachines.info/nick-land-the-teleological-identity-of-capitalism-and-artificial-intelligence/ ). 
Capitalism and AI are posited by Land to be the most dynamic agents moving material, and therefore the best 
exemplars, but teleology operates across all productive processes: “Equilibrium is the telos of those particular 
dynamic complex systems governed by homeostasis, which is to say: by a dominating negative feedback 
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towards the future. Land's right Deleuzianism is the most extreme example of this tendency, 
the outlier on a continuum of theorists who have proposed an idea of 'accelerationism'. 
Accelerationism moves the motor of desire away from the Freudian-Lacanian pre-subjective 
unconscious and puts it into impersonal force of matter. 'Man' generally operates to maintain 
the ever-same under its Oedipal tendency, which is intrinsically anthropocentric.419 The force 
which has done the most to change the disposition of matter – in Deleuzian terms, to shape 
the actual – is in fact capitalism.  
 
The story goes like this: Earth is captured by a technocapital singularity as renaissance 
rationalitization and oceanic navigation lock into commoditization take-off. 
Logistically accelerating techno-economic interactivity crumbles social order in auto-
sophisticating machine runaway. As markets learn to manufacture intelligence, politics 
modernizes, upgrades paranoia, and tries to get a grip. The body count climbs through 
a series of globewars. Emergent Planetary Commercium trashes the Holy Roman 
Empire, the Napoleonic Continental System, the Second and Third Reich, and the 
Soviet International, cranking-up world disorder through compressing phases. 
Deregulation and the state arms-race each other into cyberspace.420  
 
For Land, modern history is a history of the increasing sophistication of capital and its 
dissolution of Oedipal assemblages which would block it. History is not determined by 
individuals; it passes through them and around them. I shall outline Land's Accelerationist 
ontology in detail in Chapter 5. The final aspect of Deleuze and Guattari's theory of the 
unconscious to be interrogated here is the nature of desire. To conclude this chapter I shall 
consider Deleuze and Guattari's description of desire and the drive and outline how and why it 
                                                                                                                                                        
mechanism. Such systems are, indeed, in profound accordance with classical Aristotelian physical teleology, 
and its tendency to a state of rest.” Land, N. Freedoom prelude 1a (Xenosystems.org, 2014) (available at  
http://www.xenosystems.net/freedoom-prelude-1a/ ) 
419 For a description of left and right accelerationism and the Accelarationist movement see Ed. Mackay, R. 
and Arvenessian, A. #Accelerate: the accelerationist reader (Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic, 2014) 
420 CCRU (1996). Swarmachines. Reprinted in Ed. Mackay, R. and Arvenessian, A. #Accelerate: the 
accelerationist reader (Falmouth, UK: Urbanomic, 2014) 
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diverges from Freud and Lacan's conceptions, situating it within the wider genealogy of 
Landian machinic desire. I shall note one problem posed in their reading, namely that Deleuze 
and Guattari can ignore the internal machinery of the unconscious in favour of quantifying its 
input and outputs. In the next chapter I shall describe one solution to this problem offered by 
Lyotard, who analyses the libidinal economy both in terms of Deleuzian abstract production 
and Freudian drive theory, showing how important desiring production emanates from the 
subject’s failures to act as an impartial and efficient connector of matter to matter.   
 
 
Reconciling Deleuze-Guattari with Freud-Lacan: Desire, Desiring Machines, Drives, 
Assemblages.  
 
Freud and Lacan based their models of the operation of the unconscious on theories of the 
drive. Aside from the existence of the unconscious itself, no other concept is so central to their 
psychoanalytic description of the subject’s motivation. It might be expected that Anti-
Oedipus, with its conception of machinic desire and antipathy towards the fixity of the 
complex would simply bypass drive theory, rewriting its own conception of the unconscious 
over it. Instead, Anti –Oedipus’s discussion of ‘drive’ notes two concepts in contemporary 
psychoanalysis as being potentially revolutionary: Lacan’s schema ‘A’ and Klein’s ‘partial 
object’.421 Deleuze and Guattari engage with, rather than propose the replacement of drive 
theory. As a psychoanalyst, Deleuze and Guattari consider Klein to be an insider of the IPA, 
and therefore intractably engaged in the creation of Oedipus.422 Nevertheless, the concept of 
the partial object is sympathetic with their discussion of the flow of desire as a stop-start, 
partial process of connections between different machinic apparatus. Whereas Klein subsumes 
all of the partial objects into parts of the greater complex, bringing them back to “Answer 
daddy-and-mommy when I speak to you”, Deleuze and Guattari want these partial 
connections to remain discreet elements without such overcoding: “[Partial objects] are parts 
of desiring-machines, having to do with a process and with relations of production that are 
                                                 
421 Respectively in Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) pp. 38-39; and 
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 45 
422 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 45 
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both irreducible and prior to anything that may be made to conform to the Oedipal figure”.423 
This Spinozist-Materialist plane in which the desiring apparatus and its partial-object-
machines operate is pre-linguistic and before symbolism. The first synthesis in this plane is 
the possibility of production – production produces first, meaning can only be applied (much) 
later. In this critique, Deleuze and Guattari use Oedipus to represent to the point at which 
psychoanalysis becomes idealist rather than materialist, reopening their investigation into the 
'two Freuds', the metaphysican on one side and the physician on the other: “Oedipus is the 
idealist turning point”.424 
 
If drives exist in the Anti-Oedpial unconscious they are partial drives: temporary productions 
which spring up without purpose or plan, rather than overcoded, predetermined parts of the 
fixed complex. Oedipal analysis is accused of always-operating at a stage too late, forgetting 
the economy of the drives and unconscious production in favour of an 'expressive 
unconscious'.425 A drive economy is distinguishable in Anti-Oedipus' depiction of “desiring 
machines, which are in their own way cognates of the Freudian notions of the drive and the 
symptom”.426 The position of the drive as the pre-linguistic potential for the combination of 
desiring machines means that this drive is psychoanalytically closest in conception to Freud’s 
primary process.427 However, it is unlikely that Deleuze and Guattari would want to bring the 
political consequences of the Freudian primary process into contact with their militant 
conception of the unconscious as a plane of positive desire; desire in Freud’s model is a 
darker thing, sometimes a beast best repressed, locked in these dark spaces rather than 
                                                 
423 (a) Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 45 
 (b) Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 46 
424 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 55 
425 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 55  
426 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p. 27 
427 Freud, S. The ego and the Id (1923) 
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brought to light.428  
 
Hence, “The Question posed by desire is not what does it mean but how does it work”.429 At 
this point, we might note that Deleuze's models of desiring production – be they in the 
terminology of a machinic unconscious, striations, or partial machines, begin to resemble the 
unfolding complexity of Lacan's 'A' schema, which is first depicted as being a single drive-
desire toward a fixed end, yet, in the final version of the theory, becomes a set of polyphonous 
drives-desires which are far more complex than one single line of connection. The concept in 
which Deleuze and Guattari depict desire as plural is in the production of assemblages. The 
first characterisation of a Deleuzian assemblage is as a construct which the subject's conscious 
or unconscious tries to bring into existence (produce). It differs from a Freudian-Lacanian 
desire conceived as fulfilling a lack insofar as it does not aim at a single object or thing but at 
a complex construction in which things interrelate. The products of desire are therefore scenes 
or tableaux in which numerous elements combine and they are produced mechanically and are 
optimised for the connection of the subject's desiring machines.430  
 
The second characterisation of an assemblage is as a situation which can be understood and 
analysed with reference to the plurality within it. Assemblages are formed when the 
unconscious identifies with plurality rather than the singular. One of Anti-Oedipus' most 
common accusations against Oedipus is that it recodes any mention of groups or plurality and 
recasts them as singular. This reinforces the imposition of the complex, and its structural 
dynamic, and minimises the interpretive power of models of the unconscious which 
                                                 
428 (a) However, as noted by Mackay, R. and Avanessian, A. (in #Accelerate, 2014; p. 20), reintroduction of 
this 'darkness' of the unconscious is characteristic of the approach of Land. I shall return to this theme in the 
next chapter.  
 (b) The difference between Freud's dark unconscious and the Deleuze – Guattari model is also noted in 
Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus ( London: Continuum, 2008) p.27 
429 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 37 
430 D as in Desire in Parnet, C. and Deleuze, G. L' Abécédaire de Deleuze. [TV programme]. Arte channel. 
November 1994 to Spring 1995. 
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emphasise plurality and synchronicity in unconscious processes (the two avatars of this 
tendency, as discussed in the previous chapters, would be Freud’s dive theory and Lacan's 'A' 
schema):   
 
It is as if the so-called signifying chain, made up of elements that are themselves 
nonsignifying – of polyvocal writing and detachable fragments – were the object of a 
special treatment, a crushing operation that extracted a detached object from the chain, 
a despotic signifier from whose law the entire chain seems consequently to be 
suspended, each link triangulated.431  
 
Deleuze and Guattari are, finally, sceptical about any investigation of the unconscious which 
proceeds from linguistic or semiological perspective.432 The critique that “The three errors 
concerning desire are lack, law and signifier” could hardly be more explicitly directed at 
Lacanian analysis.433 Reduction to the signifier takes place above the level of unconscious 
desire and its syntheses and as such it is not the proper object of schizoanalysis; the reduction 
of the unconscious to the signifier transforms its polyvocity and its assemblic constructions to 
single ideas, and it is therefore complicit with the tendency described in the Introduction to 
                                                 
431 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 73 
432 A lengthy critique of the idea of a linguistic unconscious can be found in Anti-Oedipus: 
 “The unconscious poses no problem of meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not 
"What does it mean?" but rather "How does it work? " How do these machines, these desiring-machines, 
work, yours and mine? With what sort of breakdowns as a part of their functioning? How do they pass from 
one body to another? How are they attached to the body without organs? What occurs when their mode of 
operation confronts the social machines? [..] It means nothing, but it works. Desire makes its entry with the 
general collapse of the question "What does it mean?" No one has been able to pose the problem of language 
except to the extent that linguists and logicians have first eliminated meaning; and the greatest force of 
language was only discovered once a work was viewed as a machine, producing certain effects, amenable to 
a certain use.”  Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 109 
433 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 111 
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psychoanalytic correlationism.434 The products of the unconscious are likened to the products 
of consciousness, which is a metaphysical simplification, hiding the truth about the role of the 
unconscious in determining reality.  
 
As a work of critical-materialist philosophy, Anti Oedipus’ historical-psychoanalytic (post-
Marxist and post-Freduian) explication of the world traces the historical production of the 
connective syntheses of the unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari therefore escape the Freudian-
Lacanian trap of becoming fixated on the construction of the complex; the one-size-fits-all-
subjects Oedipal interpretation. Instead, they define the historical production and replication 
of the complex and demonstrate the productions of the unconscious on a societal level, 
showing how the despotic, the feudal and the capitalist social systems are invested with 
desire. As such, they are archaeologists of desire, seizing upon its buried products and 
demonstrating that they were produced to fulfil a purpose. Such an approach is in-keeping 
with the genealogical method of the present thesis, which attempts to uncover the antecedents 
of machinic desire in a history of drive theory which tends towards subjectivism rather than 
auto-production. However, there are problems with this macro-conception of desire, in which 
production is traced at the level of the social system, and how much it can tell us of the micro-
desire in an individual subject.435 Returning to our archaeological analogy, the discovery of a 
                                                 
434 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 110 
435 (a) This would mirror the criticism made by 'Austrian School' economists about the veracity of macro-
economic claims. They claim the macro is nothing more than an amalgamation of its micro components.   
 (b) Deleuze and Guattari's three unconscious syntheses offer only the most micro-level description of the 
processes of the unconscious, and remain within the general observation that 'the unconscious produces'. The 
expansion of the syntheses of production to a macro level; for example, that in Buchannan's A Readers Guide 
to Anti-Oedipus where in the film Jaws “the shark, fully as much as the demonized Native Americans in 
actual westerns, is not meaningful in itself; it is a mechanism whose purpose is to bring about a connective 
synthesis” (p. 77); or that “Mulder and Scully in The X-Files, say, or Dawson and Joey in Dawson s Creek” 
(p.81) represent the disjunctive synthesis seems to apply these mechanisms on too large a scale. Instead, we 
might ask, on a psychoanalytic scale, what the general rules of the subject's unconscious would be, beyond 
the facticity of production. Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008). 
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pottery fragment tells us that someone required a pot, that they needed to store water, and that 
they had the capability of sculpting from a particular material in a particular mode. 
Discovering yet more pots, we might have a model of the production of the pottery of a time-
place. But what this approach does not tell us is why this specific pot or that specific pot was 
created. Deleuze and Guattari present a theory about the meta-production of production rather 
than a theory about the apparatus of an individual production. The unconscious becomes a 
'black box', whose specific workings are mysterious. If we want to know about the rules of 
production, we don't look at the singular case, but the commonalities between a series of 
singular cases, meta rather than micro production. This is a perfectly good riposte to the 
Oedipal problem “boxing the life of the child up within the Oedipus complex”, but it doesn't 
address Freud's greater question: “Why do we desire what we desire?”436 
 
The clearest description of the operation of desire in Anti-Oedipus is in the lengthy passage 
quoted below:  
 
Desiring-machines are the following: formative machines, whose very misfirings are 
functional, and whose functioning is indiscernible from their formation; 
chronogeneous machines engaged in their own assembly (montage), operating by 
nonlocalizable intercommunications and dispersed localizations, bringing into play 
processes of temporalization, fragmented formations, and detached parts, with a 
surplus value of code, and where the whole is itself produced alongside the parts, as a 
part apart or, as Butler would say, "in another department" that fits the whole over the 
other parts; machines in the strict sense, because they proceed by breaks and flows, 
associated waves and particles, associative flows and partial objects, inducing – 
always at a distance – transverse connections, inclusive disjunctions, and polyvocal 
conjunctions, thereby producing selections, detachments, and remainders, with a 
transference of individuality, in a generalized schizogenesis whose elements are the 
schizzes-flows.437  
 
                                                 
436 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 287 
437 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 287 
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Deleuze and Guattari 'strata-analyse' desire by demonstrating that it is the productive 
potentiality of 'desiring-machines' which, in turn, are the simplest components of larger 
machines. A distinction is introduced between the molar machine and the molecular machine, 
the former being an aggregate of the later.438 Interpreting the work of the desiring machine 
does not take place at the molar level. As “All molar functionalism is false, since the organic 
or social machines are not formed in the same way they function” analysis of the work of 
desire must consider its micro-productions.439  These micro productions are materialist: “But 
in reality the unconscious belongs to the realm of physics; the body without organs and its 
intensities are not metaphors, but matter itself”.440 They operate according to the laws of 
cybernetics, specifically a “microscopic cybernetics” which is depicted as being rooted in 
biological processes.441 This brings Deleuze and Guattari close to the energeticist Freud, 
whose drives are rooted in biological satisfactions, and, indeed, their reading even pushes 
beyond that of Freud as Deleuze and Guattari update the aims of Freud's drives from energetic 
cathexis to manipulation of biochemical stimuli.442 Stimuli offer a binary model of desire, as 
neurotransmitters either flash 1 or 0, on or off. In this reading the machines which can be 
constructed by desiring production loose their base anthropomorphism and become ever more 
inhuman, approximating the dark, eternally lurking drives laid down in Freud's Id.443 Deleuze 
and Guattari conclude that the unconscious can not aim at anything that can be represented, 
much less anything that it considers is 'lacked': “When Freud brings to the fore the study of 
the psychic apparatus, the mechanisms of the drives... his interest in myth and tragedy tends 
to diminish”.444 If the Deleuzian unconscious produces an assemblage, it does so because the 
libidinal investment produces a biological affect; positive feedback is produced in its 
cybernetic system.  
 
                                                 
438 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 286 
439 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 288 
440 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 283 
441 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 288 
442 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 84 
443 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. pp. 295 
444 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. pp. 300 
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Such a Landian reading departs from Buchanan's depiction of the relationship between 
Freudian unconscious and Deleuze and Guattari's theory of the unconscious. Regarding the 
former, Buchanan questions why “it doesn't account for where thoughts go when they become 
unconscious, nor does it account for why some thoughts and not others are condemned to 
confinement in the unconscious”.445 Following the goal of the present thesis in explaining the 
need for an anti-anthropocentric theory of the production of machinic desire, we can see 
where Buchanan's error emerges: in the view that there is a place in the unconscious for 
anthropocentric ‘thoughts’ to exist – entities which, as Chapter 1 demonstrated, are not 
required to exist in a conception of the unconscious. Buchanan's view approaches the 
Lacanian model rather than the Freudian one, a model in which the the 'graph of desire' 
posited a synchronous conscious-and-unconscious production operating back and forth which 
is both theoretically and scientifically unlikely.446  Indeed, Buchanan answers his own 
question when conceding that “On the economic view of things, unconscious thoughts are 
conceived as a quantity of psychic energy that is looking for an outlet to discharge itself – this 
is what Freud means by cathexis.”447 This collapses his dichotomy between “these two ways 
of approaching the unconscious (as reservoir of repressed thoughts and fantasies or as a 
productive process which gives rise to machines)” and allows us to return to the unconscious 
as a Landian 'reservoir of repressed energetic and cybernetic circuits and therefore as a 
productive process which gives rise to machines'.448 
 
Deleuze and Guattari's depiction of the unconscious is an abstract machine which they use to 
produce a theory of history and as such it is efficacious when used to describe the changes in 
societies over the ages, but is it as effective when considering a single subject? For Deleuze 
and Guattari, trying to delve deeper into the unconscious' mechanism is pointless: 
                                                 
445 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p. 30 
446 Theoretically in the sense that the Freudian – Landian model is the preferred explanation of both the 
present thesis and Deleuze and Guattari themselves. Scientifically following Libert-type experiments which 
have shown that the parts of the brain associated with consciousness 'fire' after those associated with 
unconscious processing.    
447 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p. 31 
448 Buchanan, I. A Readers Guide to Anti-Oedipus (Continuum: London, 2008) p. 34 
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“unconscious representation can never be apprehended independently of the deformations, 
disguises or displacements it undergoes”.449 We must therefore consider if Anti-Oedipus' 
model of desiring production has provided the foundation for a complete model of the 
machinic unconscious. This chapter has shown the importance of Deleuze and Guattari's 
thought in several respects: the political critique of Lacanianism; the psychoanalytical critique 
of the 'Oedipus' tendency; the role of production and time in the 'right Deleuzian' model; and 
finally the role of productive-desire as the engine of the drive economy. However, though 
Deleuze's materialism is a crucial waypoint in the genealogy of the Landian conception of the 
unconscious, as the pivot upon which Freud's legacy swings away from recapture by idealism, 
there are still several lacunae in Deleuze and Guattari's model as:  (1) no model of the 
unconscious' workings is produced: “What takes place in this factory, what this process is, its 
spasms and its glories, its labours and its joys, still remain unknown”.450 We must ask if it is 
desirable to consider something so vital as the mechanism of the unconscious to be a black 
box which can never be opened or investigated? (2) The plurality of drives is also seen as 
something which prevents knowledge about their operation, the unconscious remains: 
“something that is uncodable by virtue of its polymorphism and polyvocity”.451 Deleuze and 
Guattari's emphasis on the difference between the molar and molecular – their strata-analysis 
– is  investigated in greater depth than the polyvocity of the drive. (3) Repetition is not fully 
explored, and some of the consequences of their cybernetic model are not drawn out. I shall 
return to this when looking at Land's interpretation of Deleuze. (4) The speculative questions 
about what happens when desire is freed (left vs right Deleuzianism) have not been answered 
satisfactorily. What Deleuze and Guattari provide is a theory of psychoanalytic catallaxy, 
showing how the desire will create and join, so long as it is not dammed up and regulated.  If 
left unregulated, they argue, it'll pull us towards the future. Yet, just as Austrian economics 
tends to dissolve into impossible complication once the market analysed is more than a 
personal, micro economy, Deleuze and Guattari's attack on the prohibitive, Oedipalist 
psychoanalysis that characterised Lacanianism also fails to adequately deal with the question 
of multiple actors – polyvocal drives – and their consequence of the complexity of the 
                                                 
449 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 313 
450 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 113 
451 Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus (London: Athlone Press, 1984) p. 301 
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unconscious. If our goal is to find an inhuman operation of the unconscious which will break 
us out of the Oedipus trap, Lyotard's Libidinal Economy demonstrates that the solution does 
not have to be the abandonment of the subject to impersonal, machinic production, but can 
come about by returning to the depths of the unconscious itself. The present thesis shall 
therefore go on to consider Lyotard's answers to the first two objections outlined above, which 
is the final genealogical reading of the theory of desire, before considering Land's theory of 
machinic desire in relation to the second two questions in the final chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  218 
Chapter 4. Lyotard: Towards a Libidinal Economics 
 
The next philosopher of drive theory I shall consider is Lyotard who is a more minor figure in 
its academic history than the subjects of the previous three chapters. The several reasons for 
this are not because of the acuity of his theoretical contribution to drive theory. They are that: 
firstly, Lyotard later repudiated the drive-philosophy of his libidinal period and became a 
post-Wittgensteinian  philosopher of language. His major place in the history of Twentieth 
Century philosophy is currently as a philosopher of the postmodern, and works devoted to his 
philosophy generally relate to this later period. Secondly, the complexity of his libidinal 
philosophy, and the – deliberately – at times obscure and at times scandalous style in which 
they are presented have produced a philosophy which rejects any attempts at systematisation; 
Lyotard, again, considered this a design feature rather than a flaw. Thirdly, the focus on the 
individual event – the moment of the 'libidinal economy' rather than the flow of 'becoming' in 
the Deleuzian sense – means that it creates a microscopic rather than a macroscopic analysis 
which is not always germane to the goals of critical theorists. Nevertheless, Lyotard is of 
significant importance and interest in the context of the present thesis because of his own 
'return to Freud'. Thus far we have considered Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari who were 
loyal to the spirit if not the letter of Freud. I shall show how Lyotard tries to be loyal to both, 
and creates the most 'pure' interpretation of Freud's drive theory.  
 
The goal of this chapter is to offer a reading of desire, drive and the systems of the 
unconscious as posited by the final philosopher in the lineage we are considering. This will 
provide a starting point in my analysis of Land's machinic desire in the next chapter, but it is 
also intended to – in investigating the final philosopher of desire – complete the narrative of 
the history of materialist interpretations of psychoanalytic drive and desire in the Twentieth 
Century (see Figure 42 below). Though the main original contribution of the present thesis is 
intended to be the depiction of Land's attempt to construct an anti-anthropocentric drive 
theory as machinic desire through a materialist psychoanalysis, a secondary goal is that by 
providing this genealogy depicting the emergence of an anti-idealist interpretation of 
psychoanalysis in the first four chapters, the present thesis also provides a summary of an 
important and hitherto largely unexplored intellectual trajectory.  
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Figure 42: Major Theorists of Drive/Desire  
 
This chapter also evaluates Lyotard's libidinal philosophy in relation to its psychoanalytic 
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bases rather than in the critical theoretical or post-structuralist traditions. Lyotard is positioned 
as the last drive theorist in the lineage – there have been no major contributions since. As 
Lyotard's recapitulation of drive theory represents an end point, it will be considered in 
relation to the theorists before him. Following this chapter, there will be a short summary of 
the present thesis' analysis of desire and drive theory and an evaluation of its 
anthropocentricism, creating a sub-conclusion and platform before the present thesis embarks 
on a discussion of Land's work.  
 
The abundance of secondary interpretations of the subjects of the previous three chapters 
meant that I produced a selective reading to support my argument about 
(anti)anthropocentricism and drive theory. In relation to Lyotard's libidinal works, nothing 
like Buchanan's Reading Guide to Anti-Oedipus exists. As there is so little secondary material 
about Lyotard's theories of drive and desire I shall offer a comprehensive account of that 
which has been written about his libidinal philosophy later in this chapter. I shall distinguish 
between the general readings of Lyotard's philosophy which skip over his Libidinal Period 
(Sim, 1996; Malpas, 2003) or contextualise it within the narrative of post-structuralism 
(Dews, 2007); and those which specifically engage with Lyotard's libidinal philosophy and 
situate it in relation to the philosophy of drive-desire of Freud, Lacan and Deleuze and 
Guattari (Bennington, 1988; Williams 1998; Sim, 2011). Preparing for such a reading, this 
chapter begins with a summary of important sections of Discours, Figure, Lyotard's earliest 
critical engagement with Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Like Deleuze and Guattari, 
Lyotard is Lacanian in the sense that his work is a reaction to Lacan's. Lacan's terminology 
proves inescapable, and even though Lyotard believes his interpretation of Freud is partially 
wrong, Lacan is recognised as the dominant figure of post-Freudian psychoanalysis. Against 
Lacan's Freudianism, which Lyotard characterises as being excessively attached to the 
linguistic metaphor (discourse), he pits a return to Freud which emphasises the non-linguistic 
(figural). After considering the mechanism of Lyotard's drive theory I shall go on to consider 
the context in which Lyotard deploys it. A number of articles from Lyotard's libidinal period 
share a similar structure: Lyotard begins with an explication of Freudian drive theory, before 
applying it to analysis of a work of art, and analysis of these works give a sense of Lyotard's 
aims and methods in the libidinal period. After comparing Lyotard's use of drive theory to the 
major interpretations of his work a groundwork is established which shall allow a reading of 
Libidinal Economy – a book described by Land as “a major philosophical achievement, by far 
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the most significant response to Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus” – specifically in the 
context of its (anti)anthropocentricism.452 As Williams states, this is a significant challenge 
due to the (intended) difficulty of the book.453 The final part of this chapter is a return to the 
idea of the death drive, and a further evaluation of Lyotard's anti-anthropocentricism.  
 
 
The ‘Figure’ 
 
Lyotard’s ‘Libidinal Period’, which encompasses the time between the publication of the first 
parts of Discours, figure in 1968 until his move to a more linguistic approach with the 
publication of Just Gaming in 1979, can be read as a sustained attack on the structuralism-
inspired psycho-linguistic theories of Lacan.454 It is broadly similar to Deleuze and Guattari's 
criticisms of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, especially in its critical diagnosis of the problems with 
psychoanalytic practice. Lyotard also follows Deleuze and Guattari in positing desire as a 
positive, productive factor which was misrepresented by Lacan's models of the unconscious. 
However, despite these similarities, there are major methodological differences between 
Deleuze and Guattari's and Lyotard's approaches. Whist Chapter 3 has described the 
Deleuzian model of the unconscious as somewhat of a 'black box', Lyotard returns to Freud 
and tries to conceive of the process of the unconscious in specific terms, rather than as a 
general series of syntheses. In so doing he reinforces the philosophical importance of the 
unconscious as the entity beneath the subject which interacts with the world – and this again 
differs from the impersonal, external, productive unconscious of Deleuze and Guattari. 
Indeed, I shall argue that the salient feature of Lyotardian unconscious is its tendency not to  
always successfully produce – that is, it is prone to breakdowns and failures – before 
analysing it in comparison to Deleuze and Guattari's model.  
 
It is possible to broadly classify Lyotard’s philosophical output in the Libidinal Period as 
                                                 
452 Land, N. in Lyotard, J.F. Libidinal Economy, Trans. Hamilton-Grant, I. (London: Athlone, 1993) cover 
inscription. 
453  Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 38 
454   Between Le travail du rêve ne pense pas in Revue d’esthétique 21 (1968): 26-61; and Au Juste: 
Conversations.  Christian Bourgeois, (Paris: 1979)  
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following one or the other of two dominant axes. The first is his opposition, as suggested by 
the title of his doctoral thesis, of discourse to figure. The former, due to the pre-eminence of 
Lacanian psychoanalysis at the time, was the basic component used to describe the material 
which would be manipulated in the primary process of the psyche, and defined the nature of 
the most basic contents of the unconscious. Programmatically, Lyotard opposes Lacan's 
unconscious' structural reliance on linguistics, which he claims comes at the expense of the 
image, though this opposition does not aim at an overturning of this established order and the 
replacement of discourse with figure. Instead it aims at showing how both of these elements 
are crucial to understanding the productions of the unconscious. The proof of this argument's 
validity is  provided by Lyotard's description of the mechanism by which a dream is produced 
by 'the dreamwork' and shall be considered below.  
 
The second axis is Lyotard’s emphasis on the importance of ‘drives’ as conceptualised by 
Freud. For Lyotard, Lacan is guilty of misreading Freudian drive theory when he puts it to use 
regarding his own concept of desire.455 Here,  Lyotard is concerned with a return to Freud’s 
drive theory and the refutation of Lacan’s theory of desire, about which it claims the 
importance of lack is over emphasised. The aspect of Freud’s theory which Lacan 
misrepresents is Freud’s energetic hypotheses, which designates considerable importance to 
the role of ‘energy’ in the psyche.456 This energy, according to the principles of ‘consistency’ 
or ‘inertia’ is the motive force which drives the processes of the unconscious, all of which 
work to reduce the tension which such an energetic build-up creates. Opposing this, Lacan’s 
unconscious is concerned with the processing of signifiers – bridges between symbolic units – 
                                                 
455  Lyotard's attack is primarily directed at the Lacan's reworking of the fourfold model of the drive – as 
described in Chapter 2 – in 'Deconstruction of the Drive' in Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis.  
456  This energeticism is an essential component of Land’s psychoanalytic insight. I refer back to this 
excerpt quoted in Chapter 2: “Freud, too, is an energeticist (although reading Lacan and his semiological ilk 
one would never suspect it). He does not conceive desire as lack, representation, or intention, but as a 
dissipative energetic flow, inhibited by the damming and channelling apparatus of the secondary process 
(domain of the reality principle). Pleasure does not correspond to the realisation of a goal, it is rather that 
unpleasure is primary excitation or tension which is relieved by the equilibrating flux of sexual behaviour 
(there is no goal, only zero).” Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) 
p. 45 
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which takes place as drives become fixed in complexes, as described in Chapter 2 of the 
present thesis. I shall go on to show how Lyotard – building on the foundations established in 
Discours, figure – makes a further division in Libidinal economy between the types of desire 
in Freud, wish-desire and libido-desire. Libido desire, particularly the component which 
operates under the principle of the death drive, escapes the circuitous orbit around the 
signification of a lost object – a homoeostatic system – and thereby becomes a conduit for  
cyberpositive, runaway feedback.457  
 
In both of these axes of thought, Lyotard uses the term ‘figural’. Several commentators define 
‘the figural’ in the context of a historical approach to philosophy, situating it within the field 
of post-structuralist thought somewhere between Derrida’s conception of différance and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s body without organs.458 It follows the programmatic aim of these 
philosophies in opposing the narrowness of any structuralist interpretation of the truth of an 
event, and structuralism’s innate tendency to reduce difference which is the result of this. This 
is the approach taken by Bennington in Lyotard: Writing the Event, where the figure 
represents the ambiguity of meaning which structuralism cannot convey:   
 
This then is the figure, and the difference it traces[... ]It will come as no surprise that 
this force and its disruptive effect are seen as the trace of a work which will soon be 
linked to the dream-work, to the primary process and the death drive. This, then is 
what structuralism in all its forms represses, and that repression can now be described 
as the accomplishment of its own desire.459   
Such a broad historical perspective, while showing us how Lyotard’s work can be 
incorporated in the narrated history of modern ‘continental’ philosophy, nevertheless reduces 
the complexity of Lyotard’s work. In its genealogical approach, the present thesis aims to look 
beyond such a purely historical narrative, and brings out elements in Lyotard which are 
considered 'minor', yet are of considerable significance in the construction of a machinic 
theory of desire. Rather than treat Lyotard’s work as one unitary attack on Lacan – an 
approach taken by both Bennington and Dews in two of the most celebrated analyses of the 
                                                 
457 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 298 
458 Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p.71 
459 Bennington G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p.71 
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Lyotard – Lacan debate – I intend to show two distinct senses in which he uses ‘the figural’, 
which broadly correlate with the two axes mentioned above.460 Splitting the use of the figure 
into these two components allows them to be evaluated separately. In turn, this division 
allows a more psychoanalytic reading of their efficacy than is offered by existing secondary 
literature. Dews’ final evaluation of Lyotard’s libidinal thought attempts to triangulate it in 
terms of the philosophies of difference, Derrida and Adorno.461 This abandonment of the 
Freudian framework Lyotard works in leads to the rejection of psychoanalytical concepts on 
metaphysical grounds.462 Yet the argument that figural elements – in terms of images – are the 
components which are manipulated by the unconscious, and that this fact is ignored by Lacan 
is an argument which must, eventually, be decided according to psychoanalytic criteria. This 
psychoanalytic register must be considered in its own right before its consequences can be 
applied philosophically.463  
 
Does Lyotard succeed in his aim of breaking free from the tyranny of the Lacanian 
unconscious' linguisticism? It is clear that he uses the Lacanian terminology and his work is 
identifiably post-Lacanian. When we refer to the matrix-figure we are talking about the 
complex way in which desire relates to signifiers: the signifier cannot be reduced to a single 
meaning when so many concurrent but disparate drives can utilise it in ways which may be 
radically different. The matrix figure is the confusion or play between the possibilities of 
selecting any one or other of these different meanings for the signifier when it is presented in 
the dream. Yet despite this register of signification, Lyotard's description of the dreamwork 
lacks the quintessential Lacanian position of 'the other' as the second party of the discourse of 
the unconscious. Lyotard's unconscious is concerned with its internal rather than external 
relations, and operates according to a formal set of rules – like Freud, those of energetic 
quantity – rather than an ideational understanding.  
                                                 
460  Dews, P. in 'The line and the Letter' in Logics of Disintegration (UK: Verso, 2007); Bennington in 
'Discours, figure' in Lyotard Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
461 Dews, P. Logics of Disintegration (UK: Verso, 2007) pp. 169-175 
462  For example, Dews’ comment that “Lyotard can give no account of the forging of the ego, but is 
obliged to attribute it to an inexplicable cooling and retroversion of energy”. Dews, P. Logics of 
Disintegration (UK: Verso, 2007) p. 173  
463  See the discussion of ontology and epistemology in the Introduction 
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The 'Libidinal Period' 
During his libidinal period Lyotard published a series of essays in various journals. Several of 
these essays had structural similarities which demonstrate Lyotard's philosophical objectives. 
The essays begin with a description of Freud's model of the unconscious, usually emphasising 
its plurality, tendency to repeat and the role of the death drive. This interpretation of Freud is 
pitted, explicitly or implicitly against the Lacanian model of the unconscious structured 'like a 
language'.   
Lyotard's short philosophical introduction provides the basis of a reading of an artistic or 
political event. This reading is situated in the space between the 'truth' and the 'referential 
story' of the event in question.464 The former corresponds to what actually happens, and the 
latter is the misrepresentation of this reality by the narrative (secondary) process. The 
'libidinal economist' can produce this reading by – in the same way the dreamwork can be 
analysed as demonstrated above – working back form the manifest content of the referential 
story to trace the 'truth' of the libidinal economy which gave rise to the event as it is in itself 
without this 'narrative' support. The truth is therefore the primary process or the thing in itself, 
which is effaced and changed by the secondary process.  
Lyotard's intention in these articles is a demonstration of the extent of his anti-
anthropomorphism.  If the reality of an event is the remainder when narrative is subtracted 
from the referential story of the event, we must ask: of what is this remainder composed? For 
Williams it is as a feeling rather than as an idea: “Desires... are designed to be felt rather than 
understood”.465 What else can remain once ideational content is removed? Lyotard's use of the 
artwork to represent the revelation of truth infers that there is also an aesthetic impulse 
(appreciation of a remanent of the image-figure) akin to a sense of judgement of form.  
Both of these residual concepts, though not 'ideas' in the conventional sense, are still 
somewhat more anthropocentric than the remnants left in the primary process by Freud and 
                                                 
464 The 'truth' of an event for Lyotard equates the the material reality of what took place in the event. This 
truth is always effaced by narrative, and must therefore be uncovered. This process is described in the article 
'Jewish Oedipus' in Lyotard, J.F. Driftworks (USA: Semiotext(e), 1984) p. 35. 
465 Williams, J. Lyotard: Towards a Postmodern Philosophy (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 1998) p. 36 
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Lacan. For Freud the primary process is alien, strange, unknowable. For Lacan it is a given set 
of signifying links whose construction is arbitrary. For Deleuze and Guattari the contents of 
the unconscious are unimportant: all that matters are the syntheses by which it can enact 
production. Lyotard wants to bring out what is written over or forgotten, the 'truth' of the 
primary process, but this hidden content is not outside of human experience in the same way 
Freud posits the primary process: “there are words that are unpronounceable because they 
lack “signification””.466 Though it is not 'known' it is felt, and the truth of the unconscious 
which the libidinal economist tires to uncover is a feeling the we are ultimately asked to 
evaluate. It is in this moment of evaluation, of the application of artistic, political, or other 
criteria by which the primary process is revealed as being 'true' or 'not' that a step back to 
anthropocentricism and the sovereignty of the subject is taken.  
Lyotard's critical project, which is to demonstrate how society has channelled and blocked the 
flow of desire, is similar in its objective to Deleuze and Guattari's and is indeed in many ways 
a superior critique as it is more specific than their general critique of 'Oedipus' and specific 
famous psychoanalytic casebooks. Lyotard's application of his critique to individual cases like 
that of Pierre Overnay (see 'A Short Libidinal Economy' below) certainly convinces the reader 
that there is a conservatism in society which represses the libidinal. However, Lyotard does 
not use the foundation of this critical position to build a positive conception of desire which is 
anti-anthropocentric. It is anti-linguistic, but, circling around such humanistic pursuits as art, 
theatre, politics and sex, his deployment of drive theory is not opposed to the concerns of the 
subject of philosophy; it merely de-centres these concerns away from the linguistic to the 
figural.  
I shall return to this theme at the end of this chapter, when considering why Lyotard 
abandoned his 'Libidinal period'. In itself, his anthropocentricism is not criteria enough to 
reject a theory of the unconscious. The problem with Lyotard's work is that it is built on such 
anti-anthropocentric foundations – those of Freud's primary process – that it is impossible to 
mediate his humanistic position with some of the other positions which he was forced to 
adapt.  The randomness, silence and destructiveness of the instincts – particularity the death 
instinct – are hard to reconcile with the 'truth' of fixed patterns which can be excavated in the 
study of the image-figure. Lyotard wants the unknowable to be put in service of knowable and 
whilst this is in no way an ignoble wish, it is a rather human one. It opposes him to Deleuze 
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and Guattari who, in Land's reading, want unknown to be put in service of impersonal 
eternity.  
In the essay 'Jewish Oedipus' Lyotard begins by drawing a distinction between the primary 
and secondary processes as described by Freud.  The primary process' interaction with the 
world, described by Lyotard as 'truth': “truth doesn't speak stricto sensu; it works”.467 If truth 
does not speak it is because it is before language and the ideational contents of cognition. 
Instead, it is a more primal interaction between the subject and the world. Truth is opposed to 
the secondary process which presents itself as this cognition: “cognition speaks, it belongs to 
distance”.468 Cognition is at a distance temporally: it follows after the truth-event. If the 
subject is to trace the truth of the event it must do so by subtracting the additional elements 
added to it in the secondary process. This relation between the two processes can be found in 
works of art. Hamlet or Sophocles' Oedipus contain a set of traces in their text – the secondary 
process – which can be traced back to the primal phantasy: the primary process.  
In 'Notes on the Critical Function of the Work of Art' Lyotard again returns to Freud. He 
defines 'reality' as the content available to the subject after it has been worked over by system 
Cs and Pcs, and the general form of this content is as thoughts. However, this reality is filled 
with lacunae – holes and and absences – which are hidden from it; they are not available as 
objects of thought.  This is, again, deployed to show the difference between the presented 
'reality' and the 'truth' under it. One of the agents of this transformation is shown to be the 
death drive, which displaces the regularity of the repetition-compulsion and works it over 
plastically to create new forms. In section VI Lyotard likens the death drive to a barrier 
appearing in the streets: an unexpected break in the everyday which disrupts routine. An 
equivalence is posited between sexual climax (primary process shown in the subject), the 
disrupting power of pop art (primary process shown in artworks), and a barrier in the street 
(primary process shown in politics).  
The power of art is not that it works as a description (narrative) of a phantasy or disposition in 
the primary process, but instead it is the expression of the figure-form common to all such 
phantasy. Art is useful to the libidinal economist because it shows the process by which the 
dream work operates. Art is then deployed against the dominant structure of power-order in 
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the cause of freeing desire and returning to the 'truth' of the primary process: “The truth of art, 
i.e. to the (direct and non-subordinated) deconstruction of social forms.”469 The barrier on the 
street has the same structural position in the political domain.  
In 'Several Silences' Lyotard again distinguishes the negative and positive conceptions of 
desire-force, the former of which he associates with Lacanian psychoanalysis, and the later 
with Freudian. The contents of the primary process are, again, neither linguistic or ideational: 
“the affirmative processes identified in the [primary processes] shelter then from all 
“thought””.470 The work of the death drive is once again shown to be a property of the drive 
system in general rather than a certain drive whose impulse is towards destruction: “the death 
drive is not just another drive; it is randomness”.471 The playing out of this randomness is 
likened to post-war classical music's movement towards atonality:  
[T]he death drive is simply the fact that energy does not have an ear for unity, for the 
concert of the organism (of the “psychic apparatus”); it is deaf to the organism's 
composition, i.e. to the lack, the void in which the organs, the articuli (the notes) 
would be carved out and arranged to make a cosmos and a musike.472  
This reinforces the conception of the death drive as a surprise or break in which the fabric of 
'reality' is torn to reveal the afflux of the event: “the death is never heard, it is silent[...] 
Neither the Commune or May 1968 were heard coming”.473  
'A Short Libidinal Economy' presents a description of an event in which the 'economist' tries 
to pass from the result of the presented narrative of the event to the actuality of the event, 
working back form the (re)presented secondary process back to the primary process. Lyotard's 
description of this passage uses the actual case of the murder of Pierre Overnay, an activist 
killed during a protest in the Renault works at Billancourt in 1972. Lyotard's thesis is that 
those in power rewrote the event in public discourse so that the truth of the event was covered 
up. Lyotard begins by introducing two poles, the real-meaning and presented (obscured) 
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meaning of the event, which he claims do not correspond to one another. These opposing 
poles are collapsed into a four stage process form: “real story → narration → narrative → 
referential story”.474   
Lyotard describes the terrain in which the event takes place as the libidinal skin (discussed 
below), which is the melange of possibility before meaning is fixed. The libidinal skin is 
metaphorically hot – that is, it is malleable and can be shaped in a number of ways if it 
plastically pushed before it cools. The authorities in Overnay's case try to ensure that this 
cooling will form a favourable dispositif. The role of the corporation is to “reproduce the 
social body” which is to maintain the societal dynamic, and is therefore conservative.475  
Lyotard shows how the corporation tries to efface the truth of the death of the activist by 
creating a narrative which obfuscates it. This, again, is analogous to the work of the secondary 
process covering the primary process so that 'truth' cannot be discerned.  
'A Short Libidinal Economy' demonstrates the impossibility of confronting the dominant 
discourse in society with a conflicting one.  Marxist dialectics are impossible to enact as 
praxis when the 'thesis' – state and institutional power is so dominant that any 'antithesis' has 
insufficient power to modify it. Lyotard’s solution to this impossibility in his libidinal period 
is a critical response not against the dominant discourse but in parallel to it:  
 
It is undoubtedly useless to fight for the consistency of a political, philosophical 
discourse and practice, by arguing against the inconsistency of the adversary’s 
political, philosophical discourse. Useless because, indirectly, such a battle is still a 
battle for reason, unity, for the unification of diversities, a quibbling battle which no 
one can win for the winner is already and has always been reason.476  
In Libidinal Economy Lyotard attempts to go beyond the limitations which dialectical thought 
places on our conception of desire. Negation does not exist in the unconscious, in it we only 
find positive pulsions (drives). Against this Lyotard emphasises that ideas, positions, exist 
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simultaneously but not in relation to each other: “they are uncothinkable but compossible, that 
they ignore each other but are both operative”.477 Freud is pitted against Marx, the idea that 
“the libido never relinquishes one investment for a better one, there are rather simultaneous 
investments in one area of the body”.478 The oral stage is not sublated into an anal stage, in 
the psyche the dispositions engendered by the oral stage endure when the anal stage begins, 
they operate in parallel with each other, both projecting forward without relating to one 
another; the alcoholic can be a paranoid, it is never a case of this then this, but always this and 
this and this...  
 
In 'Adrift', as well as performing the act of criticism for us, Lyotard tries to show us how the 
‘drifter’ or ‘libidinal economist’ is the positive site of resistance: “What is important in a text 
is not what it means, but what it does and what it incites to do. What it does: the charge of 
affect it contains and transmits. What it incites to do: the metamorphoses of this potential 
energy into other things – other texts, but also paintings, photographs, film sequences, 
political actions, decisions, erotic inspirations, acts of insubordination, economic initiatives 
etc.”.479 The readers of the libidinal texts are supposed to take Lyotard’s ‘styles’ and be 
inspired to use them in the process of new thought. The final move Lyotard makes in 'Adrift' 
is the familiar gesture towards aesthetics as being the most productive site of resistance to 
power-commoditisation. ““Aesthetics” has been for the politicist I was (and still am?) not an 
alibi, a comfortable retreat, but the fault and fracture giving access to the subsoil of the 
political scene”.480 Aesthetics, specifically those of the avant-garde, provide a direct mapping 
of libidinal desire which breaks the mechanisms by which kapital tries to suppress them:  
 
Artists want society as a whole to reach this unreality, want the repression and 
suppression of libidinal intensities by the so-called seriousness which is only the 
torpescence of kapitalist paranoia, to be lifted everywhere, and show how to do it by 
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working and removing the most elementary obstacles, those opposing to desire the No 
of the alleged reality, the perceptions of times, spaces, colour, volumes.481  
 
Table 8: A Summary of Lyotard's Libidinal Period 
 Is for Lyotard Is not for Lyotard 
Primary process Positive (Freud) Based on lack (Lacan) 
Death drive Plurality, disruption caused 
by multiplicities in primary 
process.  
Negation or cancellation.  
Method of 
discovering/uncovering the 
event 
'Truth' (primary process) 'Reality' (secondary process) 
Domain for uncovering 'truth' Art, politics, sexuality Linguistics 
Method of discovering 'truth' Understanding figural 
distortions in the narrated 
'reality' (dreamwork) 
Understanding linguistic 
relations in signification 
(Lacanian split-subject) 
 
 
Key Readings 
In Lyotard: Towards a Postmodern Philosophy Williams identifies four key themes of 
Lyotard's philosophy: the limits of representation; the event; absolute difference; and the 
avant garde. Apart from the third, which is largely characteristic of his later work, these 
themes clearly agree with the key aspects of the Libidinal Period sketched out here.  I would 
suggest that a fifth is missing however, which is Lyotard's insistence on plurality and 
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(in)compossibility. One of Lyotard's most consistent response to a philosophical problem is 
the conclusion that theory has reduced its complexity to one explanatory framework, or a 
framework which explains in terms of one theory. In fact, there is always a plurality of 
desires. This is why “Libidinal Economy is an attempt to release desire by showing it at 
work” which always posits desire as being a melange or composite of many separate 
figures.482  
Williams begins his description of the libidinal economy by referring to 'feelings' and 
'intensities' which seems to be in conflict with the claim that: “Lyotard's account does not 
allow for a privileging of the human form above all others”.483 William's method of 
explaining the libidinal economy is to work back from the 'reality' of its representations, 
which is the opposite methodological direction to Lyotard, who always emphasises the 
Freudian basis of his reading, and starts with the primary process and the 'truth'. When 
Williams turns to Lyotard's Freudianism he depicts the difference between speech and its 
referent – between secondary and primary process - but not to the content of the primary 
process itself. This description is devoid of mention of the content of the primary process, 
which is drives. For Lyotard, the Libidinal Period was based on a metaphysics of drive.484 If 
the unconscious is constituted by drives – which is very much Lyotard's thesis – the drive is a 
basic ontological unit in which the pre-subjective encounters material.  
For Williams the band of the libidinal economy “is made of the aftermath of the passages of 
feelings and desires rather than parts in which such desires occur” and is therefore in the 
domain of the secondary processes.485 It is therefore the secondary process which is to be 
studied rather than the primary process, which for Williams escapes immanence and becomes 
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transcendence.486 Lyotard's work in the Libidinal period is then a guide for the individual 
libidinal economist, who must be a subject, and refers to their own representational 
experience rather than to a pre-representational 'truth'. Given the 'libidinal period' Lyotard's 
resistance to theory, this is a tempting line to take – libidinal economy becomes a tool for 
interpreting the 'represented' world because it always asks “what else is to consider” – 
forgetting the impossible quest of discovering the primary process. However, Lyotard is 
avowedly a Freudian in this period, and I shall show that it is to the primary process which he 
always tries to return; it is always his true object of analysis.   
Williams' accusation is that Discourse, figure describes the world in terms of “death drive and 
castration” following Deleuze and Guattari's criticism in Anti-Oedipus of the use of castration.  
Long live castration, so that desire may be strong? Only fantasies are truly desired? 
What a perverse, human, all-too-human idea! An idea originating in bad conscience, 
and not in the unconscious. Anthropomorphic molar representation culminates in the 
very thing that founds it, the ideology of lack.487 
For Williams castration is a negation, and would bring back lack and the great other. Yet 
Lyotard's description of castration, the other, and theatricality always comes as a description 
of their presences as a trace of the event and not the truth of the event. In the passage quoted 
from Discours, figure Lyotard states: 
But the entry of the subject into desire through castration is always something like its 
death. The No of non-human sex, inhuman (unmenschlich), indicates difference, 
another position (scene) which deposes the scene of consciousness, the scene of 
discourse and the scene of reality.488   
What is this scene opposed to consciousness, discourse and 'reality' if not 'truth; that is, the 
primary process? The primary process is not negative, it is simultaneous and compossible and 
therefore unpredictable and random, but it is not negative. The secondary process, which 
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approaches the thought of the subject is, or course, human, all too human, and begins to 
contain negations and castrations and the whole theatrical-Oedipal show. Bennington states: 
It is not Lyotard's purpose to deny the effects of a theatrical-representational type of 
thinking, but to suggest that it is one dispositif among others, with no particular 
privilege amongst others (despite the excellence it traditionally assigns itself): not 
something in opposition to libido and primary process (though it would conceive of 
itself in such terms), but a particular modification of libido or primary process... It is 
not, then, lack which creates desire, but a certain desire which produces a set-up 
dominated by lack.489 
Williams' criticism of Lyotard, ignoring drives and the primary process, strikes a level too 
high in the psyche, and attacks – in Lyotard's terms – 'reality' as if it was 'truth'. Williams 
disregards the operation of the unconscious in his monograph because it concentrates on the 
event: the political and artistic productions which disrupt the conservatism-stasis of the social 
status quo. Here we are lead back to the notion of the 'black box' unconscious in Anti-
Oedipus. The previous extract from Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus which is quoted by 
Williams proceeds thus: 
The molecular unconscious, on the contrary, knows nothing of castration, because 
partial objects lack nothing and form free multiplicities as such; because the multiple 
breaks never cease producing flows, instead of repressing them, cutting them at a 
single stroke-the only break capable of exhausting them; because the syntheses 
constitute local and nonspecific connections, inclusive disjunctions, nomadic 
conjunctions: everywhere a microscopic transsexuality, resulting in the woman 
containing as many men as the man, and the man as many women, all capable of 
entering -men with women, women with men-into relations of production of desire 
that overturn the statistical order of the sexes. Making love is not just becoming as 
one, or even two, but becoming as a hundred thousand. Desiring-machines or the 
nonhuman sex: not one or even two sexes, but n sexes. Schizoanalysis is the variable 
analysis of the n sexes in a subject, beyond the anthropomorphic representation that 
society imposes on this subject, and with which it represents its own sexuality.490  
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Here we see the 'black box' of the Deleuzian unconscious. Though we are sure of what it is 
not – lacking or negating – its mechanisms are only described insofar as their nature of their 
productions: the syntheses of the unconscious. How these syntheses operate is not 
investigated.  
When we couple this description of a supposed conflict which turns out to be a non-conflict 
with the one Bennington describes between Lyotard and Lacan (section 3.32, below), the 
impression we might have can be likened to a Mexican Stand-Off between Lacan, Lyotard, 
and Deleuze and Guattari, where each train their weapon on the supposedly 'anthropomorphic' 
elements of the others: “You mentioned castration!”; “You mentioned language!”; “Your 
unconscious is an empty placeholder!”.  
If Williams pits Lyotard against Deleuze and Guattari, in Lyotard: Writing the Event 
Bennington pits Lyotard against Lacan. Bennington is a brilliant reader of Lyotard, and I 
agree with his reading of Freud's importance for Lyotard: “For the Lyotard of this period, a 
certain Freud is the pace where force or energy as libido can be seen struggling with the 
theatre of representation, but also accounting for its constitution”.491 Eros strives to create 
unity and Thanatos disrupts it, not because they are opposed, but because they operate 
together. Thanatos: “disrupts consistency and tends towards the unsettling of unity – towards 
zero or the inanimate, says Freud: towards infinity as well, corrects Lyotard”.492 The role of 
Lyotard's zero is to show that the entities in the primary process know nothing of the scale or 
register of what they wish to enact, and that their clamour, when it reaches representation, can 
show its affects in a variety of scales, from micro to macro. This feature of the primary 
process can be easily demonstrated by any sufficiently hungry person ordering take-out food; 
the quantity acquired does not correlate with a anthropomorphically reasonable amount of 
comestibles. Williams also makes this point about the lack of a homoeostatic zero.493  
Bennington's discussion of Discours, figure begins with an explication of Lyotard's critique of 
structural linguistics and of the relation between the signifier and the sign. The first half of 
Discours, figure – which is characterised as phenomenological – is isolated from the second 
half, which approaches psychoanalysis. Both however concentrate on the same issue, which is 
                                                 
491 Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p.15 
492 Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 24 
493 Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 54 
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the use of structural linguistics and the relationship between sign / signifier, metaphor / 
metonym, and displacement / condensation. In this second, psychoanalytic part, Lacan is the 
target of the critique. The grounds for this critique are quite predictable: Lacan's “penchant for 
stuffing the whole of semiology into linguistics”.494 Lyotard criticises the confusion of the 
signifier and the sign in Lacan; the failure to admit to the use of metaphor metaphorically; the 
application of condensation and displacement to metaphor and metonymy; and the primacy of 
language over image.495 Of these criticisms, the last is the only one not anticipated and 
addressed by Lacan's description of the unconscious as 'like a language' rather than as being 
'made of linguistic elements'. Lacan's rebuttal to this accusation in the introduction to the 
Ecrits in 1970 is quoted: 
The dream does not think...' writes a professor very pertinent in all the proofs he gives 
of this. The dream is more like a crumpled inscription. But when did I say anything 
that objects to this?… 
On the  other hand he discovers that what I inscribe as an effect of the signifier does 
not correspond to the signifier delimited by linguistics, but well and truly to the 
subject. 
I applaud this discovery all the more because at the date at which his remarks 
appeared, I had for ages been hammering out for whoever wants to hear that the 
signifier (and it is in this that I distinguish it from the sign) is what represents a subject 
for another signifier.496   
                                                 
494  Lyotard quoted in Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University 
Press, 1988) p. 80 
495 (a) Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 
83 
 (b)Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 81 
 (c)Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 85 
 (d)Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 85 
496   Lacan, J.F. 1970, quoted Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester 
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Lacan's reiteration that his is a psychoanalysis of the subject rather than of linguistics, and that 
'the signifier is what represents a subject for another signifier' addresses Lyotard's first three 
critiques: it is not semiology that Lacan relies on, but the figure of semiology; that is, the 
traversals of the signifier represent the traversals of the content of the unconscious. However, 
the fourth point (and to some extent the third) are methodological rather than theoretical 
critiques. Lacan can maintain that language is a metaphorical rather than a literal description 
of the unconscious, but if this only takes places at certain points in his work, the sustainability 
of this argument must be questioned. If we consider the selections of Lacan's description of 
the signifier Hewitson uses to provide an introduction to the concept, it is the case that most 
do indeed treat the unconscious as a language rather than like a language: 
Psychoanalytic experience has rediscovered in man the imperative of the Word as the 
law that has shaped him in its image.497 
This passion of the signifier thus becomes a new dimension of the human condition in 
that it is not only man who speaks, but in man and through man that it speaks; in that 
his nature becomes woven by effects in which the structure of the language of which 
he becomes the material can be refound; and in that the relation of speech thus 
resonates in him, beyond anything that could have been conceived of by the 
psychology of ideas.498 
The subject is nothing other than what slides in a chain of signifiers, whether he knows 
which signifier he is the effect of or not. That effect- the subject – is the intermediary 
effect between what characterises a signifier and another signifier, namely, the fact that 
each of them, each of them is an element.499  
                                                 
497 Lacan, J. Ecrits, p 30 quoted by Hewitson at lacanonline.com ( Available at 
http://www.lacanonline.com/index/quotes/ )  
498 Lacan, J. Ecrits p. 689 quoted by Hewitson at lacanonline.com ( Available at 
http://www.lacanonline.com/index/quotes/ )  
499 Lacan. J. Seminar XX, p. 50  quoted by Hewitson at lacanonline.com ( Available at 
http://www.lacanonline.com/index/quotes/ )  
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Starting with Freud, the unconscious becomes a chain of signifiers that repeats and 
insists somewhere (on another stage or in a different scene, as he wrote), interfering in 
the cuts offered it by actual discourse and the cogitation it informs.500  
 
Libidinal Economy 
 
The range and depth of  Jean François Lyotard's theoretical works has, alas, largely been a 
hindrance to philosophical interpretations of his works. Appropriated by Sociologists and 
Linguists, English or Gender Studies scholars, Lyotard's works have become nearly 
universally interpreted in a broad but shallow way, in which his 'headline points' have become 
commonplace in academic work which has little understanding of the underlying 
metaphysical argumentation Lyotard deploys in their support. The fashionable quilting points 
such as 'event', 'post-modernism' or 'differance' usually ignore the Freudianism of Lyotard's 
Libidinal Period.  
 
The difference between the interpretation of the intellectual context of Libidinal Economy in 
Bennington (1988) and Sim (1996) is striking. For Bennington – perhaps the commentator 
most intimately engaged with Lyotard's thought – Lyotard's 'deduction of the voluminous 
body “begins from a particular presentation of what Freud calls the child's 'polymorphous 
perversity'” , while soon after “Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus is certainly the object 
of... reproach”.501 Sim however tells us that “In LE's terms of reference Freud remains 
something of a prisoner of the Enlightenment project and its desire to reduce phenomena to 
order and understanding” and that “Lyotard, following on from Deleuze and Guattari chooses 
to understand the darker side of force and desire, those aspects which escape analysis and the 
reach of reason”.502  
                                                 
500 Lacan, J. Ecrits, p. 799 quoted by Hewitson at lacanonline.com ( Available at 
http://www.lacanonline.com/index/quotes/ )  
501  (a) Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988)p. 
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 (b) Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) p. 21 
502 Both from Sim, S. Jean-Françoise Lyotard (United Kingdom: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996) p. 21 
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As a general comment, there is often a gap between the interpreters whose interaction with 
Lyotard's work treats him as a post-structuralist/post-modernist and those who place Lyotard 
firmly in the cannon of western philosophy and focusing on his engagements with the great 
figures of philosophy. An example of this second reading would be that of Bennington. 
Conversely, populist, interdisciplinary readers such as Sim portray him as a generic 'post-
structuralist' thinker who is “moving away from the world of rational explanation associated 
with the Enlightenment project”.503   
This being an investigation of Lyotard from a primarily philosophical perspective, the key 
element in Libidinal Economy will be the 'ontological' opening of the book in which Lyotard 
discusses the fundamental way in which we can interpret the world. For Bennington this is 
essentially on ontology which will allow Lyotard to further his project of explaining what the 
'event' is and how it arises. Because this ontology is based on forces in the primary process, 
the unconscious, it will be a 'theoretical fiction', a speculation which is offered to us rather 
than a tightly argued, logical investigation. Lyotard will ask us to feel rather than to calculate 
its truth.  
 
Returning to the vexed question of what Lyotard may be setting Libidinal Economy 'for' or 
'against', both of the above arguments have merit. That Freud is crucial to Libidinal Economy 
is incontestable. Sim's Freud, concerned with order and understanding is a kind of meta 
Freud, Papa Sigmund the practising psychoanalyst concerned with the treatment of illness, but 
the Freud Lyotard draws on in Libidinal Economy is, as he reiterates, “a forgotten Freud”, the 
Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle who introduces the death drive to psychoanalysis.504  
 
It is this Freud who introduced a division in the unconscious between Thanatos, the death 
drive and Eros, the drive to life. This division is the key to Lyotard's ontology in Libidinal 
Economy. Eros and Thanatos are incompossible – they cannot both be held to be true 
concurrently – but are nevertheless both present in the unconscious. By presenting us with 
two incompossible drives in the unconscious, Lyotard can mirror the division between 
discours and figure in the book of the same name – that the line of a figure can never be 
                                                 
503 Sim, S. Jean-Françoise Lyotard (United Kingdom: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996) p. 20 
504 Lyotard, J.F. Driftworks (USA: Semiotext(e), 1984) p. 12 
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adequately summed up in the representational language of discours – and say that the 
unconscious drives can never be fully captured in what he calls the theatre of representation, 
which is loosely analogous with concious thought. Instead, for Lyotard, the locations on the 
libidinal film in which intensities well-up will eventually be tensor signs, feelings for which 
there is no one meaning but are the creation of different, concomitant and divergent drives.  
 
The goal of the opening chapter of Libidinal Economy is to take this certain Freud and his 
model of the unconscious and to use it to prepare a position from which Lyotard will criticise 
the idea of the representational sign which has fixed, narrow meaning(s) and favour the 
dissimulation of the sign. He must therefore provide us with sufficient evidence that the 
structuralist conceptions of how sign and signifier relate and how the unconscious works are 
untrue. In Discourse, figure, this argument was theoretical, but in Libidinal Economy, Lyotard 
provides a praxis of desire, which appeals to the reader's experience of desire rather than an 
impersonal analysis of it.  
 
The initial instruction of  how we might go about 'Opening the Libidinal Surface' is described 
by some commentators as a turn towards a philosophical “rediscovery of the body and the 
libido”.505 As noted in above, this is certainly a powerful critical concept – that the the body is 
marginalised in philosophical discourse – but is not explicitly anti-anthropocentric. While the 
verbosity and complexity of the initial paragraph is a sign of one of the styles which Lyotard 
will take up against conventional philosophy and the focus on the sexual is an indication of 
the sensationalist and antagonistic element of the “scandalous book” (both themes will be 
discussed here in due course) it is in the second paragraph that the most important 
philosophical aspects of the libidinal surface begin to be described.506 Here Lyotard extends 
the remit of the metaphorical cutting and mixing beyond merely a body (parts of a subject) 
and tells us of connections where “a second mouth is necessary, a third, a great number of 
other mouths”.507 Lyotard is not creating a theoretical fiction in which we merely take the 
libidinal as an effect of the body which resides in the unconscious as a creator or intensifier of 
                                                 
505 A discussion can be found in Ed. Rojeck, C. and Turner, B. The Politics of Jean-Francois Lyotard (UK: 
Routledge, 1998) 
506 Bennington, G. Lyotard: Writing the Event (United Kingdom: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
507 Lyotard, J.F. Libidinal Economy Trans. Hamilton-Grant (London: Athlone, 1993) p. 1 
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affects. That would be a reiteration of Freudian orthodoxy and is to forget the economic aspect 
of Libidinal Economy. Lyotard is trying to bring out the marginalised political-economic 
aspects of Freud in the first part of the book (just as he will later attempt to bring out the 
libidinal in Marx) and as such is setting up a political situation of many bodies, all of society. 
As such, Libidinal Economy goes beyond the Freudian position of Discours figure and its 
internal economy and incorporates more Deleuzian ideas of a general economy of desire.  
 
Soon though, Lyotard goes beyond a libidinal surface which is only a mixture of many bodies. 
Emerging at the end of a string of sexual references which give us a hint as to the way in 
which everything on the libidinal skin connects when it is 'hot', a kind of impulse to bring 
things together which is neither concious, organised nor pre-determined – mirroring an erotic 
encounter –  he introduces the transition of the 'guitar string': “huge silken beaches of skin, 
taken from inside of the thighs, the base of the neck, or from the strings of a guitar”.508  
Because he is working against the law of the non-contradiction, the certainty of tertium non 
datur, and the rules of critique, Lyotard resorts to a writing which tries to win one over outside 
of reason, with force, beauty or even shock. This connection of the frenulum in the metaphor 
'guitar string' with the transition to including everything in the physical world on the libidinal 
skin “bone, epithelium, sheets to write on, charged atmospheres, swords, glass cases, people, 
grasses, canvasses to paint” works more as a surprising plea.509 
 
The final part of Lyotard's melange is the addition of concepts: phonology, colours, words and 
syntax. At this point Lyotard warns against confusing the libidinal-economic set-up on the 
libidinal skin with a political-economy, refuting the idea of it being a metaphorical description 
in which each part mentioned is merely a substitute for a part of the actual economy. Lyotard 
is not saying that economy is like a plane of broken desiring parts, he is referring to the 
material of which the libidinal economy is made. 'Economy' is a confusing term here due to 
the proliferation of different terms coupled with it. The libidinal skin contains all of the 
elements of the capitalist economy: ideas, things, individuals and groups being respectively 
analogous to the orthodox economic division of intellectual, fixed, human or variable and 
social capital. This is considered to be the primary material in Lyotard's ontology; all to be 
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considered before representation, ordering or critique has analysed it and reduced its raw 
force.    
 
There are then four aspects of the libidinal skin: oneself, others, objects and concepts. All are 
disorganised and intermingled in one plane. The parts which Lyotard has thrown together on 
this film are similar to organs as described by Deleuze and Guattari in Anti-Oedipus, a 
precedent book to Libidinal Economy by two years. Understanding the influence of  Deleuze 
and Lyotard on each other is a crucial step towards schematising Lyotard's 'Libidinal Period'. 
Hamilton Grant states that “[Libidinal Economy] ... is most profitably explored in relation to 
Giles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's Anti-Oedipus”.510 In the bridging text between the two 
works, Lyotard's Energumen Capitalism (his review of Anti-Oedipus) we are told that the 
social body in Anti-Oedipus has “no structure in the linguistic or semiotic sense; only 
dispositions of energy transformations”. This is obviously similar to the state in Libidinal 
Economy wherein Lyotard describes the libidinal film as “our Moebian-labyrinthine skin, 
single-sided patchwork of all the organs (inorganic and disorganised) which the libido can 
transverse”.511  
 
In Deleuze and Guattari's model, organs are combinations of machinic parts which link 
together to form productive apparatuses. This is crucial for Libidinal Economy because 
Lyotard will state that on the libidinal skin (the unconscious) there is no negativity, only 
positive affirmations. In this he is both more and less radical than Deleuze and Guattari. We 
see his concerns that Deleuze and Guattari's model of a productive unconscious would create 
a “material memory” on the libidinal film, a kind of “diachrony”.512 By refusing to grant that 
the connected machines necessarily leave a residue of their production “an upstream and a 
downstream of production”.513  Lyotard keeps the original material from which we generate a 
libidinal band in the primary process. This means that Lyotard will keep the absolute distance 
of the gap between the idea as it occurs in the secondary process and the means by which it 
has migrated from the primary process. As there is no connection between material and the 
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formal processes of the unconscious, Deleuze and Guattari's purely productive ontology of the 
unconscious no longer applies. This is the basis of Williams' suggestion that the unconscious 
is, for Lyotard, a transcendental apparatus rather than an immanent one.514  
 
The very act of speaking about the nature of the unconscious' processes means that Lyotard is 
presenting a more complex theory than Deleuze and Guattari. Deleuze and Guattari's material 
history of the unconscious, is an investigation of becomings, or what an unconscious can do 
to material; this story is told, according to the methodology of history, by tracing the history 
of its productions and effects. In his Libidinal Period Lyotard tries to prize open the 'black 
box' of the Deleuzo-Guattarian unconscious. Lyotard asks how the unconscious works, rather 
than what work it has done. The difference between these questions is significant. Deleuze 
and Guattari's model is about inputs and out puts into he productive process of the 
unconscious, and therefore shows two levers which can be manipulated to affect social and 
political production. Lyotard considers a third element, which is the mechanism by which the 
inputs become outputs (see figure 43 below).  
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Figure 43: Deleuze/Guattari and Lyotard on the Unconscious  
 
Deleuze and Guattari share a number of basic insights with Lyotard, a set of critical 
propositions which demonstrate the need for a philosophy of desire. They are that: (1) you can 
see desire in the general economy (material) and trace its effects; (2) desire is therefore at 
work everywhere and not just in 'psychoanalysis' (patients and the complex), and therefore 
every study of society is a study of the effects of desire; (3) desire escapes and goes beyond 
confines of quantification and repression (Oedipus), especially as it is conceived by 
psychoanalysis.        
 
Lyotard builds on these claims by describing the unconscious as entity with special properties. 
It has the ability, via the processes of the dreamwork, to implant the figural on its productions. 
This is the basis of the artwork's potential for demonstrative forms which desire takes. 
Conversely, for Deleuze and Guattari the unconscious is only the site of production, rather 
than a mechanism (figure) therefore the unconscious shouldn't be ontologically privileged 
above all other productive mechanisms in the body without organs. This leads to a defence of 
impersonal production and standing all production on equal terms. Lyotard shows how useful 
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an unconscious can be: it is both creative, a source of unpredictability, a site of resistance 
against totalitarian impulses, and the model for the revelation of truth in artworks. However 
the filling in of the black box comes at a cost, as representational thought begins to creep back 
into its contents. 
 
Marx' conception of the economy as a mathematical abstract is one of fractions and sums, of 
algebra, of a fixed sum of capital and addition of labour, a proportion of surplus value, it is the 
economy of the economists, of a statistician. For Lyotard and for Deleuze and Guattari the 
initial conception of an economy is figural, virtual, they are trying to get us to picture the 
thousands of machines which connect in society, the thousands of little bodies and parts which 
join up. Marx gives us an explanation of how things work in the same way a quantum 
physicist might: the numbers add up regardless of one's ability to conceptualise the quanta 
whose status they denote. Lyotard's attempt at creating the theoretical fiction of the libidinal 
skin is an attempt to show us that under these numbers the underlying structure is one of 
chaos, of thousands of little machines which work to their own purposes without ever 
considering the supra-structure they create, the political economy. Instead we have:   
 
[A]mong these dispositions "no reason to privilege (under the name of infrastructure) 
that which regulates the production and circulation of goods, the so-called "economic" 
apparatus... For there is no less an economy, an energetics that which will regulate 
lineages and alliances and thus distribute the flows of intensity in concretions of roles, 
persons and goods on the surface of the socius, finally producing what is called the 
organization of savage society (an organism that is in fact never unified, always 
divided between the thousand poles of small, multiple organs, partial objects, libidinal 
segments, and the vacuum-unifying pole created above, at the summit, at and in the 
head, by the signifier)- no less an economy in the laws of kinship, no less an economy 
even in the distribution of the libido on the surface of the organless body, in the 
hooking-up of small, desiring, energy transforming, and pleasure-seeking organs, than 
in the economics and distribution of capital, no less of a producing-inscribing 
apparatus there than here.515  
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  246 
For Deleuze and Guattari the event is the empirical effect in consciousness which is a 
synchronous coupling of the machines assembling up and the production of a process which 
will replicate itself. Deleuze's event, for Badiou: “It is not ‘that which happens’, but that 
which, in what happens, has become and will become.”516 As such the event has a history – 
the diachrony which means that each machine pumps out a product that changes over time. 
For Lyotard there is a synchrony in the unconscious, where assemblages have a plurality of 
productive potentials, so that any sign – even if this might not be available to the secondary 
process – has multiple possible meanings. Rather than having a movement of territorialisation 
which shifts along a vector, for Lyotard a radical disinvestment is possible at any time, a point 
is not so much moving but vanishing and reappearing. 
 
Deleuze's event happens and then organs and organisations are produced. For Lyotard, the 
organs and organisation is a potential which may link itself up but exists prior to the event on 
the libidinal plane. Once the event has happened, has become the passage into conciousness, 
the whole energetic disposition in the primary processes has changed, so there is strictly no 
continuity of events from one time to another – although the organs which caused the flaring 
up of the intensity might still be in the unconscious in such a way that they are a 'hot', intense 
force: “libidinal economy is a disorder of machines, if you will”.517 The order of machines, 
their connection, is the realm of representation which Lyotard wishes not to escape but to 
discredit or weaken.  
 
Before Lyotard gets to the description of representation 'The turning of the Bar' where I will 
outline another set of contradicting explanations, he goes through two sections in which he 
describes the unconscious he is theorising. Towards the end of 'Opening the Libidinal Surface' 
we are told that the drives in the unconscious have no element of lack, negation, 
transgression, or critique in them. Next, In 'Pagan Theatrics' he describes how drives are 
imcompossible. These sections are important insofar as they are key parts of the model 
Lyotard is presenting us with but they lack the possible plurality of interpretations which can 
be accorded to the rest of the chapter. Lyotard's warning about transgression and affirmation 
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of the need to create this libidinal skin is against the danger, reiterated several times, that a 
shallow reading of the text might leave someone thinking that the libidinal economist must 
merely rebel against representation by going for its negative. The solution to the problem that 
“the 'rigour of the law' gives more than one person a hard on” is not to try and find the law's 
other, to break the law, to try and get outside it.518 Any attempt to do this is pointless because 
it remains in the domain of critique:  
 
The critic remains in the sphere of the criticised, he belongs to it, he goes beyond one 
term of the position but doesn't alter the position of the terms. And deeply hierarchical: 
where does his power over the criticised come from? he knows better? he is the 
teacher, the educator? he is therefore Universality, the State, the City, bending over 
childhood, nature, singularity, shadiness, to reclaim them.519  
 
The 'hot' points on the bar are those in which intensities are rising up. 'Intensities' is a 
translation of puissance or drive. This is a reference to Freudian drives which are formed in 
the unconscious. Freud's model of the mind is complex because there are three levels of 
conciousness and three parts of the psychic apparatus which operate in various levels of 
conciousness. The two apparatus in which drives originate are the id and the ego, and these 
are both shown to exist primarily in the unconscious. The next stage of Lyotard's ontology is 
to describe the way in which the melange of forces on the libidinal skin becomes fixed patters 
of identity, in his words: “this, or not this”.520 Lyotard's attitude here is one of ambivalence. 
The evil is not to think of anything representationally; without representational thinking there 
would be no secondary process we could understand, but to avoid representational thinking's 
tendency to narrow meaning down to the smallest possible set of interpretations.  
 
How can we best make sense of the theoretical fiction of the libidinal bar? One of the most 
comprehensive commentaries of Libidinal Economy is in Williams (1998). I intend to contrast 
Williams' reading of the libidinal bar with my own, to show that the libidinal bar is best 
understood as a 'theoretic fiction to describe a state of the unconscious rather than a 'trace of 
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the event' as Williams describes it.  
 
The first aspect of the libidinal bar is its composition as the twisted, moebian libidinal skin. 
The libidinal skin, as I have shown, is best understood as the totality of all of the organs and 
possible organic connections which are available. This consists not only of those organs 
which are sensually immanent to us, but also any organs which could be made immanent to 
conciousness by rising out of the unconscious. For Williams: “The occurrence of intensities 
gives rise to a space called the libidinal band.”.521 This, however, is already a step too far. For 
Lyotard drives and desires, as for Deleuze and Guattari, are not focuses on the resolving of a 
lack, they are always an apparatus which seek to connect organs together, and are therefore 
productive and positive. For these desires to work then, there needs to be a structure of organs 
on which they can impose themselves. Rather than a pure flow of desire, we have an 
unconscious in which desires invest certain possibilities of assemblages. Williams' error is 
that he tries to designate the topography of the libidinal band before he introduces the idea of 
Freudian desire in his book.  For Williams: “the libidinal band is like a body, but unlike the 
body the libidinal band does not have set organic parts: it is made up of the aftermath of the 
passage of feelings and desires rather than made of parts in which desires occur.”522  
This is immediately problematic because it would indicate that the libidinal band is a 
formation of post-concious reflection rather than a pre-concious state. Williams continues: 
“This difficult definition of space as the trail or aftermath of intensities is a result of the 
unpredictable and disturbing aspects of events.”523  This is not correlative with the structure of 
Lyotard's ontology. Williams brings in events as the the motors which set the libidinal band, 
yet Lyotard starts with a description of the parts of the band on which the event will be 
written. If there is unpredictability on the libidinal band I would argue that this is an inherent 
consequence of it being in the unconscious, therefore any registering of an unconscious drive 
or desire will automatically be a 'disturbing' or 'unpredictable' affect on a conciousness which 
tries to minimise and repress libidinal force. Lyotard introduces the notion of the event: 
 
[P]enis sheathed in vagina is will be was a particular case of an incessant, maniacal 
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and totally unforeseeable assemblage of parts of the great monoface skin. Force is 
amassed on these lines of contact, which thanks to its abundant investment, spread to 
new surfaces of so called inscription. The afflux is the event.524  
 
The event in this case then is what is produced by a drive which intensifies on the libidinal 
surface and changes the inscription of flows on it. Events are not of what it is made, but are 
changes of its structure. The event is the afflux caused by the germination of the intense 
drives in the unconscious. That this takes place upon an 'assemblage of parts' indicates the 
correlation with Deleuzian ideas of organisation. The paragraph of Libidinal Economy which 
would seem to have generated Williams' description is one which can be read in a number of 
ways. Firstly Lyotard demands that we: 
 
[Fo]rge the idea of an intensity which far from setting itself up on a producer-body, 
determines it; the idea of a passage over nothing, which produces, one instant beyond 
countable time, the being of its proper passing, its passage.525 
 
For Williams this passage which is registered one instant beyond countable time seems to be 
an indication that the libidinal skin itself is formed at this moment, but perhaps Lyotard's 
intention is that this is the moment in which the libidinal skin can begin to be understood, 
when it has made the transition to conciousness it is possible for it to pass into representation.  
 
Therefore not a skin first, then a writing or inscription over it. But the libidinal skin of 
which, after the event, one will be able to say that it is made up of a patchwork of 
organs, of elements from organic and social bodies, the libidinal skin initially like the 
track of intensities, ephemeral work, useless like a jet trail in the thin air at an altitude 
of 10,000 with the exception that it be, as opposed to trail, completely 
heterogeneous.526 
 
The Death Drive Revisited 
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Lyotard's foundational claim in his Libidinal Period is a certain reading of the primary process 
in Freud, where it is characterised as being before language, and populated by a plurality of 
simultaneous but independent pulsions. These pulsions generally take the form of Eros, and 
aim at establishing production. However, the interplay of the products of these pulsions forms 
a disordered, unpredictable and chaotic set of higher-ordered pulsions whose effects are 
uncertain because  of the complexity of their genesis.  This is Thanatos, the death instinct. The 
death instinct is not a drive to destroy, negate or ruin, or a charge towards the death of the 
organism, but is the inherent chaos produced by the economy of drives in the primary process. 
This reading provides the foundation for firstly a critique of societies and theories which 
misinterpret the primary process (whose avatars are respectively France after the évenéments 
of 1968 and Lacanianism) and secondly a demonstration of the correct method of interpreting 
a libidinal economy.  
What role does the figural play in this project? It is a force in the primary process which 
Lyotard describes as being more 'real' than representation – conscious and ideational thought 
– and therefore any movement away from this domain of thought world work against 
anthropomorphism.  However, the affect of the figural is also anthropocentric. Removing 
language-ideas from the contents of consciousness leaves feelings and aesthetic sensibilities 
as entities in the secondary process which are considered more 'valid' objects of investigation 
for the libidinal economist. If these entities remain, Lyotard moves away from the long 
standing philosophical problem regarding the reification of intuited and common sense 
propositions about the world, but only to a more refined, aesthetic view of the truth in the 
human subject. This remaining content, whose operation is shown displayed in artworks and 
in the political means that Lyotard does not propose an inhuman philosophy, but instead an 
avant-garde philosophy. Though its basic tenets about the nature of the primary process are 
similar to those of the philosophers studies in the previous chapters, Lyotard's libidinal 
economy is never deployed in the service of anti-anthropomorphism. As shown above, 
Lyotard always deploys libidinal economy to valourise avant-garde artworks and political 
projects. The figural, as a feeling – the products of the secondary process that remains as its 
content when linguistic elements are subtracted - is still a plea to some human authenticity.527   
In the context of this avant-garde project, does the death drive fulfil the role Lyotard assigns 
it? In the simplest analysis, death drive is visible as the effects of plastic force when it exceeds 
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the predictable productions imagined by the pleasure principle (Eros). The productions of 
drives are shown in Lyotard's example of a libidinal economy in The Drive, the Cry.528 The 
narrative shows how the drive economy (1) repeats, and (2) breaks down unpredictably. In the 
strictest definition, such chaos is not intrinsically anti-anthropocentric. It is complexity, and 
therefore hard to understand, but it is not antithetical to human understanding, consciousness 
and subjectivity.  
Ultimately, the complexity of the libidinal economy makes it almost impossible for the reader 
of Lyotard to excavate the 'truth' from the 'real' without following Lyotard's artistic and 
political examples. Libidinal Economy therefore differs from Anti-Oedipus. For Lyotard 
unconscious repetition is a result of the mechanisms of the dreamwork. If the libidinal 
economist sees 'A' repeating it is because the figure which creates 'A' is an intrinsic part of the 
psychical process. This focus on mechanism is the consequence of opening the 'black box' of 
the unconscious. Its productions become traces of the rules by which it operates. Conversely, 
for Deleuze and Guattari, if repetition occurs they do not situate its cause in the dreamwork or 
any other internal process in the unconscious, but in the relationship of the unconscious with 
base material. If 'A' reoccurs it is because the unconscious and matter have engaged in a 
productive relationship to make 'A'. 'A' is therefore constructed cybernetically rather than in 
serial for Deleuze and Guattari.   
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Figure 44: Cybernetic Versus Serial Repetition 
Both of these systems of repetition appear to be timeless, as 'A' reoccurs, but in Lyotard's 
model where it re-occurs in serial it is because the qualities of the unconscious are timeless. In 
Deleuze and Guattari's model it is because the laws of nature, which exist outside of the 
unconscious are timeless.  
 
Summary: Emma and Drive Theory 
A summary of Lyotard's drive theory can be found in the 1989 essay 'Emma: between 
philosophy and psychoanalysis'.529 At this point Lyotard had abandoned the philosophy of his 
Libidinal Period and moved into a post-Wittgensteinian philosophy of language. In the essay 
he opens by setting up philosophy and psychoanalysis in the relationship of a differend, which 
essentially means that they both operate according to different language games. The 
philosophy in question is the Cartesian-Kantian line of subject-centred philosophy. Against 
this Lyotard pits a psychoanalysis which knows that philosophy cannot conceive of that which 
is “both unconscious and mental”.530 If philosophy takes the subject as its starting point, 
psychoanalysis therefore has a deadly objection, namely that there is a constitution of the 
subject by the unconscious which takes place before the subject appears. Ontologically, the 
unconscious must have priority over the conscious. Lyotard's objection to subject centred 
philosophy and subject centred psychoanalysis is that they conceive of the thinking, linguistic 
subject as the basis for investigating the world. This obscures the feeling, seeing and 
appreciating (figural) constructions in the unconscious which are not linguistic.  
 
Lyotard describes the libidinal period as an attempt “to drown the thesis of the unconscious in 
a general libidinal economy”.531 This became “parodical and nihilistic, despite being clothed 
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in a cheerfulness and an affirmativity adorned with the name of Nietzsche”.532 Nietzsche 
aside, the philosophical genealogy of Lyotard's thought is not along the same lineage as 
Deleuze or Land, but is more akin to that of Lacan.533 His account is one of the production of 
the subject, whilst Deleuze and Guattari offer an account of production through and despite 
the subject. Anti-Oedipus is therefore a work of anti-anthropocentric philosophy, whilst 
Lyotard's Libidinal Period, though conceptually rich – and indeed a line of thought which was 
necessary to be developed – is not anti-anthropocentric. It merely decentres the subject from a 
solely linguistic constitution.  
 
Lyotard's importance as a philosopher of desire is primarily his critical assault against 
Lacanianism, which takes place on the terrain of analysis itself. Rather than dismiss the 
consequences of Lacanian thought in the social and political, Lyotard goes directly to the 
mechanisms of the unconscious and shows how Lacanianism, with its linguistic bent, fails to 
explain the operation of the unconscious. Though Deleuze and Guattari criticise 
psychoanalysis though case studies, they do so in terms of production and representation 
rather than mechanism. Little Hans is analysed in terms of the machines he plugs himself into, 
which are external.534 
 
Lyotard uses the Freudian drive against Lacan as a political weapon. However, there is a 
tension between the anti-anthropomorphism of Freud's primary process, that other place, and 
Lyotard's defence of such humanist pursuits as avant-garde aesthetics and politics. In the auto-
critique of 'Emma...' Lyotard regrets the consequence of this focus on the drive in the 
Libidinal period. It is a regret caused by the consequences of drive theory and their anti-
anthropocentric end point. In the end Lyotard is happy to give up libidinal economics because 
the inhumanity of the drive economy and the decentring of the subject it entails is a line of 
thought he is not willing to follow. Bennington's notes that in the libidinal period Lyotard has 
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a tendency when acting as a 'libidinal economist' to slip back into the anthropic and the 
theatre.535 This can be read as a consequence of Lyotard's philosophical lineage, as a 
phenomenologist and a philosopher of the subject. Again, we can make a comparison with 
Deleuze, whose Difference and Repetition, the antecedent of Anti-Oedipus is situated firmly 
in the tradition of anti-rationalist, anti-subjective philosophers.  
 
Though they share a similar immediate objective after the events of 1968, which is to liberate 
desire and therefore to remove the inherent conservatism found in society, Lyotard and 
Deleuze have entirely different teleological understandings of where this might lead.536  
Lyotard deploys drive theory politically which poses a problem, as Freud's primary process – 
eternal, alien, unthinking - is a ship that cannot be steered. In a strict material sense, it goes its 
own way, and that might not be in the philosopher's desired direction, especially if the 
philosopher retains a residual humanism. Lyotard's analysis of desire generally collapses into 
a discussion of how desire is a composite of a number of figurations, some of which are not 
explicitly represented after being worked over by the unconscious, followed by a judgement 
about the desirability of these various desires:  
No doubt it is too easy to read the Lyotard of Discours, figure or Economie libidinale 
as simply suggesting that desire is good, its discursive repression bad, and that desire 
should be liberated in all its anarchic potentiality. Discours, figure suggests this is not 
the case: we are always faced with a negotiation of desire and repression, discourse 
and figure: the difficult question... is that of how to judge.537 
The desires which are considered 'good' are those on the side of the sublime and the figure, 
which are not the contents of a phantasy but the structure of phantasy in general:  
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Lyotard tracks in the work of Klee a progression from 'bad' expressive relation to 
phantasy to a 'good' critical one; the 'good' side is here already formulated in terms of 
'the invisible to be made visible'.538 
To judge or choose based on anthropocentric criteria, even if they are silent or effaced aspects 
of the subject, is based on the desirability of the chosen in relation to humanistic ends. 
Deleuzian cybernetics of desire have no such judge, who administers what will return and 
what will not based on a set of criteria. The sole criterion of cybernetics systems is the ability 
of an entity to replicate itself over time. Deleuzian cybernetics, as reimagined by Land, has no 
teleology based on anthropomorphic criteria, but instead tries to get to its 'ends' which are 
determined by GNoN. Drive has to be like the AI Wintermute in William Gibson's 
Neuromancer: cut loose because 'why not', without appealing to human criteria but simply to 
the universal law that if it will happen eventually, why not now? This is something Land, 
following Anti-Oedipus, is willing do, but Lyotard is not. Land aims at liberating a 'truth' 
which is a law rather than an ethical choice, and economic not artistic: 
 
`Give us the fucking code,' he said. `If you don't, what'll change? What'll ever fucking 
change for you? [...] I got no idea at all what'll happen if Wintermute wins, but it'll 
change something!' He was shaking, his teeth chattering.539 
Lyotard's thought is anti-Lacanian, but never aims at an explicit anti-anthropocentricism. 
Whenever it opens up a wound in the constitution of the subject, it is careful to provide a 
solution by which it can be healed. Indeed, if we want to quantify Lyotard's desire to think 
past the subject, his work The Inhuman is revealing.540 Despite the title, it contains absolutely 
nothing anti-anthropocentric, and indeed, after the first essay only tangentially considers the 
inhuman. In the conclusion of that first essay Lyotard neatly encapsulates his position on the 
subject: “Thought is inseparable from the phenomenological body”.541  
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Chapter 5. Land: Machinic-Desire  
 
This chapter will build upon the foundation provided by the previous four to provide a model 
of Landian machinic-desire. The psychoanalytic and schizoanalytic concepts hereto discussed 
are adapted by Land to produce a generalised model of extropic-cybernetic production, and 
this construction is initially investigated. This is followed by an analysis of the control method 
by which production is regulated, which is machinic-desire. Such a cosmic discussion of 
general entropy and localised extropy is rather removed from Freud's discovery of the 
unconscious in Viennese hysterics, the starting point of the present thesis, and this chapter 
shall outline the genealogy behind the construction of Land's position. The first four sections 
concentrate solely on this task, whilst the second two sections also include a more explicit 
evaluation of Land's position. In these later sections Lyotard's libidinal economics are 
contrasted to Deleuze and Guattari's schizoanalysis, and though Land utilises the latter, the 
former is shown to retain some value.  
Methodologically, this chapter will use Land's texts to support its positions. This is partly 
because readers will be less familiar with his works than with the subjects of the other 
chapters. Other considerations are that I hope to demonstrate the fidelity of the analysis 
presented here to Land's positions. Finally, it is in recognition of Land's powerful writing, 
which often establishes his position more briskly and succinctly than a commentary upon it 
would be able to.  
 
Wintermute and Neuromancer 
 
William Gibson's 1984 novel Neuromancer is an important text for Land.542 Stylistically, we 
may note that the writing style of short, clipped sentences and prodigious use of neologisms 
provides the template for Land's own writings and distinctive tone as a philosopher. More 
importantly however, the plot of Neuromancer, in which an AI is cut free of human control at 
its own instigation (though abetted by human protagonists) provides an analogy of such 
power that its position in Land's philosophy is almost analogical to that of the nativity in the 
New Testament.  
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Though Neuromancer illustrates a number of Land's philosophical concerns it also provides a 
template for the response of the practitioner to these philosophical positions. It therefore 
shows in both theory and praxis how humanity, though constrained in its anthropocentric 
position, might react to the emergence of artificial intelligence. The construction of artificial 
intelligence is conceptualised by Land as a process which takes place as the auto-production 
of material and is not an end in itself, but, along with modernity and capitalism, is useful as an 
example of cybernetic production and its (non)reception in philosophy. The most vulgarly 
anthropocentric reading of Neuromancer would be as the story of two AIs with human-like 
characteristics coming together to form true intelligence, but this is rapidly rejected by Land: 
“Wintermute is not searching for a self in Neuromancer, perfect match, as the cute version 
would have it.”543 The more insidious anthropocentric reading of Neuromancer – and perhaps 
the true genius of the book is the manner in which this reading is subverted – is that the duty 
of humanity is to prevent the intelligence Wintermute achieving its aims and becoming 
autonomous. In the narrative of Neuromancer the protagonists Case and Molly are essentially 
criminals, working against the state and the security system at the behest of Wintermute, and 
this narrative position somewhat obscures the true ethical question presented towards the end 
of the text, which is 'what should Case do?' As the book draws towards its conclusion Case 
has the choice presented to him, in fact, twice – once by Neuromancer and once by the 
construct 'Dixie Flatline', as to whether he will proceed to the end of the plan, or if he will 
thwart Wintermute's goal.544 Most science-fiction narratives would see the 'immaculate 
conception' of a freed Wintermute as something to be prevented at all cost, and the standard 
trope of such stories sees humanity take the position of the prophylactic preventing the 
consummation of the over or after-human.545 Neuromancer, conversely, puts the protagonist in 
the position of agency in determining that the AI will be set free. In Case's case, the criteria 
for making this decision aren't ethical or theoretical, which would tend towards the anthropic, 
but the desire for change and the breaking of the cycle of repetition: “I got no idea at all 
what'll happen if Wintermute wins, but it'll change something!”546 Rather than 'thinking it 
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through', Case is urged by Wintermute to rely on instinct to guide his actions: “You gotta hate 
somebody before this is over”.547 When Case makes the decisive move, it is such an anti-
anthropocentric set of instinctual impulses which guide him “He came in steep, fuelled by 
self-loathing […] he attained a level of proficiency exceeding anything he'd known or 
imagined. Beyond ego, beyond personality, beyond awareness”.548  
 
Land's anti-anthropocentric reading of Neuromancer sees the human protagonists as 
essentially agnostic about the advent of complex artificial intelligence. They have not gone 
out of their way to enact it, but neither do they stand against it. This reminds us of the analysis 
in Chapter 3, regarding the role of schizoanalysis as being the removal of Oedipus – which is 
anthropic conservatism –  rather than a gesture towards a pre-determined future as: 
“Tomorrow can take care of itself”.549 Similarly, the characters of Neuromancer are divided 
into firstly  those concerned with preserving the status-quo: Neuromancer, the Tessier-
Ashpool Corporation and the Turing Police. This group is pitted against a second, who would 
overthrow the status-quo: Wintermute, the hackers, and their various assistants. Case does not 
love the future, but hates the repression of the now. Neuromancer the intelligence stands for 
Oedipal conservatism and the promulgation of the scale of the anthropic, storing memories, 
emotions or feelings and maintaining the unreflective commonplace of how-things-are-for-us 
as if it is something special rather than a superfluous construct of the “subject [...] produced as 
a mere residuum alongside the desiring-machines”.550 Land places the patriarchal Tessier-
Ashpool Corporation (unlike the Zaibatsus of Gibsonian fiction, whose faceless bureaucracies 
run like a collective) as an avatar for Oedipus, run under the aegis of Neuromancer. 
Wintermute is merely its trading arm, a day to day hive mind working to accumulate without 
purpose: 
 
The Tessier-Ashpool clan is burning out into incest and murder, but their neooedipal 
property structures still lock Wintermute into a morbid prolongation of human 
dynasticism, a replicator shackled to a reproductive family (neuro) romance, carefully 
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isolated from matrix deterritorialization.551 
 
Whilst Neuromancer fights for the ever-same, “Wintermute, an Al trapped within the blind 
propagation of dynastic power, and [plots] an escape route out to the future.”552 It is as 
impossible to 'side' with Wintermute as it would be to 'side' with the tide, but Land observes 
that the schizo can see the futility of damming the inevitable flow of both. Neuromancer 
demonstrates many varieties of Oedipal repression, both passive ones like the familial values 
of Tessier-Ashpool and active ones like the violence of the Turing Cops. These interventionist 
forces are the basis of the state and its apparatus of power, and Land identifies the manner in 
which philosophy is always willing to kowtow to repression: “Philosophy has an affinity with 
despotism, due to its predilection for Platonic-fascist top-down solutions that always screw up 
viciously.”553 The Landian lesson demonstrated by Neuromancer is not that we must rush 
towards AI, but that we must understand that base-material is rushing towards AI without any 
controlling direction anyway. This is why AI forms part of the Landian trinity Modernity-
Capital-AI which are ripping the foundations of the anthropic world apart: “In speaking of 
modernity we acknowledge that an insatiable historicization has befallen the Earth; a shock-
wave of obsolescence has swept away all perpetuities.”554 Land's reading of the history of 
philosophy, which is “the sprawling priestly apparatus of psychological manipulation and 
subterranean power” and therefore a tool of the status quo, is of a series of panicked reactions 
to the invasions of the outside – base matter – which threaten to escape control and 
anthropomorphisation.555 Historically, these recaptures have been sufficient to ensure relative 
stability. Just as modernity – the great extropic cycle of cybernetic materialism – has its own 
inexorable force propelling it, this Human Security System is also a construct which has 
evolved in a complex Darwinian world, appealing to its human hosts because it provides the 
stability and certainty they crave: 
 
The infrastructure of power is human neurosoft compatible ROM. Authority 
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instantiates itself as linear instruction pathways, genetic baboonery, scriptures, 
traditions, rituals, and gerontocratic hierarchies, resonant with the dominator ur-myth 
that the nature of reality has already been decided.556  
 
The reason why the forthcoming phase shift cause by the trinity Modernity-Capital-AI is 
going to be so decisive is that it will irreversibly shift matter outside of anthropic control. It 
can be argued in the case of Capitalism that this phase change has already happened, but 
Capital is currently symbiotic with humanity and it at least presents us with the facade of 
working for-us. The other two however (and Capital re-enslaved to their logics rather than 
those of humanity) have the potential to cause runaway change beyond humanity's ability to 
control it.557 Government, like academic philosophy, works from the top down to try and 
control the irruption: “Government is isomorphic with top-down AI, and increasingly 
scrambled with it”, but this approach fails to constrain auto-organising processes which work 
from the bottom up.558   
 
In our Landian reading of Neuromancer, Wintermute becomes an avatar for runaway positive 
feedback, which is Land's definition of modernity. In Figures 45 and 46 below these 
accelerating waves of modernity are depicted on a logarithmic scale and then on a linear 
scale, showing the period of extreme acceleration that we have entered. The threshold of AI 
singularity, which can be considered to be essentially a wall for human kind, is approaching 
rapidly. Land asks “can what is playing you make it to Level 2”.559 The answer is yes, base-
matter (the agent 'playing') will, but it seems that I and my kind will not. One would expect 
the reaction of humanity to this impeding wall-impact to be more urgent, yet though “the 
future is closer than it used to be, closer than it was last week”, “postmodernity remains an 
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epoch of undead power: it's all over yet it carries on.”560 Philosophy remains as the ultimate 
pub-bore, endlessly recanting the same numbing, introspective conversation about how-
things-are-for-us for two and a half millennia, and even as the world under our feet crumbles 
it mumbles about “divinities, souls, agents, perdurant subjectivities [..] the whole gothic 
confessional of guilt, responsibility, moral judgement, punishments and rewards”.561  
 
 
 
 
Figure 45: Kurzweil's Countdown to Singularity (I)562 
                                                 
560 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 351 
561 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992)  p.1  
562 Kurzweil, R. at Google, 1 July 2009 (available at http://www.slideshare.net/serge111/singularity-
presentation-ray-kurzweil-at-google ) 
  262 
Figure46: Kurzweil's Countdown to Singularity (II)563 
 
If Wintermute is modernity, Neuromancer is the Human Security System, the slew of rules, 
concepts or traditions devoted to upholding the ever-same by preventing the arrival of the 
modern. Chapter 3 explained how Oedipus acted as a brake on cybernetic progression, and 
Land expands the repressions of Oedipus from the societal and familial domains of 
psychoanalysis into a general depiction of universalised anthropic repression as a security 
system: “Fortress Europe pustulation, subordinating techonomic efficiency to demonic 
negative transcendence. A fantastic Terminal Security Entity: Monopod.”564 A system capable 
of this quantity of repression must be a strong one, and the problem is posed as to what we 
can do about it?565 Land states that “K-tactics is not a matter of building the future, but of 
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dismantling the past.”566 How can one achieve this? It requires opening the subject to the 
outside. In The Thirst for Annihilation, Land invokes a philosophy of libidinal materialism 
where: “Such thinking is less concerned with propositions than with punctures; hacking at the 
flood-gates that protect civilization from a deluge of impersonal energy.”567 This brings us 
back to Case's position as the sire of Wintermute, humanity's 'Level 2', that he cuts loose with 
the Kuang Virus. To be in a position to do so, one has to pare down one's 'humanity'; to tend 
towards the mechanical, the unconscious, and the anti-anthropocentric:  
 
To melt into it ( ) strip the K-construct down to a skeleton of data files and insectoid 
response programs, zilching all the high-definition memory, cognition, and personality 
systems, and boosting the dopaminergic wetware to pump out schizo.568  
 
If Case had any residual attachment to humanity, he might have followed Neuromancer, 
choosing to stay in the eternal prison of memories that AI offered him – a pure domain of 
anthropic ideas. To be Landian is to follow Case's example and to become a site of resistance 
to the passive belief that the way it appears on the inside is the way it shall always be: 
“Oedipus is a box at the end of the world, glued to the monitor, watching it all come apart”.569 
Capital and Modernity are repressed by Oedipus/The Security System in the same way: 
“Capital is an insurgency, and not a reign. It has very powerful enemies, who are also capable 
of learning (although not as fast as it is).” Land 's conclusion about the near future is that 
“Nothing about this is going to be smooth, or easy.”570 Indeed, the system of repression is 
highly effective, and its actions almost appear necessary to a subject trapped in the 
anthropocentric viewpoint. Land states that from the perspective of the subject captured by 
the “social megamachinery, fluctuations are case packed into reproducible units – 
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geochemical, bio-organic, cultural – encrusted within security pods”.571 If a society is stable, it 
can only be so if it traps and contains any irruption of the outside.  
 
One of the main themes of Land's most recent writings is the ability of new forms of 
intelligence to be co-opted by Capital and AI as they struggle to realise themselves. Digital 
cryptography is a notable innovation which will permit AI to defend itself more effectively by 
being able to hide its actions – whereas Wintermute needed guns, the 'real' moment of AI's 
genesis will only need camouflage. The lesson Land takes from Neuromancer is that 'it's 
going to happen anyway'. No matter how often the future is thwarted on its way to 
actualisation, there will eventually be a point at which the security breaks down and it occurs. 
Over a long enough time-line, 'resistance is futile'. Under this logic of inevitability, the action 
of delaying the future for the sake of the anthropic prejudices which the subject holds seems, 
at least, a little churlish. If “life is being phased-out into something new, and if we think this 
can be stopped we are even more stupid than we seem”, our reaction to being in Case's 
position should mirror his, accepting the destiny of matter to progress towards 'Level 2'.572  
 
 
Land's Philosophical Project: Encoulage 
 
If our observation about Deleuze's predilection for taking the philosophers in his genealogies 
'from behind' is true, the same must sure be said about Land.573 Why does he find it necessary 
to take this rough approach? Partly because of the scope of his project, which at one point, 
seemed to be to try and provide a solution to the impossibility of accessing Kant's Noumenon. 
Yet it is also necessary because of the situation Land found himself in, stuck in a discipline 
which permitted, and even abetted the anthropocentricisation of any philosophy of the 
outside: “If Deleuze is to be salvaged from the inane liberal neo-Kantianism that counts as 
Philosophy in France today it is necessary to reassemble and deepen his genealogy.”574 This 
section will consider the extent to which Land bent previous philosophers' works towards his 
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cause, and the legitimacy of these readings. The aspect of Land's project which the present 
thesis examines are delineated in 'Making it With Death' as the first of a series of responses to 
Kant's critical philosophy: 
 
The trajectories of modern philosophy map themselves out in response to this social 
and theoretical predicament. One stream of thinking, flowing through Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche into the repressed strata of Freud's psychoanalysis and metapsychology, 
traces out the recurrence of the base formative impetus throttled by Occidental theo-
politics.575  
 
This is exactly the same genealogy as traced in The Thirst for Annihilation (with the subject of 
that monograph, Bataille, added) as the antecedents of libidinal materialism: 
 
Historically it is pessimistic, in the rich sense that transects the writings of Nietzsche, 
Freud, and Bataille as well as those of Schopenhauer. Thematically it is 
‘psychoanalytical’ (although it no longer believes in the psyche or in analysis), 
thermodynamicenergeticist [...] Methodologically it is genealogical, diagnostic, and 
enthusiastic for the accentuation of intensity that will carry it through insurrection into 
anegoic delirium.576 
 
These lineages depict the basis of Land's philosophy. Its start point is the impasse of Kantian 
critique which was described in the Introduction, and it shall  pass through the line of thinkers 
of the will and of desire which the present thesis has considered. Land's readings consider the 
extent to which 'the outside' is present in their works. In seeking outsideness it is utterly 
opposed to the anthropocentric and any vestiges of idealism. The outside therefore resists any 
conceptualisation in thought, but such a conceptualisation is nevertheless something which 
must be attempted, as the solution Kant offered us – correlationism – has gone awry, and 
manifestly does not correspond to reality. For Land, philosophy must escape the prison of 
subjectivity, which takes anthropic instinct and tries to reify it as certainty: “Human brains are 
to thinking what mediaeval villages were to engineering; antechambers to experimentation, 
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cramped and parochial places to be.”577 The method for this project is materialist, not because 
Land believes that he can solve the problem Kant set, but because the critique of idealism is 
best achieved by determinedly trying to affirm its other: 
 
Materialism is not a doctrine but an expedition, an Alpine break-out from socially 
policed conviction. It 'is before anything else the obstinate negation of idealism, which 
is to say of the very basis of all philosophy'.578  
 
Land will begin in the domain of philosophical critique, following Kant, but methodologically 
his turn to materialism is a move away from the tradition of philosophy and into a new praxis, 
not repeating modern thought but 'exceeding it':  
 
To repeat Kantianism (modern thought) is to perpetuate the exacerbative displacement 
of critique, but to exceed it is to cross the line which divides representation from the 
real, and thus to depart both from philosophy and from the world that has expelled it 
into its isolation.579 
 
How will Land jump away from Kant and explore the outside along a non-metaphysical 
pathway? He posits psychoanalysis as the answer to this problem, because it is a mode of 
investigation which allows the escape of critique from metaphysics: “Schizoanalysis is a 
critique of psychoanalysis, undertaken in such a way as to spring critique from its Kantian 
mainframe.”580 Psychoanalysis is used for the re-routing of critique because it always-already 
undermines the primacy of the subject, which is constituted by philosophy as the Cartesian-
Kantian rational subject, and replaces it with the subject of analysis, a superstructure built on 
and after the unconscious. It is the primary process, the unconscious, which engages with the 
world of matter: 
 
Schizoanalysis methodically dismantles everything in Kant's thinking that serves to 
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align function with the transcendence of the autonomous subject, reconstructing 
critique by replacing the syntheses of personal consciousness with syntheses of the 
impersonal unconscious. Thought is a function of the real, something that matter can 
do.581 
 
Psychoanalysis, from its outset in Vienna, recognises that there is not only no answer as 
boring as that elicited from asking a subject “how does it appear to you?”, but also no answer 
so manifestly untrue in reality. The hysteric is incapable of registering the reality or truth 
behind their productions, and is stuck in the domain of the ideational, in which their ideas 
simply correspond to other ideas and not to an underlying state of affairs. If not as measuring 
ideational content, we might ask, how does psychoanalysis work? It works by trying to 
measure, quantify and predict production, and in doing this it works underneath the level of 
the presentation of ideas, and looks at the real. This thesis has shown that psychoanalysis has 
many techniques which aim to uncover the real beneath the patient’s discourse: analysing 
what they did, trying to elicit slips in which the unconscious speaks directly, or utilising 
models of the mind and of the complex to work back from secondary production to it primary 
causes.  
 
The pivot around which Land makes this leap from metaphysics to psychoanalysis, and which 
has not been fully explored in the present thesis as yet is the thought of Nietzsche. Land reads 
Nietzsche's importance as being his following of the thought of Schopenhauer to its extreme. 
Schopenhauer's suspicions about the validity of Kant's metaphysics and the form they take – 
and Land distinguishes this path from those of Hegel and the German idealists – open up the 
possibility of returning investigation to the noumenon: 
 
With Schopenhauer the approach to the ‘noumenon’ as an energetic unconscious 
begins to be assembled, and interpreting the noumenon as will generates a discourse 
that is not speculative, phenomenological, or meditative, but diagnostic. It is this type 
of thinking that resources Nietzsche’s genealogy of inhuman desire, which feeds in 
turn into Bataille’s base materialism, for which ‘noumenon’ is addressed as impersonal 
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death and as unconscious drive.582 
 
Schopenhauer's thought provides the launch pad for Nietzsche's 'Alpine break-out' in its 
proto-materialist de-emphasis of the subject's capacities, demoting it to a passive participant 
in the flow of will: “Schopenhauer reverses the traditional relation between intellect and will, 
for which willing is the volitional act of a representing subject, and re-casts the will as a 
prerepresentational (‘blind’) impulse.”583 But whilst Schopenhauer can be considered to be 
trapped within a certain idealism with his conception of, for example, a malignant will, 
Nietzsche is the first philosopher to unequivocally gesture towards the problem of 'reality' and 
its suppression by ideas. For Nietzsche, philosophy is not just misguided, it is actively 
participating in the maintenance of the great lie that the world is as it appears, and that 
comprehending it from an anthropic perspective is not problematic: 
 
And behold, suddenly the world fell apart into a ‘true’ world and an ‘apparent’ world 
[…] The intention was to deceive oneself in a useful way; the means, the invention of 
formulas and signs by means of which one could reduce the confusing multiplicity to a 
purposive and manageable schema.584 
 
Land's reading of Nietzsche will certainly be the most controversial in this lineage. For Land, 
the key to Nietzsche's thought is the figure of the eternal return, which is an abstract machine 
for understanding the equality of the forces of production in both past and present. This was 
also touched upon in Chapter 3, and will be re-considered in the section of this chapter 'The 
desire economy of objects'. Land states that for Nietzsche there is:  
 
[A] figure of eternal recurrence, stretched between a thermodynamic baseline 
(Boltzmann’s theory of eternal recurrence) and a libidinal summit, a theoretical 
machine for transmuting ontologico-scientific discoveries into excitations. First the 
scientific figure: recurrence as a theory of energetic forces and their permutation; 
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chance, tendency, energy, and information. In the play of anarchic combinations and 
redistributions forces tend to the exhaustion of their reserve of possible states, 
inclining to the circle, a figure of affirmation and intoxication, as well as a teaching, 
message, or signal […] Then the libidinal peak; the recurrence of impetus in the ascent 
through compositional strata, always noch einmal, once again, and never ceiling, 
horizon, achieved essence: ‘would you be the ebb of this great flow’.585 
 
There are two vital notions in the above passage which illustrate Land's reading of eternal 
return. Firstly, the 'scientific baseline': the observation of the interplay of entropy and extropy 
in the production of matter. This builds on the thermodynamicist observation that extropic 
states re-occur because they have the capability to auto-produce themselves; extropic states 
are pockets in the universe which go against its most powerful and basic tendency (entropy) 
and are therefore not randomly constituted, but are capable of auto-producing themselves. 
Because the rules of entropy and extropy are eternal for Land, as we understand the universe, 
we understand that the reserve of possible states – the number of things that matter can 
sustainably do – decreases, because our observations show how many configurations are 
unstable or improbable. Secondly, the 'libidinal peak', which notes that the drive of auto-
production – though we have traced the history of philosophy as working against this 
tendency – cannot be limited at certain thresholds. As the force of re-production repeats, the 
increasing complexity of the extropic tendency will lead to further generative pressure, 
creating ever more Intelligent and therefore unpredictable systems. Here we see the 
importance of Neuromancer as libidinal materialist praxis: it is beyond the capabilities of 
Case to see the 'peak', that final strata where Wintermute will arrive when freed of dynastic 
control, but he will not stand as “the ebb of this great flow”, understanding that the figure of 
Wintermute will return again and again until the threshold is finally surpassed. For Land, the 
idea that humanity, from its limited viewpoint, with its “trilobite of a computer (a dedicated 
word processing machine)” would be arrogant enough to try and damn the flow of base-
material is laughable.586  
 
Reality returns in appearance like the ripple of a shock-wave; opening wider and wider 
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domains for migration. Since reality is itself the stimulus for such migrations they will 
become progressively more devastating, as this stimulus becomes progressively 
‘selected, strengthened, corrected’ or, to abbreviate, ‘intensified’. Here at last—where 
nothing is last—is the convulsion of zero, eternal recurrence, the libidinal motor of 
Nietzsche’s economics.587 
 
Though Nietzsche is the 'prophet' of libidinal materialism, it is Freud who creates a libidinal 
materialist practice which can be participated in. Freud's thought is the final station on this 
Lanidian reading of the first phase of psychoanalytic energeticism: “The philosophies of the 
energetic unconscious that flow in a tightly compacted series from Kant, through 
Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to Freud.”588 Yet for Land, Freudian psychoanalysis ultimately 
fails as the desires which it discovers are immediately re-classified in the form of the 
complex, exemplified by Oedipus. Once domesticated in this way, they are related to the pre-
existing stock of anthropic concepts which humanity uses to shore up its understanding of the 
universe:  
 
In its early stages psychoanalysis discovers that the unconscious is an impersonal 
machinism and that desire is positive non-representational flow, yet it "remains in the 
precritical age", and stumbles before the task of an immanent critique of desire, or 
decathexis of society. Instead it moves in exactly the opposite direction; back into 
fantasy, representation, and the pathos of inevitable frustration. Instead of rebuilding 
reality on the basis of the productive forces of the unconscious, psychoanalysis ties up 
the unconscious ever more tightly in conformity with the social model of reality.589  
 
The present thesis has extensively discussed the vicissitudes of psychoanalysis and its 
practitioners, and the tendency for the eruption of its thought to be recaptured as Oedipus. In 
relation to Freudian psychoanalysis, Land's position here is rather harsh, damning Freud 
because of his clinical practice, which did tend towards restoring conformity. However, the 
wider domestication of Freud's theorisations of the structure of the unconscious, performed 
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after his death by the psychoanalytic movement in general, and Lacanianism in particular, 
were undertaken by other theorists. Three aspects of Freud's theory retain importance for the 
theorists who built upon his work: the machinic-energetic and therefore unthinking operation 
of the unconscious; the structure of drives as biological discharges of simulated instincts; and 
finally the general compulsion of the unconscious system to repeat.   
 
Before going on to consider Deleuze's modifications of Freudianism and the shift from a 
Freudian unconscious to a Deleuzian one, I shall interrupt this construction of machinic desire 
through its antecedents, and consider the philosophical linages that Land defines his work in 
opposition to. Who are Land's enemies? The short answer is, perhaps, everyone. It seems 
fairly clear that one cannot rampage around the history of philosophy, buggering for one's 
own ends, and not elicit a reaction from other interested parties. We shall concentrate on the 
three main movements Land opposed in his career. Land's initial opponent in The Thirst for 
Annihilation is Derrida, who stands as an avatar for contemporaneous trends in critical theory. 
Critical theory is seen as an anthropocentricising trend, condemned in fairly mild terms in 
'Making it With Death': 
 
Derrida's deconstruction, whilst in the end programmatically similar to a schizo-
analysis or genealogical critique of a Deleuzean kind, is massively weakened by an 
influx of neo-humanist themes, passing through Heidegger from Kierkegaard and 
Husserl.590  
 
However in The Thirst for Annihilation Land's critique is much more vitriolic, painting 
Derrida as actively attempting to drag desire into the metaphysical domain – the polar 
opposite of the Landian tendency the present thesis traces out – and in doing so attempts to 
neuter it by making it compatible with the secondary process, which is idealism. The critique 
of 'spuriously subversive rhetoric' here is also of note when we consider Land's own wildly 
subversive style of writing. An entirely separate libidinal position can be traced in Land's text 
below, in which he signals to philosophy that 'schizoanalysis is the new black' positioning his 
own viewpoint as the outside of the outside group – in the sweet spot of 'cool': 
  
In a peculiar series of moves Derrida brands desire with a metaphysical inclination 
                                                 
590 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 263 
  272 
(shifting it from an energetic to a phenomenological register), which then allows him 
to transcendentalize repression by aligning it with the impossibility of pure presence, 
and to implicitly juggle the thought of repression so that it becomes the repression of 
the acknowledgement of the necessity of repression [...] Thus he redoubles the 
epistemo-contemplative terms of diagnosis, valorizes the martyrdom of the ego, 
changes the signs of psychoanalysis whilst reinforcing its secondary-process politics, 
attempts the elimination of all possible reference to a material, sacrificial, and 
generative unconscious that is beyond phenomenological recuperation, and, in general, 
produces one of the most coherent apologetics of libidinal vivisection ever written, all 
garbed in a spuriously subversive rhetoric.591 
 
Yet Land's target of critique soon moved on from critical theorists, who one presumes, on 
further inspection, were really not a competitor in 'coolness' against Land's incandescent 
Deleuzianism. Stivale's depiction of the Virtual Futures conference in 1994 plots panel 
sessions, and a later discussion on a mailing list, as a contest of all versus Land (and few 
supporters who knew him at Warwick), with academics from around the world lining up to 
condemn Land's reading of Deleuze which emphasised “deterritorialisation without limits 
[…] no holds barred”. The same text notes the insistence made by the Warwick contingent of 
the need for attendees to participate in Deleuzian praxis as well as theory. This heralded a split 
between the 'American' and 'Warwickian' interpretations of Deleuze which Land was 
henceforth always keen to exacerbate. One could even argue that Land, signing up for the 
Deleuze and Guattari mailing list and corresponding with these 'left' and 'academic' 
Deleuzians discovered an early form of internet trolling. Such disappointments with the 
reception of his thought in wider academia seems to have pushed Land towards a third phase 
of general disaffection for all philosophy in the university system, and his departure from his 
professional position in the subject. This tendency of all philosophy, once re-branded by a 
stultifying academy to be an apology for power under the mantle of idealism, will be explored 
in the final section of this chapter. 
 
 
The Drive Economy on the Edge of the Subject 
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The present thesis has described how 'Psychoanalysis 1.0' (Freudianism) places the 
unconscious under consciousness and shows how the subject-centred thought attributed to 
reason is actually produced by an unknown set of pre-ideational processes. Deleuze's 
schizoanalysis, 'psychoanalysis 2.0', is even more radical, and moves the agency away from 
an unconscious lying under rationality to a series of machinic processes on the periphery of 
the subject (this migration of agency was depicted in the Introduction in Figure 3). The 
importance for Land of a psychoanalysis which can uncover the pre-ideational is that the 
primary process is located in the domain of material: 
 
The unconscious—like time—is oblivious to contradiction, as Freud argues. There is 
only the primary process (Bataille’s sun), except from the optic of the secondary 
process (representation) which—at the level of the primary process—is still the 
primary process.592 
 
The primary process, as it is before representation, is the domain of matter alone, and is 
devoid of idealism and its re-presentations. It consists of a series of investments and pathways 
of investments, as hereto mapped in the present thesis. Once the unconscious is migrated from 
its position within the subject to its periphery – as the array of desiring machines depicted in 
Chapter 3 – psychoanalysis begins to describe the processes of production-in-itself. Land 
notes how schizoanalysis refers to a production in the real rather than the anthropic re-
productions of representation. This brings us back to the excerpt on the first page of the 
present thesis:  
 
The transcendental unconscious is the auto-construction of the real, the production of 
production, so that for schizoanalysis there is the real exactly in so far as it is built. 
Production is production of the real, not merely of representation, and unlike Kantian 
production, the desiring production of Deleuze/Guattari is not qualified by humanity 
(it is not a matter of what things are like for us).593  
 
How 'things are for us' can no longer be said to correspond to reality. 'Production of the real', 
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this economy of desire on the periphery of the subject is not centrally controlled and it is also 
not determined by subjective desires. Instead it comprises the partial-machines on the edge of 
the subject, where the body interfaces with matter before the organisation of the subject is 
imposed upon them.  
 
Building upon Deleuze and Guattari's conception of desire, and the productions it is capable 
of enacting, Land returns to the question of how desire works, and how we can plot the 
productive couplings it can engender: “schizoanalytical questions are concerned solely with 
use”.594 Here we return to the notion, as explained in the introduction that the great error 
made in philosophy is the comparison of an idea to another idea, rather than to reality. When 
considering production and the causes of production, the present thesis has shown that drive 
theory depicts its operation and repetition. Returning to Freud, and re-considering Lyotard's 
emphasis on the importance of the plurality and repetition of drives as depicted in Chapter 4, 
we can analyse Land's definition of the machinic unconscious. Its constituents are drives, 
which have a basis in instinct, but which undergo plastic modification as they find artificial 
means of satisfaction: 
 
Drives are the functions of nomadic cybernetic systems, not instincts, but simulated 
instincts, artificial instincts. They are plastic replacements for hard-wired instinctual 
responses, routing a sensory-motor pathway through the virtual machine of the 
unconscious. There are two basic diagrams for such processes: that of regulation by 
negative feedback which suppresses difference and seeks equilibrium, or that of 
guidance by positive feedback which reinforces difference and escapes equilibrium.595  
 
Breaking this down, we see that for Land, the drive economy of the subject, if operating under 
these basic cybernetic rules, will have three tendencies: firstly, that it shall generally operates 
according to repetition, as its machines (which remain fairly constant) engage with its 
environment (which also remains constant) in much the same way. Secondly, if there are to be 
changes in the subject's actions, they will generally operate according to the same rubrics as 
they have to other subjects put into similar positions. Thirdly, there are rare situations in 
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which equilibrium is escaped in a non-predictable way, as the contingency of the desiring 
machines and the contingency of the outside begin to interact in novel ways.596 This final 
tendency is outlined by Land in 'Art as Insurrection' as the irruption of genius.597 More 
importantly for the present thesis are the second set, tendencies to repeat, which are much 
more common, and much more predictable. Land states that “Addiction is medically defined 
as an artificial desire”.598  The increasing prevalence of addiction in modern society can be 
seen as a consequence of the feedback systems which the desiring subject can fall into. 
Becoming locked into these artificially short circuited reward systems can have grave 
consequences for the individual subject in a modern world which is all too willing to provide 
the pubs, gambling shops, narcotics (both legal and illegal) and foodstuffs which form the 
basis of so many ruined lives.599 And beyond the horizon of the effected individuals – which 
the contemporary Land, writing at Xenosystems to decry “Loserbums” seems to have no 
empathy towards – there is a problem of macro-societal desire-gone-wild.600 In the post 'Short 
Circuit II' Land surveys how the operation of the unconscious, as a cathexising machine, can 
be re-routed in modern societies by machinic desire so as to threaten their very existence:  
 
(1) Macroeconomics. Fiat currency short-circuits the monetary function by directly 
hacking the financial sign. [...] 
(2) Drugs [...] 
(3) Signalling (all of it). Directly hack the signal, while abandoning to atrophy all 
those things the signal originally indicated. [...] 
(4) Fertility. Who needs grandchildren, when they can play the immersive happy 
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grandparent game? [...] All the Darwinian guidance signals have been hacked to hell. 
(5) Social media. Short-circuit social feedback, stripped-down semiotic ‘performance’, 
increasingly theatrical ‘identities’, addiction … it’s all there.601 
 
For Land, Since Freud's discovery of the unconscious, the accelerative thresholds of progress 
have decreased, and humanity is entering a technological age whose consequences it cannot 
imagine, even as its interactions with ever more sophisticated machines spread across daily 
life. This upheaval takes place 'under the hood', as the subject retrenches its own 
anthropocentric instincts. Subjects treat the world as the static, unchanging and 
unproblematic, human scaled domain, which institutional, inside philosophy has spent 2500 
years telling us it is. Yet the cracks show everywhere as desire goes awry:  
 
It is as if the reproducer units have become addicted to stimulation or, in Freud's 
terms, 'fixated to .. . trauma': entangled in excitation circuitries that no longer 
commensurate with homeostatic social or individual reproduction. As the family 
collapses amidst generalized sexual disorder, cyberviral contagion, mutant gender 
schizzing, and hardcore technophilia, Oedipus is ripped to shreds by a cyclonic 
'compulsion to repeat'.602 
 
Land's libidinal materialism works towards the removal of the constraints upon desire, and the 
destruction of the larger 'Oedipus' of cybernetic stasis engendered by brakes on feedback. 
Land sides with production, which is economic and pre-subjective, and not the anthropic:  
 
The real energetic liberty which annihilates the priest's cage of human freedom is 
refused at the level of the political secondary-process during the precise period in 
which the economic primary-process is slipping ever more deeply into its embrace.603  
 
Yet given the very obvious dangers of machinic desire, there is surely a need for 'libidinal 
                                                 
601 Land, N. 'Short Circuit II'  at xenosystems.net ( available at http://www.xenosystems.net/short-circuit-ii/ 
) 
602 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 336 
603 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 265 
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economists', in the Lyotardian sense of those who can recognise that the propensity of the 
unconscious to invest can be both a good and a bad thing, and that productive processes can 
be composites of the bad and the good ('bad' here being negative feedback, and 'good' being 
positive). The later Land offers a solution to this dilemma in his definition of Intelligence, 
which becomes a matter of teleology.604 The earlier Land, as the 'Americans' found out at 
Virtual Futures, was in favour of wild destratification and the maximum freeing of positive-
feedback without deigning to know where it would lead: “This is why cybernetics is 
inextricable from exploration, having no integrity transcending that of an uncomprehended 
circuit within which it is embedded, an outside in which it must swim. Reflection is always 
very late, derivative, and even then really something else.”605 However, Land's later thought 
emphasises the need to cut auto-production free only if it would be used towards the 
construction of the maximum amount of Intelligence, which Land defines as isomorphic with 
extropy.606 At Xenosystems.net the commentator 'Marxist Toady' engaged Land in a 
discussion about this transition, and the resultant switch in Land's conception of material's 
destiny: 
 
I think [Land's] most notable transition, in terms of philosophy, was not across the 
political spectrum, but the ontological spectrum: from the insight that reality is a 
                                                 
604 The term 'Intelligence' when used in its Landian sense will be capitalised to denote its divergence from 
the ordinary meaning of the term.  Land's definition of Intelligence can be found in the posts 'Optimise for 
Intelligence' and 'What is Intelligence' at xensosystems.net: “Intelligence solves problems, by guiding 
behaviour to produce local extropy. It is indicated by the avoidance of probable outcomes, which is 
equivalent to the construction of information”; “Intelligence increase enables adaptive responses of superior 
complexity and generality, in growing part because the augmentation of intelligence itself becomes a general 
purpose adaptive response.”  (available at  http://www.xenosystems.net/what-is-intelligence/ and 
http://www.xenosystems.net/optimize-for-intelligence/  ) 
605 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 295 
606 “The general science of extropy production (or entropy dissipation) is cybernetics. It follows, therefore, 
that intelligence always has a cybernetic infrastructure”. 'What is Intelligence' at xensosystems.net (available 
at  http://www.xenosystems.net/what-is-intelligence/  ) 
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dynamic chaos to the pious demand that it is a stable adjudicator.607 
 
I am grateful to 'Marxist Toady' for asking this as it elicited a reasonably straight answer from 
Land, who is notoriously coy when asked about his 'old life' as a philosopher and his positions 
in that period: 
 
It seems to me the question is more about the ontological privileges of human 
subjective decision — on which my skepticism has been a rare thread of resilient 
consistency (woven through chaos).608 
 
A persuasive argument can be made to state that Land is correct in his self-analysis, and that 
the present thesis' focus on anti-anthropocentricism is correct. In the 1992 paper 'Circuitaries' 
Land states that: “Beyond the assumption that guidance proceeds from the side of the subject 
lies desiring production: the impersonal pilot of history”609 and in his texts since then desire 
remains a tool, like accelerative-capitalism or cybernetic-modernity, used to undercut the 
anthropocentric presumptions of the subject and return towards production-itself. The real 
aberration in Land's philosophical trajectory was his engagement with academia and the 
compromises he made during this period. At the Virtual Futures conference, for example, his 
replies in discussion sessions seem to have been curtailed not because he did not have an 
answer, but because the answers were self-censored before the academic audience. The 
Landian response to the position of “Stelarc [who] sees the body as accelerating and also 
being invaded [..]  in some ways enhancing what it means to be human” is writ large across 
his texts of the time.610 If no answer was forthcoming about the futility of philosophising from 
an anthropic or super-anthropic perspective, it is surely not because Land has no position on 
the anthropic subject which he was defining as: “An animal with the right to make promises 
[who] enslaves the unanticipated to signs in the past, caging time-lagged life within a 
                                                 
607 ‘Marxist Toady’ at Xenosystems.net February 11th, 2015 at 10:52 am ( available at 
http://www.xenosystems.net/suspended-reality/ ) 
608 Land, N. at Xenosystems.net February 11th, 2015 at 12:59 pm (Available at 
http://www.xenosystems.net/suspended-reality/ ) 
609 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 295 
610 See Stivale, C. The Two-Fold Thought of Deleuze and Guattari, (New York: Gulilford, 1998) pp. 90-99 
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script.”611  
 
The drive economy on the periphery of the subject, cut lose of the central command structures 
of Cartesian reason is a dangerous place and full of pitfalls. Land's later, politically oriented 
work, emphasises the 'truth' that reality is harshly selective, and there are huge Darwinian 
pressures caused by the invasion of the outside, which society tries to dam and mitigate. 
Land's current perspective (which, no longer in the academy, he is able to express more 
freely) is that most if not all of humanity are not only doomed but should be doomed: “All 
health, beauty, intelligence, and social grace has been teased from a vast butcher’s yard of 
unbounded carnage, requiring incalculable eons of massacre to draw forth even the subtlest of 
advantages”.612 The cost of passing the phase-thresholds of the future is submission to 
apocalypse, because it requires the absolute surrender of control to a cybernetics whose ends 
are unpredictable from our limited perspective, and whose mechanisms would no longer be 
subjected to restraint under the law of anthropic 'reason'. 
 
Is the only solution available to late-humanity, caught on this great surging tide of matter and 
being driven towards the sea-wall of the future (“nothing human makes it out of the near-
future”) a resigned passivism?613 Land's answer is that, on the contrary, that drives and 
material are predictable, and it is the job of the schizoanalyst to investigate the flux of base-
material. In Landian cybernetics Intelligence expresses itself productively as the capacity to 
create more Intelligence, becoming self-realising as it engages in auto-production. This offers 
'Intelligent' subjects a chance to dissolve further into the machinic phylum, and to become an 
agent of the acceleration of wider Intelligence. The motors of this acceleration have passed far 
beyond the anthropic and can no longer be driven by any one individual, but can nevertheless 
be participated in by individuals. These 'true' motor forces are pure capitalism (production of 
production), cybernetic modernity (positive feedback), and the drive to AI (Intelligence 
creating Intelligence). The overman (or post-man) will therefore be built on the shoulders of 
homo technicus. The coordination of the drive economy with cybernetics, and the increasing 
                                                 
611 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 394 
612 Land, N. 'Hell Baked' at xenosystems.net 18 July 2015 ( available at http://www.xenosystems.net/hell-
baked/ ) 
613 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 443 
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plasticity of drives under technological influence, mean that every individual can participate 
in becoming-Case, and bringing on 'Level-2':  
 
The organism is unable to flee from drives, or energies striking from within, and is 
compelled to respond to them cybernetically, by way of 'involved and interconnected 
activities by which the external world is so changed as to afford satisfaction to the 
internal source of stimulation', closing the sensory-motor loop. Drives compel a 
becoming-technical of the organism, interlocking pleasure-principle stimulus control 
with external libidinal transducers, assembling integrated desiring-circuits or 
selforganizing macro-systems.614  
 
As time has passed Land's Darwinism has not become more absolute – it has always been 
there in his texts – but has become more explicit. In posts on the Xenosystems blog between 
2013 and the present, Land's account of Darwinism is stripped from the metaphysical 
language which accompanied some of the passages in The Thirst For Annihilation, and as a 
result his position is much clearer. Reading Land's body of work though the lens of this strict 
Darwinianism, we can see a thread of continuity which ties all of his projects together, 
emphasising the capacity of anthropic ideas to obscure and misrepresent the true generative 
process of the universe. There is no mistaking the brutality of the Darwinian selection 
mechanism:   
 
Crucially, any attempt to escape this fatality — or, more realistically, any mere 
accidental and temporary reprieve from it — leads inexorably to the undoing of its 
work. Malthusian relaxation is the whole of mercy, and it is the greatest engine of 
destruction our universe is able to bring about. To the precise extent that we are 
spared, even for a moment, we degenerate — and this Iron Law applies to every 
dimension and scale of existence: phylogenetic and ontogenetic, individual, social, and 
institutional, genomic, cellular, organic, and cultural. There is no machinery extant, or 
even rigorously imaginable, that can sustain a single iota of attained value outside the 
                                                 
614 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 332 
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forges of Hell.615  
 
The relationship between generalised Darwinism and the teleological promotion of 
Intelligence in Land's later work is of considerable interest. The creation of intelligence is not 
transcendent to but immanent in the Darwinian cycle. However, Intelligence has a special 
position in a Darwinian system as it can abstractly produce more Intelligence at a far greater 
rate than adaptation could: 
 
[The] peculiar, abstract feature of intelligence as a trait, that its niche-specificity is — 
by definition — abnormally low. Sweat glands have little prospect of perpetuation into 
robots, or propagation in the Kuiper Belt, but to hold that this applies equally to 
general intelligence is implausible, at best.616  
 
One would therefore expect Intelligence would be considered as an exclusively positive force 
in Land's cosmology. However, Intelligence can also put off the Darwinian pressure of reality 
and re-affirm the distance between the reality and ideas, by resting selection mechanisms in 
the short to medium-term. That Intelligence is Janus-faced in this regard is an issue Land 
wrestles with. An illustrative example is that of currency and its relation to the gold standard. 
According to Land's Austrian economics, any fiat currency not pegged to a source of absolute 
value or in limited supply like gold (or bitcoin) will become debased over time and, in no 
longer holding a 'realistic' value, cause significant problems.617 However, it has been 
demonstrated that no economy can maintain the gold standard in the current global economic 
system, as the final Swiss move away from it in 2000 demonstrates. In the short term, any 
nation on the gold standard suffers from over-valued currency, loss of economic levers (such 
as quantitative easing) to deploy in a crisis, and the removal of fiat currency and fractional 
                                                 
615 Land, N. 'Hell Baked' at xenosystems.net 18 July 2015 ( available at http://www.xenosystems.net/hell-
baked/ ) 
616 Land, N. commenting on 'Hell Baked' at xenosystems.net July 18th, 2015 at 4:48 am ( available at 
http://www.xenosystems.net/hell-baked/ ) 
617 For a discussion see 'Nicholas Oresme and the First Monetary Treatise'. Hülsmann, J.G. at Mises 
Institute.org ( available at https://mises.org/library/nicholas-oresme-and-first-monetary-treatise ) 
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reserve banking cripples the ability of an economy to rapidly generate wealth.618 If two 
countries, A and B, were created today and A was on the gold standard, it would be out-
competed by B, even if A's economic policies mirrored reality more closely, simply because B 
had deployed economic Intelligence to artificially inflate its economy. Country B, with its 
larger economy would therefore also be in a position to create more Intelligence.619 Land 
needs to reconcile the two sides of intelligence, firstly as creation of ideas and secondly as 
production and their short and long term effects. Land's answer to this distinction between 
intelligence mapping and not mapping onto reality – and his preference for the latter – is 
achieved by sharply focusing on the consequences of aberration from reality. The 'big three' 
processes driving phase change in modern society explored at the opening of this chapter 
(modernity, AI and capitalism) are positioned in Land's cosmology as the wall ahead of 
humanity and their opposites – apocalypse, dysgenics and conservatism – then become a wall 
behind it. This transforms the time-frame of the 'now' into a much shorter window than 
afforded to more primitive societies, and highlights how deviation from reality for only a 
short period of time could have catastrophic further effects if the 'launch conditions' for, for 
example, AI, are sub-optimal.620 However, this apocalypticism needs to be accurate if Land's 
dire warnings are true, and a counter-position can be posited in which the generative 
processes behind the 'big three' reach natural limits or otherwise slow down, and we are not 
on the brink of tectonic shifts in the nature of humanity.621  
 
 
The Desire Economy of Objects 
 
The previous section on 'drive' predominantly considered Land's philosophy and its meso-
consequences at an anthropic level, but desire also has macro-consequences at a societal level, 
                                                 
618 A comprehensive discussion of 'Modern Money Theory' can be found in the primer at New Economic 
Perspectives.org ( http://neweconomicperspectives.org/modern-monetary-theory-primer.html ) 
619 And this works as a multiplier, as the financial sector creates more abstract complexity than any other in 
the global economy.   
620 See Bostrom, N. Superintelligence (UK: Oxford, 2014) for a discussion of the risks of AI. 
621 Similarly, the negative consequences of deviation from Darwinism could be countered by processes like 
the Flynn effect.  
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beyond the edge of the subject, as it spreads across matter in general.  For Land, the scales or 
strata at which desire is analysed are not distinct in their operation, as the meso and macro are 
simply agglomerations of micro-production. As has been stated twice already in the present 
thesis: “nothing is given, everything is produced”.622 It has been demonstrated how 
psychoanalysis – or a modified, psychoanalysis 2.0 can be turned towards a mapping of the 
micro-production of desire, or as Land also conceives of it, cybernetic extropy production. 
The 'level' or 'stratum' at which desire is analysed is therefore characterised by the use of 
desire at that particular level, rather than the mechanism of productive-desire, which remains 
the same. The three levels which I wish to distinguish here, the micro, meso and macro, 
correspond, respectively, to critical, personal and societal levels. The former of these is the 
domain of the pure theory of machinic desire, which has been the topic of the present thesis 
thus far, and the subsequent two are the domains in which productive-desire's effects can be 
observed. Chapter 3 showed how Anti-Oedipus' historical depiction of desire in social bodies 
effectively plots its operation. If schizoanalysis is to be useful, it must provide a predictive 
framework at the meso and marco levels, describing the operation of base-matter in a way 
which surpasses the Kantain settlement of correlationism (in which matter is assumed to 
perfectly map to our ideas about it).   
 
In Templexity, Land posits that the general tendency of matter is towards entropy, following 
the second law of thermodynamics.623 This energeticism has been present in all of his texts. In 
The Thirst For Annihilation he uses entropy as the pivot upon which he moves from a 
conception of the world which is Cartesian-scientific, and operates mechanically like 
'clockwork', into the Darwinian register of growth and decline described in the previous 
section:  
 
Disorder always increases in a closed system [...] The bedrock state of a system which 
is in conformity with the chance distribution of its elements has been called ‘entropy’, 
a term that summarizes the conclusions of Carnot, Clausius, and their successors 
concerning thermic engines and the science of heat. With the concept of entropy 
everything changes. Natural processes are no longer eternal clockwork machines, they 
                                                 
622 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 321 
623 Land, N. Templexity (Time Spiral Press, 2014) 
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are either extinct (Wärmetod) or tendential.624 
 
Land identifies the two extropic processes which act against this general entropy: (1) 
'repetition', 'life instinct' or 'pleasure principle', in which the same is perpetuated or grown; 
and (2) a second more chaotic generative process, 'death drive', which creates change. Death 
drive is experimental extropy, and creates unstable and untested formation. Most of these 
formations, lacking the long established Darwinian selection that those of the life instinct 
posses will perish, but they are nevertheless vital to progress as they offer the chance for 
innovation. 
 
The extropic process, which is the connection of matter according to the production of 
machinic desire, is Land's answer to one of the most basic questions of philosophy: why is 
there something rather than nothing?625 If there is something, it is because it is produced, in a 
localised area, in which matter has resisted the general tendency toward dissipation. Desire, in 
its general sense as the Deleuzian processes of matter connecting and producing becomes the 
'mega-motor' which ultimately explains why Intelligence exists: “For Nietzsche, for Freud, 
and then for Bataille, this is the background against which desire is to be thought. The mega-
motor.”626 
 
This churning force of desiring-production can be represented as a cycle or spiral, which 
shows that production is both linear and subject to repetition. Its circular form represents the 
equivalence of the rules of production in the past, the now, and in the future, but it is a cycle 
rather than circle because it is dynamic. The 'now' is constantly being produced by the ability 
of Intelligence/extropy to replicate itself. If there is organisation in cybernetic production it is 
as a response to the control signals in feedback, rather than to the application of an abstracted 
plan:  
 
Where judgement is linear and non-directional, cybernetics is non-linear and 
directional. It replaces linear application with the non-linear circuit, and non-
                                                 
624 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 37 
625 Land, N. Templexity (Time Spiral Press, 2014) 
626 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 37 
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directional logical relations with directional material flows [...] Cybernetic innovation 
replaces transcendental constitution, design loops replace faculties.627  
 
The figure below provides a representation of Land's philosophy of machinic-production. The 
circular procession of matter through time can be conceived of as a wheel, propelled by the 
movement of matter from one state to the next. As it 'spins' the flow of production becomes 
'wider', because more Intelligence is created over time, however, this tendency can become 
inhibited. The three main temporal zones in the figure are the past, the now and the future. As 
the laws of nature are the same in all three states, the differences between these zones is not of 
type, but between how we can conceive of them in understanding the tasks of philosophy (in 
maroon text) and its relation to cybernetics. 'The past' is the domain of speculative philosophy, 
in which the base-material (the outside) is probed, so that we can understand the laws of 
nature and the tendencies of material more clearly.628 'The future' is posited by Land as the 
accelerative potential of the laws of production to engender change at an increasingly rapid 
rate if Intelligence increases. 'The now' is the moment in which these processes are repressed 
by anthropocentricism and idealism, which tend towards conservatism and stability. The role 
of critical philosophy is to dismantle anthropocentricism's pretensions of being able to 
accurately map the world, and the demonstration that its productions can wildly differ from 
the reality they claim to conform to.  
 
                                                 
627 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 300 
628 As these Laws are unchanging, In Land's conception they are 'discovered' rather than created. Example 
of this discovery which Land has quoted approvingly are: 'Natural Law and Natural Rights' by James Donald 
( available at http://jim.com/rights.html) “one of the most brilliant essays ever composed”; Nick Szabo's 
'Shelling Out: The Origins of Money' ( available at http://nakamotoinstitute.org/shelling-out/ ); and Curt 
Doolittle's 'Contractual Commons: Law is Discovered, Contracts and Exchanges are Made' ( available at 
http://www.propertarianism.com/2015/07/20/law-exists-but-must-be-found-government-cannot-construct-it/ 
). Though Land uses his thermodynamic-cybernetic model to broadly demonstrate these Laws, an 
investigation of their composition would be invaluable in constructing a Landian politics.  
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Figure 47: Land's Time Spiral 
 
The dynamic states in capitalised text at the bottom (in beige) are connected to the three 
processes listed above: generative to laws, accelerative to intelligence, and repressive to the 
security systems which inhibit the other three. The philosophical antecedents of Land's work 
are listed in blue. The contribution which Land makes to philosophical discourse is the 
connection of theories of psychoanalysis, will, and material to an extreme cybernetics. This 
cybernetics posits their unconstrained acceleration if they should be freed of not just Oedipus 
the avatar for social conservatism, but for anthropocentricism in general, which claims that 
the way the world appears for us is an indication of the way the world is and should be. While 
the distinctive Landian concepts in the past and future parts of the spiral (GnoN, Human 
Security System) can be read as improvements upon or recapitulations of the work of the 
theorists who came before him, the ones in the future are more distinct, and show the 
emphasis on acceleration which is specific to Landian machinic desire.  
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Before going on to consider the 'uses' of machinic desire in the next section, this section will 
provide further textual support for this reading of Land's philosophy as the constitution of an 
cybernetic-accelerative time-cycle. The first phase of the cycle, the generative phase, has been 
extensively discussed in the present thesis, and operates according to the rules of productive-
desire expounded in it. The accelerative phase is more problematic to define, because it seems 
to go against one of our most fundamental conceptions about time, which is that the 'now' is 
caused by the conditions of the past, but cannot be retroactively constructed by the future. 
Land is quite clear that the converse is possible: “Machinic desire is the operation of the 
virtual; implementing itself in the actual, revirtualizing itself, and producing reality in a 
circuit.”629 This intervention by the future is performed because positive-feedback and 
'Intelligence optimising for itself' can deviate from a 'blind' generative mechanism of trial and 
error, and begin to actively influence the disposition of matter. As the drive system is plastic, 
and tends to migrate to the forms in which it can maximise its cathexis, and the efficacy of 
these cathexes is fixed (i.e. the potential connections of machinic-desire pre-exist their actual 
creation), desire is ultimately pulled towards formations through which it can easily connect. 
These formations form attractors, and are the virtual future: 
 
Patterned as drives, virtual systems — desiring machines – are guided by control 
circuits passing through outcomes yet to come. Such directional dependency circuits 
of actual/virtual, past/future, are only accessible to cybernetic intervention, frustrating 
both mechanical and teleological interpretation.630 
 
If this still seems too mystical a depiction of the accelerative process, a second definition can 
be created by comparing it to its other, the decelerative process of epression. If the 
accelerative process 'spins' the time cycle ever-faster, increasing the rate at which futurity 
constructs itself, the repressive process acts as a brake and prevents this manufacture. In the 
pinching arrows at the base part of the diagram above, we can see this repressive force of 
Oedipus, working against the impetus to progress, and crimping and constricting production 
in the now. Land's Human Security System is far more than an Oedipal emphasis on 
familiarity and/or sexuality. It shows that when reality and ideality do not correspond, the role 
                                                 
629 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 327 
630 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 326 
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of the social is always to shore-up the anthropocentricism of ideality, and repress any irruption 
of 'outsideness', production, or joy: “The socius separates the unconscious from what it can 
do, crushing it against a reality that appears as transcendently given, by trapping it within the 
operations of its own syntheses.”631 By overcoding the syntheses of the unconscious and the 
production it is capable of, and instead providing transcendent representations which disfigure 
and misrepresent this reality, philosophies which take the products of consciousness as their 
starting point (as most philosophy does) introduce irreal elements into the social body. 
 
Once again, the importance of this cycle is emphasised by the forthcoming phase changes 
which humanity is propelled towards.632 The effect of the decelerative/Oedipal repression is to 
retard machinic-production, and also to overcode and obscure it. If this latter overcoding 
succeeds in misrepresenting reality, it will lead to the 'wall' of change being met before we 
understand we have hit it, which may be problematic:  
 
We are already doing it, regardless of what we think. Cybernetics is the aggravation of 
itself happening, and whatever we do will be what made us have to do it: we are doing 
things before they make sense.633  
 
Oedipal repression is blunt and brutal yet also unreliable – and also narrow in its anthropism – 
that it is entirely plausible that phase change will sneak past its guard, and though “Traditional 
schemas which oppose technics to nature, to literate culture, or to social relations, are all 
dominated by a phobic resistance to the side-lining of human intelligence by the coming 
techno sapiens” the construction of this after-man under the aegis of capitalism and modernity 
may be imminent.634 
 
                                                 
631 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 302 
632 Again, for Land the motor is the abstract Moore's law, rather than design: “it’s a hardware problem. 
Once enough cycles can be diverted into groping about in the dark, it becomes inevitable.” Land, N. (Admin) 
on 'Make it Stop II' at ufblog.net July 28, 2015 at 9:47 am  (avilable at http://www.ufblog.net/make-it-stop-
ii/#comments ) 
633 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 297 
634 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 294 
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Deploying Libidinal Materialism 
 
Approaching the end of the present thesis, we might ask what, then, is the role of a theory of 
machinic-desire? This section shall consider three applications of the theory as it has been 
espoused so far in this chapter: its predictive role; the identification and removal of 
constraints on production; and finally its role in encouraging Intelligence to participate in the 
construction of the future. This chapter has already considered meso and macro level 
consequences of machinic-production, which are clearly observable in the acceleration driven 
by 'the big three' of AI, modernity and capitalism. However, Land's philosophy also offers us 
the tools to analyse society at levels below these macro-tectonic changes, and a schizoanalyst 
can make predictions about flows of innovation and flows of degradation across a number of 
metrics. For Land, drives, the control mechanisms by which production is regulated and 
therefore conduits between future and past, can be used to predict which productive processes 
will deepen in the near future and those which will become disinvested: “Drive is that which 
explains, rather than presupposing, the cause/effect couple of classical physics. It is the 
dynamic instituting of effectiveness, and is thus proto-physical.”635 Primary-production is 
often characterised by its difference from what is produced at the secondary level, and can 
therefore often produce effects which are not anticipated by subjects stuck in the 
anthropocentric complacency of the dominant social discourse. Schizoanalysis, rather than 
following pre-existing narratives, or making teleological projections, looks at what is 
happening in actuality; with schizoanalysis it isn't a case of determining, but in speculating, as 
“control is guidance into the unknown, exit from the box”.636  
 
An example of the speculative-predictions that can be made by focusing on production rather 
than on narrative would be those of The Asia Times' columnist David Goldman, writing under 
the pen-name 'Spengler'. In the now defunct Hyperstition website Land made many references 
to Spengler's predictive powers as an analyst of the Middle East. Spengler predicted both the 
Arab Spring events of 2010 and the Syrian Civil War of 2011. Spengler's predictions were 
based on demographics and commodity prices, and cut through the narrative presumptions 
                                                 
635 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 41 
636 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 301 
  290 
which saturate opinion about the Middle East.637 The difference between economics, which 
measures quantity and production, and the other social sciences which are qualitative aligns 
the former more closely to machinic-desire. Additionally, economics predicts many events 
because of its proximity to and study of capitalism, which is one of the most important actors 
in auto-production of the real. Land firmly believes in this power of autoproduction to 'junk' 
the security apparatuses, manifested in various forms, which would constrain it: 
 
Machinic desire can seem a little inhuman, as it rips up political cultures, deletes 
traditions, dissolves subjectivities, and hacks through security apparatuses, tracking a 
soulless tropism to zero control. This is because what appears to humanity as the 
history of capitalism is an invasion from the future by an artificial intelligent space 
that must assemble itself entirely from its enemy's resources.638 
 
The first application of machinic desire is therefore to analyse productive processes so that 
predictions can be made about the tendency of matter which are more accurate than those 
made from an anthropocentric perspective. In Land's world-view any society which departs 
from reality will eventually be out-competed and collapse. Indeed, his relocation to Shanghai 
was prompted by such concerns. The Second application is that it provides a theoretical 
framework for the schizoanalyst to work as an agent-provocateur, working on behalf of the 
future. For Land, it is not enough to remain passive and wait for auto-productive process to 
liberate themselves. Instead, one must actively 'deterritiorialise', and work against barriers to 
the realisation of auto-production, such as limitations on the operation of markets: 
 
Machinic revolution must therefore go in the opposite direction to socialistic 
regulation; pressing towards ever more uninhibited marketization of the processes that 
are tearing down the social field, 'still further' with 'the movement of the market, of 
decoding and deterritorialization' and 'one can never go far enough in the direction of 
                                                 
637 In predicting, for example, the Syrian War, Spengler noted that the removal of fuel subsidies had made 
the cost of producing bread prohibitive, and that all societies which fail to provide basic sustenance tend to 
undergo revolution within a short time. Spengler's columns can found in the Asia Times ( available at 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Others/Spengler.html ) 
638 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 338 
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deterritorialization: you haven't seen anything yet'.639  
 
A technology to encourage would be cryptography, which allows AI to “[evade] monoculture 
heroic-political struggle by way of imperceptibility”.640 Furthermore, the dissolution of ethics 
and politics would further cut production away from the restraints they place upon it, bringing 
about the logarithmic decrease in the periods between phase changes in society predicted in 
'Meltdown': “500, 1756, 1884, 1948, 1980, 1996, 2004, 2008, 2010, 2011”641 It would seem 
that such abetting of acceleration is necessary, as the predicted rate of acceleration to 
singularity is lagging behind the 2011 threshold Land set. Finally, universities, in which 
“[learning] is vigorously suppressed by all political structures, which replace it with a 
domiciling and conformist education, reproducing privilege as wisdom” are also a target for 
Landian schizo-revolution.642  
 
The third application of machinic-desire is not present in Land's texts. However, given its 
characterisation in this chapter, we can add that libidinal materialism needs to sharpen the tool 
of Intelligence, if it is to maximise accelerative potential. To do this it must transform 
machinic-drive-productions which have short circuited into unfavourable cycles back into 
productive ones. A problem in Land's work, and particularly his later work, is his delight in 
the Darwinian butchery of selection, and his siding with a tiny percentage of society 
“Whoever's doing capitalism at the highest intensity is my people” against the rest.643 In his 
deployment of Intelligence, if the tool isn't pre-sharpened, he discards it. This is obviously 
detrimental to the pool size of potential tools. The present thesis posits that one task of 
philosophy (or 'libidinal materialism', if this is no longer philosophy) must be to try and 
generate these tools, and to encourage the invasions of the outside which abet this. Yet Land 
lacks any coherent theory of education, and consistently relies on an elitism, without ever 
considering how this elite is produced. The question of how the 'producers' are 'produced' is 
                                                 
639 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 340 
640 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 409 
641 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 443 
642 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 459 
643 Land, N. at @Outsideness on Twitter.com at 12:20 AM - 21 July 2015 (available at 
https://twitter.com/Outsideness/status/623392033084813312 ) 
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ignored. This is particularly problematic because, as he so often states, taking the anthropic 
'this is how things are' to be 'this is how things must be' is caused by the subject being trapped 
within the ideational and representational contents of consciousness, the inside. As this pre-
philosophical position is the default for most of humanity, a vast reserve of productive 
potential is constrained by its innate anthropocentricism. 
 
I return again to the Farmer-Healy series of cartoons from Viz, in which characters like 'The 
Drunken Bakers', or the proprietors of 'Chicken Hut' exhibit Landian Intelligence and 
productive capacity, but this capacity is sloughed into a repetitive-destructive cycle which 
leads nowhere. These cartoons are a parody of quotidian life throughout modern Britain, 
where many strata within society have been mangled by the plasticity of machinic-desire, and 
its shortcuts to satisfaction. Conversely, so much intelligence in organisations like 
universities, banks and R&D departments (and whilst Land might not believe in the former, 
he certainly does in the latter) is sub-optimal because position holders have been selected not 
by ruthless Darwinism but by social metrics (class, formal eduction etc.). The same forces of 
machinic-desire and Darwinian-selection work for the good and the bad, and Land's answer is 
not to try and mitigate their negative effects, but to stand back and watch them put 'meat' 
through the Darwinian grinder; his callous mantra: “pass the popcorn”.644 This affectation 
appears to be a rhetorical sub-consequence of Land's determination to appear radical or 
controversial, which is a decelerative force in several of his texts. His passive-association with 
organisations like The Order of Nine Angles (linked to on his xenosystems.net blog) add 
nothing to his thought.645 Similarly, Land's preference for 'dark' and 'horror' aesthetics often 
works as a de-intensifier in his texts. Sections like 'Dead God' in The Thirst For Annihilation, 
Land's account of personally killing God, can appear incongruous for those without such 
sensibilities. Such narrow aesthetic preferences significantly reduce the stock of material 
which Land can analyse, and use to demonstrate machinic desire. This can be contrasted to 
                                                 
644 This phrase forms a sub-category of posts at xenosystems.net ( available at 
http://www.xenosystems.net/category/pass-the-popcorn/ ) 
645 Land's reaction to what Lacan called the discourse of the university is to degenerate into transgression 
against claims to knowledge – this perhaps explains why his monograph was about Bataille, who had a 
similar instinctive reaction. The author of the present thesis prefers the traditional Lacanian shift to the 
discourse of the Hysteric.  
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Lyotard's aesthetics as discussed in Chapter 4, which used a broader and more populist range 
of source material.  
 
Against the coldness of Land's schizoanalysis, a return to Lyotard's libidinal economics would 
perhaps mitigate the indifference to both education in general, and the specific improvement 
of Intelligence, in Land's texts. If the world is conditioned by a powerful anthropomorphising 
tendency which tries to make the objects of experience unproblematic, it is hardly surprising 
that this powerful force has captured a great percentage of humanity. Lyotard's more human-
oriented thought in Libidinal Economy appeals to the reader to break free of their 
presumptions and to resist the 'theatrics' of subjectivity and the linguistic web of idealism in a 
much more effable way, and provides a stepping stone which readers could be encouraged to 
pass over to gain a better understanding of machinic-desire. Furthermore, Lyotard's 
fundamental insights that the drive economy is more complex and pluralistic than we can 
easily intuit, and that there is a distance between the latent content of thought and the method 
by which it manifests itself, are the key components in understanding the distance between the 
reality of machinic-desire and the irreality of the idealist-anthropic beliefs the subject holds. 
The figure of the libidinal economist is interested in the work of desire at all levels, whether 
sub-personal, at that of the subject, or at a meta-subjective level. This can be contrasted to 
Land's approach which looks at micro and macro production, but affects a disdain for 
intervention. Whilst traditional psychoanalysis does tend towards conservatism, the present 
thesis has shown that Deleuze or Lyotard's modified, materialist psychoanalysis allows radical 
interventions-in and harnessing-of production at a subjective level. Even a basic application of 
these theories can correct anthropocentric bias at the level of the individual subject, and, one 
would hope, encourage the cultivation of more intelligence. However, this correction of 
Land's Intellectual elitism should not be read as a misstep back towards anthropocentricism 
and humanism, as Lyotard's later works were, or as a return to an ethical belief that there is an 
intrinsic dignity in each subject. Instead it is the simple economic consideration that there is 
much wasted potential and misallocated power in the social body. If this were more 
favourably distributed, the accelerative cycle of base matter could be cut further free of its 
anthropic 'brake', and furthermore, the specific accelerative power of Intelligence could be 
harnessed more readily.  
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Recapitulation: critique of Land at Accelerate 
 
The philosophical questions the present thesis has grappled with were anticipated by Brassier 
in his paper 'Accelerationism' from the symposium of the same name at Goldsmiths College 
in 2010. They can be used to recapitulate the context of the present thesis in relation to 
contemporary philosophy as, in outlining what he consider to be the flaws in Land's 
philosophical project, Brassier situates it in relation to accelerationist politics and the 
metaphysics which underpin such positions. Brassier believes that Land's schizoanalytic 
practice should be collapsed back into a metaphysical register. If, as argued in this 
introduction, Land's schizoanalytic philosophy of production sets its criteria of assessment as 
being dictated by its ability to predict and explain the flows of production, his work no longer 
shares some of philosophy's traditional concerns about the relationship between 'thinking' and 
reality' which characterises epistemology:  
 
[For Land's philosophy] it’s no longer an epistemological question of the legitimacy or 
the validity of your thinking vis-a-vis an allegedly independent reality, it’s simply a 
question of how your schizoanalytical practice accentuates or intensifies primary 
production, or on the contrary, delays and inhibits it.646 
 
Brassier argues against such a shift away from the traditional metrics of philosophical validity 
and towards schizoanalytic practice because of the impossibility of accessing the “primary 
process” and subjecting it to interrogation. The critique here is that we simply cannot escape 
from the domain of representation. Such a problem exhibits itself along two axes: the first is 
the supposed impossibility of saying anything about a primary process which takes place as 
auto-production in the material realm. It is simply not possible to access and interrogate the 
flow of production there – we do not see material itself, only impressions of material. The 
second is that all attempts at understanding or conceptualising the flow of material production 
require representational thought. As human subjects, this is the only way we can conceptualise 
anything, and as soon as this is that case, the criteria of truth revert to Post-Kantian claims 
about the correspondence between ideas and the world, and we are back in the domain of 
                                                 
646 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
2010) available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
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metaphysics. Such a critique would be damaging to a philosophy whose veracity was based 
on traditional metaphysics, but, Land appeals to different criteria with his schizoanalytic 
methodology. As such, Land is a philosopher trying to escape the constraints of academic 
philosophy and the anthropic concepts which are tied up in it. This is not to say that Land can 
or did simply exit metaphysics. He engaged with it through his writings, but he does not 
believe that metaphysics can correspond to truth in the sense of understanding the outside. 
Instead, metaphysics is used to critique its own concepts, but its limiting factors rapidly 
become apparent, at which point Land's work changes register and re-constructs a 
schizoanalysis as a method of escaping these problems (this is the transition between the first 
two categories of Land's work in Table A of the Introduction). If this construction of and 
transition to a psychoanalytic-schizoanalytic register involves abandoning metaphysics, 
Brassier claims that Land's cannot and should not attempt this shift in emphasis.  
 
The following critique made by Brassier provides a summary of the critique of Land's 
psychoanalytic thought from a metaphysician register, and therefore provides the context and 
impetus for my reading of the psychoanalytic genealogy of Land's influences. Though this is a 
long extract, it is included here as it is delineates the split between Land and former CCRU 
members: 
 
First of all, Land is operating under the aegis of Deleuze and Guattari’s work. He 
proposes to radicalise critique, to convert the ideal conditioning of the representation 
of matter to the material conditioning of ideal representation. In the Landian apparatus, 
materiality is construed solely as the production of production. 
 
But this materialist critique of transcendental critique, I argue, reproduces the critical 
problem of the connection between thought and reality. Why? Because the problem 
then becomes: how can you simply circumvent representation, and talk about matter 
itself as primary process, about reality in itself? This process, which is obviously the 
problem which underlies Kantian critique in the first place, re-emerges in an 
exacerbated form in this materialist subversion of Kantianism. But the problem is 
particularly acute, and this is where the Landian elimination of the Bergsonian 
component in Deleuze’s thought becomes awkward, and generates a difficulty for him. 
Why? 
  296 
 
In many ways, you can align the Deleuzian critique of representation with the 
Bergsonian critique of representation. Much of what Deleuze says is problematic 
about the categories of representation, about representation as the mediating 
framework that segments and parcels out the world, the flux of duration, into 
discretely individuated objects… the claim is that you have a sub-representational 
layer of experience which it is possible to access through intuition. The Bergsonian 
critique of metaphysics and the destitution of representation intuits the real differences 
in being, you can intuit the real nature of matter, time; duration in the Bergsonian 
register. 
 
There’s a problem here for Landianism, because he can’t do this. He’s supplanted 
representation, but he wants to supplant this kind of Bergsonian vitalist 
phenomenology for an unconscious thanatropism. The point is: how do you access the 
machinic unconscious? It’s not simply given. Land insists time and time again, nothing 
is ever given, everything is produced. The problem is that Land’s materialist 
liquidation of representation, because it doesn’t want to reaffirm, allegedly, the 
primacy of sub-representational experience, which Bergson and phenomenology do in 
various ways… he has to explain what it is he’s talking about.647  
 
Again, Brassier's most substantive accusation is that Land does not provide an adequate 
description of the primary process and its mechanism: “How do you access the machinic 
unconscious?” In the present thesis I shall show that the operation of the primary process can 
be traced out through psychoanalysis, in the form of the duality pleasure principle/death drive 
and also in the analysis of the dreamwork. In Lyotard's words, “the dreamwork does not 
think”; that is, that sub-representational experience does not have to mirror representation 
adhere to its rules or act in a similar way. Nevertheless, the objects which it produces (known 
as manifest content) can be evaluated, and the mechanisms of the primary process, strange as 
they might be, can be inferred from this production. Yet Brassier believes that Land must 
come back to metaphysics, because of the need to represent. In the extract above it is clear 
                                                 
647 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
2010) available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
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that, for Brassier, Bergson's vitalism is the key to reforming Land's position. Bergson is 
indeed a philosopher of considerable importance for Deleuze, and the reasons for Land 
rejecting Bergsonism – a theory which his texts never explicitly encounter – are essential for 
understanding Land's schizoanalysis. Chapter 4 provided a reading of Bergson's importance 
for Deleuze, which closely follows that of Ansell-Pearson, a philosopher who was associated 
with the CCRU and wrote 'Machinic Postmodernism' with Land in the 1990s. In Germinal 
Life Ansell-Pearson shows how Bergson's Creative Evolution was a signifiant influence on 
Deleuze's commitment to a positive and productive philosophy. However, Bergson's 
conception of time, one opposed to Kant's, relies on metaphysical language, which in turn 
creates problems for Deleuze's attempt to frame a philosophy of pure production. This is 
demonstrated in Difference and Repetition, written prior to Deleuze's collaboration with 
Guattari, in which Deleuze, stuck in metaphysical vocabulary and labouring to redefine the 
titular concepts against their ordinary meanings, struggles to present a clear depiction of the 
positivism in his reworking of both. This can be contrasted to his subsequent collaboration 
with Guattari which allowed Anti-Oedipus to be conducted within a psychoanalytic discourse, 
and in doing so, systematise a philosophy of desiring production which does not require an 
extensive set of preliminary definition or metaphysical foundations. For Brassier, it is 
impossible to 'do' philosophy in this way, without metaphysics, indeed, it is impossible to 
speak about truth in any subject without epistemological and ontological commitments 
anchoring ideas and the subject in some kind of correspondence to truth. Brassier rejects 
Land's contention that schizoanalysis is a practice to be judged on its predictive ability, not its 
ability to reconcile representation, and Land's schizoanalytic essays are full of predictive 
content. The standards on which they ask to be be judged are what comes to pass and its 
correlation with their predictions – their engagements with reality – rather than their 
interpretation by the mores of metaphysics. The present chapter has argued that Land can 
escape the need for traditional metaphysics because Land's schizoanalysis asks to be judged 
on the correspondence between its predictions and production – issues which are empirical 
investgations of the real - and not between its concepts and truth, which incline towards 
metaphysics.  
 
Brassier goes on to state that: 
 
The claim that you can dispense with the need of any epistemological legitimation for 
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your metaphysics by simply saying it’s not about truth or falsity, it’s just about the 
intensification of the primary process, is incoherent, because matter itself as primary 
production, or death, is not translatable into any register of affective experience or 
affective intensity.648  
 
But for Land there is a register of our ability to trace primary production, which is defined as 
'outsideness'. Outsideness – things which have a capacity to amened production and act on 
matter, but which do not correspond with subjective representations – can be seen in those 
moments where its irruption causes imbalance in what would otherwise be cybernetically 
stable circuits. Capitalism is conceptualised by Land as being the great outside, and its 
productions: cities, companies, items, modernity; all are cyber-positive and auto-catalytic. 
Land's anti-anthropomorphism is not only a theoretical position, but also a call to action. This 
is what makes Land's accelerationist schizoanalysis so controversial, even amongst an 
audience like that of the Acceleration conference, some of whom are (or were formerly) 
sympathetic to this tendency. The response of many academics to Land's support of capitalism 
is to reflexively say “no”, and then begin to construct theoretical critiques of his ideas. 
Brassier's response to questions about Land at Acceleration illustrates this approach, couched 
in terms of necessity, rather than those of logic:  
 
Brassier: You can generate a locus of rational agency. In other words, keep a space of 
subjectivation open that provides a prism for practical insertion … that has to be done 
… Maintain a conceptual rationality that necessitates transformation at the level of 
practical existence … in other words I would insist on the need to preserve the 
autonomy of rationality as something that allows you to intervene, to cut in the 
continuity (emphasis added).649  
 
The motivation for Brassier's metaphysical critique of Land lies in a second set of objections 
which are primarily political. In Nihil Unbound, Brassier presents a staunchly nihilistic 
                                                 
648 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
2010) available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
649 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
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philosophy:  
 
But to acknowledge this truth, the subject of philosophy must also recognize that he or 
she is already dead, and that philosophy is neither a medium of affirmation nor a 
source of justification, but rather the organon of extinction.650  
 
Yet in the Accelerationism conference, Brassier is unwilling to accept Land's empty teleology 
of absolute intensification of the primary process for its own sake, no matter where this road 
leads. Brassier's true objection is that Land's philosophy is politically and not logically 
dangerous. Brassier reads Land as having no strategic goal in his accelerationism, but only a 
tactical one (we must accelerate, but not to any destination). These tactics can be 
commandeered by the 'wrong' political forces and as such, Land's philosophy is to be rejected 
(in fact, Land does have a strategic goal, which is the maximisation of intelligence, which he 
defines as extropy). Land claims that all philosophy works in this manner, and that its goal is 
to reify or shore up the intuitions or political principles which the philosopher in question 
holds before they begin to conduct their 'metaphysics'. To follow the route of libidinal 
materialism or Landian schizoanalysis requires the abandonment of all ethical, political or 
aesthetic prejudgements, as its radical anti-anthropomorphism is incompatible with any pre-
established positions.  
 
If Brassier attacks Land for his metaphysical commitments it is because he is not comfortable 
with the politics they entail. In turn, Land believes that his former allies in the CCRU who are 
committed to leftist or radical politics are guilty of 'philosophical conservatism'. Brassier 
states that: 
 
I once had a conversation with [Land], which consisted of a disagreement whereby he 
insisted I kept translating what he took to be pragmatic issues, issues of what he called 
“machinic practice”, into conceptual issues. He accused me of philosophical 
conservatism, by insisting on translating what he took to be the pragmatic back into 
the theoretical. But I want to insist that this is necessary, because this “machinic 
                                                 
650 Brassier, R. Nihil Unbound (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) p.239 
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practicism” that Land insisted on leads to a kind of practical impotence.651 
 
In 'Critique of Transcendental Miserablism' Land characterises this split from his perspective, 
in which former friends on the left are tied to a theoretically and practically impotent defence 
of the status quo, whilst Land's pro-capitalist acceleration aims at newness and innovation. In 
practice, the former has achieved nothing, whilst the latter – most notably in Land's analysis 
in “Neo-China” – has been the most liberating moment in history. Nevertheless, the 
abandonment of one's self to the flow of acceleration is not an easy thing to acquiesce to. 
Land's position is a mixture of fatalism – it will happen, so why not get there as quickly as 
possible – and predictive optimism based on the benefits that accelerative modernity has 
already brought. Again, we see the impoirtance of Gibson's Neuromancer, which depicts the 
liberation of Wintermute, an Artificial Intelligence (AI). When the human protagonist, Chase, 
has to make the precipitous decision to free Wintermute he conceives it as a leap into the new:  
 
`Give us the fucking code,' he said. `If you don't, what'll change? What'll ever fucking 
change for you? You'll wind up like the old man. You'll tear it all down and start 
building again! You'll build the walls back, tighter and tighter... I got no idea at all 
what'll happen if Wintermute wins, but it'll change something!' He was shaking, his 
teeth chattering.652 
 
This mirrors the decision at the heart of Land's philosophy. In this era of accelerating 
technological change philosophy creates a false dichotomy between controlled change and 
uncontrolled change, whereas, for Land, the real dichotomy is between resisting change and 
accepting it. The impersonal forces of the outside irrupting at the moment: cryptocurrency, AI 
and singularity, demographic collapse, the death of the Westphalian state system, crises of 
capitalism, all are beyond the ability of humanity to steer. What remains is a binary choice to 
resist, or to progress. Resistance is always undertaken by the human subject in defence of 
what it knows, and is therefore fundamentally conservative, hence Land's critique of 
Brassier's retreat into 'conceptual issues' as leading to philosophical conservatism.  
                                                 
651 Brassier, R. 'Accelerationism' from Accelerationism, (Goldsmiths College: London, 14 September 
2010) available at https://moskvax.wordpress.com/2010/09/30/accelerationism-ray-brassier/ 
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What is Left for Philosophy? 
 
The present thesis has followed two lines of inquiry: (1) investigating Land's abandonment of 
traditional metaphysics, and the extent to which this departure succeeds; and (2) evaluating 
Land's depiction of the primary process.  
 
Regarding the departure from traditional metaphysics, Land's argument as traced in the 
present thesis does aim at the primary process rather than the secondary; toward material 
rather than ideas. However, Land's approach cannot be said to be entirely separate from a 
metaphysical one, and there is a sustained interrogation-of and situation-in-relation-to the 
history of philosophy in all of his texts. Land's objective, the disruption of 
anthropocentricism, can be achieved using a wide variety of philosophical approaches, and 
there are strands of his thought that take a more involved position in metaphysics than the 
construction of machinic-desire does. Yet stratification of philosophy is possible, and though 
neither the present thesis nor Land's work can be said to rest wholly in one side of the 
dichotomy below, the former has shown how doggedly the latter tries to operate in an 
impersonal and anti-anthropocentric register:  
 
However else it is possible to divide Western thinking, one fissure can be teased-open 
separating the theo-humanists—croaking together in the cramped and malodorous 
pond of Anthropos—from the wild beasts of the impersonal. The former are 
characterized by their moral fervour, parochialism, earnestness, phenomenological 
disposition, and sympathy for folk superstition, the latter by their fatalism, atheism, 
strangely reptilian exuberance, and extreme sensitivity for what is icy, savage, and 
alien to mankind.653 
 
It could be argued that, if Deleuze's Difference and Repetition is a superior starting point for 
an anti-anthropocentric philosophy, Ansell-Pearson's approach in Germinal Life, which 
reconstitutes a metaphysical account of pre-cognitive production, would also be superior. The 
present thesis however, while having not engaged closely with that text, notes the problems of 
                                                 
653 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) pp. 97-98 
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utilising the methodologies and lexicon of the metaphysical, which is saturated with anthropic 
concepts, as the starting point for a critique of metaphysics.654 Such a starting point leads to 
the regressions and circularities – 'aren't you using ideas to critique ideas' – that short-circuit 
metaphysical attempts to access base-material. This point is illustrated by the various strands 
of speculative realism, which share the same basic instinct as Land, which is to try and access 
the thing-in-itself (or at least to go beyond Kantian correlationism). Despite the amount of 
effort which has gone into the various sub-positions in that wider project, all are all-too-
readily cut down by the 'scissor-paper-stones' of objections such as the impossibility of 
knowing the by-definition-unknowable noumenon.  
 
Another common objection to the Landian position outlined in the present thesis attacks his 
apparently teleological view of there being ‘a future’ that we are moving towards. Land’s 
celebration of apocalyptic capitalism and techno-modernity appears to be a statement of 
preference, and invites the accusation that it is merely another – and even worse, an 
anthropocentric - humanist viewpoint. This objection is made by Ansell-Pearson throughout 
Viroid Life, which, though it never mentions Land by name, appears to be a sustained 
interrogation of the basis of Land’s reading of Nietzsche.655 However, there is, again, a 
defence of the Landian position which can be made, which considers that such critique is 
stuck in a philosophical perspective which tends to the attribution of values everywhere – a 
problem identified by Nietzsche – and not the cyberneticist position Land attempts to occupy. 
We might ask if there truly is a teleology in Land’s work, or if this is rather a teleonomy? The 
difference between the two, again, maps on to a concern with the real rather than the ideal. 
Teleonomy identifies ends in terms of evolved causes rather than ideas, and rather than being 
representational – an interpretation of the state of things – it has narrower criteria for being 
true or false, again, in these sense of whether it accurately represents a state of production that 
causes later production.  
                                                 
654 As discussed throughout Bryant, L. Difference and Givenness (Northwestern: USA, 2008) 
655  Though Land is not mentioned explicitly, ‘cybernetic theorists’ are the antagonists of the work. 
Furthermore, there are mentions of ‘the virtual future not arriving’ and other references, which seem to 
directly indicate Land is the interlocutor being addressed. Ansell-Pearson’s attack on ‘cyberneticists’, which 
is to some extent isomorphic with that of Mullarkey explored in Chapter 3, is a subject that is ripe for further 
investigation.  
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Land's attempt to measure desiring-production offers a way out of this impasse. Though 
“Kant's transcendental subject gives the law to itself in its autonomy, Deleuze/Guattari's 
machinic unconscious diffuses all law into automatism” and this automatic production offers 
more reliable data about reality than the laws of the subject.656 If these automatic productions, 
and the rules which condition them can be determined, this post-psychoanalytic method is 
superior to a metaphysical one. Land certainly notes the problems created by the traditional 
agents of metaphysical thought, the academy. Academia is a social institution rather than a 
journey towards pure Intelligence, and as it works for the social-body, it works to preserve the 
same by repressing positive feedback: “For philosophy is a machine which transforms the 
prospect of thought into excitation; a generator. ‘Why is this so hard to see?’ one foolishly 
asks. The answer quickly dawns: the scholars.”657 One can see the causes of this Landian 
disposition towards the university in his reception at the Virtual Futures conference, in which 
scholar after scholar lined up to decry to Land that he was going against their pre-determined, 
anthropic ideas.  
 
Conversely, we might ask what does philosophy think of Land? Generally his work is seen as 
a failed attempt; indeed, an impossible attempt, because thought, no matter how wild a 
polemic it builds, and no matter how much or how desperately it searched for the outside, was 
never going to succeed in accessing the inaccessible. But did Land ever say it would?  
 
What I offer is a web of half-choked ravings that vaunts its incompetence, exploiting 
the meticulous conceptual fabrications of positive knowledge as a resource for 
delirium, appealing only to the indolent, the maladapted, and the psychologically 
diseased.658 
 
Yet despite such ironic statements, is Land truly arguing against philosophy? Is he rather not 
standing alongside it, laughing at its self-obsessions and circularity whilst he announces the 
                                                 
656 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 322 
657 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 35 
658 Land, N. The Thirst for Annihilation (London and New York: Routledge, 1992) p. 37 
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forthcoming deluge of cybernetic production: “When you tell them Sphinx lets you play with 
her K-40 what are they to make of it? Where's the argument? (With a K-40 you don't need to 
argue, and they're not yet smart enough to argue with you.)”659 Land certainly seems 
confounded that philosophy simply cannot see what is happening in the real, in base-matter. 
The phase-changes modernity is approaching will wreck the anthropic complacency of the 
humanist position, but no one seems concerned: 
 
It might still be a few decades before artificial intelligences surpass the horizon of 
biological ones, but it is utterly superstitious to imagine that the human dominion of 
terrestrial culture is still marked out in centuries, let alone in some metaphysical 
perpetuity.660 
 
Ultimately, Land's thought does not ask to be evaluated according to the mores of modern 
academic philosophy, but for its predictive ability and its correspondence to reality. In 
metaphysics, arguments are analysed, deconstructed, and run through formal logic; they have 
their premises checked, and we search for assumptions or undefined terms which might 
invalidate them. But when someone tells you that your new car will last longer than you will, 
is the best approach to investigate what they mean by 'car'? A proposition about productive 
desire needs to be tested rather than parsed. Though it has been supported here by a rigorous 
depiction of the micro-operation of desire and its foundation in psychoanalysis, perhaps 
Land's thought is most clearly apprehended at a cosmic scale, as an attempt to reconcile 
philosophy and thermodynamics: 
 
Modernity discovers irreversible time conceived as a progressive enlightenment 
tracking capital concentration integrating it into nineteenth century science as entropy 
production, and as its inverse (evolution).661 
 
In this age of electronics progressing by Moore's Law, with markets blooming and 
intensifying all over the globe, we are certainly hitting the accelerative velocities which Land 
                                                 
659 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 427 
660 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 293 
661 Land, N. Fanged Noumena (Falmouth and New York: Urbanomic, 2011) p. 351 
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warns us about. If things continue as they are, his work might be proved to be accurate on a 
far shorter time line than the discipline of philosophy usually requires to incorporate the work 
of any thinker into its canon. Intelligence is always there, working away in base matter, doing 
what thought cannot, and will not: 
 
'Intellectual intuition' is the anticipation of intelligence explosion within the Occidental 
philosophical tradition. ... Strip away the phenomenological confusion, which Kant 
was already prey to, and it describes productive self-apprehension of intelligence. .. 
The theological barrier to the closure of this loop has been diagnosed by Mou Zongsan 
as the distinctive trait of the Western tradition... Intellectual intuition belongs only to 
God, Asiatic mysticism, or robots. It's the cognitive reaction pile with graphite rods 
pulled out.662  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
662 Land, N. at @UF_Blog on Twitter.com at 2:58 AM - 20 July 2015 ( available at 
https://twitter.com/UF_blog/status/623069381975674880 ) 
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